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Preface 
On December 11, 2006 mrs. X. Li was awarded a Ph.D. cum laude by the Uni-
versity of Groningen (the Netherlands) for this thesis A Comparative study of 
shareholders' derivative actions, supervised by Professors dr. L. Timmerman and 
dr. M.L. Lennarts. It is with great pleasure that I present this Ph.D. dissertation in 
the series of the Institute for Company Law of the University of Groningen, the 
Netherlands. 
The main objective of the study of Xiaoning Li is to provide insight in the 
nature, ( dis )advantages and functioning of derivative shareholder litigation. In 
several countries derivative suits are a notable constraint on director mismanage-
ment. Derivative litigation by shareholders is an important issue in the ongoing 
debate on principles of corporate governance and protection of minority share-
holders. To prevent abuse, however, derivate suits are often limited by a variety of 
procedural and substantive restrictions. 
This study is comprised of six chapters. After a general introduction ( chapter 
1 ), Xiaoning Li analyses the law of derivative actions in three Western countries: 
England (chapter 2), the United States (chapter 3) and Germany (chapter 4). 
Derivative suits in these countries have their own characteristic features. Chapter 
5 studies the law of the People's Republic of China. This study illustrates that in 
the field of company law very important developments took place in the last 
years. As from January 1, 2006, a broadly amended new Company Law came into 
force, meeting the needs of China as a rising economic superpower. The 
development of derivative suits in China, which has a civil law tradition, is worth 
noting. In the final chapter ( chapter 6) Xiaoning Li concludes that the issue of 
how to strike a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the 
company and its minority shareholders is key in derivative actions. 
This excellent study provides a thorough, comparative analysis of the 
techniques of derivative actions. I have no doubt this book will contribute to the 
better understanding of derivative litigation and that it will be welcomed by legal 
professionals and scholars all over the world as a valuable resource. 
Prof d1'. Jan Berend Wezeman 
Institute for Company Law of the University of Groningen, the Netherlands 
V 

' ... no single technique of accountability (including market and legal 
remedies) is likely to be optimal under all circumstances. Each has its 
characteristic and well-known limitations, and, as a result, shareholders are 
best served by an overlapping system of protection.' 
(American Law Institute, Principles of Cmporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations (II), St Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute 
Publishers, 1994, part VII, chapter 1, Introductory Note, p. 5) 
'The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of 
functionality. From this basic principle stem all the other rules which 
determine the choice of laws to compare, the scope of the undertaking, the 
creation of a system of comparative law, and so on. Incomparables cannot 
usefully be compared, and in law the only things which are comparable are 
those which fulfil the same function.' 
(K. Zweigert & H. Kotz, translated by Tony Weir, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law (third Edition), Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1998), p. 34) 
VII 

Pref ace from the author 
Company law, including the law on shareholders' derivative action, has experien-
ced significant changes in many countries since I started writing this book. For 
example, the new German law for stock companies (the UMAG) has come into 
effect as of November 2005, China has also widely amended its own company 
law, which came into force as of January 2006, and a new British Companies Bill 
will also soon come out. These changes actually have made my research far more 
interesting than I would have expected. 
Over these past years I have always been asked why I chose to conduct my re-
search in the Netherlands, which does not have the technique of shareholders' 
derivative action and is not a subject of my research. Yes, it might sound strange. 
In fact, it was more a matter of coincidence that I came to the Netherlands, a 
beautiful small country. But it has turned out to be the best choice I could have 
made. Although there is no derivative action in Dutch company law, there have 
been arguments both for and against introducing it into the Netherlands. These 
arguments have inspired the Dutch to study the derivative action from different 
points of view and to take a more objective attitude towards it. In addition, the 
Dutch have also been interested in observing law and its application in various 
countries in addition to their own law. This diversity of viewpoint, together with 
the language talents of the Dutch, has significantly contributed to my comparative 
research. 
Litigation is also a social phenomenon. It is influenced by factors such as legal 
tradition and culture. These influences would be a topic for a totally different area 
of research, so I will not, nor am I able to, touch upon them here. Nevertheless, 
this aspect of comparative research may provide an interesting subject for further 
study in this field. 
English law tends to use the term 'company,' while American law 'corporation.' 
Therefore, 'company' and 'corporation' are used alternately in this book. 
Xiaoning Li 
October 2006 
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Introduction 
I. I The nature of derivative action 
I.I.I The proper plaintiff principle 
When harm has been done to a company ( corporate injury or corporate wrong), 
the general principle is that an action against such misconduct should be pursued 
by the company and that damages should also be awarded to that company. This 
is called the proper plaintiff principle. Other persons, such as individual share-
holders or creditors, cannot bring an action to redress this misconduct even though 
their interests may also be indirectly infringed by that misconduct. To give an 
example: the shareholders' interests could be indirectly injured because the value 
of their shares decrease due to the corporate losses, and the creditors' interests 
could also be infringed if the loss suffered by the company is so great that the 
company goes bankrupt and is not able to repay the debts owed to them. 
There are several justifications for this general proper plaintiff principle. First, a 
company is a legal entity distinct from its stakeholders and has its own legal 
capacity for enjoying legal rights and taking legal responsibility. Although this 
separate legal entity is only a fiction created by law, it is a cornerstone of modern 
company law. A company can pursue an action in its own name when its interests 
have been injured, just as it can do business in its own name. Second, in a 
corporate action where the remedies, if allowed, are awarded to the company, the 
interests of all stakeholders, including creditors and shareholders, can be 
indirectly protected. However, if an individual shareholder brings a direct action 
on his own behalf, only that plaintiff shareholder will benefit from the action. 
Third, it is submitted that it should be up to the company, through appropriate 
bodies such as the board of directors, rather than an individual shareholder to 
decide whether an action is in the best interests of the company because these 
bodies have greater knowledge of the company's management and are themselves 
more professional. Finally, the requirement that an action can only be brought by 




The nature of derivative action 
The derivative action as an exception to the proper plaintiff 
principle 
According to the proper plaintiff principle, the injured company should decide 
whether to bring an action against the wrong done to it. However, since it is not a 
natural person, the company has to make such a decision via an appropriate body. 
Normally a decision as to whether to bring a corporate action is in essence a 
business one and so is generally made by the board of directors. Where there is 
corporate wrong, the board of directors has the discretion to make a litigation 
decision based on its business judgment. The board can decide not to pursue an 
action against the wrongdoer if it thinks the company will not benefit from such 
an action. However, under certain circumstances the board cannot make a fair 
litigation decision. For example, when the directors are the wrongdoers 
committing corporate misconduct or are conh·olled by these wrongdoers, they 
may prevent the company from filing an action against this misconduct. Thus, in 
order to redress the damage to the company, other bodies or persons other than 
the board of directors must have the right or power to make a litigation decision 
based on the best interests of the company under such circumstances. How to 
identify such an appropriate body becomes a difficult issue in company law. 
Practice shows that several strategies, such as the decision-making strategy and 
the trusteeship strategy, have been gradually developed in various countries. 1 
Under the decision-making strategy, shareholders may enforce corporate claims 
collectively through the general meeting or a group of shareholders (such as 
disinterested shareholders); while under the trusteeship strategy, internal trustees 
such as the supervisory board, the independent directors or a special litigation 
committee, or external trustees such as the court or court-appointed special 
representatives, may decide whether to enforce corporate claims or allow such 
claims. Nevertheless, since each strategy has its own deficiencies2, there is still 
no single right answer to this difficult issue. The comparative study in this book 
will show how various countries have tried to solve this issue. 
The derivative action is one of these sh·ategies, one that developed rather early in 
common law countries: a shareholder or several shareholders may, under certain 
circumstances, sue on behalf of the company in respect to a corporate wrong 
against which no other remedy may be available. Since they are not corporate 
bodies, the plaintiff shareholders have to bring the suit in their own names. Their 
For a detailed discussiou of these strategies and their advantages and disadvantages see, for 
example, Hirt (2005a). The practice in valious countries will be discussed in the main parts of 
this book. 
2 For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Section 6.3 .2. 
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right to sue actually derives from the company's right of action and therefore the 
action is named derivative action. Thus, the derivative action is an exception to 
the proper plaintiff principle. The very fact that it is an exception determines that 
the derivative action can only be applied in limited circumstances. Although there 
are other limitations, basically no derivative action may be brought if the board of 
directors can make its own litigation decision in good faith; minority shareholders 
can only challenge the board's decision where the board has not been able to 
perform its duty correctly. Therefore, derivative action is basically a method by 
which shareholders hold directors, officers and other fiduciaries accountable. 
1.1.2.2 The nature of 'derivative' and 'representative' 
The shareholder's right to derivative actions derives from the company's right to 
action. It is distinguished from a shareholder's 'direct action' which the share-
holder can bring where his own right has been infringed. 3 In derivative actions, 
although it is the shareholders who indirectly suffer the loss, this indirect loss 
cannot be the cause of action.4 
Apart from the nature of 'derivative,' the derivative action also has a 're-
presentative' character. It is an action brought by the plaintiff on behalf of the 
injured company which has wrongfully failed to redress a corporate wrong. In 
such cases, even if the plaintiff is the only shareholder and thus the only one who 
has indirectly suffered from the misconduct, he still needs to bring the action in 
terms of representing the injured company. On the other hand, in most derivative 
action cases there is more than one shareholder in the injured company and not 
all of them are plaintiffs in the suit. Like the plaintiff shareholder, all non-plaintiff 
shareholders will be indirectly influenced by the result of the suit. In this sense, 
the plaintiff shareholder bringing the derivative action also represents all other 
shareholders. However, this representative nature of derivative actions should not 
be confused with representative actions or class actions because the latter two 
kinds of action are still direct actions: shareholders bring representative actions or 
class actions because their personal interests have been infringed upon. 
Due to the 'derivative' and 'representative' nature of the derivative action, the 
proceeds of the action, if any, must go to the company rather than to the plaintiff 
shareholder.5 The successful or good faith plaintiff should, however, also be 
reimbursed for the expenses incurred in the suit. Once any judgment or settlement 
comes into effect, neither the company nor other shareholders can bring an action 
based on the same claims that have already been raised in this derivative action. 
3 I will discuss the distinction between direct action and derivative action in detail later. 
4 For a further discussion of this issue and the latest legal developments, see Ferran (2001). 
5 In US law there are exceptions; see Section 3.3.4. 
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1.2 Justifications for derivative action 
1.2.1 Derivative action justified by its function 
As mentioned above, derivative actions have been developed because in some 
circumstances the injured companies cannot seek relief themselves. Redressing 
corporate wrongs which no other mechanisms can remedy is a fundamental 
justification for the existence of derivative actions. Through a derivative action, 
the injured company can acquire compensation which it might not have acquired 
if the board failed to bring an action in the name of the company. As a result, the 
interests of the injured company and its shareholders are protected. 
Derivative actions also have the functions of deterrence and education. 6 By 
providing sanctions the derivative action not only has a deterrent role, affecting 
the future behavior of the wrongdoers, but also acts as a general deterrent against 
all corporate mismanagement. This deterrent role is more effective if social 
disgrace is attached to the wrongdoers. 
Although other mechanisms, such as market mechanisms, can also police corpo-
rate management and play the same role as compensation and deterrence, the 
derivative action has its own advantages. It provides judicial oversight that is 
generally regarded as fair and just, although it is costly and time-consuming. 7 It 
also has the advantage that a single shareholder or a group of shareholders can 
trigger the procedure to protect the company's interests, avoiding the trouble of 
taking collective or coordinated action. 8 Although there is the risk of derivative 
action being abused by shareholders, it does provide shareholders with the op-
portunity to seek redress that might not be obtained otherwise. These advantages, 
although coupled with disadvantages9, justify the role of derivative action in 
protecting companies and minority shareholders' interests and in policing 
corporate management, provided that the derivative action is well devised. 
1.2.2 Derivative action justified from an economic perspective 
Justifications for derivative action can also be made from an economic perspec-
tive. 1° First, the derivative action may reduce average agency costs. Although 
other mechanisms, such as contracting, market signaling, monitoring devices, and 
the market threatening the removal of the directors, may reduce agency costs, they 
are only efficient if the marginal costs do not exceed the marginal benefits. 11 As 
6 See ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter l, Reporter's Note, p. 12. 
7 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, p. 5. 
8 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, p. 5. 
9 I will discuss the disadvantages of the derivative action in Section 1.3. 
10 See ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Reporter's Note, pp. 14-16; Cox et al. (2001), pp. 15.2-15.12. 
However, Fischel and Bradley do not agree with the economic justifications; see Fischel & 
Bradley (1986), pp. 288-292. 
11 Cox et al. (2001), pp. 15.3-15.5. 
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a result, they might not be capable of disciplining all misconduct. The derivative 
action, however, when carefully regulated, can provide a better solution in some 
circumstances. Since in a derivative action the plaintiff's attorney is a specialist 
and shareholders' collective action is normally unnecessary, the derivative action 
is an efficient method for compensating the injured company and deterring 
misbehavior, especially so-called 'one shot' breaches of duties, which may not be 
effectively policed by other mechanisms. 12 Second, the derivative action is 
justified by the portfolio theory. Because derivative action has a general deterrent 
role, affecting all corporate management, and because most shareholders hold a 
portfolio of securities, the shareholders will benefit from the collateral effect of a 
derivative action due to their holding of shares in other companies. 13 Although the 
shareholders might suffer a loss in that specific company if the costs of the 
derivative action exceed the recovery it obtains, this loss might turn out to be less, 
due to the benefit they acquire from those other companies. 
1.3 Disadvantages of derivative action 
1.3.1 Risk of unjust interference in corporate management 
Derivative action is deemed to have some problems due to its very nature. The 
individual shareholder's right to bring a derivative action may interfere with 
corporate management. This can happen when a derivative action is abused by a 
malicious shareholder for its nuisance or settlement value. 14 A derivative action 
brought by a bona fide shareholder can also interfere with corporate management. 
Since an individual shareholder normally knows little about the management of 
the company and may not be an expert on business matters, he may bring a non-
meritorious action. As a result, preventing corporate management from being 
unduly interrupted by unnecessary derivative actions is a major issue faced by 
legislators. It is also a major issue I will be discussing in this book. 
1.3.2 The plaintiff's weak incentive 
Another problem with the derivative action is the weak incentive for the plaintiff 
shareholder to pursue a derivative action for the benefit of the company. Since the 
recovery in a derivative action will go to the company, the plaintiff shareholder 
benefits little from the consequences of the litigation. On the one hand, if the 
plaintiff wins the action, the damages will be awarded to the company and the 
12 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Reporter's Note, pp. 15-16. 
13 I have to admit, however, that it is almost impossible to calculate this benefit. 
14 Abuse of derivative action for its settlement value is especially common in the US. In the US, 
the derivative action is usually controlled by the plaintiff's attorney. The plaintiff's attorney is 
likely to make a settlement for his own benefit rather than the company's benefit. For details, 
see Section 3.4.4.3. 
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plaintiff shareholder will only indirectly benefit through the shares he owns. This 
indirect benefit is usually small and not obvious, especially when the plaintiff 
shareholder only owns a very small percentage of the shares of the company. 15 On 
the other hand, if the plaintiff loses the case, he may end up bearing little of the 
costs; the company may well reimburse him for his litigation costs. 16 Because of 
his small stake in the company, an individual shareholder has very little incentive 
to pursue the derivative action simply in the best interests of the company. 
This weak incentive can have two different consequences. On the one hand, 
there might be very few derivative actions brought by shareholders. Since 
shareholders will not benefit from the action, usually they do not bother to bring 
one. This is especially possible in public companies where the minority 
shareholders usually have the free-ride problem. This lack of incentive for the 
minority shareholder to bring a derivative action is also called the under-incentive 
problem. On the other hand, the derivative action might be driven by plaintiff 
shareholders and/or their attorneys in their own interests, regardless of the 
interests of the company and other shareholders. This is known as the over-
incentive problem. For example, in the US, derivative actions are mostly lawyer 
driven. In most cases, the lawyer's interests are by no means congruent with the 
plaintiff's and the company's interests. The attorney's interest lies in the amount 
of money received less the costs spent on the case, including both time and 
money. This is not necessarily proportionate to the recovery awarded to the 
company. 17 In practice, the attorney's interest is usually better served by 
settlement, which can provide a relatively high attorney fee with lower costs due 
to the reduced work involved in preparing the case and taking it to trial, and also 
because in a settlement the attorney never incurs a risk of losing, while in a trial 
he does. If he loses the case, he will get nothing for his work. 18 Both of these 
consequences may hinder the functioning of derivative action: the injured 
company may not be compensated and the abuse of the derivative action weakens 
the deterrent role of derivative action. 
15 This is the normal case in derivative actions, especially in the case of public companies. On the 
one hand, because there is normally no legal requirement for the plaintiff shareholder to have 
a minimum percentage of shares, except in some continental European countries such as 
Germany, any shareholder who satisfies the requirements of bringing a derivative action can 
do so, even if he only owns one nominal share. Even in Germany where there is a capital 
threshold, the capital threshold is not very high in the sense of the percentage of the shares. On 
the other hand, normally a majority shareholder who might have more financial interest will 
not bring a derivative action as there are better ways of policing management, such as by 
removing the directors. 
I 6 The costs the plaintiff shareholder needs to pay vary in various countries. For details on this 
issue, see Sections 2.41.4, 3.4.4, 4.4.1.4, 4.4.2.2.3, and 5.4.4. 
17 Cox (1999), p. 33. 
18 This is also the reason why the rate of settlement is so high in American derivative action cases. 
6 
For the evidence of this high rate of settlement, see the empirical studies which have been done 
in the US. 
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1.3.3 Problems of cmporate recove,y 
Corporate recovery also creates problems in derivative actions. For example, first, 
if the wrongdoer still controls the company after the suit, the recovery awarded to 
the company will still be under the control of the wrongdoer who could engage 
in misconduct again. This is especially possible when the wrongdoer is the 
majority shareholder, because a majority shareholder cannot be removed as easily 
as a director. Second, if the wrongdoer is also a shareholder in the damaged 
company and still holds the shares after the action, he, like any other shareholder 
in the company, will also pro rata benefit from the action indirectly. This is 
contradictory to the rationale that compensation should not go to the wrongdoer, 
and, of course, the role of derivative action in deterring the wrongdoer will be 
greatly reduced as well. Third, a corporate recovery may bring about a windfall 
for some shareholders, especially shareholders in publicly traded companies. In 
publicly traded companies, ownership of shares constantly changes and there are 
at least two groups of shareholders: one group who bought their shares before the 
misconduct was disclosed and continues to hold the stock at a loss, and another 
group who bought the shares after the disclosure at a deeply discounted price. 19 
This latter group of shareholders may benefit from a windfall: normally they have 
suffered no loss due to the disclosure of the misconduct, but they will nonetheless 
benefit from the derivative action in proportion to the shares they own because a 
corporate recovery has been awarded in the derivative action and no distinction 
can be made among different groups of shareholders. 
1.4 The role of derivative action 
1.4.1 Co,porate governance as a comprehensive system 
It is generally recognized that in order to improve corporate governance, a 
plurality of mechanisms has to be developed, and the derivative action is only one 
of the mechanisms protecting the interests of companies and shareholders and 
policing corporate management. 20 '[C]orporate governance is a system. It has its 
foundations partly in company law, setting out the internal relationships between 
the various participants in a company, and partly in the wider laws and practices 
and market structures .. .' .21 In this system, the mechanisms improving corporate 
governance include both ex ante methods, which prevent misconduct and reduce 
19 There is also a group of former shareholders who bought their shares before the misconduct 
was disclosed but who sold right after the disclosure at a deeply discounted price. Since they 
are no longer shareholders they are unable to benefit from the derivative action against the 
misconduct. Thus, their loss may not be compensated unless they can satisfy the requirements 
for bringing a direct action and be compensated that way. 
20 For example, see ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, p. 5. 
21 Winter Report (2002), p. 44. 
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agency cost22 , and ex post remedies, which compensate the injured party and hold 
the wrongdoers accountable.23 None of the mechanisms are likely to be optimal 
under all circumstances since 'each has its characteristic and well-known 
limitations.' 24 Derivative action is only one kind of ex post legal remedy, and 
perhaps the last resort for shareholders both because of the expense in terms of 
time and money incumbent on lawsuits and because of the particular 
disadvantages of derivative actions, which we have already discussed above. The 
English Law Commission also states that 'Prevention is better than cure.'25 
1.4.2 Different approaches towards the role of derivative action 
Although it is commonly recognized that an overlapping system should be 
developed, there may be differing opinions concerning the role or status of any 
one particular mechanism. It could be maintained that every mechanism is as 
important as any other. It could also be maintained that some mechanisms work 
more effectively and efficiently than do others and so perform a more important 
role. The first assumption is hardly ever held since it is almost impossible for all 
the different mechanisms to perform the same role in varying situations. Thus, the 
main controversy lies in the role played by each mechanism. 
The same controversy has arisen with derivative actions. Basically, there are three 
different approaches towards the role of the derivative action. One is that the 
derivative action is 'the chief regulator of corporate management,' 26 while 
another approach considers it as 'neither the initial nor the primary protection for 
shareholders against managerial misconduct,' 27 and, finally, a third approach 
finds that derivative action scarcely serves any role at all.28 
In practice, though, the derivative action does perform different functions in 
various situations. The role of the derivative action varies according to country. 
For example, in the United States the derivative action plays an important role29, 
while in England in actual practice the derivative action is much less important 
22 Other mechanisms include, for example, shareholders' rights of voice and exit, the requirement 
of disclosure, the existence of independent directors and auditors, market forces and public 
enforcement. 
23 For example, removal of directors, exit right of shareholders, the disciplinaiy power of the 
market such as takeovers, legal suits and public enforcement. 
24 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, p. 5. 
25 See Law Commission Report 246 (1997), executive summary, p. 6. 
26 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 337 US 541, 548, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1226 (1949). 
27 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter l, Introductory Note, p. 5. The English Law Commission also held 
that the derivative action was "not common but . . . an important mechanism of shareholder 
control of corporate wrongs," see Law Commission Report 246 (1997), executive summary, p. 5. 
28 For example, in the UK there was a body of opinion which held that the derivative action was 
of little use in practice and that there was no need to reform it. See Law Commission Report 
246 (1997), para. 6.10. 
29 See Section 3.2. 
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than other remedies such as the unfair prejudice petition.30 In Germany also, the 
minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims does not play an 
important role in protecting the company's and the minority shareholders' 
interests. 31 The derivative action also plays a different role in different types of 
companies. This also varies in different countries. In England, the derivative 
action is not regarded as a major method for protecting minority shareholders in 
public companies. In the United States, on the contrary, derivative actions are 
frequently brought against wrongdoers in public companies. In Germany, the 
derivative action only applies to stock corporations. These different approaches 
may show the relationship between the derivative action and other methods of 
protection: the more effective other methods are, the less important a role the 
derivative action may play. The derivative action is only the 'last resort' for 
minority shareholders. Nevertheless, recent reforms in many countries through-
out the world show a convergence towards an intermediate approach: the de-
rivative action is necessary to protect the company and shareholders, but there 
must also be restrictions on the application of this mechanism in order to balance 
corporate efficiency with protection of the company and shareholders. 
1. 4. 3 Factors affecting the fimction of derivative action 
Many considerations, besides those based on the advantages and disadvantages of 
the derivative action, affect legislative and judicial attitudes towards the derivative 
action. First, the policy consideration aimed at balancing corporate efficiency 
with company/shareholder protection will affect the approach taken towards the 
role of derivative action. If the balance favors corporate management, normally 
the derivative action will play a less important role, while if the balance favors 
company/shareholder protection, there will be a more important role for the 
derivative action. Furthermore, the balance will tilt according to several factors. 
For example, if the market is notorious for poor investor protection, the balance 
may tend to favor shareholder protection. In contrast, when economic growth is 
the major concern, the balance may tend to favor corporate management. 
Second, the attitude towards the issue of which is the appropriate body to make a 
litigation decision in the best interests of the company where the board of 
directors has a conflict of interest will also affect the role of derivative actions. If 
other bodies such as the independent directors or independent shareholders are 
regarded as being more appropriate than an individual shareholder for making 
such a decision, the individual shareholder's right to bring a derivative action will 
be subject to the decision of such bodies. As a result, the derivative action will 
play a less important role. 
30 See Law Commission Report 246 (1997), executive summary, p. 3. 
31 See Section 4.2. 
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The third factor is whether the derivative action is aimed at protecting minority 
shareholders' interests or the company's interests as a whole. Although it is 
pursued to redress a corporate wrong, traditionally the derivative action is 
regarded as an important mechanism for protecting minority shareholders' 
interests. The reason is that the ultimate purpose in protecting companies' 
interests is to protect company stakeholders' interests, which are primarily the 
interests of shareholders and creditors. However, it is not the creditors' interests 
which are primarily protected by the derivative action, because the creditors' 
interests will not be infringed as long as the injured company is not bankrupt. In 
addition, if the company is bankrupt, the principle that· creditors have a prior 
claim to the corporate assets over shareholders under bankruptcy law provides a 
further major protection for creditors. As a result, in most counh·ies, creditors are 
not allowed to pursue a derivative action where the company is still solvent. As 
far as majority shareholders are concerned, it is not necessary for them to pursue 
derivative actions because normally they control the general meeting of 
shareholders and sometimes also the board of the directors. They are thus able to 
redress any misconduct by other methods such as removing the wrongdoers, if 
they themselves are not the wrongdoers. As a result, protecting minority share-
holders is the main concern of the derivative action. 
Although as far as the result of derivative action is concerned there is no dif-
ference between protecting companies and minority shareholders in most cases, 
the issue of whose interests are going to be protected does affect the role of 
derivative actions. If the purpose of the derivative action is to protect the 
company's interests rather than merely the interests of shareholders, a derivative 
action should be brought and the remedy should be awarded to the company as 
long as there is a corporate wrong. However, if the purpose is to protect minority 
shareholders even in cases of corporate wrong, all remedies that can redress the 
aggrieved shareholders will be regarded as sufficient even if they may not 
compensate the injured company. For the aggrieved shareholders, however, 
compensation may not be the only remedy; other remedies such as an exit right 
may also provide relief for them, especially in private companies. Therefore, more 
favorable alternative mechanisms may be available and so the derivative action 
may end up playing a less important role. For example, in England the unfair 
prejudice remedy plays a more important role than the derivative action, and to 
some extent it substitutes for the derivative action. Minority shareholders can 
bring an unfair prejudice petition in the case of a corporate wrong if they can 
prove that they are suffering unfair prejudice, and the most common remedies in 
these cases are 'purchase out.' Therefore, the interests of non-petitioner share-
holders and of the injured company may be neglected in such cases. The 
underlying policy, though, is that the derivative action is intended to protect 
aggrieved minority shareholders; if other mechanisms such as the unfair pre-
judice remedy can protect the aggrieved shareholder, the derivative action may 
not be brought. Finally, if the derivative action is aimed at protecting the interests 
of the company rather than those of the minority shareholders, there may be fewer 
alternatives to the derivative action and its role thus becomes more important. 
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Fourth, the attitudes towards the relationship between the compensatory and 
deterrent functions which the derivative action serves will affect the role of the 
derivative action. Commonly there is no conflict between the two functions 
because to hold the wrongdoers accountable to the injured naturally also provides 
a deterrent effect: the liability of compensation will discourage future miscon-
duct. However, there are exceptions. Where the misconduct did not cause damage 
to the company, should a derivative action be allowed? In such cases, though no 
compensatory goal will be served because no damage has been suffered by the 
company, a deterrent function may result if there is a successful action against the 
wrongdoer. In this case, the two functions served by the derivative action conflict 
with each other. 
The attitudes towards these two conflicting functions will affect the role of the 
derivative action. For example, if compensation is the prevailing purpose behind 
derivative action, shareholders cannot bring a derivative action if there is no loss 
to the company or to the plaintiff shareholders.32 As a result, the standing criteria 
for bringing a derivative action become stricter and situations where a derivative 
action can be brought will be limited. The role of the derivative action in company 
law, especially in policing corporate management, becomes less important. On 
the other hand, if the deterrent function prevails, a derivative action will be 
allowed even if the corporate misconduct has not caused damage and therefore 
the derivative action will play a more important role in a greater number of 
situations. However, due to the danger of overdeterrence, there have to be limits 
placed on the deterrent role. How to strike an appropriate balance between these 
two functions has become a difficult issue in derivative actions. 
Fifth, the effect of the compensatory and deterrent functions and the attitudes 
towards their effect will affect the role of the derivative action. The more 
optimistic they are about the effect of these functions, the more important 
legislators think the derivative action should be. Although empirical studies have 
been conducted in order to see whether derivative actions provide compensation 
to shareholders33, the effect of the deterrent role is by its nature immeasurable by 
empirical studies. Moreover, the veracity of these empirical studies is not without 
doubt. 34 
Last but not least, the attitudes towards private enforcement and public en-
forcement will affect the role of derivative action. 35 For example, it is generally 
recognized that in the US extensive government intervention is not welcome and 
so public enforcement is not favored. As a result, in order to solve disputes, 
32 For a detailed discussion, see Section 3 .2.4.1.2.1. 
33 For example, in the US; see Section 3.2.4.2. 
34 See ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter !, Reporter's Note, p. 12. 
35 This factor needs to be proven. 
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private enforcement, including litigation, is turned to. This may at least partly 
explain why litigation, including shareholders' suits, is so popular in the US.36 On 
the other hand, if there is a greater reliance on public enforcement the role of 
litigation may be limited. An example is England, where unlike the US, extensive 
and robust public enforcement has been developed as an effective supplementary 
tool for private enforcement. 37 
1.5 Comparative study 
1.5.1 Derivative action as a generally accepted mechanism 
The essence of the derivative action lies in awarding to an individual shareholder 
or a group of minority shareholders the right to enforce corporate claims on 
behalf of the injured company in exceptional circumstances. Whether it is called 
derivative action or not, this method of protecting the interests of companies and 
shareholders has been chosen by various countries. It is a common phenomenon 
in these countries that a board may not be willing to bring an action against the 
wrongdoers where the board members themselves are the wrongdoers or where 
they are substantially under the wrongdoers' influence or have a personal interest 
in condoning the wrong or simply have personal relationships with the 
wrongdoers. As a result, the importance of protecting the interests of companies 
and shareholders has been recognized in these countries. Various methods have 
subsequently been developed to solve this problem, among them is empowering 
an individual shareholder or a group of shareholders with the right to enforce the 
corporate claim. However, due to different legal and social backgrounds, the 
specific regulations on how to enforce this right of action vary in these countries. 
For a better understanding of the derivative action, this book has chosen four 
jurisdictions for its comparative research, England, the United States, Germany 
and China.38 
36 More and more academics in the US argue that the popularity of litigation in the US is the 
logical response to the characteristic dish·ibution of power in the US and to a historical distrust 
of a powerful government, rather than plain and simple greed, see Eviatar (2002). 
37 Such as sections 432 (appointment of inspectors) and 447 (investigation of company 
documents) of The UK Companies Act, where the Secretaiy of State has extensive 
investigation and petition powers. See Kraakman et al. (2004), p. 117; Davies (2003), p. 467. 
38 Comparative research provides an important method of knowledge; see Zweigert & Kotz 




The countries chosen for the comparative study 
England39 
INTRODUCTION 
The law of derivative actions originated in English law. According to English law, 
an individual shareholder may bring a derivative action provided he satisfies the 
requirements for bringing such an action. English law, which is famous for the 
Foss rule, has established the basic principles behind derivative actions: the 
proper plaintiff principle, the majority rule principle which reflects the principle 
of non-interference in business matters, and the principle of keeping a balance 
between corporate efficiency and minority shareholders' protection. These 
principles together have been regarded as the cornerstone of derivative actions. As 
a result, although the application and the development of these principles in 
England are not satisfactory and the English law has been regarded as outdated, 
English law is still the starting point for our understanding of derivative actions. 
Recent reform of derivative actions in England also shows the trend in the 
development of derivative actions. 
1.5.2.2 The United States 
The derivative action is more popular in the United States than in any other 
country, and the American rules on derivative actions are generally regarded as 
sophisticated and well developed. Therefore, the American law on derivative 
actions provides a good model for our study. 
The development of the American law shows how American law drew on rules 
from other countries and how it has adjusted to the tension between corporate 
efficiency and shareholder protection. This development may be divided into four 
stages.40 In the first stage, which occurred in the first part of the nineteenth 
century, the American rules developed independently without influence from 
other countries.41 Coincidently, some principles that were recognized in English 
law were also acknowledged by American courts at that time. For example, the 
court, on the one hand, generally recognized the proper plaintiff principle; on the 
other hand, the court would not allow a wrong to go unredressed simply due to 
the reason of form, and therefore the right of an individual shareholder to bring a 
derivative action was basically recognized.42 In addition, there was an under-
standing that the minority should first make a demand on the directors for redress 
before coming to the court.43 However, unlike the English law, the American law 
did not generally develop the principle of non-judicial interference in internal 
39 I refer to English law rather than UK law because the Scottish law of derivative actions is 
different from English and Welsh law. 
40 For a detailed discussion of this development, see Section 3 .1.1. 
41 Boyle (1965), pp. 320-323. 
42 Boyle (1965), pp. 320-323. 
43 Boyle (1965), pp. 320-323. 
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matters, and no majority shareholders' power existed to ratify the misconduct 
which minorities complained of.44 It was not until the 1870s that these principles 
from English law were introduced into American law.45 This could be seen as the 
start of the second stage of the development. Instead of copying English law, 
American law borrowed ideas from English law while keeping its own formalities 
and approach such as the demand requirement.46 In fact, the American rules were 
a mixture of 'native' rules and the borrowed English rules. This way of 
incorporating English rules led to differences between English and American law, 
even after the introduction of these principles. 
Although the introduction of the English Foss rule had the effect of tightening 
American law on derivative actions, for a long time American law still took a 
lenient approach towards the derivative action; this lenient approach inevitably 
led to its abuse. As a result, mechanisms to control derivative actions were 
introduced in the 1940s and the 1970s, and these represent the third and the fourth 
stages of development. 
1.5.2.3 Germany 
German law also provides an interesting model for our study. As we know, the 
German law on corporate governance is famous for its own features, such as the 
two-tier system of corporate bodies. Nevertheless, recent reforms of German 
corporate governance are showing a trend toward learning from common law 
countries. 
The German law on derivative actions has also gone through significant 
changes recently. Before the introduction of the UMAG47, there was no derivative 
action in the common law sense. Nevertheless, the former German law did 
provide an equivalent solution to the issue of enforcing corporate claims by 
minority shareholders: it allowed a group of minority shareholders to cause the 
injured company to sue for damages. However, the UMAG has since changed the 
traditional German law and has introduced a real common law derivative action: 
the minority shareholders can enforce corporate claims in their own names. In 
addition, the UMAG also learned from common law countries how to keep a fair 
balance between corporate efficiency and protection of the company and minority 
shareholders. For example, it granted the court the power to decide whether to 
allow a derivative action, and it also introduced a statutory business judgment 
rule. Nevertheless, the UMAG has still kept the traditional German feature that 
44 Boyle (1965), p. 323. 
45 Boyle (1965), p. 323. 
46 Boyle (1965), p. 317. 
47 The full name of the UMAG is Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegritiit und Modernisierung des 
Anfechtungsrechts, which means the German Act Regarding Integrity of Companies and 
Modernizations of Shareholder Suits. For a discussion of the UMAG, see Section 4.1.2.2. 
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the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims is a group right rather 
than an individual right, as is the case in the Anglo-American approach. 
1.5.2.4 China 
The main purpose of this book is to provide suggestions on how to improve the 
Chinese law on derivative actions on the basis of a comparative study. Although 
Chinese courts have accepted derivative actions in its judicial practice since the 
middle of the 1990s, there were no statutory regulations on the derivative action 
until article 152 of Company Law 2006. Since China has a tradition of civil law, 
this lack oflegislation concerning the derivative action caused practical problems 
such as inconsistency of judgments and unpredictability of the law. The 
introduction of the derivative action in Company Law 2006 is expected to solve 
these problems. 
Article 152 of Company Law 2006 is the result of transplantation and 
obviously bears the traces of the rules from other countries. However, will article 
152 play the anticipated role? Considering the special situation found in China, 
along with the problems that article 152 and other related regulations have had in 
Chinese law, the answer may be negative. Therefore, this book will try to identify 
these problems and to provide suggestions for how the Chinese law can be 
improved. 
1.6 The structure of the comparative study 
1. 6.1 The structure of the book 
This comparative study will be conducted on a country-by-country basis. 
Although some specific regulations on the derivative action are different in the 
countries cited, the main issues concerned are similar. As a result, the study of the 
law for each country will follow the same structure. The common issues con-
cerning derivative actions will first be set out and each country's solutions to 
these issues will be studied. Therefore, this book will be structured as follows. 
Chapter 1 is the 'Introduction,' providing basic knowledge of the derivative action 
and the methodology used in this book. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 will be entitled 
'England,' 'the United States,' 'Germany' and 'China' respectively. They will be 
followed by Chapter 6, the 'Conclusion.' 
1.6.2 The scope of the comparative study 
Derivative actions involve many issues both in the area of company law and civil 
procedure law. However, this book will not be discussing the issues merely in 
terms of civil procedure law such as the issues of the company's position in the 
procedure, of res judicata, and of the court's jurisdiction. Instead, this book will 
focus on the issues arising from company law. Of course, some procedural issues 
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will perforce be discussed since they are related to the company law issues. In 
addition, this book will not discuss the situation where the company is in 
bankruptcy; it will, instead, only be concerned with the company as a going 
concern. 
In studying the law of derivative actions in each country, we will focus on the 
following issues. 
First of all, a basic introduction to the law for each country will be given. This 
will include the background of the law, the basic rnles for derivative actions and 
the reforms of those rules where applicable. 
The second part will discuss the role of the derivative action and the reasons 
for this role in each country. In order to understand this role better, some 
alternative mechanisms to the derivative action will also be briefly discussed. 
The third topic will be how to distinguish shareholders' derivative actions 
from shareholders' direct actions. As mentioned48, the shareholder's right of 
derivative actions derives from the company's right of action. Where the cause of 
action lies in the company, the plaintiff shareholder must bring a derivative action 
and satisfy the restrictions of a derivative action. However, if the shareholder's 
personal interests have been infringed, he can bring a direct action for remedies 
such as damages, injunction or an exit right without being subject to these 
restrictions. Thus, it is essential to distinguish shareholders' derivative actions 
from shareholders' direct actions. Nevertheless, it is not always easy to make such 
a distinction, especially in close companies. As will be observed, the major 
criterion for making a distinction is the 'right' and/or 'injury' criterion, but a more 
flexible approach has also been taken, such as that found in American law. 
The fourth issue will be how to strike a fair balance between corporate 
efficiency and protection of the interests of companies and minority shareholders. 
On the one hand, it is generally acknowledged that there should be only limited 
judicial intervention in corporate management. This is supported by various basic 
assumptions. To begin with, it is founded on the general policy of laissez-faire. A 
society governed by the court is not desirable. Second, the court is not an expert 
on business matters, and so it is not considered fair for the court to make a 
judgment on business matters ex post. Third, a full review of management 
decisions may lead to a situation of excessive risk-avoidance by boards, or even 
paralysis of boards. Normally a decision to turn down a business opportunity is 
less likely to be criticized than a decision to follow up on a business opportunity, 
especially since business opportunities normally come with risks attached. 
Fourth, if directors are unreasonably burdened with liabilities caused by their 
business decisions, they will invest their human capital in other fields or charge 
more for their services. As a result, the cost of human capital in a company will 
be much higher which will be disadvantageous to the company. On the other 
48 See Section 1.1. 
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hand, the minority shareholders' interests should be protected. The corporate 
operators, the majority shareholders and/or the directors, may abuse their power 
and infringe the company's interests and minority shareholders' interests 
indirectly. Therefore, how to strike a fair balance between them is a pivotal but 
difficult issue. 
Although the countries we will study take different approaches towards creating 
a balance in derivative actions, the basic methods for setting this balance are 
similar. Therefore, the study on how a fair balance is shuck in each counti·y will 
mainly discuss the methods used. Since the most important method is usually to 
place certain restrictions on the minority shareholder's right to derivative actions, 
our study will start with these restrictions. I will first discuss the substantive 
restrictions. As mentioned, it is generally acknowledged that corporate manage-
ment should not be unjustly interfered with. This consideration is twofold. On the 
one hand, minority shareholders should not inappropriately interfere with the 
board's daily business operations. Therefore, the minority shareholders may not 
challenge conduct which is merely business judgment. On the other hand, since a 
corporate litigation decision is also a business decision and generally falls within 
the board's power, the non-interference consideration should also apply to the 
board's litigation decision. This first aspect generates the issue of what kind of 
misconduct may lead to derivative actions, while the second generates the issue 
of who the derivative action may be initiated against. The substantive restrictions 
mainly include these two issues. 
Second, I will discuss those procedural restrictions such as the standing re-
quirements on the plaintiff shareholders and the procedures for bringing a 
derivative action. In fact, as will be observed, Chinese law mainly focuses on 
these procedural restrictions but neglects other methods for striking a balance. 
This may end up causing problems in practice. 
Third, the effect of the independent body's point of view regarding the 
corporate litigation decision will be studied. As will be seen, the independent 
body's decision not to sue may prevent a derivative action. 
The fourth part will discuss how each country solves the problem of the plain-
tiff's incentive to bring a derivative action. As mentioned, minority shareholders 
can have an under-incentive or an over-incentive problem when initiating 
derivative actions. These problems will also affect the function of the derivative 
action itself. Although several factors will affect the shareholders' incentive, most 
of them are financial since investors are basically looking for profits. Me-
chanisms taken by various countries to deter or encourage shareholders' incen-
tives are, therefore, mainly financial, such as reducing the plaintiff shareholder's 
burden of litigation costs. 
The fifth method for striking a balance is by limiting directors' financial 
exposure to the risks and costs of litigation. This is an important method in the 
United States where it is rather common to hold directors liable. However, as will 
be observed, this method is less important in other countries, such as England and 
Germany, where directors are rarely held liable. We should also note that where 
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loss of reputation is regarded as worse than financial loss, such a limitation may 
not provide sufficient protection for the defendant directors. 
Of course, we should bear in mind that these methods for striking a balance 
are not exclusive; other ways such as improving the minority shareholders' right 
to information are also important. 
It goes without saying that a comment will follow each comparative study. 
'[M]erely to juxtapose without comment the law of the various jurisdictions is not 
comparative law: it is just a preliminary step.'49 Therefore, after the discussion of 
how to strike a fair balance, the study of each country will end with a conclusion. 




2.1 Introduction to English law on derivative actions 
2.1.1 Overview 
Derivative actions in England have traditionally been regulated by the famous 
Foss v. Harbottle 1 rule and by developments in this rule. According to these 
common law rules, an individual shareholder can bring a derivative action in 
exceptional situations. Nevertheless, there are many criticisms surrounding the 
common law derivative action. To name a few, the Foss rule is very complicated 
and is also unstable. It has kept on developing ever since its origins in Foss v. 
Harbottle in 1843, after which the rule is named, and not all the decided cases 
have necessarily been reconciled with each other.2 In fact, it is very difficult to 
define what exactly the Foss rule is. People actually regard the rule as the 'deepest 
mystery of company law'. 3 In addition, it scarcely provides minority shareholders 
with any effective mechanism to protect themselves or the company, or to 
discipline corporate management. In England, universities have even given up 
teaching the Foss rule.4 Due to these problems with the common law derivative 
action, reforms aimed at a new statutory derivative action have been suggested 
and a new statute introducing statutory derivative action is expected to be ef-
fective soon. 5 
In addition to the common law derivative action, the Companies Act 1985 also 
includes several articles that provide minority shareholders with the right to bring 
derivative actions in certain cases. For example, section 461(2)(c) provides that if 
a petitioner successfully proves unfair prejudice, the court may ' ... authorize civil 
proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company by such 
person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct ... '. Section 34 71 also 
grants a statutory derivative action in cases of political donations or expenditures 
(1843) 2 Hare 461. 
2 Davies (2003), p. 458. 
3 Mayson et al. (1996), p. 531. 
4 Sealy (1997), p. 180. 




by the company.6 However, these derivative actions are not the major concern of 
this book as special requirements are needed to apply them. 
2.1.2 
2.1.2.1 
The traditional Foss rule: the principles and the exceptions 
Two basic principles of the Foss rule 
The traditional Foss rule includes two interrelated principles and several 
exceptions to these principles. In Foss v. Harbottle two principles have been 
identified: the majority rule principle (the first limb of the rule) and the proper 
plaintiff principle (the second limb). The proper plaintiff principle has been 
widely accepted and regarded as a cornerstone of modern company law. Never-
theless, the majority rule p1inciple is complex, vague and controversial. In fact, 
the disputes about the Foss rule are mainly about the majority rule principle. In 
the following sections I will be discussing these principles in detail. 
The proper plaintiff principle 
The proper plaintiff principle was first stated by Sir James Wigram VC in Foss v. 
Harbottle. With regard to the wrongs done to the company, 'the corporation 
should sue in its own name and in its corporate character, or in the name of 
someone whom the law has appointed to be its representative'. 7 On the other 
hand, of course, where the wrong was done to an individual shareholder, the 
individual shareholder could bring a direct action for his personal injury. In fact, 
this principle is based on the acknowledgement that the rights of a company are 
different from those of its shareholders. 
English law also recognizes a related principle by which a shareholder cannot 
claim for losses simply reflective of the corporate losses; he can only claim for 
his losses, which are separate and distinct from those corporate losses.8 This 'no 
reflective loss' principle was clearly stated in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. 
Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court of Appeal).9 In this case, the Court of 
Appeal held that where the only loss suffered by the individual shareholder was a 
diminution in the value of shares resulting from the company's losses, there could 
be no claim for this diminution in a personal action because no personal loss was 
6 Part XA (sections 347 A to 347k) of the Companies Act came into force in 2001. However, 
Companies Bill (218) suggests abolishing this type of derivative action. 
7 (1843) 2 Hare 461, p. 491. 
8 Of course a critical problem with the principle is the difficulty in distinguishing the reflective 
loss and the independent and separate loss. See Davies (2003), p. 456. 
9 [1982] Ch. 204. For a detailed discussion of the development of this principle, please refer to, 
for example, Mukwiri (2005); Mitchell (2004); Hirt (2003b); and Ferran (2001). 
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suffered in such cases; the loss was that of the company and the shareholder's loss 
was only reflective of the company's losses. 10 
However, as we will see later, through a pragmatic application of the statutory 
unfair prejudice petition, English law actually takes a flexible approach towards 
the proper plaintiff principle and the no reflective loss principle. 11 
The majority rule principle 
In Foss v. Harbottle Sir James Wigram VC also clearly pointed out for the first 
time that the court would not interfere with an irregularity which the majority 
shareholders might lawfully ratify. 12 This approach has been subsequently 
followed and reiterated again and again ever since. 13 In Edwards v. Halliwell14, 
Jenkins L.J. gave a representative statement, which was regarded as the best 
description of the principle: 15 
Where the alleged wrong is a transaction which might be made binding on the 
company or association and on all its members by a simple majority of the 
members, no individual member of the company is allowed to maintain an 
action in respect of that matter for the simple reason that, if a mere majority 
of the members of the company or association is in favour of what has been 
done, then cadit quaestio. 16 
The majority rule principle has two meanings. First, it treats a simple majority of 
shareholders as the appropriate body to ratify misconduct and therefore re-
cognizes the collective nature of corporate decisions. 17 Second, it also prevents a 
minority shareholder from initiating a derivative action if the alleged misconduct 
is a mere irregularity which is ratifiable by a simple majority of shareholders; as 
a general principle, there should be no judicial intervention in business matters. 
The origin of the majority rule principle has its own specific background. As we 
know, Foss v. Harbottle was decided at a time when incorporation was not freely 
JO [1982] Ch. 204, pp. 222-223. 
11 See Section 2.2.2. 
12 (1843) 2 Hare 461, at pp. 494-495. Also see Boyle (2002), p. 4. The Law Commission Law also 
recognizes that both of these principles were applied in the Foss case, see Law Commission 
Report 246 (1997), para. 6.1. However, there is another opinion that in the Foss case only the 
proper plaintiff principle was established, the majority rule principle did not arise until Mozley 
v. Alston, (1847) I Ph 790 was decided, see Berkahn (1998), p. 76, Footnote 9. 
13 Such as in Burland v. Earle, [1902] AC 83; Edwards v. Halliwell, [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064; 
Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court of Appeal) [1982] 
Ch. 204. 
14 [1950) 2 All E.R. 1064. 
15 See Davies (2003), p. 459. 
16 [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064, at p. 1066. 
17 Hirt (2004b ), p. 71, p. 78, p. 79. 
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available and 'corporations like this, [statutory companies created by private Act] 
of a private nature, are in truth little more than private partnerships' .18 In fact, the 
decision in Foss v. Harbottle relied on early nineteenth-century decisions in the 
law of partnership. 19 On the one hand, the subordination of the will of the 
minority shareholder to that of the majority shareholder was not regarded as an 
injustice because mutual trust and contractual obligations existed between the 
individual shareholders of this partnership-like company and because these 
shareholders should have been aware of the consequences when they entered into 
the company. 20 On the other hand, the court's reluctance to interfere with internal 
management also has its origins in the partnership principle. According to the 
partnership principle, the Chancellor would not interfere with internal disputes of 
the partnership 'except with a view to dissolution' .21 This non-judicial inter-
ference policy protected corporate management against unjust shareholder inter-
vention and encouraged risk-taking to a greater extent. It is understandable, and 
perhaps justifiable, that the principle was introduced into corporate law in Foss v. 
Harbottle, since the case was decided 'at the height of the industrial revolution' .22 
As a consequence, the decision of Foss v. Harbottle 'transformed the old 
partnership rule into one of the leading principles of modern company law'. 23 
Justifications for the two principles of the Foss rule 
There are several justifications for these principles. First, they avoid multiplicity 
of suits.24 Without these principles, every shareholder could sue and the company 
would be faced with multiple lawsuits, especially if troublesome shareholders 
brought vexatious litigation. Second, these principles, especially the majority rule 
principle, created a context where futile or wasteful litigation could be avoided.25 
This was clearly explained by Mellish L.J. in MacDougall v. Gardiner: 
If the thing complained of is a thing which in substance the majority of the 
company are entitled to do, or if something has been done irregularly which 
the majority of the company are entitled to do regularly ... there can be no use 
in having a litigation about it, the ultimate end of which is only that a meeting 
has to be called, and then ultimately the majority gets its wishes.26 
Third, the policy reflected in the majority rule principle that the court will not 
interfere in a mere internal irregularity protects the efficiency of corporate 
18 Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, at p. 491. Also see Berkahn (1998), p. 78; Bottomley 
(1992), p. 141; Boyle (1965), p. 319. 
19 Boyle (1965), pp. 318-319. Also see Berkahn (1998), p. 78; Bottomley (1992), p. 141. 
20 Berkahn (1998), pp. 78-79; Bottomley (1992), p. 141. 
21 Boyle (1965), pp. 318-319. 
22 Berkahn (1998), p. 78. 
23 Boyle (1965), pp. 318-319. Also see Berkahn (1998), p. 78. 
24 See such as Gray v. Lewis (1873) 8 Ch. App. 1035, at p. 1051; Boyle (2002), p. 6. 
25 See such as Boyle (2002), p. 7. 
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management and encourages that fair-business risk-taking necessary for busi-
ness. It is generally accepted that the court should determine questions of law 
instead of questions of business judgment. 
It is not surprising that there are also doubts about these principles and the 
justifications for them. For example, Boyle points out that even without the Foss 
rule, a court of equity may still solve the problem of multiplicity of suits.27 
Moreover, the distinction between the interests of the company and those of 
individual shareholders is not always clear, and furthermore, the majority rule 
principle may unfairly leave out some meritorious cases and as a result cannot 
provide sufficient protection to minority shareholders and the company.28 
2.1.2.2 Exceptions to the Foss rule principles 
English courts generally recognize four exceptions to the above-mentioned prin-
ciples, although in our view not all of them are true exceptions. These are the 
personal rights exception, the illegal or ultra vires acts exception, the special 
majority exception, and the fraud exception. In Edwards v. Halliwell, a fifth 
exception of justice was suggested but this is not generally accepted by later 
courts.29 I will discuss these exceptions briefly in the following sections. 
2.1.2.2.1 The 'personal rights' exception 
The 'personal rights' exception means that where the misconduct infringes the 
personal rights of a shareholder, the shareholder can redress his damage by 
initiating a direct action. Since this exception actually describes a situation where 
the Foss rule simply has no application, it is not a true exception. 
The problem with this so-called exception may simply lie in the difficulty of 
making a clear distinction between corporate interests and a shareholder's 
personal interests. I will discuss this issue in Section 2.3. 
2.1.2.2.2 The 'illegal or ultra vires acts' exception and the 'special 
majority' exception 
The Foss rule principles will not apply to illegal acts or ultra vires acts before 
1989 since they simply cannot be ratified; nor will they apply to misconduct 
26 (1875) 1 Ch. D. 13, at p. 25. 
27 Boyle (2002), pp. 6-7. 
28 Boyle (2002), p. 7. 
29 See Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064, p. 1067, where it was suggested that the Foss 
rule should not be applicable in such situations where necessary 'in the interests of justice.' 
However, later cases such as Estmance (Kilner House) Ltd. v. Greater London Council [1982] 
1 W.L.R. 2 and Prndential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court of 
Appeal), [1982] Ch. 204 did not follow Edwards v. Halliwell, see Law Commission CP 142 
(1996), para. 4.7, Footnote 17. 
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which needs to be validly committed or ratified by only a special majority of 
shareholders because a simple majority of shareholders cannot confirm or ratify 
a transaction which needs a greater majority.30 The former exception is called the 
'illegal or ultra vires acts' exception and the latter the 'special majority' 
exception. 
Since the reforms of 1989, ultra vires acts can be ratified by a special majority 
shareholders' resolution 31, except for those that are patently illegal. 32 In this 
sense, it may be better to treat the ultra vires exception as already being included 
nowadays in the special majority exception.33 
2.1.2.2.3 The 'fraud on the minority' exception 
The 'fraud on the minority' exception is regarded as the only 'true' exception to 
the Foss rule.34 The meaning of the 'fraud on the minority' exception and the 
justification for the exception was well illustrated in Prudential Assurance Co. 
Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court of Appeal): 
(5) There is an exception to the [Foss] rule where what has been done amounts 
to fraud and the wrongdoers are themselves in control of the company. In this 
case the rule is relaxed in favour of the aggrieved minority, who are allowed 
to bring a minority shareholders' action on behalf of themselves and all others. 
The reason for this is that, if they were denied that right, their grievance could 
never reach the court because the wrongdoers themselves, being in control, 
would not allow the company to sue. 35 
We should note here, however, that the wrong was actually done to the company 
rather than to the individual shareholders; therefore the exception may in fact be 
misnamed. 
As mentioned in Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) 
(the Court of Appeal), two requirements must be met in order to satisfy the 
exception: the existence of a 'fraudulent' act and the existence of wrongdoer 
control. Regretfully, neither of these requirements is clear under English law. 
The '.finud' requirement 
'Fraud' here has a wider meaning than the common sense of deceit. In order to 
amount to 'fraud,' the wrongdoer must commit deceit ( or be dishonest, thus the 
30 See, for example, Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court 
of Appeal), [1982] Ch. 204, at 210F-21 IB. 
31 Companies Act 1985, section 35(3), as amended by Companies Act 1989, s. 108(1). 
32 Morse (1991), p. 442. 
33 Morse (1991), p. 442. 
34 See, for example, Law Commission CP 142 (1996), part 4, Footnote 13. 
35 [1982] Ch. 204, at p. 211. 
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common understanding of the term 'fraud'), or benefit himself at the expense of 
the company.36 The mere fact of improper purpose, lack of bona fide, conflict of 
interest, or simple negligence is not sufficient.37 In Pavlides v. Jensen38, the plain-
tiff's action was rebutted because the defendant directors had not benefited from 
their own negligence and thus no fraud was found. In addition, if the wrongdoer 
benefited from his breach of duties, but not at the expense of the company, no 
derivative action may be initiated against him either. This opinion is supported by 
the dicta of the House of Lords in Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver39, where the 
wrongdoer was regarded as merely making an incidental profit rather than mis-
appropriating the company's property.40 
However, there are criticisms of the fraud requirement. First, the standard of fraud 
is not as easy to apply as it seems. The major reason is the difficulty in defining 
corporate properties. In Cook v. Deeks41, where the wrongdoing directors 
acquired for themselves the contracts which they should have acquired on behalf 
of the company, a fraud was found because the directors' acquiring of the 
contracts was a misappropriation of corporate property. However, in the above-
mentioned case of Regal (Hastings) v. Gullive1; where the directors made use of 
the information they received as directors and benefited from that use, it was held 
that there was no fraud because the directors only took advantage of a corporate 
opportunity which the company could not itself use and so no corporate property 
was misappropriated. In fact, the distinction between fraudulent acts and non-
fraudulent acts has never clearly been settled under English law. Second, the 
requirement of a fraudulent act is also criticized for its restricted scope. As 
mentioned above, a wide range of wrongdoer's misconduct may not be regarded 
as fraud and therefore no derivative action may be brought against it. If the 
wrongdoer controls the company and prevents the company from suing against 
the non-fraudulent misconduct, the company may simply have no relief. 
Fortunately, these criticisms have been widely acknowledged and reforms of 
the derivative action already take them into account. As will be seen in Section 
2.4.2.2.2, the Companies Bill abolishes this requirement and extends the 
application of derivative actions to the breach of any director's duty. 
The 'wrongdoer control' requirement 
Traditionally, English courts have required that the plaintiff shareholder should 
establish that the company was controlled by the wrongdoer before he is allowed 
36 This wider definition of 'fraud' was not introduced until Daniels v. Daniels, [1978] Ch. 406, 
414A-E; [1978] 2 All E.R. 89. Daniels was followed by later courts. 
37 Davies (2003), pp. 440-441. 
38 [1956] Ch. 565. 
39 [1942] 1 All E.R. 378, at 382F and 389D-E; Hollington (1999), p. 20. 
40 Davies (2003), pp. 439-440. 
41 [1916] 1 A.C. 554, PC. 
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to continue a derivative action.42 The reason for this requirement is that English 
law traditionally recognizes that the company's fair collective decisions, 
especially decisions concerning ratification or decisions not to sue made by the 
general meeting of shareholders, are preferable to any individual shareholder's 
derivative actions. As a result, in order for him to bring a derivative action, a 
plaintiff shareholder has to establish that such a fair collective decision cannot be 
reached because the wrongdoer controls a majority of the shareholders' voting 
rights. As will be observed, this preference for the collective nature of corporate 
decisions is an important feature of English law and has been further developed 
in Smith v. Croft (No. 2).43 
However, the 'wrongdoer control' requirement also has problems. First of all, it 
may leave certain wrongs unredressed. For example, where the wrongdoer does 
not control the general meeting but prevents the submission to the general 
meeting of the issue complained of, the wrong still might not be redressed 
because the general meeting simply has had no chance to consider it. In such 
circumstances, no derivative action will be allowed since the 'wrongdoer control' 
requirement cannot be established. 
The second problem with the 'wrongdoer control' requirement is that this 
strict definition of 'control' may have the effect that the fraud exception will 
become nearly impossible to apply in public companies. In Prudential Assurance 
Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court of Appeal), the Court of 
Appeal held that the term of control: 
... embraces a broad spectrum extending from an overall absolute majority of 
votes at one end, to a majority of votes at the other end made up of those likely 
to be cast by the delinquent himself plus those voting with him as a result of 
influence or apathy.44 
Although in this case the Court of Appeal rejected the stricter de Jure control 
approach found in Pavlides v. Jensen, which required that the wrongdoers own 
directly or through nominees at least fifty-one percent of the voting shares45, it 
still held that the de facto control of more than fifty percent of votes needed to be 
proved.46 This could cause a severe problem in the case of public companies. 
42 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 4.12. 
43 [1988] Ch. 114. For a detailed discussion, see Sections 2.1.3.3 and 2.4.1.3. 
44 [1982] Ch. 204, p. 219. Apathy includes, for example, the votes afforded to the directors by the 
proxy voting system; see Davies (2003), p. 461. 
45 See Boyle (2002), p. 27. 
46 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 4.16. 
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2.1.2.2.4 The 'interest of justice' exception 
Edwards v. Halliwell suggested that the Foss rule should not be applicable in 
situations where this was necessary in the interests of justice.47 However, this 
exception has not been generally accepted by English courts because it has been 
considered 'not a practical test' .48 Therefore, there is no point in any further 
discussion of this exception here. 
2.1.2.3 Comments on the traditional Foss rule 
The traditional Foss rule has established two basic principles of company law and 
several exceptions to these principles. It has also raised the difficult question of 
sh·iking a balance between corporate efficiency and protection of the company 
and minority shareholders. On the one hand, derivative actions are necessary in 
order to protect the interests of the company and minority shareholders; on the 
other hand, they should also be restricted in order to protect corporate efficiency. 
The Foss rule has favored corporate efficiency over protection of the company 
and minority shareholders. Under this rule, derivative actions are strictly limited. 
The major method in this limitation is the ex ante restriction as to the nature of 
the misconduct that may give rise to derivative actions. According to the Foss 
rule, a derivative action is only allowed where there is illegal or ultra vires 
conduct, an act in breach of a special majority or procedural requirement (the 
special majority situation), or a fraudulent act. Since these acts are regarded as 
non-ratifiable by a simple majority of shareholders under English law, this 
approach is also called the 'non-ratifiable' wrong theory. This restriction of 
derivative actions to 'non-ratifiable' wrongs has both advantages and dis-
advantages. On the one hand, the ex ante restriction of derivative actions prevents 
minority shareholders from unjustly inter.fering with corporate management and 
provides protection for corporate managers; moreover, an ex ante regulation has 
the advantage of clearness and certainty.49 However, on the other hand, it also has 
its problems. For example, due to the narrow scope of non-ratifiable wrongs 
identified by the common law, as well as the requirement of wrongdoer control, 
the ex ante restriction may not provide sufficient protection for the company and 
minority shareholders. In addition, the vague boundary between ratifiable and 
non-ratifiable wrongs devalues the advantage of the certainty of law. 
The traditional Foss rule also requires the plaintiff shareholder to prove 'the 
wrongdoer conh·ol' aspect in the fraud exception. This requirement reflects the 
47 [1950] 2 All E.R. 1064, p. 1067. 
48 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court of Appeal), [ 1982] 
Ch. 204, p. 221. However, Vinelott J. had accepted this exception in the first instance, [1981] 
Ch. 257. For the approach ofrejection of the exception, also seeEstmance (Kilner House) Ltd. 
v. Greater London Council [1982] I WL.R. 2. 
49 Ferran (1998), pp. 235-247. 
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English approach of safeguarding the collective nature of corporate decisions and 
has been extended to all derivative actions since.50 
2.1.3 
2.1.3.1 
Development of the Foss rule 
Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. JI, Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) 
(the Court of Appealj: the Foss rule as the locus standi 
requirement as well as the substantive requirement for 
derivative actions 
For a long time there has been confusion as to when the requirement of the Foss 
rule should be raised during the procedure of a derivative action. In most cases 
the issue has been determined to be a preliminary one, while in some cases it has 
been left to be decided at a full-trial hearing. 51 This issue was not resolved until 
the leading case of Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 
2). In the first instance of Prudential, Vinelott J. dismissed the defendants' 
application that it should be decided as a preliminary issue whether the plaintiff 
was able to bring a derivative action. 52 However, the Court of Appeal rejected 
Vinelott l's approach and insisted that the issue should be decided as a 
preliminary one. 53 In this case, the Court of Appeal raised the famous require-
ment that in order to bring a derivative action the plaintiff shareholder must ' ... 
establish a prima facie case (i) that the company is entitled to the relief claimed 
and (ii) that the action falls within the proper boundaries of the exception to the 
rule in Foss v. Harbottle'. 54 Accordingly, the Foss rule not only provides a 
substantive restriction on the shareholder's right to a derivative action, but also 
serves as a procedural restriction by determining whether a shareholder has locus 
standi to bring a derivative action.55 
This standing requirement of the Foss rule under the Court of Appeal case of 
Prudential nevertheless makes it difficult for a shareholder to bring a derivative 
action: the shareholder has to prim a facie pass the Foss rule test. In addition, it is 
also difficult for the judges to decide whether the plaintiff has the standing to sue 
in the very early stages of a proceeding because there is hardly any evidence 
available to them.56 Although the Court of Appeal in the Prudential case 
considered that the preliminary stage on the locus standi issue should be short57, 
50 See Section 2.1.3.2. 
51 Such as North-West Transportation Co. Ltd. v. Beatty (1887) L.R. 12 App. Cas. 589 (PC); Hogg 
v. Cramphorn Ltd. [1967) Ch. 254; also see Boyle (2002), p. 8. 
52 [1981) Ch. 257, pp. 286-287. 
53 [1982) Ch. 204, pp. 221-222. 
54 [1982) Ch. 204, pp. 221-222. 
55 Boyle (2002), p. 8; Davies (2003), p. 453. 
56 Sealy (1987), p. 4. 
57 [1982) Ch. 204, pp. 221-222. 
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this might not always be the case.58 The court may have to decide complicated 
questions of law or questions of fact or both.59 
2.1.3.2 Taylor v. National Union if Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area): 
generalization of the 'wrongdoer control' requirement60 
Taylor v. National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area)61 extended the 
'wrongdoer control' requirement in the fraud exception to encompass all 
derivative actions, including those against illegal or ultra vires acts, or acts which 
need a special majority's ratification. This generalization of the 'wrongdoer 
control' requirement is based on the court's recognition that the simple majority 
shareholders' power to make a negative litigation decision against any misconduct 
(the decision not to sue) differs from their power to ratify the misconduct: 
although a simple majority of shareholders cannot ratify non-ratifiable miscon-
duct, they may still be capable of deciding whether to sue against this non-
ratifiable misconduct in the name of the company. If they decide not to sue, this 
negative litigation decision should bar the individual shareholder's right to 
derivative actions, unless the wrongdoer controls the voting and therefore a fair 
litigation decision cannot be made. As a result, the individual shareholder needs 
to establish 'wrongdoer control' before being allowed to continue the derivative 
action. 
It is obvious that Taylor regarded a majority of shareholders to be more 
appropriate than individual shareholders for making litigation decisions on behalf 
of the company. This was well elucidated by Vinelott J.: 
Although the misapplication of the funds of a corporate body . . . cannot be 
ratified by any majority of the members, however large, it is open to a majority 
of the members, if they think it is right in the interests of the corporate body 
to do so, to resolve that no action should be taken to remedy the wrong done 
to the corporate body and such a resolution, if made in good faith and in what 
they considered to be for the benefit of the corporate body, will bind the 
minority.62 
By extending the wrongdoer control requirement to all derivative suits, Taylor 
actually followed and developed the approach of favoring the collective nature of 
58 For example, the hearing of Smith v. Croft (No. 2) [1988] Ch. 114 lasted 18 days; see Law 
Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 6.6. In that case complicated questions of law arose. 
Difficult questions of fact can also arise at this stage. 
59 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 6.6. 
60 For a detailed discussion, see Hirt (2004b), pp. 163-167. 
61 [1985] B.C.L.C. 237. 
62 Taylor v. National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area) [1985] B.C.L.C. 237, pp. 254-255. 
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corporate litigation decisions in the tradition of the Foss rule. 63 The case was 
confirmed in Smith v. Croft (No. 2), where the wrongdoer control requirement 
applied to the ultra vire act. This extra restriction on an individual shareholder's 
right to derivative actions in fact has a negative effect on the function of derivative 
actions. 
2.1.3.3 Smith 11. Cr(!/l (No. 2): the independent body s view 
Smith v. Croft (No. 2) further developed the approach of favoring the collective 
nature of the corporate litigation decision. In this case Knox J. held that: 
Ultimately the question which has to be answered in order to determine 
whether the rule in Foss v. Harbottle applies to prevent a minority shareholder 
seeking relief as plaintiff for the benefit of the company is 'Is the plaintiff 
being improperly prevented from bringing these proceedings on behalf of the 
company?' If it is an expression of the corporate will of the company by an 
appropriate independent organ that is preventing the plaintiff from prosecuting 
the action he is not improperly but properly prevented and so the answer to the 
question is 'No'. 64 
Smith v. Croft (No. 2) recognized that where a simple majority of shareholders is 
not available to make a litigation decision in the best interests of the company 
such as in the case of wrongdoer control, an appropriate independent body is still 
preferable to an individual shareholder in making such a decision. An individual 
shareholder is regarded as not being in a better position to sue than the company 
itself. 65 Consequently, this case has added another restriction to the individual 
shareholder's right to initiate derivative actions: a negative litigation decision of 
an appropriate independent body will also bar a derivative action, provided the 
decision is made in good faith and for the benefit of the company.66 Therefore, a 
simple majority shareholders' decision is no longer needed in order to prevent a 
derivative action. This restriction of an independent body's view applies 'equally 
to frauds and to corporate actions arising out of ultra vires cases'. 67 • 
With regard to the practical application of this new development in Smith v. 
Croft (No 2), there are still several unsettled issues, which I will discuss in Section 
2.4.1.3. Nevertheless, it is important to indicate here that the new development 
has actually put a significant restriction on the individual shareholders' right to 
derivative action and therefore 'will have a destructive impact upon the derivative 
action' if it is followed. 68 
63 Hirt (2004b), p. 167. 
64 [1988] Ch. 114, at p. 185. 
65 Davies (2003), p. 465. 
66 See Mayson et al. (1996), p, 538. 
67 Davies (2003), p. 462. 
68 Davies (2003), p, 462. 
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2.1.3.4 Comments on the development of the Foss rule 
The case law development of the Foss rule has shown a trend toward tighter 
restrictions on a shareholder's right to derivative actions. In Prudential Assurance 
Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court of Appeal), the Foss rule 
served as a prerequisite standing requirement for a shareholder to initiate a 
derivative action; Taylor extended the 'wrongdoer control' requirement in the 
fraud exception to all derivative actions; and Smith v. Croft (No 2) added the most 
significant restriction since the Foss rule, ruling that the individual shareholder's 
right to derivative actions should be submitted to an independent body's review. 
This trend shows that English courts have undervalued the function of derivative 
actions. In fact, 'the derivative action is not to be regarded as a normal part of the 
enforcement apparatus of the law, but as a weapon of last resort'. 69 
2.1.4 Rule 19.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules: the requirement of 
judicial approval to continue a derivative action 
Rule 19.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules stipulates the procedures for bringing a 
derivative action. In 1994, Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment) 1994 (RSC) 
Ord. 15, r. 12A, which specifically dealt with derivative actions, came into force. 
This rule has now been replaced by a simplified form of the new Civil Procedure 
Rules 1998, part 19, rule 19.9, as amended by the Civil Procedure (Amendment) 
Rules 2000. The latter came into force as of May 2, 2000. The major charac-
teristic of rule 19 .9 is that it requires that the plaintiff shareholder seek leave from 
the court to continue a derivative action. 70 Nevertheless, it does not clarify the 
factors that the court should take into account when deciding whether to grant 
leave. For a detailed discussion of rule 19.9, see Section 2.4.1.2.3. 
2.1.5 
2.1.5.1 
Reforms of the common law derivative action 
The necessity for reforms 
The English law on derivative actions, as mentioned above, is regarded as 
obscure, complex and 'inaccessible save to lawyers specializing in this field'. 71 
Moreover, those cases already decided have not been reconciled with each other. 72 
It has been widely acknowledged in England that there should be reforms to 
common law derivative action. 73 
69 Davies (2003), p. 463. 
70 CPR, part 19, rule 19.9(3). 
71 For comments on the current law, see Law Commission Report 246 (1997), paras. 1.4, 1.6, 6.4, 
7.11. Also in Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 1.6, 14.1-14.4. 
72 Davies (2003), p. 458. 
73 See Law Commission Report 246 (1997), executive summary. 
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Reforms to the common law derivative action are also regarded as a necessity 
in order to keep up with the international trend. After reviewing recent develop-
ments in other countries, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong 
and Japan, the Law Commission recognized that 'In an age of increasing 
globalization of investment and growing interest in corporate governance, greater 
transparency in the requirements for a derivative action is in our view highly 
desirable'. 74 
2.1.5.2 Proposals for the reforms 
The Law Commission has carried out the primary reform work on derivative 
actions. In February 1995, the Lord Chancellor and the President of the Board of 
Trade requested the Law Commission '. . . to carry out a review of shareholder 
remedies with particular reference to: _ the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 
Hare 461 and its exceptions; sections 459 to 461 of the Companies Act 1985; and 
the enforcement of the rights of shareholders under the articles of association; and 
to make recommendations' .75 The Law Commission published its Consultation 
Paper in 1996 and the Report in October 1997 respectively, where recommen-
dations for a new statutory derivative action were made.76 
In March 1998, the Department of Trade and Industry (the DTI) of the UK 
launched a three-year project to review the whole of British core company law, 
including shareholder remedies. An 'independent, widely based, non-political' 
Company Law Review Steering Group (referred to hereafter as 'the CLR')77, 
whose members were appointed by the DTI, conducted this project. The project 
broadly fell into four stages: strategy, development, completion, and final phases. 
At each stage a consultation document was published. These documents, with the 
common heading of Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, are 
named respectively, The Strategic Framework, Developing the Frame,vork, 
Completing the Structure, and The Final Report.78 Following the CLR's reports, 
two White Papers on company law reform were published in 2002 and 2005 
respectively79, which set out the Government's proposals for the comprehensive 
reform of British company law.8° Consequently, the Company Law Reform Bill 
was introduced in the House of Lords on November 1, 2005, and brought forward 
to the House of Commons on May 24, 2006. On July 20, 2006 the Bill completed 
the Commons Committee. The title of the 'Company Law Reform Bill' was 
changed to the 'Companies Bill' during the committee stage in the House of 
74 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.9. 
75 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 1.2. 
76 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), section B; Law Commission Report 246 (1997), part 6. 
77 See Rickford (2002), at p. 9. 
78 They were published respectively in February 1999, March 2000, November 2000, and July 
2001. For a detailed review of the reform, see Rickford (2002). 
79 White Paper (2002) and White Paper (2005). 
80 White Paper (2005), Summary, p. 5. 
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Commons in July 2006.81 On October 19, 2006 the Bill completed the Report and 
Third Reading stages of the House of Commons. As a result, a new company act 
is expected to come into force in the near future. As to the reform of derivative 
actions, both the CLR and the Companies Bill basically endorse the Law 
Commission's recommendations but with several differences. I will discuss the 
recommendations for the new statutory derivative action in Section 2.4.2. 
2.2 The role of derivative action in England 
2.2.1 An unimportant role and the reasons for it 
Common law derivative action actually plays an unimportant role in English 
practice in disciplining corporate management and in protecting the interests of 
the company and minority shareholders, especially in public companies. Minority 
shareholders' derivative claims against wrongdoers are rare, particularly since the 
new developments in the Foss rule. 82 Some factors may account for this un-
important role. 
Strict requirements 
The prima facie reason for the rare application of common law derivative actions 
is the increasingly strict requirements under English law for initiating a derivative 
action. These strict requirements make it difficult even to have a chance of a 
hearing. Professor Sealy pointed out that in England: 
... the rule has been formulated and applied in a progressively more and more 
restrictive way to the point where it would now be either a very bold or a very 
foolish lawyer who would allow or encourage his shareholder client even to 
think of starting derivative action.83 
English policies 
These strict requirements actually reflect the traditional English attitude towards 
derivative action and the policies behind it. First, English courts have traditionally 
been reluctant to interfere with corporate internal management. Professor Sealy 
regards this attitude of non-judicial interference as the major reason that English 
law has put strict requirements on initiating derivative actions, even though it may 
81 The latest version of the Companies Bill is Bill 218 (20 July 2006, House of Commons). For 
details of the Companies Bill, see http://www.dti.gov.uk/bbf/co-Iaw-reform-bilVindex.html. 
82 Hirt (2004b), p. 18; Sealy (1987), p. 1. 
83 Sealy (1997), p. 179. 
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not explicitly say so. 84 As to the balance between the efficiency of corporate 
management and protection of minority shareholders, English law has con-
sistently favored the former. 
Second, the development of English law has shown 'a marked judicial 
antipathy, even hostility, towards the minority shareholder who comes before the 
court as a litigant'. 85 This judicial antipathy is even more obvious towards 
minority shareholders in large public companies because such companies are of 
enormous size and play important roles in the economy, and because the minority 
shareholders therein normally have less of a stake in bringing a derivative 
action. 86 Actually, English common law has consistently been more concerned 
with the risk of the abusive application of derivative actions by minority 
shareholders than with the risk of insufficient protection for the company and 
minority shareholders.87 
Third, English common law has insisted on the collective nature of corporate 
decision-making: an individual shareholder's derivative action should be sub-
jected to an appropriate collective decision-making body. Therefore, the deriva-
tive action becomes a last resort. 88 With regard to the balance between preserving 
the collective nature of corporate decision-making and the enforcement of 
directors' duties and protection of minority shareholders, English law again 
favors the former. 89 
It is generally agreed that these traditional English policies were based on their 
specific backgrounds. As we mentioned in Section 2.1.2.1, the Foss rule had its 
origins in partnership principles and was decided at a time when economic 
development was the main concern. However, we may wonder why, after the 
1980s when the context began to change, and especially since protection for 
companies and investors has begun attracting more and more attention, these 
policies have not been changed but, instead, have continued to be followed. 
Alternative mechanisms 
As in other Western jurisdictions, there has been a plurality of legal and non-legal 
mechanisms to protect companies and minority shareholders, as well as to disci-
pline corporate management in England. For example, in addition to the 
84 Sealy ( 1987), p. 4. 
85 Sealy (1987), p. 2. 
86 Boyle (2002), pp. 12-13. 
87 Davies (2003), p. 447; Hirt (2004b), p. 181. 
88 Davies (2003), p. 463. The approach to the derivative action as the weapon of last resort was 
also embodied in Barrett v. Duckett, [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 243 (CA), where the court found that 
a derivative action should be allowed only if the plaintiff had no other remedy available; see 
Section 2.4.1.2.4. 
89 Davies (2003), p. 463. 
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derivative action, the unfair prejudice remedy, the enforcement of shareholders' 
personal rights, the right to attack the alteration of articles of association, and the 
just and equitable winding-up remedy also provide private enforcement for 
individual shareholders. Moreover, English law additionally provides extensive 
and robust public enforcement of director's duties in order to supplement private 
enforcement.90 According to sections 432 (appointment of inspectors) and 447 
(investigation of company documents) of the UK Companies Act 1985 (as amen-
ded in 1989), the Secretary of State has extensive investigatory and petitioning 
powers. In addition, market forces such as the takeover mechanism also discipline 
the behavior of managers, especially those in public companies. 
Due to the limitations of this book, it is impossible to discuss all the 
mechanisms, even if very briefly. However, in the following section I will discuss 
the unfair prejudice remedy, which is regarded as superseding the derivative 





The unfair prejudice remedy and the derivative action 
An introduction to the unfair prejudice remedy91 
The predominant role of the unfair prejudice remedy 
The unfair prejudice remedy, which is provided by sections 459-461 (which will 
be referred to as the section 459 remedy or the unfair prejudice remedy hereafter) 
of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended in 1989), was originally introduced 
because the common law derivative action and the winding-up remedy played an 
insufficient role in protecting minority shareholders.92 The intended purpose of 
enhancing the minority shareholders' position by introducing the unfair prejudice 
remedy has been achieved to a certain extent. Nowadays the unfair prejudice 
remedy is, in practice, the major mechanism for providing protection for minority 
shareholders, especially shareholders in small private companies. It is more 
popular and more frequently invoked than all the other remedies put together, 
such as the derivative action, the enforcement of shareholders' personal rights, the 
right to attack the alteration of articles of association and the just and equitable 
winding-up remedy.93 Due to this remedy, minority shareholders may obtain relief 
which they might not be able to obtain under other forms ofprocedure.94 
90 Kraakman et al. (2004), p. 117; Davies (2003), p. 467. 
91 For details of the unfair prejudice remedy, please refer to, for example, Boyle (2002), Davies 
(2003), Hollington (1999), Joffe (2000), and Boros (1995). 
92 Boyle (2002), p. 90; Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 7.11. 
93 Sealy (1997), p. 174. 
94 Sealy (1997), p. 174. 
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We should note, however, that the unfair prejudice remedy only plays an 
important role in small and medium-sized companies. It has hardly ever been 
applied in public companies95 because it is difficult to prove the most important 
element of the petition, 'legitimate expectation,' and also because the remedy 
awarded under the unfair prejudice remedy usually is not compensation but 'buy-
out,' which may not be attractive in public companies.96 
2.2.2.1.2 The unfair prejudice remedy: a wide-ranging remedy 
The unfair prejudice petition provides a wide-ranging remedy for an aggrieved 
shareholder where the company's affairs 'are being or have been conducted in a 
manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or 
of some part of its members (including at least himself)' .97 The court, if satisfied 
that the petition is 'well founded,' may 'make such order as it thinks fit for giving 
relief in respect of the matters complained of'. 98 
The wording of section 459 is deliberately wide ranging so that the unfair 
prejudice proceeding can award protection to minority shareholders in various 
situations.99 This flexible approach could be seen in the use of certain terms in 
section 459. First, the 'interests,' rather than merely the legal rights, of a member 
are protected. 100 The interests protected by the unfair prejudice remedy are 
normally recognized as the 'legitimate expectation' of a member. 101 Although 
95 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), summary: 'The remedy can be used by shareholders in 
publicly listed companies but the statistical survey shows that 96% of the claims of this type 
commenced in 1994 and 1995 related to private companies of which 84% had 5 or fewer 
shareholders.' Also see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), Appendix E, statistics, Table 1. 
96 Boyle (2002), pp. 101-102. For an introduction of the unfair prejudice petition, see Section 
2.2.2.1. 
97 Section 459(1) of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended by the Companies Act 1989, Schedule. 
19, para. 11) states that 'a member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order 
under this Part (i.e., Part XVII of the Companies Act 1985, added by the writer) on the ground 
that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or of some part of its members (including 
at least himself) or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an 
act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.' 
98 Section 461(1) of CA 1985. 
99 This flexibility, however, also causes problems by blurring the distinction between the unfair 
prejudice remedy and the derivative action; for details about this issue, please refer to Section 
2.2.2.2. 
100 Not all interests of a member are protected by section 459. Under this section, 'interests' 
should be interests qua member. 'Interests' may also include a member's expectation that he 
continue to participate in corporate management. See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 
9.18-9.20. 
101 For judicial illustration of 'legitimate expectation', see Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Pie [1995] 
1 B.C.L.C. 14, at pp. 19-20, per Hoffinann L.J; O'Neill v. Phillips, [1999] I W.L.R. 1092, at p. 
1102. Also see Davies (2003), pp. 517-518. 
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generally no informal agreements are recognized as legitimate expectations in 
public companies, especially listed companies 1°2, in private companies, especially 
small ones, legitimate expectation is generally recognized as existing in informal 
agreements among members, as well as in the articles and formal contracts. As a 
result, section 459 applies not only to situations where there is 'illegality,' such as 
breaches of constitution, but also to those situations where there is no 'illegality' 
but a mere breach of an informal agreement in private companies. 
Second, the more widely interpreted terminology of 'unfair prejudice' 
replaces the former restrictive term of 'oppression.' Although it is still unclear 
what 'unfair prejudice' is, and there is no exact definition of it, case law has laid 
down some guidelines. 103 (1) Prejudice may include, but is not restricted to a fall, 
or risk of fall in the value of the petitioner's shares; exclusion from the corporate 
management may also be a prejudice to the petitioner. 104 (2) Prejudice to the 
minority must be unfair and not just prejudice per se. (3) The test of whether the 
prejudice was unfair is an objective one. 105 (4) Unlawful conduct does not always 
amount to unfair prejudice. Trivial misconduct breaching the articles, although 
unlawful, may not amount to unfair prejudice. The principle that the court should 
not interfere with corporate management is also recognized in the unfair 
prejudice remedy. Therefore, the court generally is unwilling to find unfair 
prejudicial conduct in corporate management; only gross mismanagement can 
lead to 'unfair prejudice' .106 Nevertheless, some lawful conduct, if it has 
contravened the petitioner's legal expectation, may still be regarded as unfair 
prejudicial conduct. 107 (5) Although the section 459 remedy is not an equitable 
one and the petitioner need not come with 'clean hands,' the petitioner's conduct 
can still affect the case; due to the petitioner's conduct the respondent's act may 
end up not being considered unfair. 108 
102 The reason for this is what Vinelott J. pointed out in Re Blue Arrow pie ([1987] B.C.L.C. 585, 
at 590): ' ... it must be borne in mind that this is a public company, a listed company, and a 
large one ... Outside investors were entitled to assume that the whole of the constitution was 
contained in the articles, read, of course, together with the Companies Act. There is in these 
circumstances no room for any legitimate expectation founded on some agreement or 
arrangement made between the directors and kept up their sleeves and not disclosed to those 
placing the shares with the public through the Unlisted Securities Market.' This approach, 
together with the unnecessary exit remedy in listed public companies, leads to the few 
applications of section 459 to listed public companies. 
103 For the guidelines see, for example, Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 9.21-9.30. 
104 Such as Re RA Noble [1983] B.C.L.C., 273; see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 9.30. 
105 See, for example, Re RA Noble, [1983] B.C.L.C., 273; Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Pfc, [1995] 
1 B.C.L.C. 14. 
106 See, for example, Re Elgindata (No. I) [1991] B.C.L.C. 959 at p. 993; also see Boyle (2002), 
pp. 100-101. 
107 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Pfc, [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 14; also see Law Commission CP 142 
(1996), paras. 9.21-9.24. 
108 Re RA Noble [1983] B.C.L.C., 273; also see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 9.28-9.29. 
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Third, the CA 1989 added to section 459 the phrase, 'the interests of its 
members generally'. As a result, the section may provide protection for minority 
shareholders, not only where the interests of some of the members' are unfairly 
prejudiced, but also where all members' interests are unfairly prejudiced, for 
example, where dividends are not paid, or where there are injuries to the 
company. 109 Since an injury to the company may also give rise to a member's 
derivative action, this application of section 459 to corporate wrongs may cause 
an overlap between the section 459 remedy and the derivative action. I will 
discuss this overlap later in Section 2.2.2.2. 
The broadly drafted terms in section 459 make it difficult to define all categories 
of unfair prejudice cases. Nevertheless, it is generally recognized that breaches of 
informal agreement among the members and breaches of fiduciary duties by the 
corporate controllers are two important categories. 110 The Law Commission also 
recognized that some common allegations under the unfair prejudice remedy 
are111 : 'exclusion of a minority shareholder from management' 112, 'misappropria-
tion or diversion of corporate assets' 113, 'failure to provide information,i 14, 
'improper increases in share capital' 115, and 'excessive remuneration and non 
payment or payment of inadequate dividends'. 116 Among these the first two 
allegations are especially frequent. 117 
2.2.2.1.3 Remedies awarded under the unfair prejudice petition 
Remedies that may be awarded under the unfair prejudice petition are set out in 
section 461 of the Companies Act 1985. Section 461(1) gives the court broad 
discretion 'to make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the 
matters complained of'. Section 461 (2) lists several remedies that the court may 
award to the petitioner 'without prejudice to the generality of subsection ( 1)'. 118 
These remedies include the courts' order to 'regulate the conduct of the 
company's affairs in the future' 119, the order to 'require the company to refrain 
from doing or continuing an act complained of by the petitioner or to do an act 
which the petitioner has complained it has omitted to do>l20, the order to 
109 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 9.31. 
110 Davies (2003), p. 521. 
111 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 7.2 and part 9. 
112 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 9.34. 
113 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 9.40. 
114 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 9.35. 
115 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 9.36-9.38. 
116 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 9.41-9.43. 
117 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 7.2. 
118 Section 461(2) of the CA 1985. 
119 Section 461(2)(a) of the CA 1985. 
120 Section 461(2)(b) of the CA 1985. 
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'authorize civil proceedings to be brought in the name and on behalf of the 
company by such person or persons and on such terms as the court may direct' 121 , 
the order to 'provide for the purchase of the shares of any members of the 
company by other members or by the company itself and, in the case of a purchase 
by the company itself, the reduction of the company's capital accordingly' 122, and 
so on. 123 In order to obtain these remedies, the petitioner must state the remedies 
he seeks. The court normally will not award remedies the petitioner does not 
specify; 124 sometimes the court will grant remedies which have not originally 
been sought, but only provided the petitioner agrees. 125 
A detailed discussion of these remedies is not our concern here. However, since 
unfair prejudicial conduct may be found where the injury was done to the 
company, the issue arises as to whether the petitioner can be compensated, either 
directly or indirectly, for those losses that are derived from corporate losses. This 
issue is actually quite important with regard to the relationship between the unfair 
prejudice petition and the derivative action. I will discuss this issue in Section 
2.2.2.2.3. 
2.2.2.1.4 Problems with the unfair prejudice petition 
The unfair prejudice petition also has its own problems in practice. First, the 
proceeding is lengthy and costly. 126 This particular issue has been considered by 
both the Law Commission and the CLR, and some suggestions for reform have 
been raised and generally accepted, such as case management and an alternative 
arbitration scheme. 127 Second, as mentioned in Section 2.2.2.1.1, the petition has 
hardly ever been applied to public companies. Third, the relationship between the 
unfair prejudice remedy and the derivative action is still unclear. For example, 
under what circumstances can the unfair prejudice petition be filed where the 
121 Section 461(2)(c) of the CA 1985. 
122 Section 461(2)(d) of the CA 1985. 
123 For example, the court may award interim orders such as injunction, or even interim payment; 
see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.27, Footnote 71. 
124 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.1. 
125 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para 10.1, Footnote 7. 
126 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. I I.I. 
127 For case management, see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), part 17; Law Commission Report 
246 (1997), part 2; for the arbitration scheme, see DTI (01/942), para. 2.27. Neither of these 
reforms is confined to the unfair prejudice remedy. The Law Commission also recommended 
some other reforms, but those methods have been rejected either by the Law Commission itself 
or by the CLR. For example, a new unfair prejudice remedy for smaller companies was 
recommended but rejected by the Law Commission, see Law Commission CP 142 ( 1996), part 
18; Law Commission Report 246 (1997), part 3. A presumption of unfairness in certain cases 
of exclusion from management and inclusion of a model exit article in Table A were 
recommended by the Law Commission but rejected by the CLR, see Law Commission CP 142 
(1996), part 19; DTI (00/656), paras 4.103-4.104. 
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injury was done to the company and, if it is allowed, what remedies may be 
awarded under it? I will discuss these issues in the following sections. 
2.2.2.2 The relationship between the unfair prejudice remedy and the 
derivative action 
As mentioned, the unfair prejudice remedy can apply to the situation where the 
company has suffered losses through misconduct. This application actually blurs 
the distinction between this remedy and the derivative action. Much of the 
conduct presently regulated by the section 459 petition might have fallen within 
the scope of derivative actions before the introduction of this petition. 128 This 
vagueness also raises the issue of whether the unfair prejudice remedy should 
completely replace the derivative action, or whether a separate derivative action 
is still necessary. In fact, the relationship between the unfair prejudice remedy 
and the derivative action still remains unclear under English law. 
2.2.2.2.1 The purpose of the unfair prejudice petition: also providing 
protection for minority shareholders where the company has 
suffered losses 
When it recommended changes to section 210 of the Company Act 1948, the 
precursor of section 459 of the Company Act 1985, the Jenkins Committee 
especially considered the weak position of minority shareholders where 
misconduct was done to the company and where the wrongdoer, who controlled 
the company, unduly prevented a corporate action against this misconduct. 129 In 
such cases, the minority shareholders also suffer indirectly. The Jenkins 
Committee recognized that such a weak position for minority shareholders could 
be attributed to the excessive restriction resulting from the exceptions to the Foss 
rule. 130 In order to provide better protection for minority shareholders, the Com-
mittee recommended that section 210 of the Company Act 1948 should be 
changed to give the court discretion as to authorizing a petitioner to bring a 
proceeding in the name of the company. 131 The Committee's recommendations 
were later accepted by section 75 of the Companies Act 1980, which subsequently 
became sections 459(461 of the Companies Act 1985. 132 
The legislature's intention to improve the minority shareholders' position 
where the company suffered losses became more obvious when section 459 was 
amended by the Company Act 1989 to extend its application to the situation 
128 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 7.2. 
129 Jenkins Committee (1962), paras. 206-207. Also see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 
7.11. 
130 Jenkins Committee (1962), para. 206. 
131 Jenkins Committee (1962), para. 206. 
132 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 7.12. 
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where the misconduct is unfairly prejudicial to 'the interests of its members 
generally'. 133 It is clear from this wording that the section 459 petition applies to 
those situations where the misconduct was done to the company, and all 
members' interests were therefore affected equally. 
English courts have supported the legislature's approach. In a number of cases the 
courts have allowed an unfair prejudice petition in the case of breaches of 
fiduciary duties to the company, even when the facts of these cases could also 
give rise to derivative actions. The actual availability of a derivative action will 
not bar a section 459 petition. 134 According to these decided cases, various types 
of breaches of fiduciary duties may give rise to section 459 petitions, for 
example, cases involving conflict of interest135, cases involving the exercise of 
directors' powers for an improper purpose 136, cases involving not acting bona fide 
in the best interests of the company137, and cases involving the diversion of 
corporate funds. 138 
2.2.2.2.2 A derivative action or an unfair prejudice petition: application of 
the unfair prejudice petition where the company has suffered 
losses 
As mentioned above, a petitioner may bring an unfair prejudice petition where the 
company has suffered losses and thus circumvent the requirements of the Foss 
rule. However, will a petitioner be free to bring an unfair prejudice petition in any 
case of corporate losses so that the derivative action is indeed totally replaced? 
The answer may be no. It is hard to imagine that all the rationales under the 
derivative action and the Foss rule will be dropped. 139 There must be some 
limitation on the application of the unfair prejudice petition in the case of 
corporate losses. The Law Commission also clearly insists that a separate 
derivative action is needed. 140 The question then is how to define the scope of the 
unfair prejudice petition, or in other words, how to distinguish between the 
application of the unfair prejudice remedy and the derivative action, where the 
133 See Section 2.2.2.1.2. 
134 Hoffinann J. is famous for this approach. This can be seen from decisions he has made in 
several cases, such as In Re A Company (No. 005287 of 1985), [1986] I W.L.R. 281; Re A 
Company [1986] B.C.L.C. 382; Re A Company [1986] B.C.L.C. 376. Other cases include Re 
Saul D Harrison & Sons Pie [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 14, Re Stewarts (Brixton) Ltd. [1985] B.C.L.C. 
4, Lowe v. Fahey [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 262; also see Davies (2003), pp. 513-514. 
135 Such as Re Stewarts (Brixton) Ltd. [1985] B.C.L.C. 4; Re London School of Elechm1ics [1986] 
Ch. 211; Re Cumana Ltd. [1986] B.C.L.C. 430. 
136 Such as Re a Company Exp. Glossop [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1068. 
137 Such as Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons Pie. [1995] I B.C.L.C. 14. 
138 Such as Lowe v. Fahey, [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 262. 
139 Davies (2003), p. 514. 
140 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.11. 
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injury was done to the company. The Law Commission has not fully addressed 
this issue. Nevertheless, we may find some clues in case law. 
In Re Saul D Harrison & Sons Plc, Hoffmann L.J. declared that 'enabling the 
court in an appropriate case to outflank the rule in Foss v. Harbottle was one of 
the purposes' of the section 459 petition. 141 However, what is an appropriate case? 
This complicated issue was addressed by Millett J. in Re Charnley Davies Ltd. 
(No. 2). 142 In dicta, Millett J. held that a separate wrong from the wrong done to 
the company was not necessary for a successful section 459 petition because in 
the case of corporate wrong the members' interests might also be unfairly 
prejudiced. However, in order to satisfy a section 459 petition, it is also not 
sufficient for the petitioner to allege a mere breach of duties to the company by 
the controllers. Instead, the petitioner must show something more: he must show 
that his interests have been unfairly prejudiced by the controller. Millett J. pointed 
out that 'The very same facts may well found either a derivative action or as. 459 
petition'143 , however, 'This should not disguise the fact that the nature of the 
complaint and the appropriate relief is different in the two cases' .144 Just as in the 
case of the breach of the corporate constitution, there may be more than one legal 
dimension for the same facts. 145 If mere breach of duties to the company is the 
complaint and only corporate remedies are sought, the shareholder should bring 
a derivative action rather than an unfair prejudice petition. 146 The gist of the unfair 
prejudice petition is the disregard shown toward members' interests rather than 
the wrong done to the company. 147 
However, the approach in Re Charnley Davies Ltd. (No. 2) was not followed 
by the Scottish Inner House of the Court of Session in the case of Anderson v. 
Hogg. 148 The petition in Anderson v. Hogg was against an unlawful payment of a 
salary and other compensation by the respondent director to himself. The Inner 
House (Lord Prosser dissenting) ordered the respondent to return the unlawful 
payment to the company. When considering whether there was unfair prejudice in 
the case, the Inner House did not follow the approach in Re Charnley Davies Ltd. 
(No. 2). Lord Coulsfield held that an 'unlawful and materially prejudicial' action 
itself might be unfair. He held that 'There seems to be no case in which a 
shareholder's complaint under s. 459 on that basis has been rejected on the ground 
141 [1995] I B.C.L.C. 14, at p. 18. 
142 [1990] B.C.L.C. 760. This case concerns a petition under section 27 of the Insolvency Act, 
which serves the same role as section 459 of the CA when an administration order is effective. 
143 Re Charnley Davies Ltd. (No. 2), [1990] B.C.L.C. 760, at p. 784. Jill Poole and Pauline Roberts 
also pointed out that 'especially in the context of private companies, it is invariably possible to 
find some personal wrong deriving from the directors' conduct to bring the action withins. 459 
... ' Poole & Roberts (1999), at pp.117-118. 
144 Re Charnley Davies Ltd. (No. 2), [1990] B.C.L.C. 760, at p. 784. 
145 For a discussion on the breach of the corporate constitution, see Section 2.3.2. 
146 See Davies (2003), p. 514. 
147 See Hirt (2003a), at p. 104; Davies (2003), p. 514. 
148 2002 S.L.T. 354, Inner House. 
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that, although the action was unlawful and materially prejudicial, it was not 
unfair' .149 The case could be decided on the merits in that it involved only two 
groups of shareholders and so in that case there was little distinction between 
unlawful misconduct to the company and unfairness to the shareholder. 150 
However, if this approach is taken, a wrong done to the company which injures 
the legal rights of the corporation may always be unfairly prejudicial to the 
shareholder's legal interests, therefore, the derivative action might be completely 
circumvented by the member's applying for a section 459 petition. 151 
2.2.2.2.3 Remedies in the unfair prejudice petition regarding corporate 
losses 
The relationship between the unfair prejudice petition and the derivative action in 
the case of wrongs done to the company is even vaguer when we turn to the 
remedies awarded in the petition regarding corporate losses. The reason is that the 
petitioner may be compensated, either directly or indirectly, for those losses 
which are derived from the losses of the corporation. For example, there may be 
a compensatory element in the form of valuation for the purchase order; 
furthermore, a petitioner may be awarded direct compensation for his reflective 
losses. In addition, a corporate relief rather than a personal one may be awarded 
in the petition. In the following sections I will discuss these respectively. 
The compensato,y element in valuation for the purchase order 
A purchase order is the most common remedy that can be awarded under the 
unfair prejudice petition. 152 The reason for this may be that the unfair prejudice 
remedy mainly provides protection for members of private companies, especially 
quasi-partnership companies, where there is normally no exit right for 
members. 153 Unlike public companies, there is no open shares market for 
members of private companies, therefore, the exit right provided by the unfair 
prejudice remedy has been welcomed. 154 
149 2002 S.L.T. 354, Inner House, at p. 360. 
150 Davies (2003), p. 515. 
151 See Davies (2003), pp. 515-516. However, Hirt pointed out that Anderson v. Hogg may not be 
an important case for English courts since it is a Scottish one and the decision of the case was 
not based on sufficient authmity, see Hirt (2003a), p. 104. 
152 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.10. This is evidenced by the Law Commission's 
statistics. According to the Law Commission's statistics, among 156 pieces of unfair prejudice 
petitions during the period ofl994-l 995, 69 .9% applied for an order that the petitioner's shares 
be bought, and 20.5% applied for an order that the respondents sell their shares. See Law 
Commission CP 142 (1996), Appendix E, Table I. 
153 This could be seen from the fact that unfair prejudice is mostly ascertained in small private 
companies, see Davies (2003), p. 525. 
154 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.10, Footnote 27. 
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The major difficulty with a purchase order is how to decide a fair value for the 
shares to be sold. 155 When evaluating the price of the shares, the court should also 
be subject to the general standard of section 461 (1) that 'to make such order as it 
thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the matters complained of.' Thus, the 
overriding consideration for the English court concerning valuation is the 
requirement of 'fairness' .156 This requirement includes compensating the 
petitioner for unfairly prejudicial conduct when necessary. 157 Specifically, the 
court will consider factors such as the basis of the valuation of a minority 
shareholding ( or in other words whether the shares should be valued on a pro rata 
or a discounted basis), the date on which the shares should be valued, adjustments 
to that valuation, the type of order158, and so on. 159 
Where the unfairly prejudicial conduct such as misappropriation or 
mismanagement caused injury to the company, the English court, basing itself on 
the requirement of 'fairness,' may take the corporate losses into consideration 
when evaluating the price of the shares to be bought. Put another way, in order to 
strike a balance of fairness between the parties, the valuation may be carried out 
on the hypothetical basis that misconduct had not yet occurred and that the 
company had not yet suffered any loss. For this purpose, the corporate loss may 
then be hypothetically accounted to the company. 160 As a result, the petitioner 
shareholder may obtain more than the market value of the shares and his 'indirect 
loss' (or 'reflective loss') derived from the corporate loss may be compensated in 
the purchase order. 161 This approach of compensating the petitioner shareholder's 
'reflective loss' in the purchase order is different to that under German law, which 
only evaluates the shares based on their 'market value' .162 
However, Hirt doubts the appropriateness of redressing the petitioner's 
reflective loss in awarding the purchase order. 163 He gives several reasons. First, 
such an order might reduce the value of the company's cause of action against the 
wrongdoers or affect the position of the creditors, although it also might neither 
reduce the company's assets (in a case where the order is against the respondent) 
nor affect the injured company's cause of action against the wrongdoer. 164 Second, 
such an order also runs contrary to the principle that a shareholder cannot recover 
damages that are only a reflection of the company's loss. 165 
155 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 10.10-10.25. 
156 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.11. 
157 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.22. 
158 It is also possible for the court to make a purchase order such that the petitioner should buy out 
the respondent's shares; see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.24. 
159 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 10.10-10.25. 
160 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.21. 
161 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.22. 
162 For a discussion on the German law, please refer to Section 4.2.3.2.1. 
163 Hirt (2003a), pp.109-110. 
164 Hirt (2003a), p. 106, p. 109; Hirt (2003b), p. 429, Footnote 48. 
165 See Hirt (2003a), p. 106, pp. 109-110. 
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Compensat01J1 damages directly to the petitioner 
Although the petitioner's reflective losses, which are derived from the corporate 
losses, may be compensated in the purchase order, it is open to doubt whether 
compensatory damages will be awarded to the petitioner directly. 166 
In the Irish case Irish Press plc. v. Ingersoll Irish Publications Ltd. 167, the Irish 
Supreme Court overturned the High Court's order that the respondent should 
compensate the petitioner directly, on the basis that such a direct compensation 
was beyond the court's ability under section 205(3) of the Irish Companies Act 
1963, which requires that orders should be made ' ... with a view to bringing to 
an end the matter complained of ... '. 168 Therefore, Irish law distinguishes 
between the compensatory element in the valuation of shares in the exit remedy 
and the court's ability to award compensatory damages in the petitioner's own 
right. 169 Although section 461 of the UK Companies Act is different from the 
Irish Act and contains no such limitation as that found under section 205(3) of the 
Irish Act, the English Law Commission held that 'The approach in the English 
courts should ... arguably be the same' as the Irish approach. 170 
However, a recent English High Court case has taken the approach that a 
petitioner may be compensated for his reflective losses in a section 459 petition, 
and it is at the court's discretion to decide whether to make a purchase order with 
a complementary element or to award compensatory damages to the petitioner. 171 
In Atlasvif!W v. Brightview172, the petitioners claimed that one of the respondents, 
Mr Shalson, misappropriated the assets of the company (Brightview) for the 
benefit of the members holding class A shares (the A shareholders) and to the 
exclusion of the members holding class B shares (the B shareholders). The 
petitioners brought a section 459 petition, seeking either an order reversing the 
effect of the undervalued sale and requiring the respondents to account for any 
profits, or an order that the respondents pay damages to the petitioners. 173 Among 
other arguments, the respondents raised the 'reflective loss argument,' which 
stated that the duty they were alleged to have breached was owed to the company 
rather than the company's shareholders and therefore only the company was the 
proper claimant. Moreover, any diminution in the value of shares as a result of the 
breach was merely reflective of the company's losses (if any). 174 However, the 
High Court of Justice Chancery Division Companies Court rejected the 'reflec-
166 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.27. 
167 [1995] 2 ILRM 270. 
168 For an introduction to the case, see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.27, Footnote 72. 
169 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.22, Footnote 62. 
170 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para.l 0.27, Footnote 72. 
171 Atlasview v. Brightview, 2004 WL 741783, para. 63. 
172 2004 WL 741783. 
173 2004 WL 741783, para. 19. 
174 2004 WL 741783, paras. 58-59. 
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tive loss argument'. It refused to follow the cases relied on by the respondents for 
the argument such as Prudential Assurance Company Ltd. v. Newman Industries 
Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court of Appeal), Stein v. Blake (No. 2)175 and Johnson v. Gore 
Wood & Co. 176, considering that these cases were 'all concerned with writ 
actions' and 'do not purport to lay down any principle governing the exercise of 
the court's power under s.459' .177 The Court acknowledged that there had been 
many cases in which a section 459 petition was allowed against a majority 
shareholder's misappropriation of corporate assets 178, and held that: 
... there is no justification for reading into s.459 a restriction to the effect that 
a petitioner can only complain if the unfairly prejudicial conduct does not 
involve a breach by any directors of their duties to the company. Equally, as a 
matter of interpretation, there is no justification for imposing an absolute bar 
on the types of relief that the court might award at trial in relation to unfairly 
prejudicial conduct which happens also to involve a breach by directors of 
their duties to the company. Indeed, any such interpretation of s.459 would 
appear to run counter to its express wording, which refers to unfair prejudice 
'to the interests of its members generally' or of some part of its members. 179 
The Court also recognized that in such a case a derivative action would have the 
drawback of unjustly benefiting the wrongdoing majority shareholder: 
... by that route [a derivative action], the defendant transferees would be 
having to make a payment to the transferor company, the bulk of which they 
would then recover in their capacity as majority shareholders. That hardly 
seems like a desirable route for compensating those who have in fact suffered 
the loss. 180 
As to the form of relief, the Court held that: 
... the 'reflective loss argument' does not provide a bar to any of the relief 
sought in the Petition. The fact that the impugned conduct might give rise to a 
cause of action at the suit of the company does not mean that it is incapable 
also of giving rise to unfair prejudice: nor does it necessarily preclude the 
court from awarding financial compensation to the petitioners in satisfaction 
of their claim. In deciding on the appropriate form of relief, the trial judge will 
no doubt be astute to ensure that the B Shareholders do not achieve double 
175 [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 573; [1998] 1 All E.R. 724 (CA). 
176 [2002] 1 AC 1. 
177 2004 WL 741783, para. 59. 
178 2004 WL 741783, para. 60. 
179 2004 WL 741783, para. 61. 
180 2004 WL 741783, para. 62. 
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recovery by receiving financial compensation directly from the A Share-
holders and also retaining their B Shares in Brightview in circumstances 
where the company is able (if it is) to recover in respect of the same loss: 
indeed, it seems to me most likely that the trial judge would, if the Petition 
succeeded, order the Respondents to acquire the Barton Parties' shares, valued 
on the basis that there had been no transfer to Freshbox, rather than making an 
award of damages (however described). But that is a matter for his discretion, 
if and when it comes to considering the appropriate form of relief. It is not a 
ground for summarily striking out the Petition, or any particular head of relief 
currently pleaded in it. 181 
Compensation to the injured company 
Another vague aspect of the unfair prejudice petition, which is problematic, is 
whether the court will grant corporate relief in such a petition where the company 
has suffered losses. Section 461 (2)( c) empowers the court to authorize a 
derivative action to be brought by the petitioner in the name of the company, 
provided the petitioner succeeds in the unfair prejudice procedure. However, 
orders by the court to authorize a derivative action could only be found in a very 
few reported cases. 182 The need to pass two proceedings makes this kind of relief 
lengthy, costly and inconvenient. 183 It turns out to be unpopular in practice. 184 
Different approaches have been taken with regard to whether English courts 
should grant compensation to the company under the unfair prejudice petition. 185 
The traditional approach was taken in Re Charnley Davies Ltd. (No 2)186, where 
it was held that corporate relief (that is, a payment to the company) was not 
appropriate under the section 459 petition. Millett J., as mentioned, held that the 
essence of the unfair prejudice petition is the disregard of the petitioner's interests 
rather than the wrong done to the company, although both of them may be found 
in the same facts. Thus, in such circumstances, whether a derivative action or an 
unfair prejudice petition is appropriate principally depends on the remedies 
sought. If only the wrong done to the company is the complaint and corporate 
remedies are sought, a section 459 petition is not suitable and the aggrieved 
181 2004 WL 741783, para. 63. 
182 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.9. 
183 See Poole & Roberts (1999), p. 119; Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.9. 
184 According to the Law Commission's statistics, only 26 out of the 156 petitions between 1994-
1995, representing only 16.7%, applied for the 461(2)(c) order. In addition, there are few 
reported cases where such an order has been awarded. In Re Cyplon Developments Ltd. March 
3, 1982, (unreported, CA) the order was granted; however, the order was requested but refused 
in Re Hailey Group Ltd. [1993] B.C.L.C. 459; see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.9. 
185 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.27. 
186 Also see Re Little Olympian Each-Ways (No. 3) [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 636. 
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shareholder should bring a derivative action. 187 This approach seems consistent 
with the prima facie understanding that the section 459 petition should provide 
remedies where there is unfairly prejudicial conduct against the member. 
However, in a more recent case the court took a different approach in favoring 
corporate compensation in section 459 petitions. In Lowe v. Fahey188, Mrs Lowe, 
a minority shareholder of Fahey Developments Ltd., brought a section 459 
petition, alleging that the respondent majority shareholders, Mr and Mrs Fahey, 
transferred profits of Fahey Developments to a third party, Brickfield Property 
Ltd., which was under the control of the Faheys. The petitioner sought not only 
personal relief, that is, an order that either her shares be bought or the 
respondents' shares be sold out, but also corporate relief, that is, an order that the 
respondents, the Faheys and Brickfield Property, give an account to Fahey 
Developments of the funds appropriated. When considering whether corporate 
compensation could be awarded against both majority shareholders and a third 
party under the unfair prejudice remedy, the court held that: 
where ... the unfairly prejudicial conduct involves the diversion of company 
funds, a petitioner is entitled as a matter of jurisdiction to seek an order under 
s.461 for payment to the company itself not only against members, former 
members or directors allegedly involved in the unlawful diversion, but also 
against third parties who have knowingly received or improperly assisted in 
the wrongful diversion. 189 
However, it is worth noting that although the case appeared to deviate from 
former cases in the sense that it awarded corporate compensation under the unfair 
prejudice petition, it might not really have departed from the approach in Re 
Charnley Davies Ltd. (No 2) which held that section 459 should mainly provide 
protection for members where they are unfairly prejudiced. In Lowe v. Fahey, the 
court also held that 'This is not to say that in a case where the only substantive 
relief being sought was a claim on behalf of the company against such a third 
party that a claimant could always proceed by way of petition instead of derivative 
action' .190 In other words, only when corporate compensation is one of the 
remedies sought by the petitioner should the court award corporate compensation, 
since two separate proceedings would be costly and time wasting. However, if 
corporate compensation is the only relief sought, the section 459 petition may be 
inappropriate and a derivative action might be necessary. 191 
The Scottish court went further in Anderson v. Hogg ( far beyond the approach 
in Lowe v. Fahey. The Inner House of the Court of Session (Lord Prosser 
187 See Davies (2003), p. 514. 
188 [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 262. For a comment on the case, see Gray (1997). 
189 [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 262, at p. 268. 
190 [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 262, at p. 268. 
191 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 10.27, Footnote 73. 
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dissenting) ordered reimbursement of the unlawful payment by the respondent to 
the company, which was the only relief sought by the petition. As a result, Millett 
J.'s opinion in Re Charnley Davies has been fully rejected. 192 
Researchers take different approaches to the issue as well. Hirt doubts the 
appropriateness of awarding corporate relief under the section 459 petition 
because it may not be consistent with the rationales under the Foss rule. The 
question of whether a shareholder should be entitled to enforce the company's 
rights, the very question which arises in derivative actions, simply cannot be 
avoided in the section 459 petition. 193 From the opposite perspective, Poole and 
Roberts argue for flexibility on the section 459 remedies so as to include 
corporate relief. 194 They raise several reasons for this. First, if the section 459 
petition is allowed to address corporate wrongs, it would be ironic and 
meaningless if corporate remedy was not allowed on the basis that 'the section 
459 is not considered an appropriate form of action for such relief' .195 Second, 
under the section 459 petition, it would in all practicality be inconvenient if 
another separate action were needed in order to redress the corporate wrong. 
Poole and Roberts cited Hoffmann J.'s opinion in Re A Company (No. 005287 of 
1985). 196 In this case, Hoffmann J., when refusing to strike out this petition whose 
facts might also give rise to a derivative action, held that: 
Looking at the matter from a practical point of view that [that is, a separate 
derivative action is needed to redress corporate wrongs in a successful section 
459 petition, added by the author] does not seem to me to be very convenient. 
It would mean separate proceedings having to be commenced by writ and 
separate pleadings delivered in respect of matters which would very 
substantially overlap, if not duplicate, the issues canvassed in the petition and 
affidavits under section 459 ... I would be reluctant to come to the conclusion 
that this form of duplication was necessary unless it was clear that the 
jurisdiction under sections 459 and 461 did not permit the whole mater to be 
dealt with upon the petition. 197 
Third, no extra costs will be incurred if there is no need to begin an independent 
derivative action. Fourth, if the corporate remedy is awarded under the section 
459 petition, other shareholders and creditors may also benefit from it. 
192 See Davies (2003), p. 515. 
193 Hirt (2003a), p. 106, pp. 108-109. 
194 Poole & Roberts (1999), pp. 119-122. 
195 Poole & Roberts (1999), p. 120, Footnote 7. 
196 [1986] 1 W.L.R. 281. 
197 [1986] 1 W.L.R. 281, at p. 284. 
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2,2,2.3 Will the section 459 petition supersede the derivative action 
under current English law? 
Under current English law, the unfair prejudice remedy might run the risk of 
completely incorporating the derivative action. This can be seen from the 
following aspects. First, the application of the unfair prejudice petition is broad 
enough to cover situations of corporate wrongs, which would have been regulated 
by the rules of derivative action if the unfair prejudice petition had not been 
applicable. In order to bring an unfair prejudice petition in the case of corporate 
wrongs, the petitioner only needs to establish unfairly prejudicial conduct towards 
his (and other members') legal interests; no specific and separate wrong to the 
petitioner is necessary. 198 In fact, especially in private companies, it is always 
possible for the court to identify certain unfairly prejudicial conduct towards the 
petitioner from the director's breach of duties to the company. 199 In addition, other 
similarities with regard to the application of the two procedures may contribute to 
the overlap. For example, both are mainly applied in private companies, both of 
them may be brought against persons other than majority shareholders and 
directors, and neither of them applies to mere negligence. 
Second, it is normally easier for a member to bring an unfair prejudice petition 
rather than a derivative action. As we will observe in Section 2.4.1, the substan-
tive and the procedural requirements for the derivative action are very strict. 
However, if the shareholder brings a section 459 petition, he need not be bothered 
with these requirements, but only needs to establish that there is unfair prejudicial 
conduct towards him (and other members). Although the section 459 petitioner 
cannot obtain indemnity for his litigation costs, he may be able to ask for legal 
aid that is not available to parties in derivative actions. 200 As a result, it is not 
surprising to see that shareholders bring the section 459 petition instead of the 
derivative action in the case of corporate wrongs. The Law Commission also 
admitted this fact. 201 
Third, the unfair prejudice remedy also provides flexible and fair relief. For 
example, the petitioner shareholder may be compensated for his reflective losses, 
which is normally not possible in a shareholder's personal action. Moreover, relief 
to the injured company may also be awarded under the unfair prejudice petition. 
This flexible and fair relief, especially when in most cases it is made to the 
petitioner directly, is of course more attractive to minority shareholders than the 
corporate relief under the derivative action, which the shareholder can only 
indirectly benefit from. 
However, there may still be room left for the derivative action under English law. 
Due to the different focuses of the two proceedings, there may be misconduct 
198 Poole & Roberts (1999), p. 117. 
199 Poole & Roberts (1999), pp. 117-118. 
200 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 16.3, Footnote 15. 
201 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 16.3. 
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which amounts to breach of fiduciary duty but not unfair prejudice.202 This may 
especially be the case if the derivative action is reformed to encompass breach of 
director's duty of skill and care, since section 459 only applies to serious 
mismanagement.203 In addition, the section 459 petition has its own flaws, such 
as its lengthy and costly procedure. Therefore, if the aggrieved minority share-
holder can easily pass the standing requirements under the derivative action, he 
may prefer a derivative action to a section 459 petition.204 
2.2.2.4 Should there be one or hvo forms of action? 
Questions 
This broad application of the unfair prejudice petition and its overlap with 
derivative actions gives rise to the following questions, as raised by Poole and 
Roberts: 
Should the derivative action be dispensed with in favour of a single form of 
action, making identification of the type of wrong less significant? 
If the two forms of action remain, should the derivative action be applicable 
to corporate wrongs and the unfairly prejudicial conduct action reserved for 
personal wrongs? 
Should it be possible to obtain a corporate remedy by means of a section 459 
petition and should it be possible to obtain a personal remedy in a derivative 
action?205 
English law 
As mentioned, English law regards both the unfair prejudice remedy and the 
derivative action as being necessary. Moreover, although English courts do not 
limit the application of the unfair prejudice petition to personal wrongs and may 
in fact compensate the petitioner's reflective losses or award corporate remedy in 
the petition, they are relatively conservative towards this broader application. 
Basically, the unfair prejudice remedy can apply to corporate wrongs where there 
are also personal wrongs (unfair prejudice to the petitioner) and thus where 
personal remedies could be sought at the same time.206 
202 Boros (1995), p. 233. 
203 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras 9.44-9.48. 
204 Boros (1995), p. 219. 
205 Poole & Roberts (1999), p. 112. 
206 This can be compared to the Scottish court's approach. In addition, Australian courts take yet 
another approach: they prefer interpreting the unfair prejudice provision in a way which could 
supersede the derivative action; see Boros (1995), p. 219. 
51 
CHAPTER2 
The Law Commission also supports this case law approach: 
There are still cases where a derivative action is the only or most appropriate 
route to take. Whilst we noted the tendency of applicants to bring section 459 
proceedings in respect of matters which could have given rise to a derivative 
action, we do not consider that the two should be entirely assimilated. They 
are different in principle - one gives rise to a personal right which the 
shareholder can enforce, the other relates to the company's cause of action ( 
and although they may cover some of the same ground, this will not always be 
the case. As was pointed out on consultation, section 459 has largely become 
an exit remedy, and what is needed is a remedy for those who want to stay in 
the company. We consider that a separate and distinct right to bring a 
derivative action should remain. 207 
As to the remedies granted, the Law Commission seems to insist that the unfair 
prejudice petition mainly provides personal relie:£2°8, while the derivative action 
only provides corporate relief. 209 
Researchers' different attitudes toward the English approach 
Researchers have taken different stances on the approach taken by English law. 
One body of opinion doubts the necessity of maintaining a division between the 
unfair prejudice remedy and the derivative action. The reason given is that the 
distinction between personal and corporate wrongs is not clear, and, even where 
it is possible to make a clear distinction, the relationship between the two actions 
still remains vague.210 A single form of action is even suggested.211 
Others argue in favor of this division. However, even here there are dis-
agreements with regard to the wrongs that should be redressed and the remedies 
that should be awarded under each proceeding. For example, Hirt takes a strict 
approach. He suggests that in the case of a breach of directors' duties, the role of 
207 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.11. 
208 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), part 10. 
209 The Law Commission suggests that the court should not have the power to grant a personal 
benefit in a derivative action. The reason is that it is unnecessary and undesirable to do so. On 
the one hand, the injured shareholder can seek his personal relief via the unfair prejudice 
remedy that also applies to corporate wrong; on the other hand, personal relief may be in 
conflict with those policy considerations under the derivative action, such as protection of 
creditors and other shareholders. See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para.16.50; Law 
Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.108. 
210 See, for example, Poole & Roberts (1999), pp. 115-116; Payne (1998), p. 38. 
211 MacIntosh (1991), p. 30. MacIntosh thinks that a single form of action would 'eliminate 
differences in matters of procedure, costs, standing, and the substantive standard of liability 
that currently arise as between the derivative and oppression action.' 
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the section 459 petition should be very limited.212 He also finds that it is in-
appropriate to award either personal or corporate relief under the unfair prejudice 
remedy in order to redress corporate wrongs and that this inappropriateness is 
caused by 'the overlap between corporate and personal rights and remedies to 
which a petition under s.459 based on a director's breach of duty give rise' .213 He 
points out that 'It is important ... to recognize the conflicting policies that govern 
and shape different shareholder remedies and to make an informed and consistent 
policy choice across the range' .214 Hirt's opinion, however, seems to be different 
from the more flexible duality approach taken by the English courts and the Law 
Commission. On the other hand, Boyle suggests that it should be possible to 
award personal relief as part of the derivative action in appropriate situations, for 
example, where the compensation to the company may once again be under the 
control of the wrongdoer. 'There seems no reason why a plaintiff shareholder 
should be driven to an unfair-prejudice petition if he/she has already chosen to 
bring a derivative suit' .215 
Comments 
The prevailing approach towards this issue is that a separate derivative action 
should be maintained, while the application of the unfair prejudice remedy should 
be flexible. However, we should note that the development of case law shows that 
the unfair prejudice remedy has been applied in a more flexible way. This might 
rnn the risk of the unfair prejudice remedy superseding derivative actions and so 
this would then lead to only one form of action in practice. 
There is another issue regarding the flexible application of the unfair prejudice 
remedy to which attention should also be paid. As we know, derivative actions are 
justified in terms of several policy considerations, such as providing protection 
for the company and the aggrieved minority shareholders, providing protection 
for creditors and other stakeholders, the principle of majority rnle, the principle 
of no judicial interference in business matters, as well as the avoidance of 
multiplicity of actions and strike suits. These policy considerations, if we still 
believe in them, should not simply be avoided through the application of the 
unfair prejudice petition. Therefore, the court may in fact need to take these 
policy concerns into account when hearing an unfair prejudice petition. 
212 Hirt (2003a), p. 106, p. 110. 
213 Hirt (2003a), p. 106, p. 108. 
214 Hirt (2003a), p. 106, p. 110. 
215 Boyle (1997), p. 259. 
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2.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between 
shareholders' derivative action and direct action216 
2. 3.1 Introduction 
The essence of the distinction between the shareholder's direct action and 
derivative action is to ascertain the causes behind the action, or in other words, to 
ascertain whose rights have been infringed or who has been owed duties that have 
been breached. If a duty is owed to the shareholder and the shareholder's personal 
rights have been infringed, the infringed shareholder can bring a direct action to 
recover his direct losses. Otherwise, a corporate action or a derivative action is 
needed. When the shareholder brings a direct action, normally he cannot claim for 
those losses that simply reflect the corporate losses. 
It is not always easy to distinguish shareholder's personal rights from corporate 
rights. Traditionally, English law lacks a comprehensive definition of share-
holder's personal rights. Nevertheless, for the sake of the distinction, we are able 
to identify shareholders' personal rights in four instances. First, an individual 
shareholder has rights derived from other laws such as contract law or tort law. 
Second, a shareholder has the right conferred on him by corporate legislation. For 
example, the Companies Act 1985 confers some statutory rights on a shareholder, 
such as the right to call a shareholders' general meeting217, the right to receive 
notice of resolutions to be dealt with in the next AGM218, the right to challenge 
resolutions219, and so forth. 220 Third, the constitution of the company may also 
grant certain personal rights to a shareholder. Finally, in exceptional situations a 
fellow shareholder or directors of the company may owe certain duties to an 
individual shareholder, and if these duties are breached, the shareholder may have 
a right to claim against this breach. The vagueness of the distinction between 
shareholder's direct actions and derivative actions lies mainly with these last two 
groups of rights, which I will discuss in detail in the following sections. 
216 Under English law the shareholder's direct action does not include the unfair prejudice petition, 
which is not a writ action. 
217 The Companies Act 1985, sections 366A(3), 367, 368(1), 371. 
218 The Companies Act 1985, section 376. 
219 The Companies Act 1985, sections 4, 5, 54. 
220 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 3.2. In Joffe (2000), at pp. 77-102, Joffe classified 
personal rights under the Companies Act 1985 as rights '(a) to object to an alteration in the 
company's memorandum of association; (b) to object to a variation of class rights; ( c) to object 
to the giving of financial assistance for purchase of the company's own shares; (d) in con-
nection with company meetings; (e) in connection with the rectification of the register of 
members; (f) in connection with takeover offers under the CA 1985, Pt XIIIA.' However, it 
should be noted that not all of these statutory rights are individual rights that can be enforced 





Claims arising from the breach of a company s constitution 
Nature of a company s constitution 
Under English law a company's constitution is generally regarded as creating a 
contract between the company and its members and between the members inter 
se.221 This contractual nature has been established by company law for more than 
one hundred and fifty years and is now embodied in section 14(1) of the 
Companies Act 1985222, which provides that: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles, when 
registered, bind the company and its members to the same extent as if they 
respectively had been signed and sealed by each member and contained 
covenants on the part of each member to observe all the provisions of the 
memorandum and of the article.223 
Of course, this contract created by section 14 is not a standard contract but a 
statutory one. As a result, some contractual principles will not apply to this 
statutory conh·act.224 Moreover, the constitution has another side effect: due to the 
ensuing registration, statements to outsiders such as investors, directors, and 
traders are also created. 225 
221 CLR suggested a change from a contractual nature to a statutory one, see DTI (00/1335), para. 
5.64. However, all the legal professional bodies have objected to this suggestion, see DTI 
(00/1335), para. 5.68. 
222 DTI (00/1335), para. 5.64; Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 7.2. 
223 Companies Bill (218) adopts a single constitution and therefore the memorandum of 
association will not be constitutional any more; see clause 8 of Companies Bill (218). Section 
14(1) of the Companies Act 1985 will be replaced by clause 34(1) of Companies Bill (218), 
which nevertheless does not change the nature or effect of the constitution; see Company Law 
Reform Bill (190-EN) clause 34, para. 108; clause 34 of Company Law Reform Bill (190) is 
now clause 34 of Companies Bill (218). 
224 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 2.9. In Joffe (2000), at pp. 46-47, Joffe enumerated 
some differences between the statutory conh·act and an ordinary one: '(a) variation of an 
ordinary contract requires consent of all the parties to the contract. .. The statutory contract is 
made expressly subject to the provisions of the CA 1985. Amongst other things, these 
provisions permit the company by special resolution to alter the statement of the company's 
objects in its memorandum and to alter its article. The statutory contract is therefore subject to 
variation with the consent of only three-quarters of the members entitled to vote at general 
meeting. (b) In certain cases, the content of the articles can be overridden by the provisions of 
the CA 1985 ... (c) Certain alterations to the articles are, however, prohibited by the CA 
1985 ... (d) Terms may be implied into the articles purely on the basis of the construction of 
their language to give them reasonable business efficacy ... ( e) The conh·act 'is also, unlike an 
ordinary contract, not defeasible on the grounds of misrepresentation, common law mistake, 
mistake in equity, undue influence or mistake'. (f) The court has no jurisdiction to rectify 
articles of association. (g) The statutory contract is not subject to the provisions of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977, ss. 2-4.' 
225 Davies (2002), p. 243. 
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2.3.2.2 The twin aspects of the liability arising from a breach of the 
constitution 
The liability arising from a breach of the constitution has twin aspects.226 It is 
generally accepted in English law, both in statute and in case law, that the liability 
arising from ultra vires is twofold. Through ultra vires conduct, the directors have 
breached their duties to the company, and the company has breached its section 
14 contract with the shareholders at the same time. For example, section 35(2) of 
the Companies Act provides that 'a member may bring proceedings to restrain the 
doing of an act which but for subsection (1) would be beyond the company's 
capacity'. At the same time, subsection (3) of the section provides that 'it remains 
the duty of directors to observe any limitations on their powers flowing from the 
company's memorandum'. Such a double-sided liability may also exist where 
other regulations in the constitution have been breached in addition to breaches 
due to ultra vires conduct. On the one hand, the breach of the constitution may 
generate actionable shareholder personal rights against the company based on the 
contractual nature of the constitution. On the other hand, since the directors also 
have the duty 'to cause the company to conduct its affairs in accordance with its 
constitution and not to exceed their own authority' 227 , the directors will breach 
their duty to the company if the constitution has been breached. Thus, a breach of 
the constitution may constitute wrongs both by the company and against the 
company. 
Where the breach of the constitution gives rise to liabilities to both the 
company and individual shareholders, the identification of the action will depend 
on the remedies sought by the plaintiff shareholder. This has been clearly 
illustrated in Taylor v. National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area).228 In 
this case, the officers of the union had called an ultra vires strike and had already 
spent some funds on it. The individual member plaintiff both sought an injunction 
restraining the continuance of the strike and also requested that the officers pay 
back to the union the funds already spent. The plaintiff succeeded with the former 
claim, but failed with the latter: the former claim was his personal claim, while 
the latter one belonged to the company and the plaintiff did not meet the 
requirements of the Foss rule. 
2.3.2.3 Vagueness of personal rights conferred by the constitution (the 
principle of 'mere internal irregularities') 
Nevertheless, identification of actions in the case of a breach of the constitution 
is not as simple as this may appear from the above. One reason is that the English 
law is rather vague as to the shareholder's personal right to lodge a complaint 
226 Davies (2003), pp. 451-452; Davies (1992), pp. 97-99. 
227 Davies (1992), p. 96. 
228 [1985] B.C.L.C. 237. 
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concerning the breach of the constitution. Although it is generally accepted that a 
company's constitution institutes conh·acts between the company and its members 
as well as between the members inter se, a shareholder of the company does not 
have a personal right to enforce all articles in the constitution. In fact, there are 
two restrictions on the shareholder's right to enforce the constitution. The first one 
is that the constitution only generates 'insider rights': it only confers rights on a 
shareholder in his capacity as shareholder, not in any 'outsider' capacity such as 
director or solicitor.229 The second restriction results from the application of the 
Foss rule principle: 'mere internal irregularities' cannot give rise to shareholders' 
personal actions (the principle of 'mere internal irregularities'). In MacDougall v. 
Gardiner, Mellish L.J. provided that if the internal affairs of the company were 
not being properly managed, the company was the proper person to lodge the 
complaint. 230 In addition, there was no use in having litigation ' ... the ultimate 
end of which is only that a meeting has to be called and then ultimately the 
majority gets its wishes'.231 In this sense, the Foss rule applies to shareholders' 
direct action as well. 
These restrictions have given rise to problems in English law, especially the 
second restriction.232 The application of the 'mere internal irregularities' principle 
has actually generated conflicts under English law. On the one hand, the con-
tractual nature of the constitution provides individual shareholders with the right 
to claim directly against the breach of the constitution. On the other hand, the 
'mere internal irregularities' principle prevents the individual shareholder from 
interfering with 'mere internal irregularities', even if these 'mere internal 
irregularities' have breached the constitution.233 In addition, the scope of the 
application of the 'mere internal irregularities' principle to shareholder's direct 
action is rather vague. A shareholder actually may bring a direct action against 
some 'internal irregularities', such as those in voting procedures, defective 
notices of meetings, or inadequate notice of certain resolutions.234 Under English 
law there is no comprehensive definition of either personal rights or 'internal 
irregularities', nor is there a definite list of the enforceable personal rights 
conferred by the constitution: 'It has never been clear of which breaches of the 
articles the individual shareholder may freely complain' .235 English case law also 
shows this ambiguity. There are two irreconcilable lines of judicial authorities 
229 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 2.15-2.20. 
230 (1875) 1 Ch. D. 13, at p. 23. 
231 (1875) 1 Ch. D. 13, p. 25. 
232 Although the first restriction also generates problems, it is generally regarded as justifiable. 
Therefore, I will not go into any further discussion on this first restriction here. For details on 
the first restriction, please refer to Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 2.15-2.20 and 
Davies (2002), p. 244. 
233 Davies (2003), p. 451. 
234 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 2.24-2.25; Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 
7.7. 
235 Davies (1992), p. 95. 
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following the 1870s' cases of MacDougall v. Gardiner and Pender v. Lushing-
ton236 respectively.237 In MacDougall v. Gardiner, where the chairman of the 
shareholders' meeting refused a request for a vote and then wrongfully breached 
the articles, the courts held that the breach was an internal irregularity and that no 
personal rights were injured. On the other hand, in Pender v. Lushington, the facts 
were similar to those of MacDougall and the chairman refused to recognize the 
votes of nominee shareholders; however, the court held that the breach had 
injured the shareholders' personal rights. 
Different approaches have been taken towards this vagueness. The Law 
Commission has suggested that there should be no reform of the current law 
because there was no evidence of hardship having been caused by any difficulty 
in identifying personal rights conferred by the article.238 In addition, adding a 
non-exhaustive list of personal rights enforceable under section 14 would not be 
useful. 239 The Law Commission also pointed out that in practice the shareholder's 
personal right to enforce the constitution may be unimportant because of the 
successfulness of the unfair prejudice remedy.240 The Law Commission's 
approach has been adopted by Companies Bill (218), which suggests no changes 
to the effect of the constitution. 241 
However, Davies finds that the application of the 'mere internal irregularity' 
principle to the shareholder's direct action against the breach of the constitution 
is unjustifiable and incoherent.242 He holds that part of the confusion in English 
law, as mentioned above, may be caused by the failure to recognize the twin 
aspects of the liability arising from the breach of the constitution:243 
It is wholly unclear why a breach of the articles should be subject to majority 
control. It is one thing for the majority to forgive a wrong done to the 
company, quite another for them to purport to forgive a wrong done by the 
company, which is the essence ofa CA1985, s.14 claim ... 244 Even where the 
shareholder is complaining of a procedural defect in the taking of a decision 
by the shareholders, it seems correct in principle that the shareholder should 
be entitled to have the decision taken properly.245 
236 (1877) 6 Ch.D. 70. 
237 Davies (2003), pp. 450-451. 
238 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), paras. 7.10-7.12. 
239 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), paras. 7.10-7.12. 
240 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 7.10. 
241 See Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN) clause 34, para. 108. Clause 34 of Company Law 
Reform Bill (190) has been followed by clause 34 of Companies Bill (218). 
242 Davies (2002), pp. 243-245. 
243 Davies (2003), p. 451. 
244 Davies (2002), p. 244. 
245 Davies (2002), p. 245. 
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As to the two conflicting policies, that between the contractual nature of the 
constitution and the 'mere internal irregularities' principle, Davies also suggests 
that today the former policy should take priority over the latter.246 
The CLR has also taken the approach that the uncertainty caused by the 
current law should be removed. 247 After considering the unsatisfactory effect of 
giving a non-exhaustive list of personal rights, since the list will end up being 
'arbitrary' and will 'leave in place obscure and inconsistent case in the remaining 
field' 248 , the CLR proposed that 'all obligations imposed by the constitution 
should be enforceable by individual shareholders unless the contrary is provided 
in the constitution'. 249 However, the court would have the power to dismiss an 
action in a 'trivial' or 'fruitless' situation.250 Moreover, the shareholder would 
only 'be entitled to damages for loss suffered in his personal capacity, as opposed 
to derivative loss suffered as a result of damage to the company' .251 
2.3.3 
2.3.3.1 
Claims arising from the directors breach of fiducia,y duties 
The general principle 
Under English law the general principle is that directors owe duties, both 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith and duties of care and skill, to the 
company since they are regarded as agents of the company (shareholders 
collectively) instead of agents of individual shareholders.252 Generally no duties 
are owed by directors to individual shareholders.253 This principle was first 
established in Percival v. Wright254 and has been followed ever since. In Stein v. 
Blake (No. 2), the Court of Appeal held that in the case of the director's 
misappropriation of company assets, the directors' duties were owed to the 
company; no duties to shareholders existed even when the value of shares had 
diminished. As a result, in the case of breach of directors' duties, shareholders 
normally can only bring a derivative action rather than a direct action. 
246 Davies (2003), p. 451. 
247 DTI (00/1335), para. 5.64. 
248 DTI (00/1335), paras. 5.72-5.73. 
249 DTI (00/1335), paras. 5.73, 5.65; DTI (01/942), para. 7.34. 
250 DTI (00/1335), para. 5.66; DTI (01/942), para. 7.34. 
251 DTI (00/1335), para. 5.73. 
252 Davies (2002), p. 116. These duties also apply to any officer of the company who is authorized 
to act as an agent of the company, especially to those acting in a senior managerial capacity; 
Davies (2003), p. 379. 
253 See such as Davies (2003), p. 374. 
254 [1902) Ch. 421. 
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2.3.3.2 Exceptions to the general principle 
However, the decision in Percival v. Wright has been criticized over the years.255 
It is argued that there should be some exceptions to the general principle; in other 
words, directors may owe fiduciary duties to individual shareholders in certain 
situations in order to protect individual shareholders' interests. Where a director 
has breached his duties to individual shareholders, those injured shareholders 
may bring a direct action against him. 
The problem of the exceptions to the general principle is how to define these 
exceptions. That is, how to define the scope of the circumstances where a director 
owes duties to individual shareholders directly. If the scope of such duties is too 
broad, the Foss rule and the policies under the Foss rule will be seriously injured 
since shareholders will be able to circumvent the Foss rule simply by bringing a 
direct action.256 If, on the other hand, the scope of such duties is too narrow, the 
individual shareholder's interests may not be well protected. English law has 
traditionally favored the Foss rule and recognized the director's duties towards 
individual shareholders only in very exceptional cases, which I will discuss in the 
following sections.257 
In the case of established legal relationships 
It is generally accepted that directors owe duties to individual shareholders 
directly where there are established legal relationships between them. For 
example, where the directors are authorized to give advice to the shareholders 
concerning the exercise of their rights or to negotiate on their behalf, such as in 
selling shares to a potential takeover bidder, here the directors are to be regarded 
as the agents of the individual shareholders instead of agents of the company.258 
Therefore, it is a natural conclusion that these directors owe fiduciary duties to 
these individual shareholders which are independent of those directors' fiduciary 
duties owed to the company. These then are the prime situations where directors 
do, in fact, owe duties to individual shareholders. 
In the case of special factual relationships 
A more controversial issue is whether directors should owe duties to individual 
shareholders where there is only a 'special factual relationship' between them, as 
opposed to an established legal relationship. Such duties were first fully accepted 
by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Coleman v. Myers. 259 The case involved 
255 Davies (2003), p. 374; Arsalidou (2002), p. 62. 
256 Davies (2003), p. 452. 
257 Davies (2003), p. 452. 
258 A famous case is Allen v. Hyatt (1914) 30 T.L.R. 444, P.C. See Joffe (2000), p. 67. 
259 [1977] 2 NZLR 225. 
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a small family company with unlisted shares. The shareholders of the company 
had traditionally relied on the directors for information and advice. Disputes 
arose where the directors recommended to the shareholders a takeover bid by a 
company that was wholly owned by the directors. In the recommendation, the 
directors did not disclose the material fact that the value of the target company 
would be increased as a result. Although in this case the directors were not agents 
of the shareholders, the court held that the directors still owed fiduciary duties to 
the shareholders directly because of certain special factors in this case. The court 
accepted that the directors' fiduciary duty to individual shareholders does not 
always exist, nor is it possible to establish any general standard as to when the 
fiduciary duty will arise. Nevertheless, there are some factors which may help to 
decide whether there are such duties, such as the family-based character of the 
company, the directors' dominant position in both companies, the directors' high 
degree of insider knowledge, the existence of a reliance relationship, and the 
shareholders' dependence upon information and advice. 
The approach in Coleman v. Myers has recently been accepted by English case 
law as well. In Platt v. Platt260, where the special factual relationship between the 
director and the shareholders was similar to that in Coleman v. Myers, David 
Mackie Q.C. held that the defendant director owed a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholder plaintiffs, following the reasoning in Coleman v. Myers. In Peskin v. 
Anderson261, the English Court of Appeal also accepted the distinction between 
the directors' duties to the company and those to individual shareholders and 
recognized that the directors may owe duties directly to the individual 
shareholders in the case of a special factual relationship between them. However, 
after analyzing the facts of this case, the court concluded that in the current case 
there was no such special relationship which might give rise to the directors' 
duties to shareholders: in this case, the company was not a family company, the 
alleged breach was the directors' conduct of the company's affairs, the directors 
had no conflicts of interest in the sale of shares, and there was no suggestion that 
the plaintiff shareholders asked for the directors' advice. Since Pesldn v. 
Anderson, the special fact exception has been generally accepted in English 
law.262 Although there is no general standard determining what amounts to 'a 
special factual relationship', it is clear that only a few situations can satisfy the 
standard. Those possible situations may include those involving family or small 
companies, or, if in companies with large numbers of shareholders, where 
directors give their advice during a takeover bid. 263 
260 [1999] 2 B.C.L.C. 745, Ch. D., partly reversed on another basis by Platt v. Platt [2001] 1 
B.C.L.C. 698, CA, 2000 WL 1918531. 
261 [2001] B.C.C. 874, [2001] I B.C.L.C. 372, 2000 WL 1841707. 
262 Davies (2002), p. 232. 
263 For example, see Re A Company [1986] B.C.L.C. 382; see Davies (2003), p. 376. 
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In the case of directors' exercising powers for improper pwposes 
It is problematic whether an individual shareholder can bring a direct action 
against the directors where they have exercised their powers for improper 
purposes. It is generally accepted in English law that directors bear the duty not 
to exercise the powers conferred on them by the constitution for an 'improper' or 
'collateral' purpose.264 However, what is unclear is who can enforce the claims 
against the directors if they have breached this duty. In the dictum of Re A 
Company (No. 5136 of 1986), which was an unfair prejudice petition265 , Hoffman 
J. held that although the directors' breach of duty in acting with an improper 
purpose when allotting shares was 
... in theory a breach of its duty to the company, the wrong to the company is 
not the substance of the complaint ... The true basis of the action is an alleged 
infringement of the petitioner's individual rights as a shareholder ... An abuse 
of these powers is an infringement of a member's contractual rights under the 
articles.266 
Although Hoffmann J. did not directly recognize that the directors owed duties to 
individual shareholders in this case, he did, however, anticipate that this kind of 
improper-purpose act by directors could be regulated by the shareholders' 
exercise of their statutory contractual rights.267 A bolder approach was taken by 
the Supreme Court of South Australia in Residues Treatment and Trading Co. Ltd. 
v. Southern Resources Ltd. (No. 4).268 In this case the directors had also issued 
new shares for an improper purpose in a takeover bid, and the court held that the 
plaintiff shareholder had a personal, equitable right against the directors' mis-
behavior. 269 
Nevertheless, Hoffman's approach is not consistent with other English cases. 
For example, in Bamford v. Bamford270, the Court of Appeal held that the 
directors' abuse of power by allotting shares not bona fide in the interests of the 
company was not a breach of the articles and therefore not a wrong done to the 
individual shareholders but to the company. 
In the case of directors' breach of duty to act fairly as between shareholders 
Another controversy concerns the directors' duty to act fairly as between 
shareholders. In Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. The Rank Organization 
264 Davies (1992), p. 99. 
265 [1987] B.C.L.C. 82. 
266 [1987] B.C.L.C. 82, at p. 84. 
267 Joffe (2000), p. 70. 
268 (1988) 14 ACLR 569; see Sealy (2001), at p. 484. 
269 For a brief introduction to the case, see Sealy (2001), at p. 484; Davies (1992), at p. 101. 
270 [1969] 1 All E.R. 969. 
62 
ENGLAND 
Ltd. 271, the court held that it was an implied term in the articles of association that 
directors had the duty to act fairly as between shareholders, which was enforce-
able by individual shareholders. The Law Commission also accepted that 'A 
director must act fairly as between different members' 272, however, it did not 
clarify whether such a duty could be enforced by individual shareholders.273 The 
CLR's attitude has been clearer but conservative. The CLR finds that the 
directors' basic duty to 'promote the success of the company for the benefit of the 
members as a whole' 274 includes the duty to 'achieve outcomes that are fair as 
between its members'. 275 Therefore, according to the CLR's opinion, although the 
directors bear the duty to act fairly as between shareholders, such a duty is not 
separately owed to individual shareholders and thus cannot be enforced by 
individual shareholders.276 The CLR's approach has been accepted in Companies 
Bill (218).277 
2.3.4 Claims arisingfinm the majority shareholders' misconduct 
The majority shareholders may abuse their controlling power either through the 
board of directors or through the general meeting of shareholders. In the former 
case, under English law the majority shareholders may be regarded as 'de facto' 
or 'shadow' directors and therefore be subject to the directors' liability rules. 
Where the majority shareholders exercise their voting rights in the general 
meeting, the traditional English view is that shareholders have no general 
fiduciary duties either to the company or to other shareholders. Differing from the 
fiduciary nature of directors' powers, the shareholders' voting rights are based on 
their possession of shares and thus are proprietary rights. 278 When exercising their 
voting rights, the shareholders may do so for their own interests, even if the 
interests are opposed to those of the company. Actually the traditional English law 
does not exclude the interested shareholders from voting.279 In Re Astec (BSR) 
pie., Jonathan Parker J. held that 
271 [1985] B.C.L.C. 11. 
272 Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (1999), Appendix A 'Draft Statement of 
Directors' Duties,' para. 10, p.184. 
273 Davies (2002), p. 233, Footnote 61. 
274 DTI (01/942), p. 345 (Annex C, Schedule 2, para. 2(a)). 
275 DTI (01/942), p. 345 (Annex C, Schedule 2, para. 2, Footnote (2) (b)), and p. 352 (Annex C, 
Explanatory Note 18). 
276 Davies (2002), p. 235. 
277 Clause 173 of Companies Bill (218). 
278 See, for example, Davies (2003), p. 438; Davies (2002), p. 220; Hirt (2004b), pp. 98-99; Payne 
(1999), p. 611; Hollington (1999), pp. 8-11. 
279 See, for example, North-West Tim1sportatio11 Co Ltd. v. Beatty, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 589, PC. 
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... in general the right of a shareholder to vote his shares is a right of property 
which the shareholder is free to exercise in what he regards as his own best 
interest. He is not obliged to cast his vote in what others may regard as the best 
interests of the general body of shareholders, or in the best interests of the 
company as an entity in its own right.280 
However, giving the majority shareholders complete freedom to exercise their 
voting rights without consh·aint may cause the majority shareholders to abuse 
their voting power and thus to infringe upon the interests of the company and 
minority shareholders. English case law has also been aware of this risk and has 
put restrictions on the majority shareholders' voting rights in certain situations. 
For example, in Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Afi·ica Ltd. 281, the court laid down a 
standard that a decision to alter the company's articles should be made 'bona fide 
for the benefit of the company'. If the shareholders have breached this standard 
when making a decision to alter the company's articles, the individual dissenting 
shareholders will be granted the power to have the decision reviewed.282 However, 
the application of this standard in English case law is not clear; for example, it is 
not clear, according to this standard, how far the majority shareholders should 
consider the interests of the company. 283 In fact, the courts have vacillated 
between the conflicting principles of non-interference within business matters 
and the protection of minority shareholders. 284 
We should also bear in mind that the statutory mechanism of the unfair prejudice 
remedy actually plays an important role in restricting the majority shareholders' 
abuse of power. In addition, clause 239 of the Companies Bill (218) suggests that 
an interested shareholder should be excluded from voting for ratification of a 
director's misconduct. This new restriction will definitely prevent the majority 
shareholders' abuse of voting power in ratification of misconduct. 
2.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and 
protection for the company and the minority shareholders 
2. 4.1 Rules in the common law derivative action 
The English law on derivative actions is well known for favoring the efficiency of 
corporate management rather than providing protection for minority share-
holders. This approach can be examined from the following aspects. 
280 [1998] 2 B.C.L.C. 556, 584c-d. 
281 [1900] I Ch. 656, at p. 671. 
282 Davies (2002), pp. 234-235. 
283 Davies (2003), pp. 486-496. 





Substantive limitations on the scope of derivative actions 
Whose misconduct may lead to a derivative action 
Persons who may infringe upon a company's interests can be classified into three 
types: directors, intra-corporate persons other than directors such as majority 
shareholders, or a third party. It is generally agreed that derivative actions should 
not be allowed to seek relief for the company in respect of a cause of action 
arising from a third party's misconduct, because the power to make a corporate 
litigation decision lies within the board of directors. It is also generally agreed 
that where the directors themselves injured the corporate interests, a derivative 
action should be allowed, provided other requirements have been satisfied, 
because the directors cannot make a fair litigation decision for the company due 
to conflict of interest. However, it is problematic whether a derivative action 
should be allowed against misconduct by the majority shareholders. Two different 
approaches can be taken towards the issue: the first one is that where the cause of 
action arises from the misconduct of majority shareholders, derivative actions 
may be allowed as well; the second approach, however, does not allow a derivative 
action. 
Compared to the first approach, the second approach tends to favor more the 
director's power to make corporate litigation decisions and therefore puts more 
limitations on the minority shareholders' right to derivative actions. The rationale 
under the second approach is, where there is no breach of duty by a director, the 
company itself via the board of directors should have the freedom to make 
litigation decisions.285 This approach has both advantages and disadvantages. On 
the one hand, it protects the board's business judgment and prevents minority 
shareholders from abusing the right to derivative actions. On the other hand, it has 
the disadvantage of providing insufficient protection for the company and 
minority shareholders. For example, where the principle misconduct is committed 
by the majority shareholders, the board of directors may make a negative litiga-
tion decision against them, not because the negative litigation decision is in the 
best interest of the company, but because the majority shareholders have exerted 
influence on the board or because the board is unwilling to sue these shareholders 
to whom they are closely related. In order to redress the remedy, a minority share-
holder can only sue the board for its breach of duty by making such a negative 
litigation decision. It is not an easy job, however, especially considering the 
court's traditional unwillingness to hold directors liable for the breach of duty of 
care and skill. 
Current English law takes the first approach, which is that a derivative action can 
be brought against wrongdoers such as majority shareholders, officers and 
285 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 16.8. 
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employees as well as directors, provided the plaintiff shareholder has satisfied the 
requirements for a derivative action. Nevertheless, the difference between the two 
approaches actually has been reduced under English law due to the requirement 
of 'wrongdoer control' for bringing a derivative action and the law of shadow 
directors.286 In fact, the defendants in derivative actions are normally directors 
with many shares. Contrary to the current approach, the Companies Bill takes the 
second approach: a derivative claim can only be brought in respect of a cause of 
action arising from the misconduct of directors. 287 I will discuss this in Section 
2.4.2.2.1. 
2.4.1.1.2 Nature of the defendant's misconduct that may lead to a derivative 
action 
All Western jurisdictions accept that directors should be allowed a certain amount 
of discretion in business judgments.288 Therefore, minority shareholders may not 
initiate derivative actions against the director's reasonable business decisions even 
if those decisions cause damage to the company. However, it is difficult to 
demarcate a clear boundary between misconduct which may lead to a derivative 
action, and misconduct which may not. There are two approaches to this issue. 
One is that the law sets up a boundary between these two kinds of misconduct ex 
ante, or in other words, the law provides in advance that only ce1tain kinds of 
defendant misconduct may give rise to derivative actions.289 The other approach 
is that while in principle all kinds of defendant misconduct may give rise to 
derivative actions, the court will follow the principle of not interfering with the 
directors' business judgment when hearing cases.290 
The current English common law takes the first approach. According to the Foss 
rule, a minority shareholder cannot sue against misconduct if it is a mere irregu-
larity which is ratifiable by a simple majority of shareholders. This in fact limits 
the scope of the derivative action: a minority shareholder may only bring a 
286 Under English company law, a shadow director, in accordance with whose directions or 
instluctions the directors of the company are accustomed to act, will be treated as a director in 
regard to the duties and liabilities; see section 741 of the Company Act 1985. Also see clause 
251 of Companies Bill (218). 
287 Clause 260(3) of Companies Bill (218). 
288 Timmerman (2004), p. 50. 
289 The English common law derivative action is an example of this approach. Other examples 
include the abolished section 147 (3) of the GermanAktG (1998) and the current section 148 
of the German AktG (as reformed by the UMAG); see Section 4.4. The American style of 
business judgment rule plays a similar role to the ex ante rest1iction: according to the business 
judgment rule, the plaintiff needs to prove certain misconduct of directors in order to rebut the 
presumption that the defendant director is deemed to have fulfiled his duty; therefore, the 
plaintiff needs to prove something more than the director's mere breach of duty in order to hold 
the director liable; see Section 3.4.1.2. 
290 This approach is suggested by Companies Bill (218); see Section 2.4.2.2.2. 
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derivative action against non-ratifiable misconduct. However, this English ap-
proach of an ex ante limitation has its own defects. It may not provide sufficient 
protection for the company and minority shareholders, since English law 
identifies a broad scope of ratifiable misconduct, which may not give rise to 
derivative actions. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2.2, under English law only illegal 
or ultra vires conduct, an act in breach of a special majority or procedural 
requirement (the special majority situation), or a fraudulent act are non-ratifiable, 
whereas ratifiable wrongs cover a wide range of misconduct, including non-
disclosure of a conflict of interest, negligence through which the wrongdoers did 
not benefit personally at the expense of the company, the exercise of power for a 
collateral purpose, and so on.291 No derivative action may be brought against 
these ratifiable wrongs even though they may cause losses to the company. 
Another defect of the English restriction is that it is difficult to make a clear 
distinction between ratifiable and non-ratifiable misconduct. 
As we will observe, the Companies Bill abandons the English common law 
approach and adopts the second mechanism: it extends the application of 
derivative actions to all directors' breaches of duties. 292 I will discuss the 
Companies Bill's approach in Section 2.4.2.2.2. 
2.4.1.2 
2.4.1.2.1 
Procedural requirements on plaintiffs for bringing derivative 
actions 
The requirement of being a current member of the company 
Under English law only a current member of the company can bring a derivative 
action.293 A former member has no such right even ifhe was a member when the 
wrong was done to the company. The rationale is that if the current members are 
not willing to bring a derivative action, a former member has no reason to do 
so.294 On the other hand, a current member can do so even if he joined the 
company after the wrong. Therefore, there is no contemporaneous ownership 
requirement as there is in American law because 'the right to bring proceedings 
as a member in respect of the wrong is part of the bundle ofrights represented by 
a share and can be transferred to a transferee' .295 It is said, however, that the fact 
that the claimant was not a member when the alleged wrong took place would be 
taken into consideration by the court when granting permission to allow a 
derivative action.296 
291 Hannigan (2000), p. 504. 
292 Clause 260(3) of Companies Bill (218). 
293 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 20.32-20.34. 
294 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.50. 
295 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.98. 
296 Hollington (1999), p. 29. 
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For our purposes a member is defined under section 22 of Companies Act 
1985 as:297 
( 1) The subscribers of a company's memorandum are deemed to have agreed 
to become members of the company, and on regish·ation shall be entered as 
such in its register of members. (2) Every other person who agrees to become 
a member of a company, and whose name is entered in its register of members, 
is a member of the company.298 
As a result, no beneficial shareholder will be allowed to bring a derivative action. 
The Companies Bill continues to adhere to this approach.299 
2.4.1.2.2 The three standing requirements under modern case law 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.3 .1, the Foss rule assumes the role of providing locus 
standi requirements as well as substantive requirements for derivative actions. 
Therefore, in order to bring a derivative action, a plaintiff shareholder needs to 
satisfy three standing requirements which actually make it very difficult to 
initiate a derivative action under English law. First, he must prim a facie prove that 
the misconduct against the company central to his complaint is non-ratifiable. 300 
Second, he must prima facie prove that there is no wrongdoer control. This 
requirement applies to all derivative action cases. 301 And, third, no independent 
body of the company has made a decision not to sue in the name of the company. 
The first two requirements were already discussed in Section 2.1; the law on the 
third requirement is still in a state of development302, and I will discuss this third 
requirement further in Section 2.4.1.3. 
2.4.1.2.3 Rule 19 .9 of the CPR: the court's approval etc. 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.4, rule 19 .9 of the Civil Procedure Rules ( as 
amended in 2000) specifically deals with the procedures to bring a derivative 
action. According to this rule, there are several basic steps in bringing a derivative 
action. First, one or more aggrieved shareholders must make a claim that the 
297 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.50. 
298 This will be replaced by clause 112 of Companies Bill (218), which nevertheless only adds 
some words 'to make it clear that the subscribers to the memorandum become members on 
registration of the company, even if the company fails to enter their names in the register of 
members'; see Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN) clause 111, para. 234; clause 111 of 
Company Law Reform Bill (190) is now clause 112 of Companies Bill (218). 
299 Clause 260(1) & (4) of Companies Bill (218), 
300 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) (the Court of Appeal), [1982] 
Ch. 204; see Section 2.1.2. 
301 Taylor ii National Union of Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area) [1985] B.C.L.C. 237; Smith v. 
Croft (No. 2), [1988] Ch. 114; see Section 2.1.3. 
302 Smith v. Croft (No. 2), [1988] Ch. 114; see Section 2.1.3.3. 
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company is entitled to a remedy303, and in that claim the company must be a 
defendant. 304 Second, after the claim form has been issued the plaintiff must apply 
for permission of the court to continue the claim305 ; this application must be 
supported by written evidence.306 Third, the claim form, application notice and 
written evidence must be served on the defendant within a certain period, in any 
event, at least fourteen days before the court is to deal with the application. 307 
Finally, if permission to continue the claim is given by the court, the defendant 
must file a defense within fourteen days after the date on which the permission is 
given or such period as the court may specify.308 
The most important feature in this rule is that the plaintiff is required to seek leave 
of the court to continue a derivative action; otherwise, he may not be allowed to 
take any further steps in the proceeding. This approach to judicial control of 
derivative actions is well stated by Launcelot Henderson Q.C., as a deputy judge 
of the High Court, in Portfolios of Distinction Ltd. v. Laird and others: 
Far from being a technicality, the provisions of the rule reflect the real and 
important principles that the Court of Appeal reaffirmed in Barrett v. Duckett, 
and underline the need for the court to retain control over all the stages of a 
derivative action.309 
Several principles regarding the requirement that the court should decide as a 
preliminary issue whether to grant leave and how the court should make this 
decision were stated in Barrett v. Duckett310 and repeated in Portfolios of Distinc-
tion Ltd. v. Laird and others: 
4. When a challenge is made to the right claimed by a shareholder to bring a 
derivative action on behalf of the company, it is the duty of the court to decide 
as a preliminary issue the question whether or not the plaintiff should be 
allowed to sue in that capacity. 
5. In taking that decision it is not enough for the court to say that there is no 
plain and obvious case for striking out; it is for the shareholder to establish to 
the satisfaction of the court that he should be allowed to sue on behalf of the 
company. 
6. The shareholder will be allowed to sue on behalf of the company if he is 
bringing the action bona fide for the benefit of the company for wrongs to the 
303 CPR, rule 19.9(1). 
304 CPR, rule 19.9(2). 
305 CPR, rule 19.9(3). 
306 CPR, rule 19.9(4). 
307 CPR, rule 19.9(5). 
308 CPR, rule 19.9(6). 
309 [2004] EWHC 2071, 2004 WL 1640261, at para. 60. For a detailed discussion of the case and 
the reasons for the judicial control, see Reisberg (2005a). 
310 [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 243, at p. 250. 
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company for which no other remedy is available. Conversely if the action is 
brought for an ulterior purpose or if another adequate remedy is available, the 
court will not allow the derivative action to proceed.311 
Although Barrett v. Duckett was decided before the introduction of rule 19.9, 
Launcelot Henderson Q.C. held in Portfolios of Distinction Ltd. v. Laird and 
others that the principles should 'remain valid today and should inform the 
exercise by the court of its discretion whether or not to permit a claimant to 
continue a derivative claim' .312 
However, since rule 19.9 itself does not clarify those factors which the court 
should take into account when making a preliminary decision to grant leave, 
theoretically the court might have great discretion in handling a derivative action. 
If the court is flexible enough to relax the strict case law requirements, it may, as 
Boyle points out, 'have removed many of the past artificial barriers to derivative 
litigation'. 313 Reed even thinks this rule makes it too easy for a plaintiff to bring 
a derivative action.314 He finds that due to the relatively early stage that the court 
will grant leave and to the lack of sufficient evidence ( only written evidence 
supplied by the plaintiff) the court is more likely to give permission; as a result, 
the company and the defendant are to some extent deprived of the essential 
protection under the Foss rule.315 However, will the English court be radical 
enough to make such a reform and then abandon the standing requirements in 
case law? The answer may be negative. It is more likely that when considering 
whether to grant leave to continue a derivative action, the court may still be 
concerned with the standing requirements under case law.316 Portfolios of 
Distinction Ltd. v. Laird and others is a good example. 
2.4.1.2.4 Other situations which may bar a derivative action 
Inequitable conduct on the part of the plaintiff shareholder 
Since a derivative action is a remedy afforded by equity to protect the interests of 
the company and the minority shareholders, the court will take into account 
equity principles when deciding whether to allow a derivative action.317 As a 
result, the plaintiff must come with 'clean hands', as any inequitable conduct, 
such as receipt of proceeds with knowledge of the illegality, acquiescence or 
311 [2004] EWHC 2071, 2004 WL 1640261, at para. 57. 
312 [2004] EWHC 2071, 2004 WL 1640261, at para. 58. 
313 Boyle (2002), p. 33. 
314 Reed (2000). 
315 Reed (2000), pp. 156, 159. 
316 See Mayson et al. (1996), p. 545; Poole & Roberts (1999), p. 103; Davies (2003), p. 457, 
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laches, may bar a derivative action. This was well elucidated in Nurcombe v. 
Nurcombe: 
In my judgment, that case [Towers v. African Tug Co., [1904] 1 Ch. 558, added 
by the author] establishes that behaviour by the minority shareholder which, 
in the eyes of equity, would render it unjust to allow a claim brought by the 
company at his instance to succeed, provides a defense to a minority 
shareholder's action. In practice, this means that equitable defenses which 
would have been open to defendants in an action brought by the minority 
shareholder personally (if the cause of action had been vested in him 
personally) would also provide a defense to those defendants in a minority 
shareholder's action brought by him. 318 
Ulterior pwpose and the availability of other adequate remedies 
Equity also requires the court to consider all the circumstances when deciding 
whether to grant a derivative action, including the plaintiff's purpose in bringing 
the action and the availability of other remedies.319 In Barrett v. Duckett320, the 
derivative action was struck down because the plaintiff brought the action for 
personal reasons rather than in the company's interest and because liquidation 
was 'an alternative remedy such as to make the derivative action inapprop-
riate' .321 
The fact that the company is in liquidation 
The fact that the company is in liquidation will also prevent a derivative action.322 
Where a company is in liquidation, the liquidator will take control of the 
company's affairs away from the board and the shareholders. Thus, it is the 
liquidator instead of the board or the shareholders' meeting, with the permission 
of the liquidation committee or the court if necessary, who will have the power to 
begin an action in the name of the company. 323 There is no opportunity for the 
wrongdoing directors or shareholders to repress such an action, and therefore it is 
not necessary to allow a derivative action. 
A shareholder may ask the liquidator to bring an action against the 
wrongdoer. 324 If the liquidator refuses, the shareholder may obtain an order from 
the court asking the liquidator to bring such an action according to sections 
318 [1985] I W.L.R. 370, p. 378. 
319 Hollington (1999), p. 29. 
320 [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 243, at p. 250. For a detailed discussion of the case, please see Sealy (1995). 
321 [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 243, at p. 255. 
322 See, for example, Fargro v. Godfrey [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1134. 
323 Hollington (1999), p. 28; Joffe (2000), p. 26; Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 5.20. 
324 Joffe (2000), p. 26. 
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112(1) or 168(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986, or may obtain an order permitting 
the shareholder to bring the action in the name of the company.325 
2.4.1.3 The appropriate independent body s view: Smith 11. Crqfl (No. 2) 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.3.3, Smith v. Croft (No. 2) acknowledged that where 
an independent body of the company decided not to bring a suit against the 
misconduct in the name of the company, this negative litigation decision would 
bar a shareholder's derivative action. The rationale is that a company's 
independent body is regarded as being more appropriate than is an individual 
shareholder to make a litigation decision in the best interest of the company.326 
This case shows the English approach of favoring the collective nature of 
corporate decisions. 
However, it is not clear under English law which is the appropriate independent 
body: the independent directors, or the independent shareholders, or both? In 
Smith v. Croft (No. 2), Knox J. suggested a very flexible solution: he was of the 
opinion that the appropriate independent body 'will vary according to the 
constitution of the company concerned and the identity of the defendants who 
will in most cases be disqualified from participating by voting in expressing the 
corporate will'. 327 Actually it appears that an appropriate independent body can 
be a group of shareholders, the directors or a committee of the directors.328 
Currently there is no criterion on the size of the independent body, thus it could 
be a very small group.329 Nevertheless, the weight attached to the independent 
body's opinion may vary according to its size.330 It is also possible that in many 
cases such an independent body may not exist at all.331 
There are also problems with the practical application of the appropriate 
independent body. The first one is how to judge its independence. In Smith v. 
Croft (No. 2) 332, Knox J. generally agreed with the test applied by the Court of 
Appeal in Allen v. Gold Reefs ofWestA.frica Ltd. 333, that is, whether the votes were 
'exercised bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole'. Knox J. also 
referred to a more detailed standard: 
325 Fargro v. Godfi'ey [1986] l WL.R. 1134. See Joffe (2000), p. 26; Law Commission CP 142 
(1996), para. 5.20. 
326 Davies (1992), p. 89; Hirt (2004b), p. 168. 
327 [1988] Ch. 114, at p. 185. 
328 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 4.29. 
329 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 4.29; Poole & Roberts (1999), p. 110. 
330 Poole & Roberts (1999), p. 110. 
331 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 4.18. 
332 [1988] Ch. 114, at p. 186. See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 4.28. 
333 [1900] 1 Ch. 656, at p. 671. 
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... votes should be disregarded if, but only if, the court is satisfied either that 
the vote or its equivalent is actually cast with a view to supporting the 
defendants rather than securing benefit to the company, or that the situation of 
the person whose vote is considered is such that there is a substantial risk of 
that happening. The court should not substitute its own opinion but can, and 
in my view should, assess whether the decision making process is vitiated by 
being or being likely to be directed to an improper purpose.334 
The second issue concerns the effect of the independent body's opinion. In other 
words, if an appropriate independent body makes a decision not to sue, whether 
that decision should be binding. In Smith 1~ Croft (No. 2), Knox J. regarded the 
decision as decisive. 335 Hollington also pointed out that the court would hardly 
allow a derivative action ignoring the independent body's negative litigation 
decision. 336 
Third, it is still not clear who bears the burden of proving the independent 
body's point ofview.337 Davies holds that although Smith v. Croft (No. 2) did not 
require the plaintiff shareholder to prove that the independent body had also made 
a decision to sue the defendant, it seems clear that, according to Knox J., if the 
defendant can show that the plaintiff shareholder did not have the support of the 
appropriate independent body, the action against the defendant should not be 
allowed. 338 This may significantly deter a derivative action. 
Although Smith v. Croft (No. 2) did not explicitly refer to American law, the 
approach of the independent body's opinion is said to be influenced by the Ameri-
can law which allows for a special litigation committee in derivative actions. 339 
However, this approach concerning the opinion of the independent body has 
attracted much criticism in England.340 Unlike in the United States where the 
attitude toward the derivative action is normally less hostile341 , the English law of 
derivative actions had already been criticized for being inappropriately 
unfavorable to the injured company and minority shareholders, even before Smith 
v. Croft (No. 2), and it is widely acknowledged that this extra restriction on 
bringing a derivative action found in Smith v. Croft (No. 2) will make a derivative 
action 'extremely difficult to bring except in the smallest companies'. 342 
334 [1988] Ch. 114, at p. 186. 
335 See Hollington (1999), p. 28. 
336 Hollington (1999), p. 28. 
337 Hirt (2004b ), p. 176; Davies (2003), p. 462, Footnote 8. 
338 Davies (1992), p. 89. 
339 See Boyle (1990), p. 3. 
340 See such as Boyle (1990); Ho (1998), pp. 650-652. 
341 As to American law, please see Chapter 3. 
342 See Boyle (2002), p. 29. This view is shared by other lawyers such as in Davies (2002), p. 226, 
where it is said 'after this decision [Smith v. Croft (No 2), added by the author], it is arguable 





Incentives for individual shareholders to pursue derivative 
actions 
Costs and indemnity: providing negative incentive 
The general principle of costs allocation under English law is that 'the costs 
follow the event' 343; in other words, the losing party pays the winning party's 
costs as well as his own costs.344 However, this general principle may be un-
reasonable for derivative actions: due to the derivative and representative nature 
of the derivative action, the recove1y will be channeled to the company, and the 
plaintiff shareholder in a derivative action will not directly benefit from the 
action. If the plaintiff shareholder has to bear the costs while at the same time not 
being able to benefit directly, he may not be willing to initiate a derivative action. 
Therefore, an exception to this general principle, which applies to derivative 
actions, was introduced in Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2).345 In this case the Court 
of Appeal held that the plaintiff shareholder in a derivative action might have the 
right to be indemnified by the company for costs.346 This exception was 
formalized later in RSC, 0 15, r 12 A (13), which is now substituted by CPR, part 
19, rule 19.9(7). According to this rule, the court has the discretion to order the 
company to indemnify the plaintiff shareholder against any liability with respect 
to costs incurred in the action even if the action fails, provided he has acted 
reasonably and in good faith in bringing the action. An application for a costs 
indemnity order can be made, together with an application for leave to continue 
the derivative action. 347 
However, the indemnity rule may only alleviate the plaintiff shareholder's 
burden of costs to a certain extent, rather than totally removing that burden. An 
indemnity granted by the court usually does not cover all the costs the plaintiff 
shareholder has incurred, even if he is impecunious.348 In fact, the court's power 
to decide the amount of the indemnity is regarded as a way the court exercises its 
supervision of the derivative action: it provides financial impetus to ensure 
diligent action by the plaintiff and to avoid meaningless or strike suits.349 
2.4.1.4.2 The conditional fee agreement 
The English law on indemnity only reduces the plaintiff shareholder's negative 
incentive to initiate derivative actions. Additionally, individual shareholders may 
343 CPR 44.3 (2) (a). 
344 Lowry (1997), p. 253, Footnote 69. 
345 [1975] QB 373. 
346 [1975] QB 373, pp. 400-401, per Buckley L.J. 
347 Boyle (2002), pp. 36-37. 
348 See Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 6.14 and Footnote 41. 
349 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para 6.14 and Footnote 41; also see Davies (2003), p. 455. 
74 
ENGLAND 
still require positive incentives in order to initiate derivative actions, due to the 
continuing shareholder's under-incentive problem. This under-incentive problem 
may be more obvious in England because, as mentioned in Section 2.4.1.2.4, 
English law on derivative actions does not allow the plaintiff shareholder to bring 
a derivative action for ulterior motives. 
Nowadays the well-known mechanism for generating shareholders' positive 
incentive, or perhaps more precisely, the shareholders' lawyers' positive incentive, 
is the contingency fee arrangement. 350 Nevertheless, although the contingency fee 
arrangement is widely applied and regarded as a strong incentive for encouraging 
derivative actions in the United States351 , traditionally in England it has been 
considered to be contrary to public policy. 352 Although English law has recently 
developed the conditional fee agreement, which is regarded as a step toward the 
American contingency fee arrangement353 , it is still uncertain whether the 
conditional fee agreement applies to derivative actions. According to a conditio-
nal fee agreement, if the client wins, the lawyer will be able to charge the normal 
fee and an additional fee which is no more than one hundred percent of the 
normal fee354; if the client loses the case, he need not pay the lawyer's fee355, but 
he may still need to pay other costs, such as the winner's fee. 356 This conditional 
fee agreement was first introduced into English law by section 58 of the Courts 
and Legal Services Act 1990357 in limited situations, but currently it may apply to 
any type of court litigation except criminal proceedings and family proceed-
ings. 358 However, there is doubt as to whether the conditional fee agreement is 
applicable to derivative actions.359 The reason for this is that, as Boyle pointed 
out, in derivative actions the benefits of a successful action must be awarded to 
the nominal defendant company instead of to the plaintiff shareholder, therefore 
the agreement may not permit the plaintiff shareholder's 'bargaining away' any 
350 For an introduction to the contingency fee arrangement, please refer to Section 3.4.4.2. 
351 See, for example, Hirt (2004b), pp. 132-133; also see Section 3.4.4.2. 
352 Hirt (2004b), p. 133. 
353 Hirt (2004b), p. 133. 
354 Article 4 of the Conditional Fees Agreements Order1998 (SI 1998 No.1860), which is 
substituted by article 4 of the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2000 (SI 2000 No. 823). 
355 See Andrews (1998); Boyle (2002), p. 37, p. 83. 
356 Hirt (2004b), p. 133, Footnote 60. 
357 !990c.41. Section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 was substituted by section 
27(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (c.22). 
358 Section 58A(l) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (as amended by section 27(1) of the 
Access to Justice Act 1999 ( c.22)) and article 3 of the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2000 
(SI 2000 No. 823). 
359 In Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [1975] QB 373, the different approaches to the conditional fee 
agreement already existed. Lord Denning, in principle, agreed with the agreement to be 
employed in derivative actions; however, taking a different approach, the majority of the Court 




part of the benefits which do not belong to him.360 English courts also show 
hesitancy in applying the conditional fee agreement to derivative actions: there 
seems to have been no such cases up until now.361 
2.4.1.4.3 Conclusion 
To sum up briefly, the incentive problems generated by the current English law 
are mainly under-incentive problems rather than over-incentive ones. On the one 
hand, due to the principle of cost arrangement and the court's control of 
reimbursement, the individual shareholder may still bear the costs or a part of 
them; this discourages the individual shareholder from initiating derivative 
actions. On the other hand, the conditional fee agreement, which may generate 
positive incentive for the individual shareholder, has still not been applied to 
derivative actions in practice. 
2.4.1.5 Limiting directors 'financial exposure to the risks and costs of 
litigation 
Under English law a director can only eliminate or reduce his possible liability for 
damages and his burden of costs for litigation in derivative actions by asking the 
company to buy director and officer insurance on his behalf. He cannot be 
indemnified by the company for his liability arising from cases where the 
judgment comes down against him.362 This lack of protection for directors from 
financial risk may result from the lenient approach of English law towards 
holding directors liable, except in situations of serious mismanagement. 
2.4.2 
2.4.2.1 
Changes in the Companies Bill 
Introduction 
The purpose of the new statut01y derivative action 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.5, the Companies Bill suggests substituting a new 
statutory derivative action for the common law derivative action. The purpose of 
the new statutory derivative action would be to introduce a 'new derivative 
procedure with more modern, flexible and accessible criteria for determining 
whether a shareholder can pursue an action' .363 Nevertheless, it is not purported 
360 Boyle (2002), p. 37, p. 83. 
361 Hirt (2004b), p. 134. 
362 Hearnden & Mendelssohn (2005), at p. 62. 
363 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.15; Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN), Part 
11, Chapter I (Derivative Claims and Proceedings by Members), para. 468; Part 11, Chapter I 
of Company Law Reform Bill (190) is now Part 11, Chapter 1 of Bill 218. 
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to 'formulate a substantive rule to replace the rule in Foss v. Harbottle' .364 In fact, 
the reform would not affect the current balance of power between shareholders 
and managers under English law or the underlying policy that a derivative action 
may be brought only in limited circumstances.365 As a result, and as admitted by 
the Law Commission, the new statutory derivative action would not 'make 
significant changes to the availability of the action' and would not represent 'a 
large overall increase in litigation' .366 
Problems with the common law derivative action as identified by the Law Com-
mission 
In its Consultation Paper the Law Commission perceived four major problems 
with current common law derivative action.367 First, the rule is obscure and 
outdated. It could only be found in case law, much of which was decided many 
years ago. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile all these decided cases.368 Second, 
the plaintiff can only bring a derivative action ifhe can prove wrongdoer's control. 
This causes problems especially in listed public companies where the share-
holding is scattered and therefore difficult to prove wrongdoer control. 369 In 
addition, under the current law the meaning of wrongdoer control is unclear and 
resh·ictive. Third, a minority shareholder cannot bring a derivative action against 
the breach of director's duty of care and skill unless he can prove that the 
negligence has benefited the wrongdoer or that the failure of the other directors 
to bring an action constitutes a fraud on the minority.370 Fourth, the fact that the 
standing for a minority shareholder to bring a derivative action has to be 
determined as a preliminary issue results in the action being lengthy and costly.371 
As will be seen in the following sections, the reforms of common law derivative 
actions have mainly focused on the problems just mentioned. 
2.4.2.2 The new law concerning substantive limitations on the scope of 
derivative actions 
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1.1, a common law derivative action may arise from 
the breach of duty by the majority shareholders as well as by the directors. 
364 Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN), Part 11, Chapter 1, para. 468. Part 11, Chapter 1 of 
Company Law Reform Bill (190) is now Part 11, Chapter 1 of Bill 218. 
365 Diana Faber, the Law Commissioner, said that, 'Our aim is to provide speedy, fair and cost 
effective mechanisms for resolving disputes between minority shareholders and those running 
companies, without disturbing the current balance of power between members and managers,' 
see Law Commission CP 142 (1996), executive summary. Also see Law Commission Report 
246 (1997), executive summary. 
366 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.13. 
367 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 14.1-14.4. 
368 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 14.2. 
369 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 14.2. 
370 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 14.3. 
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However, the nature of the misconduct that may give rise to derivative actions is 
resh·icted: the plaintiff shareholder can only bring a derivative action against non-
ratifiable misconduct. Nevertheless, the Companies Bill changes both aspects of 
these substantive limitations. The result, therefore, may well be that the availa-
bility of the derivative action might be slightly narrower as far as the causes of 
actions are concerned, while remaining slightly broader regarding the scope of the 
liability. 372 
2.4.2.2.1 Whose misconduct may lead to a derivative action 
According to the Companies Bill, the availability of derivative actions should be 
limited to claims arising from breaches or proposed breaches of directors' duties, 
including claims against third parties as a result of such breaches, for example, 
according to the rules of constructive ttusts or tracing. 373 For this purpose, 
'directors' will include a former director, and a 'shadow' director will be treated 
as a director. 374 This is also the approach suggested by the Law Commission.375 
The reason for this limitation, as elucidated by the Law Commission, is that 
where the director did not breach his duties, the company itself should have the 
freedom to decide whether to bring an action against the corporate wrong.376 
Consequently, there may be two kinds of derivative actions against directors for 
their breaches of duties. The first type comprises cases against directors who 
breached their duties and caused injuries to the company by themselves.377 The 
second type of case is that against those directors who did not injure the company 
by themselves but breached their duty by not pursuing an action against the 
wrongdoer. In this second type of case, it is the third party (including majority 
shareholders, officers and employees of the company) rather than the director 
who caused direct injury to the company.378 Nevertheless, a derivative action can 
only be brought against the directors rather than against the wrongdoing third 
party because the cause of action against the wrongdoing third party 'does not 
arise out of the breach of duty' by directors.379 However, it is doubtful whether 
this second type of derivative action will be allowed by the court, since making a 
371 For example, in Smith v. Croft (No. 2) [1988] Ch. 114, the preliminary stage took 18 days; see 
Law Commission CP 142 (1996), paras. 6.6, 14.4. 
372 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), paras. 6.13, 6.24-6.37, 6.38-6.41. 
373 Companies Bill (218) clause 260(3), which was Company Law Reform Bill (190) clause 
243(3), also see Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN), clause 243(3), para. 471. 
374 Companies Bill (218) clause 260(5). 
375 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 16.8; Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.24. 
376 Law Commission CP 142 (1996), para. 16.8. 
377 What misconduct or what breach of duty may give rise to derivative action is an issue I will 
discuss in the next section. 
378 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), paras. 6.31-6.35. 
379 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), paras. 6.27, 6.31-6.35. 
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litigation decision is a business judgment which the court is normally unwilling 
to interfere with. 
This new approach under the Companies Bill may make the availability of 
derivative action narrower than that found under the current common law deriva-
tive action, especially regarding claims against the wrongdoing majority share-
holders.380 There is no difference where the wrongdoer is a normal third party 
because it is virtually impossible to pursue a derivative action against a normal 
third party under the common law derivative action; there have been no such 
cases either.381 However, where the wrong was committed by a majority share-
holder rather than a director, a derivative action may be allowed under common 
law but not allowed under the Companies Bill. The Law Commission has 
illustrated the reasoning behind the approach found in the Companies Bill. As 
viewed by the Law Commission, in such cases the main conflict is regarded as 
being between the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder, and that 
therefore the appropriate remedy for the aggrieved minority shareholder is 
personal action under the articles of association or, more likely, the unfair 
prejudice remedy. 382 If the aggrieved minority shareholder also wants redress in 
the form of a corporate remedy, he may bring the unfair prejudice petition and 
apply for an action to be brought in the name and on behalf of the company.383 
Although this means that a section 459 petition is necessary, the Law 
Commission held that 'it seems to us preferable to leave the court to do this than, 
at least in the first instance, to open the door to derivative litigation against third 
parties by having a wider rule' .384 
The Companies Bill's restriction of derivative actions to the directors' breach 
of duties actually shows the traditional English approach of being unfavorable to 
derivative actions. It may also lead to less protection for the interests of the 
company and other stakeholders where the majority shareholder has committed 
wrongs against the company. First, if the aggrieved minority shareholder only 
seeks personal relief in such cases, the company's injury may not be redressed. 
And, second, seeking an action in the name and on behalf of the company via the 
section 459 petition is too troublesome to be a practical solution. Although 
theoretically the board should bring a corporate action to redress the corporate 
damage, it is doubtful whether it would do so against the majority shareholder of 
the company. 
380 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), paras. 6.13, 6.24-6.37. 
381 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.33. 
382 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.30. 
383 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.29. 
384 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.29. 
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2.4.2.2.2 The nature of the defendant's misconduct that may give rise to a 
derivative action 
The Companies Bill also adopts the Law Commission's recommendation that a 
derivative action may be brought with respect to an alleged breach of any duty of 
directors, including the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.385 It 
is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the misconduct is non-ratifiable, nor 
to show that the wrongdoing directors control the company. 386 This extension is 
intended to address the deficiency in the current law that there may be no remedy 
against the director's negligence in most cases: under common law a derivative 
action against the director's negligence may only be pursed if the alleged 
wrongdoer also has profited through this negligence. Moreover, a section 459 
petition can only be sought to redress the director's serious mismanagement. 387 In 
this sense, the scope of the new derivative action should be broader than the 
common law derivative action.388 This is reasonable considering the Companies 
Bill's restriction on the causes of derivative action. 
The extension of the derivative action to directors' negligence certainly will 
increase the risk of unjust interference with corporate management. However, the 
Law Commission finds that there is no need to worry about this risk since the new 
derivative action will be under tight judicial control. 389 It is a deeply rooted 
principle in English case law that the court should not unjustly interfere with the 
corporate manager's business decisions. The Law Commission also declines to 
introduce a statutory business judgment rule390 and gives some reasons for this: 
first, it is a long-established judicial approach that English courts do not 'second 
guess' directors on commercial matters nor take the advantage of hindsight391 ; 
second, there is no other reason to codify the rule392; third, a statutory business 
judgment principle, although it may lead to greater certainty, might not be as 
broad or flexible as the common law one.393 This approach has also been adopted 
by the Companies Bill. 
385 Companies Bill (218) clause 260(3), which was Company Law Reform Bill (190) clause 
243(3), also see Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN), clause 243(3), para. 471. 
386 Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN), Part 11, Chapter l, para. 468. Part 11, Chapter 1 of 
Company Law Reform Bill (190) is now Part 11, Chapter 1 of Bill 218. 
387 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.38. 
388 Boyle doubts the practical effect of the extension: since negligence may be ratified, obtaining 
the court's leave may be not as easy as in the case of fraud; in addition, the standard of 
directors' duty of skill and care might be raised; see Boyle (2002), p. 67. 
389 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), para. 6.41. For the rules of the judicial control, see 
Section 2.4.2.3. 
390 Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (1999), paras. 5.21-5.29. 
391 Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (1999), para. 5.28. 
392 Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (1999), para. 5.29. 





The new law of the procedural requirement on plaintiffs to initiate 
derivative actions 
The requirement of the court's permission to continue a derivative 
action: a preliminary trial 
The most important procedural requirement for initiating a derivative action 
under the Companies Bill is that a member of the company who initiates a 
derivative action must apply to the court for permission to continue the action. 394 
This requirement reflects the current procedure under the Civil Procedure Rules. 
According to the Companies Bill, it is no longer necessary for the plaintiff to 
satisfy the standing requirements established by the Foss rule, that is, those re-
quirements to prove that the misconduct is non-ratifiable, that there is no wrong-
doer control, and that there is no negative litigation decision by the independent 
body. In fact, by means of the requirement of a preliminary trial, the Companies 
Bill grants the court greater power to control the derivative action. 
2.4.2.3.2 A two-stage procedure for the preliminary trial 
Unlike the recommendations of the Law Commission and the CLR, the Com-
panies Bill introduces a two-stage procedure in the preliminary trial for granting 
permission to continue a derivative action.395 At the first stage, the plaintiff shall 
establish a prima facie case for giving permission; if he cannot do so, the court 
must 'dismiss the application and may make any consequential order it considers 
appropriate' .396 At this stage, the court will only make its decision based on the 
evidence submitted by the plaintiff; evidence from the defendant will not be 
required. 397 If the plaintiff survives the first stage, he then proceeds to the second 
one. At the second stage, the court may require evidence to be provided by the 
company and will decide whether to grant permission.398 The Companies Bill lists 
those circumstances where the court must refuse permission and those factors the 
court must consider when deciding whether to give permission.399 
394 Companies Bill (218) clause 261. The same requirement applies if the plaintiff wants to 
continue the claim as a derivative claim; see Companies Bill (218) clause 262. 
395 Companies Bill (218) clause 261, which was Company Law Reform Bill (190) clause 244, also 
see Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN), Part 11, Chapter I, para. 469. Part 11, Chapter 1 of 
Company Law Reform Bill (190) is now Part 11, Chapter I of Companies Bill (218). 
396 Companies Bill (218) clause 261(2). 
397 Companies Bill (218) clause 261(2), which was Company Law Reform Bill (190) clause 
244(2), also see Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN), Part 11, Chapter I, para. 469. Part 11, 
Chapter I of Company Law Reform Bill (190) is now Part 11, Chapter I of Companies Bill 
(218). 
398 Companies Bill (218) clause 261(3) & ( 4), which was Company Law Reform Bill (190) clause 
244(3) & (4), also see Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN), Part 11, Chapter I, para. 469. Part 
11, Chapter 1 of Company Law Reform Bill (190) is now Part 11, Chapter I of Companies Bill 
(218). 
399 Companies Bill (218) clause 263(2), (3) & (4). 
81 
CHAPTER2 
Although this two-stage procedure enables the courts to dismiss unmeritorious 
cases at the very beginning of the action without disturbing the defendants or the 
company, and has the advantage of efficient trials400, it may make the share-
holder's access to derivative actions more difficult. Another problem with the 
Companies Bill is that it is silent on what amounts to aprimafacie case for giving 
permission. Actually, this two-stage procedure takes a step back from the Law 
Commission and the CLR's recommendations. 
2.4.2.3.3 The matters which the court should consider in deciding whether 
to grant permissio 
Clause 263 of the Companies Bill (Bill 218) stipulates that: 
(2) Permission ( or leave) must be refused if the court is satisfied-
( a) that a person acting in accordance with section 173 ( duty to promote the 
success of the company) would not seek to continue the claim, or 
(b) where the cause of action arises from an act or omission that is yet to 
occur, that the act or omission has been authorised by the company, or 
( c) where the cause of action arises from an act or omission that has already 
occurred, that the act or omission-
(i) was authorised by the company before it occurred, or 
(ii) has been ratified by the company since it occurred. 
(3) In considering whether to give permission (or leave) the court must take 
into 
account, in particular-
( a) whether the member is acting in good faith in seeking to continue the 
claim; 
(b) the importance that a person acting in accordance with section 173 
( duty to promote the success of the company) would attach to continuing it; 
( c) where the cause of action results from an act or omission that is yet to 
occur, whether the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would 
be likely to be-
(i) authorised by the company before it occurs, or 
(ii) ratified by the company after it occurs; 
( d) where the cause of action arises from an act or omission that has already 
occurred, whether the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances 
would be likely to be, ratified by the company; 
( e) whether the company has decided not to pursue the claim; 
(f) whether the act or omission in respect of which the claim is brought gives 
rise to a cause of action that the member could pursue in his own right rather 
than on behalf of the company. 
400 Company Law Reform Bill (190-EN), clause 244, para. 472. Clause 244 of Company Law 
Reform Bill (190) is followed by clause 261 of Companies Bill (218). 
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(4) In considering whether to give permission (or leave) the court shall have 
particular regard to any evidence before it as to the views of members of the 
company who have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter. 
Several comments may be made concerning the above regulation. First, the 
Companies Bill distinguishes those circumstances in which the court must refuse 
permission from those circumstances that the court must take into account but 
that are not decisive. Where a person acting in accordance with section 173 would 
not seek to continue the claim, or where the conduct or omission giving rise to the 
cause of action has been authorized or ratified by the company, the court must 
refuse permission. In the former case, the action will not be in the best interests 
of the company, while in the latter case, there is simply no cause of action due to 
the authorization or ratification.401 We should pay attention here to the fact that 
the Companies Bill makes an important change to the traditional English law on 
ratification: according to clause 239 of the Bill, the decision of a company to 
ratify a director's conduct, which amounts to negligence, default, breach of duty 
or breach of h·ust in relation to the company, must be made by the members, and 
the votes in favor of the ratification by the director (if he is also a member of the 
company) or any connected member shall be excluded. Unlike the traditional law 
which states that a member can vote for his own interests and cannot be excluded 
from voting, this change definitely provides more protection for the company and 
minority shareholders. 
Second, the Companies Bill makes a non-exhaustive list of matters which the 
court should take into account in deciding whether to give permission. These 
matters are important for the court's decision but are not decisive, although some 
of them, such as whether the misconduct is ratifiable or not, may bar a derivative 
action under common law. This list also shows that the Companies Bill takes the 
h·aditional non-favorable approach towards the shareholder's right to derivative 
actions. 
Third, the Companies Bill regards the viewpoint of the independent members 
as being especially important in the court's decision but not decisive in it either. 
This helps to clarify the vagueness of common law with regard to the independent 
body's view. 
2.4.2.4 Comments on the Companies Bills regulation 
There is no doubt that the Companies Bill will improve the minority shareholder's 
right to derivative actions. The new statutory derivative action applies to an 
alleged breach of any duty by directors, and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to 
prove wrongdoer control, which may improve the minority shareholder's right to 
derivative actions in public companies as well. Furthermore, an independent 
body's negative litigation decision will not bar a derivative action, and moreover, 
401 Law Commission Report 246 (1997), paras. 6.84-6.86. 
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the new law is also more accessible and predictable.402 However, we also 
acknowledge that this Bill still maintains the traditional attitude of not favoring 
derivative actions and will not affect the current balance between corporate 
efficiency and the protection of minority shareholders. This can be seen in at least 
two examples: the derivative action is restricted to the breach of duty by directors, 
and a two-stage procedure is required in the preliminary trial necessary for 
granting permission to continue a derivative action. 
Another feature of the new statutory derivative action is that the court is 
granted greater discretion in controlling derivative actions. Actually, under the 
new scheme judicial oversight, rather than the obstacle of substantive and 
procedural requirements, is the major method for keeping a balance between 





The function of derivative action in English cmporate governance 
An unimportant role for derivative action 
The derivative action only plays a minor role in English corporate governance. 
The major reason for this unimportant role is the English attitude towards 
derivative actions and the balance between corporate efficiency and the 
protection of minority shareholders. The difficulty a shareholder has in bringing 
a derivative action under common law actually reflects this attitude. Although the 
Companies Bill suggests introducing a new statutory derivative action which will 
make a derivative action more accessible, it is not expected to significantly 
improve the role of derivative actions since the basic attitude has not changed. 
Another reason for the unimportant role of derivative actions is that there 
exists an alternative remedy which is more attractive. In England, minority 
shareholders have three main remedies: the derivative action, the unfair prejudice 
remedy, and the shareholder's personal right to enforce articles of association. 
Among them the unfair prejudice remedy is, for all practical purposes, the most 
important. This flexible remedy supplements the derivative action to a great 
extent since it may apply to those circumstances where the injury was done to the 
company and where the petitioner can be compensated for his reflective loss in 
such cases. 
We should bear in mind, however, both the unfair prejudice remedy and the 
derivative action provide protection mainly to minority shareholders in privative 
companies. There are obstacles to applying either of them to minority share-
holders in public companies. English strategies for disciplining corporate 
402 However, it is also argued that such a list is not helpful in guiding advisors or shareholders; see, 
for example, Reisberg (2006), pp. 100-101. 
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managers and protecting the interests of the company and minority shareholders 
in public companies, especially publicly listed companies, are mainly market 
related, for example, the shareholders' removal rights over the directors and their 
exit rights coupled with the takeover offer.403 
2.5.1.2 Neglecting the function of public pu,pose for derivative action 
As we know, the derivative action has a function of public purpose, especially in 
public companies.404 However, the public purpose seems to be neglected by 
English law. For example, English law has paid more attention to personal relief 
rather than corporate relief. English practice shows that the derivative action, 
under which remedies are awarded to the company, is not regarded as an 
important mechanism. The major remedy sought by minority shareholders, even 
if in the case of corporate wrongs, is the unfair prejudice remedy, which provides 
personal relief (mostly an exit remedy). The Companies Bill also states that the 
possibility for the aggrieved party to pursue an action in his own right should be 
a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant permission to 
continue a derivative action.405 This attitude of favoring personal relief may, 
however, result in the problematic situation where the interests of the injured 
company itself may not be protected. 
The unimportant role given to minority shareholders in improving corporate 
governance is also shown by the main relief they normally receive: whether in 
private or public companies, exit is normally the most common relief. It seems 
that minority shareholders have less chance of a 'voice' in companies, or they are 
not encouraged to give their 'voice'. As a result, they may play a less important 
role in improving corporate governance. 
2.5.2 The English model of strildng a balance between corporate 
efficiency and protection of the interests of the company and of 
minority shareholders 
2.5.2.1 The appropriate body for maldng a litigation decision in the best 
interests of the company 
English law has been endeavoring to identify the appropriate body to make a 
litigation decision in the best interests of the company. Generally this power is 
granted to the board of directors. Where the board is unwilling to sue, according 
to English common law it appears open to the shareholders collectively (normally 
in general meetings) to bring an action.406 Moreover, traditionally an individual 
403 Davies (2002), p. 253. 
404 Bottomley (1992). 
405 Companies Bill (218), clause 263(3)(f). 
406 See Davies (2003), p. 445. 
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shareholder can also bring a derivative action in exceptional situations. Recently, 
English law has also identified two other bodies which are regarded as being 
more appropriate than an individual shareholder for making a litigation decision 
for the company: according to Smith v. Croft (No.2), the decision of a company's 
independent body not to sue should prevent an individual shareholder from 
initiating a derivative action.407 In addition, rule 19.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules 
requires that an individual shareholder's right to derivative actions should be 
subject to the court's pe1mission. 
Two features may be identified regarding English law. First, as to enforcing 
corporate claims, English law has been striving to preserve the collective nature 
of corporate decisions. Therefore, the roles of the general meeting, the 
independent body, and the individual shareholder in making a litigation decision 
for the company decrease respectively. Although English law is still in a state of 
development, especially since the law on the independent body has still not been 
settled, it continues to consider the derivative action as a last resort. As long as 
there is another intra-corporate body that can make a fair litigation decision, it 
can bar a derivative action. Therefore, under current English law, it is extremely 
difficult for an individual shareholder to initiate a derivative action. The second 
feature is that the court, as an outsider, is granted the power to decide whether to 
permit a derivative action. 
The Companies Bill, despite certain amendments, maintains these features. First, 
the court is still regarded as being the appropriate body to decide whether a 
derivative action should be permitted. The Companies Bill actually grants the 
court even more discretion in making such a decision; although the intra-
corporate body's litigation decisions are important in the court's decision, they are 
no longer decisive. The court can exercise its own discretion in deciding whether 
the action should be continued. As a result, unlike traditional common law, which 
tries to identify the appropriate body within the company to make a corporate 
litigation decision, the Companies Bill chooses an external body, the court. 
Second, the Companies Bill also tries to preserve the collective nature of 
corporate decisions. This can be seen from those matters which the court should 
take into account when deciding whether to grant permission: the court should 
consider, among other matters, whether the company has decided not to pursue 
the claim and, in particular, any evidence before it regarding the views of 
independent members of the company.408 
407 Smith v. Croft (No. 2). See Sections 2.1.3.3 and 2.4.1.3. 
408 Companies Bill (218), clauses 263(3)(e) and 263(4). 
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2.5.2.2 The English model of strildng a balance 
It is widely acknowledged that under English law the balance favors corporate 
efficiency over minority protection. The policy of non-judicial interference with 
business matters is deeply rooted in English law. It is embodied not only in the 
derivative action, but also in other remedies such as the unfair prejudice remedy 
and the shareholder's personal right to enforce articles of association. For 
example, no derivative action is allowed against ratifiable misconduct, the unfair 
prejudice remedy only applies to gross mismanagement, and there may be no 
personal rights if the breach of articles is only for 'mere internal irregularities'. 
For striking a balance the principal method found in common law is the Foss rule 
and its subsequent development. These rules, however, have laid down significant 
obstacles for individual shareholders to initiate derivative actions. In addition, 
judicial oversight also plays a role: the court's permission is needed in order to 
continue a derivative action. Furthermore, an individual shareholder may have 
less incentive to initiate a derivative action when allocation of the costs of the 
action is taken into consideration. 
The Companies Bill upholds the traditional attitude towards the derivative action 
and has no intention of altering the current balance. However, it does repeal the 
obstacles in traditional common law and totally relies on judicial oversight to 
strike a balance: the Bill grants the court broad discretion in deciding whether to 
permit a derivative action. Therefore, the new law is more flexible and perhaps 
more accessible to the individual shareholder, depending on how the court ends 
up interpreting 'a prim a facie case for giving permission'. 409 Actually, the effect 
of the new law on a shareholder's right to derivative actions will depend on how 
the court ends up exercising its discretion in granting permission. 




The United States 
3.1 Introduction to American law on derivative actions 
3.1.1 Development of American law on derivative actions 
American law on derivative actions is quite different from English law, although 
both of them are common law jurisdictions. In fact, 'The law of business 
corporations is one area where English and American law differ to a very marked 
degree'. 1 
As will be seen, the historical development of derivative actions in the United 
States has shown a tendancy to place more and more restrictions on the share-
holder's right to derivative actions. However, regarded as 'the legal equivalent of 
a cat's nine lives' 2, the derivative action has survived these restrictions and still 
plays an important role in American corporate governance.3 In short, the history 
of the derivative action is 'an expression of the tension between shareholders and 
management' and as such illustrates the legal response to this tension.4 
In the following section, I will divide the development of derivative actions in 
the United States into four stages. 
3.1.1.1 The first stage: the origin of American law on derivative actions -
an isolated development 
When the first line of cases on derivative actions occurred in the United States, 
there were still no helpful authorities in English law ( Foss v. Harbottle had not 
been decided yet. Therefore, American judges had to solve the issue of the mi-
nority shareholder's standing in actions against corporate wrongs by themselves. 
In 1817 Att. -Gen. v. The Utica Insurance Company5 for the first time proposed 
the possibility of minority shareholders bringing actions against corporate 
wrongs. Taylor v. the Miami Exporting Co. ( 1831 )6 was the first successful case 
of this kind of action reported, but it was little noted, perhaps because the 
Boyle (1965), p. 317. 
2 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1749. 
3 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1749. 
4 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.03. 
5 2 Johns Ch. 371, (N.Y. 1817), 1817 WL 1582 (1817). 
6 5 Ohio 162 (1831). 
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principles involved in the issue were not properly discussed.7 The case which did 
attract greater attention was Robinson v. Smith in the following year8, where the 
Chancery Court of New York upheld the shareholder's right to initiate a derivative 
action on behalf of the corporation.9 Although the court admitted that generally 
an action to redress a corporate wrong should be brought in the name of the 
corporation, it would not allow a wrong to go unredressed simply for the sake of 
form and therefore decided to allow a derivative action. 10 This shareholder right 
to derivative actions was firmly supported in the Federal Supreme Court case of 
Dodge v. Woolsey in 185 5. 11 In this case, the shareholder's derivative action was 
allowed against an outsider ( the tax collector of the State of Ohio. There was no 
director's breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty or director's fraud involved. 
To summarize, during this period, American courts, isolated and without in-
fluence from English law as they were, developed their own rules on derivative 
actions. They were much more lenient towards minority shareholder's derivative 
actions than their English colleagues were. They 'were prepared to allow the 
minority to sue whenever the directors refused to act in clear breach of their duty 
or, alternatively, whenever it could be shown that the corporation was under the 
control of the wrongdoers'. 12 
The more lenient approach of the United States towards derivative actions, com-
pared to the English one, may be explained by the background of the derivative 
action cases. Unlike in England where the principles of company law and relevant 
litigation procedures, including the Foss rule, found their origin in the law on 
partnerships, in the United States, corporate law, including derivative action rules, 
developed independently. 13 Therefore, the principles deeply rooted in English 
company law such as the principle of majority rule and the principle of non-inter-
vention in business matters did not act as obstacles to the American shareholder's 
right to derivative actions from the outset before the reception of the Foss rule. 14 
In fact, American courts more or less freely permitted suits by minority share-
holders.15 
Recognition of the dual aspects of derivative actions may also account for the 
American approach. 16 In Dodge v. Woolsey, it was recognized that the derivative 
action was in fact a combination of two suits: one enforcing the company's rights 
of action against misconduct; the other enforcing the obligation owed by the 
7 See Boyle (1965), p. 322, Footnote 21; Hornstein (1967), p. 284. 
8 3 Paige 222 (N.Y.Ch. 1832), 1832 WL 2663 (1832). 
9 Boyle (1965), pp. 321-322, Footnote 21; Hornstein (1967), p. 284. 
10 3 Paige 222,223 (N.Y.Ch. 1832), 1832 WL 2663 (1832). 
11 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331 (1855). 
12 Boyle (1965), p. 322. 
13 Hornstein (1967), pp. 283-284. 
14 Boyle (1965), p. 323. 
15 Hornstein (1967), p. 284. 
16 Hornstein (1967), pp .. 284-285. 
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company to the plaintiff and to all other shareholders in equity. 17 Therefore, the 
individual shareholder was regarded as having an equitable right to enforce a 
corporate right of action against the directors or other wrongdoers if the 
management wrongfully refused to do so. 18 This dual aspect of derivative actions 
has been generally recognized. 19 
This lenient approach did not mean that during this period the courts were 
prepared to grant derivative actions without restrictions. In Dodge v. W<Jolsey, the 
plaintiff shareholder made a request to the board of directors to prevent the 
alleged corporate wrong. In fact, during this period the need to exhaust intra-
corporate remedies had already been emphasized, and it was a rule that prior to 
filing a derivative action the plaintiff shareholder first had to put a demand to the 
board of directors.20 In addition, the minority shareholder was not permitted to 
bring a derivative action against a mere business judgment of the director. In 
Dodge v. Woolsey, the Supreme Court distinguished breach of trust cases from 
those cases in which there was 'only error and misapprehension, or simple 
negligence on the part of the directors' 21 ; where there was 'an error of judgment 
merely,' no liability was permitted to be found. 22 This distinction is regarded as 
the predecessor of the business judgment rule. 23 
3.1.1.2 The second stage: reception of the English Foss rule in a different 
form and to a limited extent 
3 .1.1.2.1 Reception of the English Foss rule 
The influence of the English Foss rule on American law began in the l 870s.24 In 
Brewer v. Proprietors of Boston Theatre25, the Massachusetts Supreme Court for 
the first time clearly stated that in order to justify a derivative action, the plaintiff 
shareholder 'must show that suitable redress is not attainable through the action 
of the corporation'. 26 The plaintiff must have applied to the board of directors to 
bring a corporate action (the demand on the board of directors), and the board 
must have refused the request. The demand could be excused, however, if it would 
be futile to do so, such as when 'the directors themselves are the parties charged 
with the wrong, or by whose fraud or willful collusion the wrong has been 
17 Dodge v. Woolsey 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331, 341-344 (1855). 
18 Dodge v. Woolsey 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331, 342-344 (1855). 
19 Cox et al. (2001), p. 15.17. 
20 Boyle (1965), p. 322; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.03, text accompanying Footnotes 7 & 8. 
21 Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331, 343-344 (1855). 
22 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331, 345-346 (1855). 
23 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.03, text accompanying Footnotes 9 to 11. 
24 For a detailed discussion of the English Foss rule, please refer to Section 2.1. 
25 104 Mass. 378 (1870). 
26 104 Mass. 378, 386 (1870). 
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accomplished, and the suit is to be brought against them' .27 In addition, the Court 
also acknowledged that shareholders collectively had the power to ratify certain 
misconduct other than fraud or ultra vires act.28 
The Federal Supreme Court case of Hawes v. Oakland29 was even more strongly 
influenced by the Foss rule and it has been regarded as the equivalent of Foss v. 
Harbottle. 30 In Hawes v. Oakland, Justice Miller established both substantive and 
procedural limitations on the shareholder's ability to initiate derivative actions, 
which were very similar to those in the Foss rule. Substantively, Justice Miller 
required that the causes of derivative actions had to be restricted to certain areas 
of misconduct, such as the directors' unauthorized acts, fraudulent transactions, 
or acts carried out for their own interests which would result in serious injury to 
the corporation or to other shareholders.31 In addition, he also set out several 
procedural requirements for any shareholder who wished to file a derivative 
action. Firstly, there was the requirement for the plaintiff shareholder to make 
demands on both the managing board and shareholders as a whole.32 Secondly, 
there was the contemporaneous ownership requirement, which required the 
complainant to be a 'shareholder at the time of the transactions of which he 
complains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by operation oflaw'. 33 
Thirdly, the plaintiff shareholder also had to establish that 'the suit is not a 
collusive one to confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction in a case of 
which it could otherwise have no cognizance' .34 
Although Hawes v. Oakland was obviously influenced by the English Foss 
rule, it still differed from the English rule. The most important difference was that 
Hawes v. Oakland did not simply copy the Foss rule into American law, but made 
demands both on the board of directors and shareholders. Another difference was 
that the demand requirement, unlike in the Foss rule, did not apply to share-
holders' direct actions.35 
Both the substantive and procedural restrictions placed on derivative actions 
as established by Hawes v. Oakland would follow later. 36 One case in point is the 
subsequent enactment of Equity Rule 94 in 1881, which is the antecedent of the 
current Rule 23 .1 ( on derivative actions) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
27 104 Mass. 378, 386-387 (1870). 
28 104 Mass. 378, 394-398 (1870). 
29 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 450, 26 L.Ed. 827 (1881). 
30 Griggs & Lowry (1994), p. 477. 
31 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 450,460, 26 L.Ed. 827 (1881). 
32 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 450, 460-461, 26 L.Ed. 827 (1881). 
33 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 450, 461, 26 L.Ed. 827 (1881). 
34 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 450,461, 26 L.Ed. 827 (1881). 
35 Boyle (1965), pp. 324-325. 
36 For a detailed discussion of the restrictions placed on derivative actions in current American 
law, see Section 3.4. 
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3.1.1.2.2 Developments after Hawes v. Oakland 
Thus Hawes v. Oakland should have had the effect of tightening the American 
rule on derivative actions. However, the courts of most states later interpreted this 
case more liberally. 37 This more lenient approach added to the differences 
between American and English law. For example, those situations which may give 
rise to derivative actions under the current American law are not limited to the 
grounds found in Hawes v. Oakland. It is generally accepted that shareholders 
may sue derivatively against a director's breach of duty, subject to the business 
judgment rule and the demand requirement. The English Foss rule, in contrast, 
only allows derivative actions against fraudulent acts. Moreover, under the 
American law the demand requirement was also further relaxed by later courts 
such that a demand on the board of directors may be excused if the alleged 
wrongdoer conh·ols the board or colludes with the majority on the board, and even 
in cases where a demand on the board is not excused, the board's refusal to sue 
may in itself be non-binding if the plaintiff can show the existence of 'wrongful 
refusal'. 38 In addition, in many states a demand placed on shareholders is no 
longer required. Even in jurisdictions where the demand on shareholders is still 
necessary, the demand can be excused in certain situations.39 
3.1.1.3 The third stage: the security-for-expenses statutes 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, American courts generally took a 
lenient approach towards derivative actions, especially through their laxity in 
terms of the demand requirement. This lenient approach led to the popularity of 
'strike suits,' which were brought without substantial merits in law or fact, but 
simply for the benefit of forcing a settlement.40 By the 1940s the abuse of 
derivative actions had become a serious problem.41 In the 1940s the New York 
Chamber of Commerce formed a special committee on corporate litigation. The 
committee examined 1,400 derivative actions filed between 1936 and 1942 in 
New York City and completed its Report (the Wood Report) in February 1944.42 
The Report concluded that the benefits of these actions were normally 
outweighed by their costs and that derivative actions were abused frequently. It 
found that, first, the plaintiff shareholders generally were nominal and had no 
financial interests in pursuing the suits; second, a limited number of attorneys 
were taking charge of the bulk of the litigation; third, the plaintiff hardly ever won 
the case; and fourthly, private settlements in which the corporation often received 
37 Boyle (1965), p. 325. 
38 For a detailed discussion of the demand on the board, please refer to Section 3.4.2.2.2. 
39 For a detailed discussion of the demand on the shareholders, please refer to Section 3.4.2.2.3. 
40 Boyle (2002), p. 41. 
41 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.03. 
42 F. Wood, Survey and Report Regarding Derivative Suits, (1944); as cited in ALI (II), Part VII, 
Chapter 1, Introductory Note, Reporter's Note 1, p. 9. 
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nothing were common.43 This Report directly resulted in New York's security-for-
expenses statute, which was enacted to 'meet the evil posed by baseless strike 
stockholders' suits against corporate directors and stockholders'44, and it was 
hoped that this statute might deter strike suits.4s Sixteen states followed New York 
and enacted security-for-expenses statutes, excluding Delaware.46 In addition, 
other methods were also taken to constrain derivative actions, for example, 
'common law defenses were tightened, and an extraordinary procedural 
complexity developed around such questions as jurisdiction, alignment of the 
parties, demand on the board and shareholders, and settlement and dismissal' .47 
Initially, adoption of the security-for-expenses statutes was regarded as the 
death knell for derivative actions.48 However, in the end these statutes did not have 
the expected effect. Plaintiffs were able to avoid the application of these statutes 
by several means, such as by pleading a cause of action under federal law or 
satisfying the threshold applied by many statutes to exempt such a requirement 
(for instance, by aggregately holding more than five percent of shares).49 As a 
result, by the late 1960s there was a revival of derivative actions.so Between 1956 
and 1966 the number of reported derivative suits increased significantly 
compared to the previous decade.st 
3.1.1.4 The fourth stage: the special litigation committee 
Because the security-for-expenses statutes scarcely played any role in preventing 
or reducing strike suits, and because by the mid-1970s the American economy 
had begun to grow, the balance between corporate efficiency and the protection 
of minority shareholders was reconsidered. This led to the development of a new 
strategy for controlling the abuse of derivative actions. A special litigation 
committee of the corporation, which was composed of independent directors, 
could terminate a derivative action on the grounds that the action would not be in 
the best interests of the corporation even if the derivative action was against other 
directors of the corporation. This strategy, first applied by the Federal District 
43 F. Wood, Survey and Report Regarding Derivative Suits, (1944), p. 32; as cited in ALI (II), Part 
VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note Reporter's Note 1, p. 9; also see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 
1.03. 
44 Roach v. Franchises International, Inc., 32 A.D.2d 247, 249, 300 N.Y.S.2d 630, (1960); also 
see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.03, Footnote 26. 
45 Roach v. Franchises International, Inc., 32 A.D.2d 247, 250, (1960); also see Ferrara et al. 
(2005), Section 1.03, Footnote 27. 
46 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.03. 
47 F. Wood, Survey and Report Regarding Derivative Suits, (1944), p. 32; as cited in ALI (II), Part 
VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, Reporter's Note I, p. 9. 
48 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.03, text accompanying Footnote 28. 
49 ALI (II), Part VII, Section 7 .04, Comment H, pp. 90-91. 
50 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), pp. 261-262. 
51 Dykstra (1967). 
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Court of New York in Gall v. Exxon Cmp. 52, and later by the Federal Supreme 
Court in Burks v. Lasker53 and the New York Court of Appeals in Auerbach v. 
Bennett54, was accepted in the early 1980s by many courts in various states. 
Although these states took varied approaches towards it, this strategy of the 
special litigation committee has indeed provided a substantial obstacle to a 
shareholder's right to initiate a derivative action. 55 
3.1.1.5 Recent developments 
In recent years there has been no substantial reform of derivative actions. 
However, due to the apparent abuses in securities litigations and corporate 
scandals such as Enron, there have been reforms aimed at several aspects of 
corporate governance. These reforms, although they do not regulate derivative 
actions directly, may have certain effects on derivative actions. An example is the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the SOX) in 2002. The SOX was enacted 
in response to a series of corporate scandals. Major measures adopted include 
strengthening the directors' and officers' liabilities, ensuring auditor indepen-
dence, and creating a board of independent accounting overseers. Although the 
SOX has nothing to do with derivative actions directly, it may have an indirect 
effect on derivative action in several ways. 56 First, the SOX extends the statute of 
limitations for civil suits for violations of federal securities laws from one year 
after discovery or three years after the disputed h·ansaction to two years after 
discovery or within five years after the disputed transaction. 57 These extensions 
provide additional time for the aggrieved shareholder to initiate derivative 
actions. Second, the requirements on lawyers to report any potential material 
violation of securities law or a breach of fiduciary duties may provide an op-
portunity for discovery for plaintiffs in derivative actions.58 Third, the SOX also 
improves the role of independent directors and committees of independent 
directors and tries to provide better ex ante mechanisms for disciplining corporate 
management and so, if they should prove successful, could well make derivative 
actions less important.59 
52 418 F Supp 508 (United States District Court, SDNY, D.C.N.Y. 1976). 
53 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
54 47 N.Y.2d 619,393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. 1979). 
55 For the details about the special litigation committee, see Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.3. 
56 For the effects, see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.05. 
57 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, s 804, 28 U.S.C. s 1658. 
58 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, s 307, 15 U.S.C. s 7245. 
59 For the improvement, such as the requirements for the changes in board composition, 
especially the requirement for an independent accounting oversight board; see Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, ss 201-206, 15 U.S.C. ss 78c(a), 78f, 78j-l. 
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3.1.2 Methodology of research 
Derivative actions in the United States are governed both by state law and federal 
law. Although the law on derivative actions varies from state to state, some 
general rules may be identified. I would now like to focus on these general rules. 
To do so, I will need to pay special attention to Delaware law, as well as rules 
suggested in the American Law Institute (ALI)'s Principles of Corporate 
Governance: Analysis and recommendations (hereinafter 'the ALI Principles')60 
and the Model Business Corporation Act (hereinafter 'the MBCA'). As we know, 
Delaware is regarded as the American corporate center and its corporate law has 
assumed a dominant position.61 The ALI Principles recommend what good 
corporate practice should be and the MBCA offers guidance in the development 
of corporate law. Although neither of them are law, the ALI Principles and the 
MBCA certainly have an impact on where the law may go and, therefore, are 
useful in analyzing American law.62 
3.2 The role of derivative action in the United States 
3.2.1 A more important role in the United States than in England 
Although its role has varied for different periods in the United States, the 
derivative action has continuously played a more important role there than in 
England. Hornstein lists some factors which may account for this difference: 
major legal principles, traditional practices and ethical standards of the legal 
profession. 63 
To begin with, those legal principles favored in American law may explain the 
American approach to derivative actions. In corporate law there are two lines of 
principles which may conflict with each other: one line is comprised of the 
principles of corporate entity and corporate self-government through majority 
rule, while the other line follows the principle of protecting the interests of 
corporations and minority shareholders. Where the two lines of principles 
conflict, American law has always been ready to disregard the corporate entity in 
order to prevent injustice, since equity 'never permits a wrong to go unredressed 
merely for the sake of form' .64 This approach is different from the English one, 
which as mentioned in Chapter 2 favors more the first line of principles. This 
60 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and recommendations, 
St. Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute Publishers (1994). 
61 See, for example, Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 2.02, text accompanying Footnote 1. 
62 Cox et al. (2001), pp. 2.26-2.28; Lockwood & Barsch (1996), pp. 610-611. 
63 Hornstein (1967), p. 282. 
64 Robinson v. Smith, 3 paige Ch, 222,233 (N.Y. 1832). Also see Hornstein (1967), pp. 282-283, 
p. 286. 
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difference may be due to the historical development of each system of law. As 
mentioned in Section 3 .1.1.1, American law on derivative actions originally 
developed from the pure corporate form, while the English Foss rule grew out of 
the law on partnerships. 65 In addition, as early as in the case of Dodge v. Woolsey, 
the dual aspects of derivative actions had been recognized. Therefore, from the 
very beginning there were fewer limitations on granting minority shareholders the 
right to initiate derivative actions under American law. Although later the United 
States did introduce the English Foss rule, it still took a form that was different 
from and less strict than the English Foss rule. 66 
The willingness to grant relief to minority shareholders in the United States has 
traditionally resulted in lenient rules regarding a shareholder's right to derivative 
actions. For example, the resh·ictions on the shareholder's right to bring a derivative 
action were less shict and so derivative actions could be applied widely. In fact, 
derivative actions in the United States were originally 'the earliest and principal 
consh·aint on director mismanagement' .67 They could even be applied in disputes 
that did not arise from corporate mismanagement.68 Although later development 
has brought about a stricter approach towards them and as a result their role has 
been in decline, derivative actions still play a relatively important role. 
The third reason for the popularity of derivative actions in the United States 
may be the contingency fee arrangement. Unlike in England, the contingency fee 
arrangement is widely accepted and is also applied to derivative actions. This 
allocation of litigation costs is regarded as contributing to the popularity of 
derivative actions. 69 
Hertig and Kanda raise other factors which may account for the popularity of 
litigation in the enforcement of fiduciary duty in the US.70 For example, with 
regard to the conflict between shareholders and directors, because in England 
institutional investors tend to form voting alliances and in continental Europe 
ownership of public corporations is generally concentrated as well, shareholders 
in such countries are more likely to have non-judicial methods for disciplining 
management. In the US, however, due to the widely scattered share structure, 
litigation is the main method for shareholders to control management.71 Another 
example is that it is generally acknowledged that in the US private enforcement 
65 Hornstein (1967), pp. 283-284. 
66 Boyle (1965), p. 323. 
67 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1756. 
68 For example, in Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 331, (1855), the action was against the 
tax collector of the State of Ohio and therefore did not involve an intra-corporate dispute. In 
this case, the derivative action was brought in order to avoid the jurisdiction of the State court 
and to seek federal jurisdiction. For a detailed discussion of the wider scope of application for 
this, see DeMott (2003), Sections 1 :3 & I :4. 
69 For a detailed discussion of the contingency fee arrangement, please see Section 3.4.4.2. 
70 Kraakmanetal. (2004),pp.116-118. 
71 Kraakman et al. (2004), p. 117. 
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is more favored than in other countries, while public enforcement finds relatively 
little favor. 72 In England, public enforcement, on the other hand, plays an 
important role.73 Furthermore, other factors such as business ethics and possible 
compensation awarded by the court may also affect the popularity oflitigation.74 
3.2.2 A less important role nowadays than in the past 
For a long time after its origin, the derivative action was a recognized form of 
litigation and was considered 'the chief regulator of corporate management'. 75 
However, as seen from the historical development of derivative action, for the last 
half century the attitude towards derivative action and its function has changed. 
In fact, since the early 1980s the derivative action has played a less important role 
in corporate governance than in earlier days. 76 
The decline in the role of derivative actions is a direct result of the restrictions 
on derivative actions, both substantive and procedural, which were added later, as 
mentioned in Section 3 .1.1. These additional restrictions are mainly due to the 
bad reputation of derivative actions. Moreover, economic growth by the 1970s 
had also resulted in a reconsideration of the balance between the corporate entity 
(and corporate efficiency) and protection for minority shareholders.77 As a result, 
the shareholder's right to derivative actions was restricted. 
The decline of the role of derivative actions may also be a result of the 
development of other mechanisms. Until the early 1980s, there were few effective 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms. For example, scarcely any market 
for corporate control existed, and shareholder voting was generally regarded as 
ineffective. 78 Derivative actions were the principal method for disciplining 
corporate management. However, after the 1980s other mechanisms, both ex ante 
and ex post, developed, so that there may now be less need for derivative actions. 
For example, particularly in the early 1980s, the development of the market for 
corporate control provided a real alternative to litigation as a method of 
disciplining corporate management.79 In particular, the requirement by American 
stock exchanges for more independent directors for large public corporations and 
the development oflarge institutional investors may have provided ex ante control 
of corporate management. In fact, not only law, but also private ordering and 
72 Eviatar (2002). Also see Section 1.4. 
73 Kraakman et al. (2004), p. 117. See Section 2.2.1. 
74 Kraakman et al. (2004), p. 118. 
75 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). Coffee & Schwartz (1981), 
p. 261. 
76 Growth of derivative actions still continued in the 1960s; Dykstra (1967), p. 74. 
77 Cox (1999), pp. 3-4. 
78 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1756. 
79 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1756. 
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norms have provided mechanisms for strengthening 'the roles of various 
gatekeepers who affect corporate governance'. 80 
In the case of close corporations, American legislatures and courts have 
developed special mechanisms to solve corporate governance problems. These 
special mechanisms, at least to a certain extent, have succeeded in making the 
derivative action less important in close corporations than in public corporations. 
I will discuss this issue further in the following section. 
3.2.3 
3.2.3.1 
A more important role in public c01porations than in close 
corporations 
Classification of close corporations and public c01porations 
Traditionally, different states had their own single corporate statute which was 
applicable to all corporations. Also most case-law doctrines were uniformly 
applicable to all corporations. 81 These uniform statutory and judicial rules and 
norms usually reflected the needs of publicly held corporations and were suitable 
for them. 82 However, in recent years there has been a trend toward recognizing the 
distinctive features of close corporations and developing rules and norms 
specifically suitable for these close corporations. 
3.2.3.1.1 The distinction between close and public corporations 
Corporations are generally divided into public corporations ( or publicly held cor-
porations) and close corporations ( or closely held corporations).83 Nevertheless, 
80 Thompson & Thomas (2004), pp. 1756-1757. 
81 ALI (I), Introductory Note to Parts III and III-A (Structure of the Corporation), p. 79. 
82 Thompson (1993), p. 700; Eisenberg (2000), p. 349; O'Kelley & Thompson (1999), p. 453. 
83 But see the different classification by the ALI. The ALI divides the corporations into 'closely 
held corporations' and 'publicly held corporations.' However, the two types of corporation are 
not reciprocal; see ALI (I), Sections 1.06 and 1.31. S 1.06 defines 'closely held corporation' as 
'a corporation the equity securities of which are owned by a small number of persons, and for 
which securities no active trading market exists.' S 1.31: "'Publicly held corporation" means a 
corporation that as of the record date for its most recent annual shareholders' meeting had both 
500 or more record holders of its equity securities and $5 million or more of total assets; but a 
corporation shall not cease to be a publicly held corporation because its total assets fall below 
$5 million, unless total assets remain below $5 million for two consecutive fiscal years.' In 
addition, for the purpose of Parts III and III-A (structure of the corporation), ALI adopts a 
three-tier division of corporations. The first tier is 'large publicly held corporations' which 
consist of corporations with at least 2,000 record holders of equity securities and $100 million 
of total assets. The second tier is 'small publicly held corporations' which consist of 
corporations, other than the first-tier corporations, with at least 500 record holders of equity 
securities and $5 million of total assets. The third tier consists of very different types of 
corporations including closely held corporations and corporations that are publicly held for 
many functional purposes with more than 50-100 but fewer than 500 shareholders. See ALI (I), 
Introductory Note to Parts III and III-A (Structure of the Corporation), pp. 79-81. 
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there are neither legal definitions nor unanimously agreed definitions for these 
two types of corporation. Generally speaking, close corporations are identified by 
several features: they only have a few shareholders84; their shares cannot be 
publicly transferred since there is no public market for the shares; in many close 
corporations, shareholders have entered into agreements to restrict the trans-
ferability of shares85 ; they are normally managed by the shareholders, and so on. 86 
Although different definitions may emphasize different features, most close 
corporations have most, if not all, of these features. In conh·ast, public cor-
porations normally have a larger number of shareholders and their shares can be 
publicly traded on the national securities exchanges.87 In addition, ownership and 
management of public corporations are normally separate. Of course, there are 
many 'in between' corporations that have some characteristics of both public 
corporations and close corporations, such as a corporation which has a substantial 
number of shareholders but whose shares are infrequently or 'sparsely' traded. 88 
However, these 'in between' corporations do not affect the basic classification. 
The major agency problem in close corporations is different from that in public 
corporations due to their differing features. In public corporations, the major 
agency problem is between shareholders and directors; due to widely spread 
shareholding in public corporations, disputes among shareholders are not the 
primary problem in the United States. However, in close corporations the major 
agency problem is normally between majority and minority shareholders, since 
therein, managers and shareholders are normally identical and the close 
corporation, on the level of both the general meeting of shareholders and the 
board of directors, is generally controlled by majority shareholders due to the 
application of the majority rule principle. In addition, in close corporations 'the 
distinction between the interests of the corporation as an entity and interests of its 
shareholders may seem more formal than real' 89, therefore, where corporate 
interests have been infringed upon, the real dispute lies between shareholders 
rather than between the controlling wrongdoer and the corporation. 
Another distinction between close and public corporations is that it is 
normally more difficult for the aggrieved shareholder in a close corporation to 
exit the corporation, due to the lack of public markets for these shares and the 
restriction on the transferability of shares. This may lead to the concern that 
different legal remedies may be necessary for shareholders in close corporations. 
84 This is typically defined as less than 25; Rock & Wachter (1999), p. 913, Note 1. 
85 Hamilton (2000), p. 2. 
86 Hamilton (2000), p. 2, pp. 343-344. 
87 Hamilton (2000), p. 2, pp. 376-377. 
88 Hamilton (2000), p. 3. 
89 DeMott (2003), pp. 2-34 - 2-35. 
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3.2.3.1.2 Different treatment for close corporations 
Due to the distinctions between close and public corporations, the traditional 
corporate norms, which usually reflect the needs of public corporations, 
especially large public corporations, may be unsuitable for close corporations.90 
This inappropriateness of one general corporate law has been gradually re-
cognized and new norms specifically applicable to close corporations have been 
developed over the last twenty-five to thirty-five years.91 On the one hand, case 
law has developed new rules for close corporations, for example, the power of the 
participants in close corporations to contract out of the statutory rules has been 
greatly extended92, remedies which are only available to minority shareholders in 
close corporations have been developed93, and special criteria to distinguish 
between direct and derivative actions have been established.94 In addition, 
separate legislation specifically applicable to close corporations has been enacted 
in some states. However, these special close corporation statutes have not been 
widely applied in practice.95 Therefore, I will not be paying special attention to 
them. 
3.2.3.2 Empirical study of the role of derivative action 
In the United States derivative actions are filed against both public and close 
corporations. Unlike the rare application of derivative actions in public com-
panies in England, in the United States derivative actions play a more important 
role in public corporations than in close corporations. This can be shown by a 
recent empirical study carried out by Thompson and Thomas.96 They made a 
detailed study of all corporate litigation in Delaware from 1999 to 2000. 
According to their study, during the two-year period, there were 137 derivative 
action complaints, among them eighty percent (108) were filed against public 
companies with the remaining twenty percent (26) against close companies97, 
including close corporations, limited partnerships, a mutual company and a 
limited liability company.98 Among the cases against close companies99, only one-
third were granted affirmative relief, while almost half were dismissed without 
90 Thompson (1993), pp. 700-702. 
91 For example, Thompson (1993), p. 704. 
92 Rock & Wachter (1999), p. 914. 
93 Rock & Wachter (1999), p. 923. For a detailed discussion of the remedies, please refer to 
Section 3.2.3.4. 
94 For details, see Section 3.3.3. 
95 Hamilton (2000), p. 359. 
96 Thompson & Thomas (2004). 
97 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1762, Table 3. 
98 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1764. 
99 Since one transaction generated two suits there were actually twenty-five cases; see Thompson 
& Thomas (2004), p. 1764. 
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relief. 100 Therefore, the authors concluded that 'private company derivative 
litigation in Delaware plays little role in the governance of these firms' .101 
One question about Thompson and Thomas 's study is whether the statistics on 
Delaware cases represent the role of the derivative action throughout the United 
States. The answer should be positive as far as public corporations are concerned 
due to the dominance of Delaware corporate law in public corporations and the 
popularity of Delaware as a state where public corporations choose to in-
corporate. 102 However, we should not answer the question so quickly with regard 
to close corporations. In fact, regarding close corporations Delaware does not 
have the same dominant position as it does regarding public corporations; its 
share of total non-public incorporations is less than three and a half percent. 103 
Besides, Delaware's law on close corporations is different from that of most other 
states. 104 In fact, Delaware's law provides fewer remedies for aggrieved minority 
shareholders in close corporations than do other states. For example, the 
commonly available remedy of oppression is not recognized in Delaware; there is 
no involuntary dissolution statute in Delaware either; unlike a majority of states, 
Delaware also does not allow the court discretion to treat a derivative action as a 
direct one where a derivative action is not necessary. 105 On the conh·ary, 
shareholders in Delaware are more often expected to protect themselves by 
contractual agreements. The limited options for litigation by minority investors in 
close corporations should have resulted in a more important role for derivative 
actions in Delaware106, yet this has not been the cases as is shown by the study. 
The researchers also regard this fact as a 'puzzle' .107 They surmise that the 
reasons might lie in the fact that the aggrieved minority shareholders preferred 
direct actions to derivative actions or relied more on contractual agreements, or 
there were simply relatively few close corporations in Delaware. 108 
No empirical study on the derivative action's role in close corporations in 
other states has yet been conducted to my knowledge. 109 However, it is generally 
accepted that in most states there is a trend toward recognizing the distinctive 
features of close corporations and developing new corporate governance 
strategies for minority shareholders in close corporations. These new strategies, 
100 Thompson & Thomas (2004), pp. 1766-1767, Table 6. 
101 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1767. 
102 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1760. 
103 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1763. 
104 Thompson & Thomas (2004), pp. 1763-1764. 
105 DeMott (2003), Section 2:5, p. 2-35. 
106 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1792. 
107 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1792. 
108 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1785, p. 1792. 
109 In fact, there is far less research on the derivative action against close corporations than there 
is against public corporations. Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas also pointed out 
that 'the academy has virtually ignored derivative suits against private companies.' Thompson 
& Thomas (2004), p. 1760. 
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especially the minority shareholders' new causes of direct action against mis-
conduct (the mechanism of broadened involuntary dissolution and the mechanism 
of enhanced fiduciary duties owed by a shareholder to others), provide better 
protection for minority shareholders and may be undervaluing the role of the 
derivative action in close corporations. I will discuss this trend in detail in the 
following sections. 
3.2.3.3 Different corporate governance strategies in close corporations 
As mentioned above in Section 3 .2.3 .1.1, close corporations have their own 
features that are different from those of public corporations. Due to these 
differences, mechanisms that deal with corporate governance issues in public 
corporations may not be functional in close corporations. For example, there is no 
market force to discipline corporate management in close corporations; the close 
corporate structure also makes it difficult for close corporations to adopt the 
mechanism of independent directors. The derivative action, as it is structured in 
American law, may also be ill-suited to close corporations. There are two possible 
reasons for this. First, if it is directed against the controlling shareholders in close 
corporations, a derivative action may have problems. For example, the nature of 
the derivative action requires that the recovery, if awarded, be paid to the 
corporation. However, since it is difficult to expel the wrongdoing majorities 
from the company or to eliminate their controlling power, the recovery awarded 
to the injured company would still be under their control. Besides, they would 
also indirectly benefit from the recovery based on the shares they owned. Thus, 
the function of compensation and deterrence found in a derivative action might 
not be workable. Second, the procedural restrictions on derivative actions for 
preventing strike suits hardly play any role in close corporations110 and the risk of 
strike suits is less serious due to the greater stake of the plaintiff shareholder in 
the action. As a result, many jurisdictions have modified their statutory and 
judiciary norms and developed mechanisms specifically for close corporations. 
These mechanisms may end up reducing the conflict among shareholders in close 
corporations. For example, the greater freedom to make contractual agreements 
among shareholders ex ante may make the problem of oppression by majority 
shareholders less severe than it might have been before. 111 
Of course, a detailed discussion of the mechanisms applied in close corporations 
is not our aim here. Nevertheless, we should pay attention to the mechanisms 
which may affect the function of derivative actions in close corporations. The 
most important mechanisms which may undermine the function of derivative 
110 This is why the court is more likely to excuse demand in close corporations where it is difficult 
to find a disinterested and independent party; see Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1767. 
111 Hamilton (2000), p. 350. 
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actions may be the mechanism of broadened involuntary dissolution and the 
mechanism of enhanced fiduciary duties owed by the controlling shareholder to 
other shareholders. These mechanisms allow the aggrieved minority shareholders 
in close corporations to bring actions against the wrongdoer directly. 112 Actually 
these recently developed causes of direct action may not only provide new 
remedies for minority shareholders against the majority shareholder's oppression 
that they did not have before, but may also give minority shareholders the right to 
initiate (procedurally simple) direct actions in the case of corporate wrongs under 
circumstances where in public corporations only (procedurally complex) deriva-
tive actions could be initiated. 113 Therefore, in close corporations the minority 
shareholders' right to initiate direct actions and the right to derivative actions may 
overlap. Although the minority shareholders who initiate direct actions against 
corporate misconduct may not recover their reflective loss114, and although the 
plaintiff of a direct action cannot recover lawyers' fees from the corporation115 
while a successful plaintiff in a derivative action can116, a direct action may still 
be more attractive for minorities than a derivative action because these minorities 
can avoid the substantive and procedural hurdles of the derivative action and 
benefit directly from the remedies. These causes of direct action have become 
especially attractive recently now that legislatures and the courts have broadened 
the circumstances to which the remedies may apply and have expanded the range 
of remedies, showing a tendency to provide better protection for minority 
shareholders in close corporations. 117 
In the following section, I will briefly discuss those recently developed 
mechanisms which grant causes of direct action to individual shareholders in 
close corporations: the mechanism of broadened involuntary dissolution and the 
mechanism of enhanced fiduciary duties owed by the controlling shareholder to 
others. 
112 But in Delaware where there are no rules similar to the 'oppression' remedy or the heightened 
fiduciary duties of the majority shareholders, the derivative action still plays a less important 
role in close corporations than in public corporations; see Thompson & Thomas (2004). The 
authors cannot find a good explanation for this and admit that 'the small number of derivative 
lawsuits presents something of a puzzle,' Thompson & Thomas (2004), at p.1792. For this 
unimportant role in Delaware, see Section 3.2.3.2. 
113 This in fact blurs the tr·aditional distinction between direct and derivative actions in close 
corporations. For a more detailed discussion of the distinction, please refer to Section 3.3.3. 
114 For details of the remedies under direct action, please refer to Section 3.2.3.4. 
115 Thompson (1993), p. 732. 
116 See Section 3.4.4.1. 
117 Thompson (1993); Rock & Wachter (1999), p. 923. 
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3.2.3.4 
3.2.3.4.1 
The new causes of shareholders' direct action in close 
co,porations: remedies against the majority shareholder's 
oppression 
Introduction 
Improper exercise of the majority shareholder's control, which is also known as 
the majority shareholders' oppression of minorities, is a major problem in close 
corporations. The majority's oppression may take many forms, such as 
termination of the minority's employment in the corporation, unequal treatment 
of the minority, overcompensation for majority shareholders, and misapprop-
riation of corporation assets by the majority shareholders for their own benefit. 
Some misconduct, such as the breach of an agreement, undoubtedly gives rise to 
the causes of shareholders' direct action. Nevertheless, some misconduct may 
give rise to difficulties in identifying causes of action. For example, misconduct, 
such as the majority's misappropriation of corporate assets or overcompensation 
for the majority shareholder, prima facie causes injury to the corporation and 
gives rise to a corporate cause of action, however, it may also give rise to a 
shareholder individual cause of action in close corporations. 
Generally, two mechanisms have been developed to provide minority share-
holders with direct remedies (causes of direct action) against the majority 
shareholders' 'oppression': the mechanism of broadened involuntary dissolution 
and the mechanism of enhanced fiduciary duties owed by a shareholder to 
others. 118 These two mechanisms, although not directly connected, both 'reflect 
the same underlying concerns for the position of minority shareholders, 
particularly in close corporations after harmony no longer reigns' .119 For 
example, the standards used by some courts to define 'oppression' in the 
involuntary dissolution remedy are the same as the standards used by some courts 
to determine breach of fiduciary duty. 120 'Their purposes and effects ... are so 
sufficiently similar that it makes sense to think of them as two manifestations of 
a minority shareholder's cause of action for oppression' .121 
Nevertheless, these two mechanisms do exist separately and should not be 
confused. Neither of the mechanisms is used by all states. 122 The common law 
remedy of fiduciary duty is mainly developed in states where the statutory 
remedy of broadened involuntary dissolution is not available. 123 In states where 
118 The principle of involuntary dissolution is also a major way to solve the problem of deadlock 
in close corporations, but this is beyond the scope of our discussion. 
119 Thompson (1993), p. 739. 
120 Thompson (1993), p. 700, pp. 711-712. 
121 Thompson (1993), p. 700. 
122 Thompson (1993), pp.738-739. 
123 Thompson (1993), p. 739. 
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both of them do exist, there are still differences in their application, such as the 
right to a jury trial, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and the exclusiveness of the 
statutory remedy. 124 In fact, the specific facts of a case may find that one remedy 
is more appropriate than another. In the following sections, I will discuss them in 
turn. 
3.2.3.4.2 The broadened involuntary dissolution remedy: the statutory 
remedy of oppression 
Nowadays, the statutes of each state provide minority shareholders in close 
corporations with the remedy of receivership or involuntary dissolution in one or 
more specific situations. 125 Among them, most states (39) include 'oppression' or 
a similar term such as 'unfair prejudice' as a ground for dissolution in their 
involuntary dissolution statutes, in addition to the grounds of illegality, fraud, 
misapplication of corporate assets, or waste of corporate assets. 126 These grounds 
for involuntary dissolution provide the aggrieved minority shareholders in a close 
corporation with a much wider opportunity for relief and show that attention has 
been paid to the interests of individual minority shareholders as well as share-
holders as a group. 127 
As a ground for involuntary dissolution, oppression was first introduced by 
the Illinois and Pennsylvania corporations acts in 1933. 128 Originally 'oppression' 
was interpreted narrowly and this statutory remedy was not widely applied, partly 
because of the extreme remedy of dissolution and the court's traditional reluc-
tance to dissolve a going concern. 129 Nevertheless, for the last twenty to thirty 
years, the remedy of involuntary dissolution for oppression has been broadened 
in two respects: the grounds for judicial dissolution have been broadened (a 
broadened interpretation of 'oppression'), and the range of remedies has been 
broadened as well ( a wide range of remedies other than dissolution). Due to the 
broadened grounds and remedies, the original dissolution remedy has turned into 
124 Thompson (1993), pp. 739-345. 
125 Such as deadlock, illegality, fraud or oppression. See Hamilton (2000), p. 369. For the purpose 
of this book, I only discuss the situation of oppression. 
126 O'Neal & Thompson (2004), Section 9:27: 'Relief based on oppression or similar conduct; 
statutes listing broad grounds for relief', Footnote 6 and accompanying text. The remaining 
states can be classified into three types: first, 'states which list illegality or fraud (but not 
oppression) as grounds for dissolution'; second, 'statutes which only list deadlock as grounds 
for shareholder action'; and third, 'states in which minority shareholders in most corporations 
have no statutory grounds to seek dissolution. Delaware, Kansas, and Oklahoma statutes 
provide no grounds for involuntary dissolution except in corporations that have two 
shareholders each owning 50 percent.' Id., Footnote 6. 
127 O'Neal & Thompson (2004), Section 9:27: 'Relief based on oppression or similar conduct; 
statutes listing broad grounds for relief.' 
128 Thompson (1993), p. 709. 
129 Thompson (1993), p. 709. 
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a general remedy for the aggrieved shareholders, which actually rarely results in 
the dissolution of the corporation nowadays. 130 In fact, it has become the principal 
relief for aggrieved minority shareholders in close corporations. 131 
A broadened inte1pretation of 'oppression' 
As mentioned, the grounds for judicial dissolution have recently been broadened. 
In other words, the interpretation of 'oppression,' which may give rise to the 
involuntary dissolution remedy, has been widely broadened. 'Oppression' is a 
general term referring to abusive tactics for controlling shareholders or directors. 
Sometimes other terms such as 'freeze-outs' or 'squeeze-outs' or 'unfair pre-
judice' are used. 132 'Oppression,' or these alternative terms, does not necessarily 
mean 'illegality' or 'fraud.' It may be identified even where there is an absence of 
mismanagement or misapplication of assets. 133 Usually there is no statutory 
definition of 'oppression' .134 Nevertheless, courts have developed three principal 
approaches for defining 'oppression,' none of which are exclusive, and some-
times they are applied in combination. 135 The first approach defines 'oppression' 
as 'burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct . . . a visible departure from the 
standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder 
who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely' .136 The second approach 
relates 'oppression' to the enhanced fiduciary duties owed by a shareholder to 
other shareholders 137, which I will discuss below. The third approach links 
'oppression' to the frustration of the reasonable expectations of the share-
holders.138 Whatever the definition of oppression, we should remember that in-
juries to the corporation, such as misappropriation of corporate assets or waste of 
corporate assets, are also generally recognized as oppression and thus may give 
rise to a shareholder's individual right to the remedy for oppression. 139 
The broadened range of remedies 
Once 'oppression' has been established, the traditional remedy has been dis-
solution of the corporation. However, as dissolution of the corporation is an 
unusual solution and since the court normally will only use so drastic a remedy 
130 Thompson (1993), pp. 708-709. 
131 Thompson (1993), p. 708. 
132 Hamilton (2000), p. 365; Thompson (1993), p. 709, Footnote 70. 
133 O'Neal & Thompson (2004), Section 9:27: 'Relief based on oppression or similar conduct; 
statutes listing broad grounds for relief,' text accompanying Footnote 9. 
134 Thompson (1993), p. 711. 
135 Thompson (1993), pp. 711-719. 
136 Fix v. Fix Material Co., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
137 Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So. 2d 58, 61 (Miss. 1982), Bakerv. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 
P.2d 387 (Or. 1973); see Thompson (1993), p.712. 
138 Thompson (1993), p. 712. 
139 Thompson (1993), p. 708. 
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in very exceptional circumstances, the current trend is that a wider range of 
remedies may be awarded such as buyouts, appointment of a custodian or a pro-
visional director, altering provisions of the constitution, or directing or prohi-
biting acts of the corporation, its shareholders, directors or officers. 140 In many 
states, the availability of alternative remedies is actually authorized by the 
statutes. 141 Even in the absence of specific statutory authorization, the courts are 
still more willing to grant alternative remedies rather than the remedy of 
dissolution. 142 
Valuation of the shares in buyouts 
The most common remedy for oppression is a buyout of the petitioning share-
holder's shares. 143 However, buyouts raise the difficult problem of how to value 
the shares. In fact, there still is no clear solution to this problem. It is generally 
agreed, though, that the buyout price should be the 'fair value' of the shares. 144 
However, the buyout statutes fail to define 'fair value.' Many courts apply the 
standard of valuation applied in appraisal right cases, which is unfortunately not 
clear either. 145 Due to the lack of authority, different opinions exist as to what 'fair 
value' is. The two major conflicting opinions are, first, the 'fair market value' 
which reduces or discounts the price of shares that lack control or other valuable 
140 See Section 14.34 of the MBCA; Lockwood & Barsch (1996), p. 641. For a detailed discussion 
of the alternative remedies, see Thompson (1993), pp. 718-726. 
141 Such as Arizona, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, and so on; see Thompson (1993), p. 720, 
Footnote 142. 
142 See, for example, Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W:D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 802 F.2d 448 
(3d Cir. 1986); Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'! Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Alabama 1968); 
Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W:2d 269 
(Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230 (Montana 1983); McCauley v. Tom 
McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific C01p., 
564 P.2d 277 (Oregon 1977); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 
1973); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W:2d 375 (Texas Ct. App. 1988); Contra, Corlett, Killian, 
Hardeman, McIntosh & Levi, PA. v. Merritt, 478 So.2d 828 (Florida Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see 
Thompson (1993), pp. 720-721, Footnote 144. 
143 Moll (2004), p. 308. 
144 See, for example, MBCA Section 14.34(a) ('In a proceeding under Section 14.30(2) to dissolve 
a corporation ... the corporation may elect or, if it fails to elect, one or more shareholders may 
elect to purchase all shares owned by the petitioning shareholder at the fair value of the 
shares.'); see also Model Statutory Close Corp. Supp. § 42(b)(l) (stating that a court, if it 
orders a share purchase, should 'determine the fair value of the shares, considering among 
other relevant evidence the going-concern value of the corporation'). The buyout statutes of 
several large states and the courts in the states without statutory authorization for a buyout 
remedy also require the buyout price be the 'fair value' of the shares; see Moll (2004), p. 310. 
145 Moll (2004), pp. 310-311; Henderson (1995), pp. 217-223. In Weinbe1ger v. UDP, Inc., 457 
A.2d 701, (Del., 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court also applied the valuation method in the 
dissenter's right case to a non-dissenter's right situation. 
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attributes; second, 'the net asset value' or the 'enterprise value' which ascribes to 
each share its pro rata portion of the overall enterprise value without discount. 146 
A question that relates to our research is whether the fair price in buyouts should 
reflect the petitioning shareholder's reflective losses which arose from the injury 
done to the corporation by the oppressive conduct. If the petitioning shareholder 
can claim for the reflective loss, the position of derivative actions may be even 
weaker, as it is in England. 147 However, there is neither legislative nor judicial 
opinion on this issue. 
As to whether these reflective losses will be considered in appraisal right cases, 
American courts and legislatures have had differing opinions. In Gonsalves v. 
Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., where no derivative action was initiated against 
overcompensation, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that 
in an appraisal proceeding such a loss should not be considered when valuing the 
dissenter's shares. 148 In Sieg Co. v. Kelly149, the Supreme Court of Iowa took the 
same approach as the Delaware Supreme Court. In this case it held that the claims 
against pre-merger mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty, which resulted 
in the injury to the corporation and then depreciated the value of the shares, 
should be presented in a separate action and so were not appropriately considered 
in an appraisal action: 'only if the trial court had decided the depreciation resulted 
from the anticipated merger, and therefore would normally be excluded from 
consideration, should it have gone on to consider whether exclusion of the 
depreciation would be inequitable' .150 
Nevertheless, there is also another line of cases. In Indiana, where the statute 
provides that the appraisal right remedy should be exclusive and therefore no 
derivative action will be allowed after the dissenter's rights have arisen151 , the 
Court of Appeals oflndiana in Young v. General Acceptance Cmp., 'affords the 
dissenter the opportunity not only to have the fair value of his or her shares to be 
determined, but also to argue any breach of fiduciary duty or fraud claims' in the 
appraisal proceeding. 152 
We should note, however, that the opinions in the appraisal right cases may not 
explain the buyout situations since the two remedies have different grounds. As 
mentioned in Sieg Co. v. Kelly: 
146 Moll (2004), pp. 311-314. 
147 See Section 2.2.2. 
148 701 A.2d 357, 363 (Del Super 1997). 
149 568 N.W:2d 794 (Iowa 1997). 
150 568 N.W:2d 794, 802 (Iowa 1997). 
151 Indiana Code section 23-1-44-8( c ). 
152 738 N.E.2d 1079, 1089 (Ind App 2000). 
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An appraisal action is not an equitable proceeding wherein the court assigns a 
value to the dissenters' stock that it considers 'fair and equitable under all the 
circumstances'; it is only an action 'at law to determine the fair value of the 
dissenters' shares'; 153 
The Weinberger court was clear that the narrow remedy provided by an 
appraisal action does not encompass claims of fraud, self-dealing or breach of 
fiduciary duty; those claims are separate and distinct and can be redressed 
outside the appraisal remedy. 154 
On the contrary, the remedy of oppression is purported to assist the aggrieved 
shareholders. Whether the court, when valuing the shares, will consider the 
difference is still unknown. 
3.2.3.4.3 The enhanced fiduciary duties owed by the controlling 
shareholder directly to other shareholders: the common law 
remedy 
Development of the enhanced fiducia,y duty 
It has been generally recognized in the United States that directors, as well as 
officers and majority shareholders who participate in the management of the 
corporation, owe fiduciary duties to the corporation (the shareholders collecti-
vely) rather than to individual shareholders. In addition, shareholders normally do 
not owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders. 155 However, this attitude has 
changed to some extent over the last decades. Recognizing the unique nature of 
close corporations and their resemblance to partnerships, some courts have held 
that partnership-type duties should be imposed on the shareholders and directors 
of close corporations: they should owe heightened fiduciary duties to other 
shareholders. 
One of the first cases imposing such duties was Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Co. of New England, Inc. 156 In this case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court clarified the reasons for imposing such duties and illustrated the standard 
for such duties. It held that: 
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the 
partnership, the h11st and confidence which are essential to this scale and 
manner of enterprise, and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close 
corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe one 
153 568 NW2d 794, 802, (Iowa 1997). 
154 568 NW2d 794, 802 (Iowa 1997). 
155 Hamilton (2000), p. 373; O'Neal & Thompson (2004), Section 9:19, 'Traditional Use of 
Fiduciary Duty', text accompanying Footnotes I and 2. 
156 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, (Massachusetts 1975). 
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another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise 
that partners owe to one another. In our previous decisions, we have defined 
the standard of duty owed by partners to one another as the 'utmost good faith 
and loyalty.' Stockholders in close corporations must discharge their 
management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict 
good faith standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-
interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to 
the corporation. 
We contrast this strict good faith standard with the somewhat less stringent 
standard of fiduciary duty to which directors and stockholders of all 
corporations must adhere in the discharge of their corporate responsibilities 
The more rigorous duty of partners and participants in a joint adventure, here 
extended to stockholders in a close corporation, was described by then Chief 
Judge Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 
N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928): 'Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one 
another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many 
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's 
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties .... Not honesty alone, 
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of 
behavior' .157 
However, the Donahue decision, if strictly applied, 'will result in the imposition 
of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group in a close corporation 
which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the 
best interests of all concerned' .158 Therefore, in the subsequent case of Wilkes v. 
Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 159, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
developed the Donahue decision and tried to strike a balance between minority 
protection and efficient corporate management. Recognizing that the majority 
shareholders 'have certain rights to what has been termed 'selfish ownership' in 
the corporation which should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary 
obligation to the minority' 160, the court developed the standard of 'legitimate 
business purpose' to decide whether the majority shareholder in a close cor-
poration breached their Donohue fiduciary duties. The court should ask 'whether 
the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its 
action' .161 If the answer is affirmative, however, the minority shareholders should 
still have the opportunity 'to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could 
have been achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the 
157 367 Mass. 578, 592-594, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-516 (Massachusetts 1975). 
158 Wilkes \( Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 850, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 
(Massachusetts 1976). 
159 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (Massachusetts 1976). 
160 370 Mass. 842, 850-851, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Massachusetts 1976). 
161 370 Mass. 842, 851, 353 N.E.2d 657 663 (Massachusetts 1976). 
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minority's interest' .162 The court 'must weigh the legitimate business purpose, if 
any, against the practicability of a less harmful alternative' .163 
The Donahue principle of a heightened fiduciary duty owed by a shareholder to 
other shareholders and the Wilkes standard of judicial review have been adopted 
by the courts in several states, although they take different approaches towards the 
scope and meaning of these fiduciary duties. 164 Nevertheless, some courts have 
still refused to apply the Donahue principle, such as the Delaware Supreme Court 
in the case of Nixon v. Black:well. 165 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that it should 'be a matter for legislative determination in Delaware' for 
duties to be created in a normal corporate practice such as the creation of 
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs); it was inappropriate to create special 
judicial duties since that 'would border on judicial legislation'. 166 The court also 
held that '[i]t would do violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation 
law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed 
stockholder buyout for which the parties had not contracted' .167 
Some statutes have also recognized that heightened fiduciary duties exist among 
shareholders. 168 When deciding whether to grant relief under involuntary 
dissolution, the courts have been asked by some statutes to 'take into account the 
duty which all shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one another to act 
in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the corporation and 
the reasonable expectations of the shareholders ... '. 169 This also shows the 
relationship between the principle of fiduciary duties and the statutory 
involuntary dissolution remedy. 170 
Examples of the breach of heightened fiduciary duties 
A majority shareholder's breach of the heightened fiduciaiy duties owed to other 
shareholders may include non pro rata distribution of profits to majority 
shareholders in which the minority shareholders were not permitted to share171, 
162 370 Mass. 842, 851-852, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Massachusetts 1976). 
163 370 Mass. 842, 852, 353 N.E.2d 657 663 (Massachusetts 1976). 
164 Such as New York, Rhode Island, Illinois, Colorado, Mississippi, Minnesota, and Ohio; see 
Thompson (1993), p. 729; O'Neal & Thompson (2004), Section 9:21, 'Enhanced Fiduciary 
Duties,' Footnote 8. 
165 626 A.2d 1366 (Delaware 1993). 
166 626 A.2d 1366, 1377 (Delaware 1993). 
167 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Delaware 1993). 
168 Such as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751(3)(a) (Westlaw: M.S.A. s 302A.751(3)(a)); N.D. Cent. 
Code§ 10-19.1-115(3) (Westlaw: ND ST 10-19.-115). Also see Thompson (1993), p. 729. 
169 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751(3)(a) (Westlaw: M.S.A. s 302A.751(3)(a)). 
170 Thompson (1993), p. 729. 
171 Such as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 
505, (Massachusetts 1975). 
112 
THE UNITED STATES 
dismissal of the minority shareholder as a corporate officer and director172, 
exclusion of the minority shareholder from significant participation173, selling 
corporate assets to the majority shareholder or related parties for inadequate 
consideration174, and causing the corporation not to pay bills owed to the 
minority's firm which later failed. 175 Therefore, by misconduct toward the 
corporation, the majority shareholder in a close corporation may also breach his 
duties owed to the minority shareholders, as well as his duties to the corporation. 
In fact, it is not always easy to distinguish whether the plaintiff should bring a 
direct or derivative action in such cases. For details about the distinction, please 
see Section 3.3. 
Remedies 
The aggrieved minority shareholder may acquire equitable remedies if he has 
successfully established that the defendant majority breached the heightened 
fiduciary duties owed to him. The court will exercise 'its traditional equity 
powers' to put him 'as nearly as possible in the same position which he would 
have occupied if there had been no wrongdoing ... '. 176 Forms of relief may 
include, for example, a preliminary injunction, a rescission of the unfair dealing, 
an order to give the plaintiff an equal opportunity, an order to distribute dividends, 
a realignment of shareholders ownership, as well as monetary relief such as 
damages or restitution. 177 
As mentioned, by injuring the corporation, the majority may have breached both 
its duties owed to the corporation and the duties owed to the minority share-
holders. Therefore the problem is, as in the statutory oppression remedy, whether 
the plaintiff shareholder can claim for the reflective losses in such cases through 
a direct action which is based on the breach of the duties owed to him. Some 
courts have answered the question positively. In Sugarman v. Sugarman178, the 
majority shareholder paid his father and himself excessive compensation and 
benefits, which were not available to the plaintiff shareholders, and offered to buy 
the plaintiffs' stocks for a grossly inadequate price. The Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit held that these facts proved that the majority shareholder tried to 
improperly freeze the plaintiffs out of the company and therefore had breached 
172 Such as Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (Massa-
chusetts 1976). 
173 Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (WD. Pa. 1984), aft'd, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986); also 
see Thompson (1993), p. 728. 
174 Such as Dowling 1\ Narragansett Capital Co,p., 735 F. Supp. 1105 (D.R.I. 1990). 
175 Such as Zimmerman 1\ Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 402 Mass. 650, (Massachusetts 1988); also see 
Thompson (1993), p. 728. 
176 Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849,402 Mass. 650,661 (1988) (quoting Shu/kin v. Shu/kin, 
301 Mass. 184, 192-93 (1938)). 
177 Billings (1996), pp. 5-14. 
178 797 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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his fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders. Instead of awarding damages to 
the corporation, the court awarded the damages directly to the plaintiffs in an 
amount equivalent to the amount of stock owned by them. 179 However, it has been 
argued that Sugarman v. Sugarman is uncommon. Billings regarded that Sugar-
man v. Sugarman was 'an unusual, even aberrant, example of overcompensation 
being redressed in a direct action; more commonly, the Massachusetts courts have 
required a derivative claim, reasoning that the injury is to the corporation and 
rejecting attempts to characterize overcompensation as part of a freeze-out 
scheme directed at the plaintiff' .180 
In Donahue v. Draperl8l, where the defendant shareholder had breached the 
agreement among the shareholders by appropriating the corporate goodwill upon 
the dissolution of the corporation, the court also awarded the plaintiff half of the 
value appropriated. Nevertheless, the case is regarded as being easier to explain 
than Sugarman since there was breach of agreement in this case. 182 
3.2.4 Ongoing debates as to the role of derivative action in the United 
States 
We have just enumerated the features of the role of derivative action in the United 
States and have noted that such a role has been weakened in practice. However, 
neither theoretically nor judicially is it a settled issue as to the role the derivative 
action should play. In fact, there still are ongoing debates on this issue. 
3.2.4.1 
3.2.4.1.1 
Compensation versus deterrence 
The possible conflict between the functions of compensation and 
deterrence 
As mentioned in Section 1.2.1, derivative actions have several functions, the most 
important of which are compensation and deterrence. We should pay special 
attention here to the fact that, although only the injured corporation will be 
directly compensated by a derivative action, the compensatory function, as 
studied by the American literature as well as judicial opinions, sometimes refers 
to direct compensation to the injured corporation, while at other times to indirect 
compensation to the shareholders in the corporation. 
Generally the functions of compensation and deterrence do not conflict with each 
other because by compensating the injured party the derivative action also deters 
the wrongdoers and other persons from committing misconduct again. Never-
179 797 F.2d 3, 7-9 (1st Cir. 1986). 
180 Billings (1996), p. 9. 
181 22 Mass. App. Ct. 30 (1986). 
182 Billings (1996), p. 9. 
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theless, in certain situations there are conflicts between the functions, such as in 
cases where the misconduct did not cause any damage to the corporation. In such 
a case, whether a derivative action will be allowed against the misconduct 
depends on the attitude towards the functions of the derivative action. If 
compensation is regarded as the prevailing purpose, then a derivative action will 
only be allowed when the corporation has suffered losses. However, if the 
deterrent function prevails, a derivative action will be allowed as long as there is 
misconduct, no matter whether the corporation suffered losses or not. Put simply, 
'deterrence justifies a relaxation of standing criteria'. 183 
The conflict between compensation and deterrence generates practical pro-
blems in derivative actions. For example: 
Should a court dismiss an otherwise meritorious derivative action if it appears 
that costs of litigation will exceed the likely recovery? Should a defendant be 
permitted to raise the defense that the crime paid, that the benefits of illegal 
action undertaken by him on behalf of the corporation exceeded the costs and 
penalties imposed on the corporation as a result? Should a shareholder not 
injured by the misconduct be denied the ability to bring a meritorious deriva-
tive action that otherwise would not be pursued? 184 
In each of these cases, a deterrent perspective tends to answer in the negative, 
while a compensatory rationale tends to respond in the affirmative. 185 
Therefore, the attitude towards the conflicting functions will directly affect the 
attitude towards the derivative action. 
The attitude towards the functions of compensation and deterrence may affect 
the attitude towards derivative actions in another way. If the function of com-
pensation is regarded as the prevailing purpose, the unsuccessful performance of 
the function may lead to the conclusion that derivative action is not satisfactory 
and that it then should not play an important role. In contrast, if the focus is on 
deterrence, the effect of compensation will not determine the effect of derivative 
actions; derivative actions may still play an important role even if there is hardly 
any compensatory function. I will discuss this issue further in Section 3.2.4.2. 
3 .2.4.1.2 Current judicial approaches 
3 .2.4.1.2.1 The judicial approach that compensation prevails over deterrence 
The judicial approaches towards the conflicting functions of compensation and 
deterrence are not concurrent in the United States. The prevailing judicial 
approach is that compensation is the primary purpose while deterrence is simply 
183 Cox (1984), p. 778. 
184 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), p. 308. 
185 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), p. 308. 
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the by-product186, or in other words, the function of compensation prevails over 
deterrence. Two rules illustrate this approach. 187 The first rule is the 'net loss' 
requirement. Under this rule, the plaintiff shareholder in a derivative action must 
establish that the corporation has suffered a net loss through the misconduct, that 
is, the damage suffered by the corporation from the misconduct must exceed the 
benefit it acquired from the misconduct; otherwise, the action will be dis-
missed.188 
The second rule, the 'vicarious incapacity' principle, goes even further. Under 
this principle, even if it suffered loss, the injured corporation is prevented from 
suing its former controlling shareholder if the current controlling shareholder 
acquired his shares from the defendant without loss. 189 The principle was first 
established in Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber. 190 In that case the defendants, 
who were also former shareholders, injured the corporation through mismana-
gement; later they transferred the shares to the current sole shareholder at a fair 
price. The Supreme Cami of Nebraska denied the corporation's right to claim 
against the mismanagement since the current shareholder suffered no losses. 
Commissioner Pound held that: 
Where a corporation is not asserting or endeavoring to protect a title to 
property, it can only maintain a suit in equity as the representative of its 
stockholders. 191 
... where it is proceeding in equity to assert rights of an equitable nature, or is 
seeking relief upon rules or principles of equity, the court of equity will not 
forget that the stockholders are the real and substantial beneficiaries of a 
recovery, and if the stockholders have no standing in equity, and are not 
equitably entitled to the remedy sought to be enforced by the corporation in 
their behalf and for their advantage, the corporation will not be permitted to 
recover. 192 
Rejecting that deterrence could justify the corporation's action, Commissioner 
Pound also held that 'If a wrongdoer deserves to be punished, it does not follow 
that others are to be enriched at his expense by a court of equity. A plaintiff must 
recover on the strength of his own case, not on the weakness of the defendant's 
case' .193 The approach in Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber was accepted by the 
Supreme Court in Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostock Rail-
road.194 In this case, a majority shareholder, who acquired 98.3 percent of the 
186 See Cox (1984), p. 764; Cox (1999), pp. 8-9. 
187 Cox (1999), p. 8. 
188 Cox (1999), pp. 8-9; Cox (1984), pp. 764-765; Forte (1965), pp. 333-339; Note (1964), p. 179. 
189 Cox (1999), pp. 9-10; Cox (1984), pp. 765-766. 
190 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903). 
191 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024, 1031-1032 (1903). 
192 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024, 1033 (1903). 
193 67 Neb. 644, 673, 93 N.W. 1024, 1035 (1903). 
194 417 U.S. 703 (1974). 
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shares from a former controlling shareholder at a fair price, caused the 
corporation to sue the former shareholder and its parent corporation for an 
alleged misappropriation during their years of control. The case was accepted by 
the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit195 but dismissed by the Supreme Court. 
The reason given by the Supreme Court was that if the case were allowed, most 
recovery to the corporation would go to this controlling shareholder, who knew 
about the alleged misconduct at the time of purchasing the shares and had 
suffered no loss from the misconduct. Therefore a recovery, if allowed, would be 
a windfall for him. 196 Here the Supreme Court's opinion is that deterrence alone 
cannot justify a corporate action; other considerations such as unjust enrichment 
may be more important factors. 
The rationale under the 'vicarious incapacity' principle, stating that the 
prevention of unjust enrichment prevails over deterrence, also applies to 
derivative actions. The most obvious example is the contemporaneous ownership 
principle, which requires that the plaintiff shareholder own the shares at the time 
of the complaint of misconduct. 197 One purpose of the principle is 'to prevent 
unjust enrichment by those who acquired their shares with knowledge of the 
alleged wrong'. 198 
3 .2.4.1.2.2 The judicial approach that deterrence predominates when the 
compensation function is absent 
In the United States there is also another line of cases which recognizes the im-
portance of the deterrent role and takes the approach that deterrence pre-
dominates when a compensatory function is absent. A typical statement of this 
approach can be found in the New York Court of Appeal's case of Diamond v. 
Oreamuno: 
It is true that the complaint before us does not contain any allegation of 
damages to the corporation but this has never been considered to be an 
essential requirement for a cause of action founded on a breach of fiduciary 
duty .... This is because the function of such an action, unlike an ordinary tort 
or contract case, is not merely to compensate the plaintiffs for wrongs 
committed by the defendant but, as this court declared many years ago ... 'to 
prevent them, by removing from agents and trustees all inducement to attempt 
dealing for their own benefit in matters which they have undertaken for their 
195 Bangor &Aroostook R.R. v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 482 F.2d 865, 868 (1st Cir. 1973), 
rev'd, 417 U.S. 703 (1974). 
196 Bangor Punta, 417 U.S. 703, 716-717 (1974). 
197 Cox (1999), pp. 9-10. For a more detailed discussion of this principle, please refer to Section 
3.4.2.1. 
198 ALI (II), Section 7 .02, p. 37. Other purposes include discouraging strike suits, preventing the 
purchase of suits and preventing the collusive establishment of a federal diversity jurisdiction. 
See Hamilton (2000), pp. 543-544; ALI (II), Section 7.02, p. 37; Cox (1984), p. 767. 
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own benefit in matters which they have undertaken for others, or to which 
their agency or trust relates' .199 
Other cases reflecting the same approach include the Supreme Court cases of 
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 200 and City of Riverside 1< Rivera201, and the 
Delaware Supreme Court cases of Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado. 202 
3.2.4.1.2.3 The third approach which considers neither compensation nor 
deterrence to be the major concern 
There is also a third approach which considers that both compensation and 
deterrence are superseded by other considerations, such as the shareholders' 
responsibility for supervising management or management's motivation of risk-
taking. If a derivative action is regarded as adversely affecting these concerns, the 
court may disallow the derivative action. 203 Nevertheless, this is not a common 
approach, and I will not discuss it further. 
3.2.4.1.2.4 Comments 
3.2.4.1.2.4.1 Problems of the first approach 
The first approach has been much criticized, especially by academics. For 
example, Cox held that 'The most apparent error courts make is elevating com-
pensation over deterrence in defining the mission of the derivative suit'. 204 Coffee 
and Schwartz submitted that 'Such a rationale may have been appropriate when 
the derivative action first emerged, but today the changed relationship between 
the shareholder and his corporation makes such a rationale seem increasingly 
anachronistic'. 205 
Generally, criticisms of the first approach are as follows. First, 'compensation is 
a goal that the derivative action can realize only imperfectly'. 206 This may be due 
to several reasons: the constant transfer of shares especially in public corporations 
may cause some shareholders to go uncompensated while some get windfalls; the 
injury to the corporation and the injury to the individual shareholder is unlikely 
to be congruent; and the recovery is normally rather small both for the cor-
199 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498 (N.Y. 1969). 
200 396 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970). 
201 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986). 
202 430 A.2d 779, 789, (Delaware 1981). Also see ALI(Il), Part VII, chapter 1, Introductory Note, 
Reporter's Note, pp.12-13. 
203 Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); 
Cox (1984), pp. 755-758. 
204 Cox (1999), p. 39. 
205 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), p. 302. 
206 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), p. 302. 
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poration ( considering its whole value of assets) and for the individual shareholder 
( due to the small percentage of his shares). 207 In addition, in some cases the relief 
may not be of a financial nature.208 Second, the first approach ignores the social 
value of derivative actions. Derivative actions are generally against breaches of 
fiduciary duties, something that has substantial public influence.209 If derivative 
actions are intended to police corporate management and improve corporate 
governance generally, their deterrent role should be improved. 'Compensating the 
injured is a private matter, whereas deterrence is of public concern' .210 Third, the 
'net loss' requirement rule based on this approach ignores the long-term interests 
of the company. In certain cases, although there is no 'net loss' caused by the 
alleged misconduct, the company will suffer long-term damage because the 
wrongdoer has not been punished and bad corporate management may continue. 
In fact, how to define 'loss' is a tricky issue. Fourth, if the 'contemporaneous 
ownership' requirement based on this approach is justified by the necessity for 
preventing unjust enrichment, it may conflict with the nature of derivative action. 
Since damages under derivative actions will be awarded to the injured 
corporation, preventing shareholders who bought their shares after the mis-
conduct from bringing a derivative action may cause the corporation and other 
stakeholders to remain uncompensated.211 In addition, if a shareholder who 
satisfies the contemporaneous ownership requirement brings a derivative action, 
the non-qualified shareholder may still reap a proportional gain indirectly 
because the damages will be awarded to the corporation. 
3.2.4.1.2.4.2 Problems of the second approach 
Application of the second approach without any limitation may also create the 
problem of over-deterrence and a possible abuse of derivative actions. Since the 
second approach justifies a relaxation of the standing requirement on initiating 
derivative actions, it will be easier for minority shareholders to bring vexatious 
suits. In addition, the effect of the deterrence function also depends on public 
esteem for the derivative action. If the derivative action was notorious for the 
abuse of its use and the low possibility of it benefiting the corporation and its 
shareholders, there would hardly be any deterrent effect. 
3.2.4.1.2.4.3 Striking a balance between the two approaches 
On the one hand, due to problems resulting from the predominance of the 
compensatory function, many researchers have suggested an improved deterrent 
function. For example, Cox suggests that courts should consider the deterrent 
207 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), pp. 302-305; Cox (1999), p. 16. 
208 Cox (1999), p. 16. 
209 Cox (1999), p. 1 I. 
210 Cox (1999), p. 11. 
211 The reform of the Pennsylvanian law on the 'contemporaneous ownership' requirement shows 




function when granting standing to initiate derivative suits and approving 
settlement, so that 'the public character of the norms raised by the suit' can be 
emphasized.212 Coffee and Schwartz also point out that 'the derivative action is in 
some ways naturally adapted to a deterrent rationale, principally because it 
harnesses private enforcement resources and focuses its penalties on the 
individual rather than the corporation' .213 On the other hand, due to the concern 
about overdeterrence, how far the deterrent function should go in derivative 
actions still remains problematic. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that there 
should not be an absolute application of either approach; a balance should be 
struck between the two approaches.214 
The ALI Principles also propose a balance between compensation and deterrence. 
On the one hand, if the deterrent function is regarded as an important and 
independent purpose of derivative actions rather than a mere consequence of the 
compensatory function, the derivative action can protect the long-term interests 
of the corporation by punishing the misconduct.215 The general deterrent function 
may also improve corporate management and thus reduce general agency costs.216 
The shareholders in the harmed corporation may also benefit from the general 
deterrent function if they hold a portfolio of securities.217 On the other hand, 
however, the ALI 'is particularly sensitive to the danger of overdeterrence and the 
impact of even the potential risk of litigation on the willingness of outside 
directors to serve and on their conduct as directors' .218 There are some examples 
of the ALi's efforts to strike a balance between compensation and deterrence. The 
first example is that found in Section 7 .1 0(b) of the ALI Principles where the ALI 
recognizes that: 
... under certain limited circumstances the long-run deterrent value of the 
derivative action and the social and economic importance of confidence in the 
integrity of the corporate system generally outweigh the corporation's interest 
in a swift termination procedure for actions that seem unlikely to produce a 
net monetary benefit for it.219 
Another example is that the ALI has also adopted a relaxed contemporaneous 
ownership rule in Section 7.02. According to Section 7.02(a)(l) of the ALI 
Principles, a shareholder, who acquired the shares before the alleged wrong was 
212 Cox (1999), p. 39. 
213 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), p. 305. 
214 See, for example, Coffee & Schwartz (1981), pp. 308-309. 
215 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter I, Introductory Note, p. 8. 
216 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, Reporter's Note, p. 16. 
217 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, Reporter's Note, p. 16. 
218 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, p. 8. 
219 ALI (II), Section 7.10, Comment G, p. 148. 
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publicly disclosed or was known by him, can commence and maintain a derivative 
action even if he was not a shareholder when the alleged wrong was committed. 
However, this relaxation is more concerned with avoiding unjust enrichment than 
improving the deterrent function of derivative actions.220 As long as the 
contemporaneous ownership principle is retained, the purpose of the derivative 
action is still compensation oriented.221 A more radical reform has been taken in 
Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvanian law, a shareholder can bring a derivative 
action when it is necessaiy to avoid the injustice of a serious wrong to the 
corporation going umedressed.222 
3.2.4.2 
3.2.4.2.1 
Debates as to the role of derivative action 
Doubts about the prominent role of derivative action 
Originally the prevailing approach of the derivative action was that it was 'the 
chief regulator of corporate management'. 223 However, the prominent role of the 
derivative action was brought into doubt later due to problems resulting from 
derivative actions, such as the ineffectiveness of the suits (the corporations and 
the shareholders were barely ever compensated by the suits)224, the high rate of 
settlements, the high litigation costs of the suits, and the fact that many cases were 
driven by the plaintiff's attorneys and that many cases were strike suits. These 
problems have been detected by several empirical studies, such as the Wood 
Report.225 Although these studies have been carried out from different 
perspectives and are based on different samples, they share skepticism about the 
effect of derivative actions and come to the conclusion that 'there is a greater 
likelihood that more of these suits are frivolous' 226 and that 'derivative suits are 
not an important monitoring device to curb managerial malfeasance' .227 By 
examining the market reaction to judicial decisions as to whether to allow or 
terminate a derivative action, Fischel and Bradley used econometric techniques to 
study the effect of a derivative action on the wealth of a company's share-
holders.228 The study showed that 'a successful derivative suit, on average, has a 
slight positive effect on the wealth of the firm's stockholders' and 'a court's 
220 Cox (1999), p. 39. 
221 Cox (1999), p. 39. 
222 See 15 Pa. Bus. Corp. Law§ 1782(b) (Westlaw: 15 Pa.C.S.A s 1782(b) (Pennsylvania Statutes 
and Consolidated Statutes Annotated)). 
223 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp, 337 U.S. 541, 548, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1226 (1949). 
224 Romano (1991), p. 61. 
225 See Section 3.1.1.3. Other empirical surveys include, for example, Jones (1980a), Jones 
(1980b), Fischel & Bradley (1986), and Romano (1991); see ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, 
Introductory Note, Reporter's Note. 
226 Romano (1991), p. 61. 
227 Fischel & Bradley (1986), p. 282. 
228 Fischel & Bradley (1986), p. 278. 
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termination of such a suit has a slight negative effect on shareholder wealth'. 229 
Thus they concluded that 'derivative suits are not an important monitoring device 
to curb managerial malfeasance' because '[i]f derivative suits were effective 
monitors we would expect a much greater market reaction to the court decisions 
in this study'. 230 Professor Romano's research is more recent. She randomly 
selected 535 public companies over a period extending from the late 1960s to 
1987 for her study. The study showed that the rate of settlement in derivative 
actions was high231 and that the amount of recovery to. the companies was 
small232, while most cases involved fees awarded to the plaintiff's attorneys. 
Professor Romano also examined stock price reactions to announcements of the 
commencement and termination of shareholder litigations (both class actions and 
derivative actions) and drew the conclusion, similar to Fischel and Bradle's, that 
the changes in stock price 'do not provide compelling support for the proposition 
that shareholders experience significant wealth effects from litigations'.233 As a 
result, both of these studies conclude that derivative action yielded no significant 
wealth effect. The compensatory role of derivative action was thus in doubt. 
American legislatures and courts also seem to take the approach that the 
function of derivative actions is a doubtful one. As a result, more restrictions have 
been placed on derivative actions. The ALI, although it does not wholly agree 
with the empirical studies and considers it difficult to make an overall evaluation 
of the derivative action, does regard the derivative action as 'neither the initial nor 
the primary protection for shareholders against managerial misconduct'. 234 
3.2.4.2.2 The approach favoring a strengthened role for derivative action 
Nevertheless, the derivative action still has its proponents, who suggest a 
strengthened role for the derivative action. Some arguments are based on the 
deterrent or educational functions of the derivative action. They regard the 
derivative action as something that cannot be judged simply by its compensatory 
function, which 'most certainly will condemn it to failure' .235 Instead, the value 
of the derivative action should be judged by its other functions as well, such as its 
deterrent and educational functions: 
229 Fischel & Bradley (1986), p. 282. 
230 Fischel & Bradley (1986), p. 282. However, the ALI doubts the reliability of the data in this 
study; see Section 3.2.4.2.2. 
231 Eighty-three out of one hundred twenty-eight actions (about 65%) were settled; see Romano 
(1991), p. 60. 
232 The average recovery in derivative actions was about half of that awarded in class actions, see 
Romano (1991), p. 61. 
233 Romano (1991), at pp. 65-66. 
234 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, p. 5. 
235 Cox (1999), p. 16. 
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Despite the numerous abuses which have developed in connection with such 
suits they have accomplished much in policing the corporate system es-
pecially in protecting corporate ownership as against corporate management. 
They have educated corporate directors in the principles of fiduciary 
responsibility and undivided loyalty. They have encouraged faith in the wis-
dom of full disclosure to stockholders. They have discouraged membership on 
boards by persons not truly interested in the corporation ... The measure of 
effectiveness of the stockholder's derivative suit cannot be taken by a 
computation of the money recovery in the litigated cases. The minatory effect 
of such actions has undoubtedly prevented diversion of large amounts from 
stockholders to management and outsiders.236 
Other proponents of derivative actions doubt the seriousness of the problems with 
them and even deny that problems exist, especially those problems with sh·ike 
suits and the ineffectiveness of derivative actions in general. For example, Macey 
and Miller suggest that 'strike suit litigation is relatively uncommon' .237 They 
point out that defendants, as repeat players in shareholders' litigations, are 
unlikely to settle suits because that would make them easy targets and generate 
more frivolous suits; plaintiffs' attorneys are unlikely to bring strike suits either, 
due to the substantial risks inherent in these suits.238 Coffee also points out that 
the high rate of settlement does not necessarily suggest that most cases are cases 
without merit and that the low incidence of litigated plaintiffs' victories does not 
mean that the plaintiffs abuse the suits. It is more probable that the low rate of 
plaintiffs' victories reflects the asymmetric stakes in derivative actions: in 
derivative actions what the defendants lose is much more than what the plaintiffs 
or their attorneys receive and, therefore, the defendants are likely to litigate cases 
which they have a greater chance of winning, while by the same token settling 
other cases. 239 
It is also submitted that the plaintiffs' attorneys should not be blamed for the 
problems of derivative actions: 
The mere fact that lawyers pursue their own economic interest in bringing 
derivative litigation cannot be held as grounds to disqualify a derivative 
plaintiff ... To be sure, a real possibility exists that the economic motives of 
attorneys may influence the remedy sought or the conduct of the litigation. 
This influence, however, is inherent in private enforcement mechanisms and 
does not necessarily vitiate the substantial beneficial impact upon the conduct 
of fiduciaries.240 
236 Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525-526 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
237 Macey & Miller (1991), p.78. 
238 Macey & Miller (1991), p.78. 
239 Coffee (1986), pp. 700-701. 
240 In re Fuqua Industries, Inc., 752 A.2d 126, 133 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
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The empirical studies that confirm the problems of derivative actions, as 
mentioned above, have also been brought into doubt. For example, re-analyses of 
Wood's data have shown that the overall rate of plaintiff's success ( cases where 
some recovery was granted) was about forty-four percent and 'compared 
favorably with the rate of plaintiff's success in similar forms of civil litigation' .241 
Fischel and Bradley's survey, which examined the change in the market price of 
the common stock of firms involved in derivative actions242, was also 
criticized.243 The ALI gave several reasons for its doubts about the survey.244 First, 
the data might not be reliable due to the methodology the study used. The study 
questionably presumed that stock markets would sensibly react to the relatively 
small recoveries from derivative actions. In addition, there is no evidence that the 
market's expectation was frustrated by the termination of any derivative actions. 
Second, even if the data were reliable, the indifference of the market price to 
derivative actions should not necessarily result in the conclusion that these 
derivative actions were ineffective. The indifference may be due to concern over 
collusive or cosmetic settlements, which leave nothing to the corporation. 
Moreover, the deterrent effect of derivative actions generally will not be reflected 
in the price of stocks in one single corporation. 
Very recent empirical research has also come up with a result contradicting the 
previous ones. By studying all corporate law complaints filed in Delaware over a 
two-year period from 1999 to 2000, Thompson and Thomas found: 
. . . that there are a small number of derivative suits, about thirty per year, 
brought against public companies incorporated in Delaware. Contrary to 
earlier studies, we do not find evidence that that these cases are 'strike suits' 
yielding little benefit. Instead, roughly 30 percent of the derivative suits 
provide relief to the corporation or the shareholders, while the others are 
usually dismissed quickly with little apparent litigation activity. In cases 
producing a recovery to shareholders, the amount of recovery typically 
exceeds the amount of attorneys' fees awarded by a significant margin. The 
cases do demonstrate some indicia of litigation agency costs (for example, 
suits being filed quickly, multiple suits per controversy, and repeat plaintiffs' 
law firms), but each of these costs is much less pronounced for derivative suits 
than for other forms of representative litigation. Overall, the claim that 
derivative suits are typically strike suits is much weaker than in earlier 
periods. 245 
241 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, Reporter's Note, p. 9. 
242 Fischel & Bradley (1986), pp. 277-283. 
243 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, Reporter's Note, p. 12. For the comments on 
the study, also see Ribstein (1986). 
244 ALI (II), Part VII, Chapter 1, Introductory Note, Reporter's Note, p.12. 
245 Thompson & Thomas (2004), pp. 1749-1750. 
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Different methods have also been suggested for strengthening the role of deri-
vative actions. For example, Buxbaum, Coffee and Schwartz have suggested that 
the board's powers to terminate derivative actions should be decreased246; Scott, 
distinguishing the duty of loyalty from the duty of care, suggests removing 
obstacles to derivative actions that enforce the duty of loyalty247; and Thompson 
and Thomas suggest that derivative actions against public corporations brought 
by investors holding one percent or more of the corporate shares should be 
excused from the demand requirement that is currently applied. 248 
3.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between 
derivative action and direct action 
3.3.1 Criteria applied in American law generally 
In determining whether an action should be direct or derivative, American courts 
are not bound by the label applied by the plaintiff in the pleading, instead they 
will look to the body of the complaint and apply certain criteria to decide the 
nature of the action.249 The major criteria employed are the injury and the right 
criteria, nevertheless, some courts may also consider other factors. Therefore, as 
will be seen, the distinction is not always consistent in case law. 
We should also bear in mind that the difficulty for the plaintiff in clarifying 
the nature of the action may always be alleviated by claiming both of the actions 
alternatively or concurrently.250 
3.3.1.1 
3.3.1.1.1 
The injwy and the right criteria 
Introduction to the injury and the right criteria 
The most common criterion employed by American courts to distinguish 
derivative actions from direct actions is the injury criterion and/or the right 
criterion. Many statements such as the following can be found in the American 
literature and cases: 
In determining whether a particular claim is derivative or personal, the Court 
must consider the nature of the harm inflicted and the nature of the rights 
violated. Where the injury is personalized to a shareholder and flows from a 
violation of rights inherent in the ownership of stock, suit may be brought by 
246 Buxbaum (1980); Coffee & Schwartz (1981). 
247 Scott (1983). 
248 Thompson & Thomas (2004), pp. 1749-1750. 
249 Rubinstein v. Skytelle1; Inc., 48 F.Supp.2d 315, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Ferrara et al. (2005), 
Section 1.02, text accompanying Footnotes 13-18. 
250 Billings (1996), p. 12. 
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the shareholders. On the other hand, where the injury is to the corporation and 
only affects the shareholders incidentally, the action is derivative.251 
Here, an injury suffered by the shareholder personally does not require that the 
injury thus suffered be separate and distinct from that suffered by other 
shareholders.252 In fact, an injury may affect a substantial number of shareholders 
individually and still not be a corporate injury. In such cases, direct actions may 
still be allowed in the form of class actions. 
Legal rights and injury relate to each other. Since it is legally defined, an injury 
is not cognizable if the victim has no right to sue directly for relief.253 Actually, 
an injury presupposes certain legal rights: without a legal right, no cognizable 
injury exists.254 Therefore, in most cases the employment of the injury and the 
right criteria leads to no substantial differences in the results. For example, 
violation of corporate legal rights leads to injmy to the corporation, while 
violation of shareholder's individual rights directly leads to irtjury to the 
shareholder. 
However, there may be some exceptions and the infringement of rights may 
not be identical to the injury suffered: sometimes the infringement of rights may 
lead to no injury; while sometimes a wrongful act may infringe both the rights of 
the corporation and of shareholders individually. In the latter case, the identifica-
tion of the action may not only depend on the right infringed, but also on the 
plaintiff's complaints or the remedies sought by the plaintiff. A good example is 
the claims against ultra vires acts, which I will discuss in Section 3.3.2.1. 
3.3.1.1.2 Non-exhaustive categories of actions based on the right and/or 
injury criteria 
Shareholder's personal rights and direct actions 
As mentioned, injuries presuppose legal rights. Therefore, we will first identify 
the shareholder's personal rights. Generally there are two groups of sources for 
the shareholder's personal rights: the first is the statutory law, the constitutions of 
the corporation, a shareholder agreement with the corporation, or an agreement 
among the shareholders, including implied contracts.255 The second group of 
sources is the duties owed to the shareholder individually by the wrongdoer, such 
as the common law fiduciary duties owed to the shareholder, contracts or torts 
duties with respect to which the shareholder is a party in an individual capacity. 256 
251 Dowling 1\ Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (D.R.l. 1990). 
252 Cox & Hazen (2002), pp. 421-422. 
253 Welch (1994), p. 155. 
254 Welch (1994), p. 155. 
255 Welch (1994), p. 163. 
256 Welch (1994), pp. 163-164. 
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Basically, a shareholder's personal rights include, inter alia: the right to divi-
dends, the right to inspect corporate books and records, the right to vote, the right 
to attend the general meeting of shareholders, the right to have the constitutions 
followed, the claim 'that corporate officials sought to 'entrench' themselves or 
manipulate the corporate machinery so as to frustrate plaintiff's attempt to secure 
representation or obtain control,' the claim 'that proposed corporate action should 
be enjoined as ultra vires, fraudulent, or designed to harm a specific shareholder 
illegitimately,' the claim 'that minority shareholders have been oppressed or that 
corporate dissolution or similar equitable relief is justified,' the claim 'that a 
proposed corporate control transaction, recapitalization, redemption, or similar 
defensive transaction unfairly affects the plaintiff shareholder,' and so on.257 
Actions enforcing these rights are, therefore, direct actions normally. Specifically, 
the following actions are generally regarded as direct actions although there may 
be different approaches: 
( 1) actions to enforce the right to vote, to protect preemptive rights, to prevent 
the improper dilution of voting rights, or to enjoin the improper voting of 
shares; (2) actions to compel dividends or to protect accrued dividend 
arrearages; (3) actions challenging the use of corporate machinery or the 
issuance of stock for a wrongful purpose (such as an attempt to perpetuate 
management in control or to frustrate voting power legitimately acquired by 
existing shareholders); (4) actions to enjoin an ultra vires or unauthorized act; 
(5) actions to prevent oppression of, or fraud against, minority shareholders; 
(6) actions to compel dissolution, appoint a receiver, or obtain similar 
equitable relief; (7) actions challenging the improper expulsion of shareolders 
through mergers, redemption, or other means; (8) actions to inspect corporate 
books and records; (9) actions to require the holding of a shareholders' 
meeting or the sending of notice thereof; and (10) actions to hold controlling 
shareholders liable for acts undertaken in their individual capacities that 
depress the value of the minority's shares.258 
Derivative actions 
Any damage to the corporation is regarded as directly done to the corporation 
rather than to the shareholders, even though the shareholders also suffer 
diminution in the value of their shares; such diminution is only regarded as 
shareholders' indirect losses. Therefore, a shareholder can only bring derivative 
actions against such a corporate injury. This principle was first established in 
Smith v. Hurd259 and is widely accepted today.260 This distinction is in fact based 
on the 'injury' criterion. 
257 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 1, pp. 26-28. 
258 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment C, p. 18. 
259 53 Mass. 371 (1847). 
260 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 2, p. 28; Note (1962), p. 1148. 
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Derivative actions can also be detected from the 'rights' criterion. For example, 
since directors, officers and the controlling shareholders are generally regarded as 
owing fiduciary duties 'to the corporation as a whole rather than to individual 
shareholders or to individual classes of shareholders '261 , an individual share-
holder normally should bring derivative claims against the breach of such duties, 
such as 'claims of gross negligence, mismanagement, self-dealing, excessive 
compensation, and usurpation of corporate opportunity' .262 Nevertheless, some 
of these claims may also lead to a shareholder's direct action in close corpo-
rations, which I will discuss later in Section 3.3.3. 
Direct or derivative actions or both 
The classifications of actions mentioned above are neither exhaustive nor 
unconditional. In fact, it is more difficult to draw a line between the injuries to or 
the rights of the corporation and the shareholder than it might seem. While in 
many cases the line is clear, it is also often hazy. This is especially the case where 
the same misconduct may give rise to either a direct or a derivative action or both. 
For example, there is a split of authority on identifying the plaintiff's claims for 
compelling dividends.263 While it is generally agreed that claims for declared 
dividends are direct actions, there have been disagreements as to compelling 
dividends.264 The claim may be direct and individual since '[t]he right to 
dividends is an incident of [stock] ownership'; here shareholders were injured 
directly due to the failure of distribution of dividends.265 On the other hand, a 
derivative action was also allowed by holding that the duty owed by the directors 
was to the corporation. 266 Although nowadays a direct action is the prevailing 
view, a derivative action may still be justified on the grounds that the corporation 
also suffered losses due to 'punitive excess retained-earnings taxes or that the 
retained earnings will othe1wise be used improvidently' .267 
The difficulty of identifying actions occurs especially in certain situations 
such as ultra vires or unauthorized act, and breaches of duties by directors and 
controlling shareholders, which I will discuss in Section 3.3.2. 
3.3.1.2 Other considerations 
In addition to rights and/or injury criteria, the court may also take into account 
other factors, such as policy bases for derivative actions, the competing interests 
261 Hamilton (2000), p. 445. 
262 Thompson (1993), p. 732; O'Neal & Thompson (2004), Section 9.22 (Direct v. derivative suits; 
individual recovery in derivative suits). 
263 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 421. 
264 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 421. 
265 Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Co1p., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956). 
266 Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331 (N.Y 1954). 
267 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 421. 
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of each party268 , or even the results from the characterization269 when identifying 
an action. Indeed, the court is regarded as having 'wide discretion in interpreting 
whether a complaint states a derivative or primary claim' .270 Although these 
factors may be of secondary significance in the identification of action271 , they 
still deserve our attention. 
Policy considerations 
As mentioned, the policy justifications for derivative actions include, for example, 
the need to protect the creditors and other stakeholders of the corporation, the 
avoidance of multiplicity of law suits, the prevention of unjust interference in 
corporate management by individual shareholders, and the judicial policy of 
favoring the resolution of corporate disputes within the structure of the 
corporation.272 When determining whether a suit should be derivative or not, the 
court may also consider whether such justifications for derivative suits exist. For 
example, where the plaintiff shareholder only seeks injunctive or prospective 
relief instead of damages, courts are more willing to permit direct actions because 
the policy considerations favoring derivative actions are less convincing: the 
relief sought does not involve financial recovery, but will benefit all shareholders 
proportionately as well as other stakeholders. In addition, there is no financial 
motivation on the part of the plaintiff shareholder and therefore there is less risk 
of abuse of the suit. 273 This approach actually explains why courts often allow a 
shareholder's direct action to enjoin mergers, recapitalizations and similar 
structural changes. 274 
Results of the action 
Courts may also consider results such as the adequacy of remedies available 
under each action in order to determine the type of suit. In Hanson v. Kake Tribal 
Co,p.275, the plaintiff shareholders brought class actions against the village 
corporation for discriminatory payment of dividends based on a financial security 
plan which was adopted by the corporate directors to further the social and 
financial welfare of some shareholders. According to the plan only the original 
shareholders would receive the dividend. Although the illegal payments 
diminished the corporate assets and there were many shareholders who neither 
received the illegal payments through the plan nor were included as members of 
268 Note (1962); ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment D, p. 20; Welch (1994), pp. 165-166. 
269 Hanson 1'. Kake 'I'ribal Co1p., 939 P.2d 1320, (Alaska 1997). 
270 Hanson v. Kake Ti-ibal C01p., 939 P.2d 1320, 1327 (Alaska 1997). 
271 Welch (1994), p. 165. 
272 See Section I. Also see Welch (1994), pp. 165-166. 
273 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment D, p. 20; ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note I, p. 28. 
274 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment D, p. 20; ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 1, p. 28. 
275 939 P.2d 1320, (Alaska, 1997). 
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the class of plaintiff shareholders, the Supreme Court of Alaska allowed the class 
action. The court considered that a derivative action was not appropriate since it 
would not adequately compensate the plaintiffs. In this case, the recipients of the 
misappropriated funds were shareholders who did not know the distribution was 
illegal when receiving the dividend, therefore, the corporation might not have 
been entitled to damages from such shareholders.276 In addition, 'it is unlikely 
that any damages collected from the responsible directors and officers would 
approximate the sum of payments made under the plan' .277 In fact, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska's classification of the action is regarded as representing 'a choice 
between imperfect alternatives, each carrying significant drawbacks'. 278 
3.3.1.3 Application of the criteria 
It is common for the court to apply more than one criterion, at least to some 
extent, in determining the nature of the action.279 Since the distinction between 
the shareholder's individual 'rights' and/or 'injury' and those of the corporation is 
not always easy, other criteria may be applied to identify the nature of the action. 
Nevertheless, the rights and/or the injury criteria are still basic and other 
considerations are only 'of secondary significance'. 280 
However, there is still another voice commenting on the application of the 
criteria. Welch considers that the application of various criteria is 'both confusing 
and time consuming' .281 Regarding the rights criterion as the most compelling 
one, he suggests that there should be only one test, that is, the rights criterion, and 
'no other criteria need be mentioned ... except optionally in order to elaborate on 
the consequences of the court's determination' .282 The dissenting Judge Fabe in 
Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp. also shared this approach. Judge Fabe disagreed 
with the majority's opinion that the classification of action would be judged by 
the adequacy of the recovery. Instead, he insisted the focus of the classification 
should be on the nature of the harm.283 
3.3.2 Distinction in several situations 
The distinction between direct and derivative actions is especially difficult in 
several situations to which I will pay special attention in the following sections. 
276 939 P.2d 1320, 1326-1328 (Alaska, 1997). 
277 939 P.2d 1320, 1327 (Alaska 1997). 
278 DeMott (2003), Section 2:4, p. 2-30. 
279 Welch (1994), p. 166. 
280 Welch (1994), p. 165. 
281 Welch (1994), pp. 166-167. 
282 Welch (1994), p. 167. 
283 Hanson v. Kake Tribal C01p., 939 P.2d 1320, 1334 (Alaska 1997). 
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3.3.2.l Claims arising fiwn ultra vires or unauthorized acts 
American law generally recognizes the dual consequences of ultra vires or 
unauthorized acts. On the one hand, if a company suffers losses from the ultra 
vires or unauthorized act, the claim for damages against the act belongs to the 
company and therefore a shareholder can only bring a derivative action to enforce 
the claim. 284 On the other hand, a shareholder can bring a direct action if he only 
claims injunction, that is, to enjoin the ultra vires or unauthorized act.285 
The dual consequences of the ultra vires or unauthorized act are due to the 
twin aspects of the act. By causing damage to the corporation, the ultra vires or 
unauthorized act not only infringes on the rights of the corporation, but also 
infringes on the individual shareholder's right to 'have the corporate property 
managed in their interest'286, even though the individual shareholder may suffer 
no direct financial losses. In such cases, the identification of action may not 
simply depend on the right and/or injury criteria, but also on the plaintiff's 
complaints, or in other words, the remedies sought by the plaintiff. This approach 
was clearly illustrated in Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc.: 
A shareholder's financial interest in a corporation provides two separate 
grounds for standing to challenge the actions of a board of directors 
depending upon the nature of the asserted claim. In one type of action, a 
shareholder sues the corporation solely in a personal capacity and complains 
that the acts of the corporation, its officers or third persons, have undermined 
the rights of the shareholders to exercise their relative voice in corporate 
affairs. [Citation omitted] The second type of shareholder suit is a derivative 
action which arises out of a 'primary right of a corporation but which is 
asserted on its behalf by the stockholder because of the corporation's failure, 
deliberate or otherwise, to act upon the primary right.' [Citation omitted] ... 
In distinguishing between a personal and derivative action, a court is required 
to look to the plaintiff's complaint. [Citation omitted] It should be further 
noted that because the shareholders are possessed of a right to have the 
corporate property managed in their interest, any shareholder may bring an 
action to enjoin the misapplication of its assets, or to enjoin ultra vires acts.287 
284 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 1, F, p. 27; Starbird v. Lane, 203 Cal. App.2d 247, 21 
Cal.Rptr. 280 (1962). 
285 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 1, F, p. 27. 
286 Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F.Supp. 390, 402, (N.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other 
grounds, 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980). 
287 Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F.Supp. 390, 402, (N.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other 
grounds, 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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3.3.2.2 Claims arising fi'om breach of duties by c01porate fiduciaries 
The 'personal injury' doctrine (or the 'special duty' doctrine) 
Directors, controlling shareholders and senior officers of a corporation normally 
have wide powers to control, manage and direct the corporation. Therefore they 
are generally regarded as owing fiduciary duties to the corporation.288 These 
fiduciary duties are basically owed to the corporation rather than to individual 
shareholders.289 Therefore, where the fiduciaries breached their duties and injured 
the corporation, normally a shareholder can only bring a derivative action against 
this breach. 
However, there are also exceptions to this general rule. If due to the fiduciary's 
misconduct an individual shareholder has suffered a 'personal' injury that is 
separate and distinct from that suffered by the corporation, or if the misconduct 
has violated a special duty owed to the shareholder such as a contractual duty, a 
shareholder's direct action may be allowed even though the alleged wrong 
involved the corporate management, principally injured the corporation and 
involved a corporate action.290 This is called the 'personal injury' doctrine or the 
'special duty' doctrine.291 
A 'special duty' may be found where the wrongdoing corporate fiduciaries 
occupy a dual relationship.292 For example, they are directors, officers, or the 
controlling shareholders of the corporation and therefore owe fiduciary duties to 
the corporation. At the same time, they may have another relationship with an 
individual shareholder in such a way that guard, trust or pledge exists between 
them.293 In fact, the 'special duty' exception originated from exactly such cases.294 
The second circumstance of the exception is where there is a contract between 
the wrongdoing fiduciary and the individual shareholder, or where the individual 
shareholder is the beneficiary of a contract which the defendant, as a party, has 
breached.295 The court sometimes has even gone so far as to permit a direct action 
where there was breach of contract, but where the misconduct related to the 
corporate management and where the plaintiff shareholder did not suffer an 
injury that was separate and distinct from that suffered by the corporation. In 
288 Hamilton (2000), pp. 444-445. 
289 Hamilton (2000), pp. 444-445. 
290 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment C, p. 19; ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 3, p. 29; 
Hildta v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Alaska 1986). 
291 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment C, p.19; ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 3, p. 29. 
292 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 3, p. 29. 
293 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 3, p. 29. 
294 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 3, p. 29. 
295 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 3, p. 29. 
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Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.296 , several corporations reached an 
agreement to contribute start-up funds and assistance to a newly formed 
corporation. Later one party to the agreement, a shareholder in the newly formed 
corporation, breached the agreement that benefited the corporation. Overruling a 
previous decision of the same court297, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the 
shareholder who was a party to the agreement could sue individually for breach 
of conh·act by another party shareholder, even though the plaintiff shareholder 
had not suffered separate and distinct injury from that suffered by the 
corporation.298 The court held that: 
A shareholders agreement for the benefit of a corporation does create a duty 
running to both the corporation and the promisee. Section 305(1) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) makes this clear: 
A promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to the promisee to 
perform the promise even though he also has a similar duty to an intended 
beneficiary. 299 
As to the remedies, the court held that 'In the event such a breach is established' 
the plaintiff shareholder, also a party to the agreement, 'may recover all proximate 
damages that can be proved with reasonable certainty'. 300 
Thirdly, a corporate fiduciary may be treated as committing torts toward the 
individual shareholder when 'an element of fraud or malice in the intent of the 
corporate official toward the shareholder was seen' and therefore a special duty 
to the individual shareholder may exist.301 Nowadays, this type of a special duty 
is typically found where a director intentionally or negligently made deceptive 
misstatements to the shareholder in connection with a sale of stock, or where the 
stocks were issued with a wrongful intent such as diluting the interest of a 
specific shareholder by devaluing the shares or diluting the control already held, 
or preventing the exercise of control through voting at the annual meeting of 
shareholders.302 Nevertheless, case law has taken different approaches as to 
whether the deterrence of a takeover attempt, such as the issuance of a 'poison 
pill' security, may also give rise to direct actions 'on the grounds that it chills 
voting rights or restricts the alienability of the shareholder's stock' .303 The ALI 
296 713 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1986). 
297 Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 645 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1982). The facts and the issues 
presented in the case were the same as those in Hikita. 
298 Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Alaska 1986). In this case, only 
the corporation suffered losses through the misconduct complained about. 
299 713 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Alaska 1986). 
300 713 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Alaska 1986). 
301 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 3, p. 29. 
302 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 3, pp. 29-30; ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment C, p. 19. 
303 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note 3, pp. 30-31. 
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Principles suggest that the test should be whether the shareholder suffered an 
injury that is independent from a prior injury to the corporation. 304 
In Lochhead v. Alacano305, the defendants (directors and majority 
shareholders) granted themselves additional shares at inadequate prices before 
the merger of the corporation and forged corporate documents such as the notice 
of a shareholders' meeting and the meeting minutes. In his First Amended 
Complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had breached a fiduciary duty 
to him when they illegally deprived him of the value of certain stock of the 
purchasing corporation.306 However, under Utah law 'as to corporate directors 
and officers ... the duty is owed to the corporation itself and to the shareholders 
only collectively'307, and 'It is for the corporation ... to institute action for wrongs 
inflicted upon it by corporate officers or to set aside contracts made in fraud of 
corporate rights'. 308 Therefore, a fiduciary duty owed to an individual shareholder 
was not recognized and a direct action was not allowed. Nevertheless, in his Third 
Amended Complaint, the plaintiff changed the cause of action. The plaintiff 
claimed that he was directly injured by the defendants' misconduct due to the 
reduction in his proportionate ownership interest. 309 This injury was not indirect 
loss deriving from a diminution in value of the plaintiff's stocks, in fact, the 
overall value of the sold corporation at the time of merger was unaffected by the 
defendants' conduct, and neither the sold corporation nor the purchasing 
corporation suffered any corporate injury as a whole.310 The plaintiff's amended 
claim was upheld by the court. The court accepted that the plaintiff's personal 
right was injured. It stated that: 
The right of a stockholder to maintain an existing proportion between his 
stock and the entire capital stock is a property right of which, under ordinary 
circumstances, he cannot be deprived by an increase of stock. A stockholder 
has a personal right of action to attack and avoid a fraudulent increase of stock 
made and issued to another which results in depriving him of his relative 
position as a stockholder. A suit to protect this personal, primary right is not 
derivative because it is not maintained in the right of the corporation or 
brought on its behalf.311 
In addition, the court also acknowledged that the plaintiff's injury from the 
dilution of his ownership interest was direct and distinct from that of the 
304 ALI (II), Section 7.01 (b), and Comment C, p. 19. 
305 697 F. Supp. 406, (D. Utah 1988). 
306 697 F. Supp. 406,410 (D. Utah 1988). 
307 697 F. Supp. 406, 410 (D. Utah 1988). 
308 697 F. Supp. 406,410 (D. Utah 1988). 
309 697 F. Supp. 406, 410-411 (D. Utah 1988). 
310 697 F. Supp. 406, 411-412 (D. Utah 1988). 
311 697 F. Supp. 406,412 (D. Utah 1988). 
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corporation.312 Based on the infringed personal right and direct injury, the court 
allowed a direct action. 
Delaware law 
The derivative versus direct distinction under Delaware law was for a long time 
complicated and confusing. This was partly due to the fact that some courts 
applied the 'special injury' requirement to make a distinction while others did 
not.313 The 'special injury' test required a plaintiff who claimed for a direct action 
to 'state a claim for an injury which was separate and distinct from that suffered 
by other shareholders or a wrong involving a contractual right of a shareholder 
which existed independently of any right of the corporation' .314 Furthermore, 
'When an injury to corporate stock falls equally upon all stockholders, then an 
individual stockholder may not recover for the injury to his stock alone, but must 
seek recovery derivatively on behalf of the corporation'.315 Obviously the 'special 
injury' test confused the injury to the corporation as a separate entity with the 
direct injury to shareholders equally but individually. Those courts that did not 
adopt the 'special injury' test identified shareholder's direct claims as those where 
the shareholder's injury was direct or independent of any injury suffered by the 
corporation.316 
The above situation may recently have changed, however. In 2004 some 
landmark decisions were made by the Delaware Court of Chancery and the 
Delaware Supreme Court.317 In these cases, the 'special injury' test was 
abolished. Recognizing that the 'special injury' test was 'not helpful' and 
'confusing'318, the Delaware Supreme Court held that when determining whether 
the action should be direct or derivative, 
. . . a court should look to the nature of the wrong and to whom the relief 
should go. The stockholder's claimed direct injury must be independent of any 
alleged injury to the corporation. The stockholder must demonstrate that the 
duty breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can prevail 
312 697 F. Supp. 406, 413 (D. Utah 1988). 
313 Donaldson (2005), pp. 389-396. Cases adopting the 'special injury' requirement include, for 
example, Bo/wt v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, (Delaware 1970); while cases which did not 
accept the requirement include, for example, Kramer v. TVestern Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 
348, (Delaware 1988). 
314 Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Delaware 1996). 
315 Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246,249 (Delaware 1970). 
316 Donaldson (2005), pp. 393-394; Kramer v. TVestern Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 
(Delaware 1988). 
317 The Delaware Court of Chancery case of Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, (Del. Ch. 2004), 
and the Delaware Supreme Court case of Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, INC., 845 
A.2d 1031, (Delaware 2004). 
318 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, INC., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Delaware 2004). 
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without showing an injury to the corporation;319 
[The distinction] must turn solely on the following questions: ( 1) who suffered 
the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and 
(2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the 
corporation or the stockholders, individually)?320 
Although there are still open questions, such as whether the 'special injury' test 
is still indicative, and how to distinguish the shareholder's injury from the 
corporate injury321 , the latest development in Delaware case law is indeed closer 
to the test of 'personal injury' doctrine or the 'special duty' doctrine that we have 
been discussing. 
3.3.3 Special treatment for close co1porations 
The above mentioned distinction between direct and derivative actions applies to 
all corporations generally. However, the distinction may be more difficult to make 
in close corporations. This is at least partly due to the special treatment for close 
corporations given by some courts. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3.1.2, when 
recognizing the special features of close corporations, some courts may apply 
different rules to close corporations from those applied to public corporations. 
This different treatment may also be embodied in the distinction between direct 
and derivative actions. 
3.3.3.1 Different approaches to the question of whether the nature of 
close corporations should be relevant to the distinctions in close 
corporations 
American courts have taken different approaches to the question of whether the 
nature of close corporations should be relevant as far as the classification of suits 
is concerned. Some courts take the strict position that the distinct nature of close 
corporations should not be relevant. 322 An individual shareholder must bring a 
derivative action to claim corporate injury even if the plaintiff is the only 
shareholder.323 They can only bring a direct action for injuries that are personal 
and distinct from those done to the corporation.324 This approach sticks to the 
319 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, INC., 845 A.2d 1031, 1038-1039 (Delaware 2004). 
320 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, INC., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Delaware 2004). 
321 Donaldson (2005), pp. 403-408. 
322 DeMott (2003), Section 2:5, p. 2-35. Such a line of cases include, for example, Hames v. 
Cravens, 966 S.W.2d 244 (Arkansas 1998); Abe/ow v. Symonds, 38 Del. Ch. 572, 156 A.2d 416 
(1959); and W. E. Hedger Transportation Co1p. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 186 Misc. 758, 61 
N.Y.S.2d 876 (N.Y. Sup. 1945). 
323 Such as W. E. Hedger Transportation Co,p. v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 186 Misc. 758, 61 
N.Y.S.2d 876 (N.Y. Sup. 1945). 
324 DeMott (2003), pp. 2-35 - 2-36. 
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traditional justifications for derivative actions such as the necessity to protect the 
creditors and to avoid multiple suits.325 
Nevertheless, some courts have taken a more flexible approach. Recognizing the 
distinct nature of close corporations, the courts are inclined to treat close 
corporations differently and permit direct actions in close corporations where, if 
in public corporations, the claimant would have brought a derivative action.326 
Several justifications are given for this approach. First, corporate recovery in 
derivative actions may give rise to problems in close corporations.327 The 
recovery going to the corporation may still be under the control of the defendant 
and so the defendant majority shareholder would also indirectly benefit from the 
recovery based on the shares they own. In addition, the plaintiff minority 
shareholder may not be fully compensated by the corporate recovery. Therefore, 
neither the compensatory function nor the deterrent one would be achieved. 
Second, the justifications for a derivative action may not exist or be less 
substantial in close corporations.328 For example, since there are only a small 
number of shareholders in such corporations, the threat of a multiplicity of suits 
is unlikely to happen.329 The need to protect creditors may not be necessary if the 
corporation is not insolvent; seeking the intra-corporate remedy is neither 
necessary nor possible since a disinterested board would hardly exist in such 
corporations. 330 The strict requirements on initiating an action may also not be 
needed because such requirements aim to protect public corporations against 
'strike suits' by plaintiffs holding only a nominal interest in the firm.331 This 
protection may not be necessary in close corporations. This lack of justifications 
for a derivative action is especially the case where the shareholders in a close 
corporation are divided into two groups: the plaintiff minority shareholders and 
the defendant majority shareholders. If the corporation is still solvent, the 
interests of creditors will not be affected either. In such corporations, since the 
plaintiffs are the only injured shareholders, individual recovery will not prejudice 
the rights of other shareholders. Based on these considerations, it is held that 'in 
exceptional situations' courts 'should look at the 'realistic objectives' of a given 
case to determine if a direct action is proper'. 332 
The ALI also takes the flexible approach. Section 7.0l(d) of the ALI's 
Principle states that: 
325 DeMott (2003), pp. 2-36 -2-38. 
326 DeMott (2003), pp. 2-38- 2-43; Thompson (1993), pp. 733-738. Examples of the cases can be 
seen in this section. 
327 O'Neal & Thompson (2004), Section 9.22 (Direct v. derivative suits; individual recovery in 
derivative suits), text accompanying Footnote 10. 
328 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment E, p. 21. 
329 DeMott (2003), pp. 2-38 - 2-39. 
330 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment E, p. 21. 
331 ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment E, p. 21. 
332 Thomas v. Dickson, 301 S.E.2d 49, 51 (Georgia 1983). 
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In the case of a closely held corporation, the court in its discretion may treat 
an action raising derivative claims as a direct action, exempt it from those 
restrictions and defenses applicable only to derivative actions, and order an 
individual recovery, if it finds that to do so will not (i) unfairly expose the 
corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially 
prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a 
fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.333 
Typical examples of a shareholder's individual cause of action in close corpo-
rations, which would be a corporate cause of action if in public corporations, may 
include: 
termination [ of employment of the plaintiff shareholder] coupled with 
increased salaries and corporate benefits for the shareholders who remain; 
misuse of corporate authority to gain a greater share of proceeds when the 
corporation is sold; 
misappropriation of assets by the controlling shareholders; 
selling corporate assets too cheaply to controllers or related parties; 
the controllers receiving benefits in the form of increased salaries and 
other compensation.334 
In fact, it is difficult for the plaintiff shareholder to accurately identify the nature 
of action in close corporations due to the inconsistency of case law. 335 The best 
solution for the plaintiff shareholder may be to bring both claims jointly or alter-
natively. 336 For example, the empirical study showed that in Delaware in more 
than half of derivative cases concerning private companies, the complaint linked 
an individual claim to the derivative one.337 
3.3.3.2 Judicial grounds for allowing direct actions instead of derivative 
actions in close c01porations 
Flexible treatment of the classification of actions in close corporations may also 
be based on different grounds, which I will discuss in the following sections. Of 
333 Cases citing Section 7.0l(d) of the ALI Principles include, for example, Schumacher v. 
Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1991); Barth 1i Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, (Indiana 1995); 
Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc. 140 N.C.App. 390, 537 S.E.2d 248 (N.C.App. 
2000). 
334 O'Neal & Thompson (2004), Section 9.22, text accompanying Footnotes 37-41. Also see 
Thompson (1993), pp. 733-734. 
335 Such as with regard to the overcompensations cases, in Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st 
Cir. 1986) the direct claim was sustained, while in Bessette 1i Bessette, 385 Mass. 806, 808-
810 (1982), the direct claim was rejected. 
336 Billings (1996), p. 12. 
337 Thompson & Thomas (2004), p. 1765. 
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course, the court may apply more than one ground to justify the identification of 
the action. 
3.3.3.2.1 New causes of direct action and the varied injury criterion 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3.4, many states have developed two remedies for 
minority shareholders in close corporations in order to grant individual share-
holders the right to bring direct actions against the majority shareholder's 
oppression: the statutory remedy of the broadened involuntary dissolution and the 
common law remedy of enhanced fiduciary duties owed by the controlling 
shareholder to other shareholders directly. If the plaintiff shareholder can prove 
that the misconduct amounted to 'oppression' in the statutory remedy or breached 
the common law fiduciary duty owed to him, he may bring a direct action against 
the misconduct in his own name based on these causes of action. 
An individual shareholder may seek the above remedies even if the same 
misconduct also injures the corporation and gives rise to a derivative action 
simultaneously.338 In such cases, the misconduct also has twin aspects: it has 
infringed on both the rights of the corporation and those of the plaintiff share-
holder. As in cases of ultra vires or the unauthorized act, traditionally the 
identification of action in such cases depends on the plaintiff's complaints or the 
remedies sought by the plaintiff. A direct action can be brought if the shareholder 
seeks the prevention or enjoining of the oppression or an exit remedy.339 
Nevertheless, a direct action may not be allowed if a claim is made by the 
shareholder for damages against losses that are reflective of the corporate losses. 
However, some courts may treat close corporations in a special way and adopt a 
varied injury criterion to allow a shareholder's direct action for damages where 
the injury was to the corporation and, therefore, would only give rise to a 
derivative action if in public corporations. For example, where the misconduct 
injured the corporation but benefited the majority shareholders, the traditional 
view is that the injury was suffered by the corporation, while shareholders 
individually only bore indirect losses; therefore an individual shareholder can 
only bring a derivative action for damages. Nevertheless, in close corporations 
some courts have accepted that in such cases the minority shareholders have 
suffered losses separate and distinct from those suffered by the majority 
shareholders, which would give rise to the minority shareholders' direct 
actions.340 Actually, in such cases the courts focus on 'the disproportionate 
338 Generally courts allow shareholders to maintain derivative and direct actions simultaneously. 
339 See ALI (II), Section 7.01, Reporter's Note I, p. 27. 
340 See, for example, Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc., 140 N.C.App. 390,537 S.E.2d 
248 (N.C.App., 2000); Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Co1p., 735 F. Supp. 1105 (D.R.I. 
1990); Crosby 1\ Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989); Traylor v. Marine Co1p., 328 F. Supp. 
382 (E.D. Wis. 1971). 
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impact' of the misconduct on the minority shareholders rather than the injury to 
the corporation.341 In Sugarman v. Sugarman342, where the majority benefited his 
father and himself through unequal salaries and overcompensation not available 
to the minority shareholders and where the majority offered to buy out the 
minority at an inadequate price, the First Circle of the Federal Court of Appeal 
did allow the direct action based on the 'freeze-out' theory and granted direct 
damages to the plaintiffs. In Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc. 343 , 
where the defendants diverted assets and business opportunities from the 
Company to the defendants and therefore emiched themselves at the expense of 
the Company and the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina also 
acknowledged that: 
. . . plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they have suffered an injury 
'separate and distinct' from the injury sustained by the other shareholders or 
the corporation itself ... 
The gist of plaintiffs' allegations is that they have suffered substantial 
financial losses as the result of the defendants' actions, while the defendants 
have obviously profited from those same wrongful acts. Plaintiffs have 
sufficiently alleged that they have suffered injuries 'separate and distinct' 
from the defendants, who have suffered no injuries at all. 
In Crosby v. Beam344, where the controlling shareholders received benefits in the 
form of increased salaries and other compensation, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
allowed a direct action. The court held that the shareholders in close corporations 
owed heightened fiduciary duty to each other and that the controlling share-
holders had breached such duty 'to minority shareholders when control of the 
close corporation is utilized to prevent the minority from having an equal 
opportunity in the corporation.' Where such a breach has occurred, the minority 
shareholder was individually harmed even where there were no special damages 
peculiar to the minority shareholder and, therefore, a minority shareholder might 
then proceed with a direct action against the offending majority or controlling 
shareholders.345 The court also pointed out that 'a derivative remedy is not an 
effective remedy because the wrongdoers would be the principal beneficiaries of 
the recovery'. 346 Therefore, in this case, although there was a non-party share-
holder, the court still allowed a direct action against the controlling shareholders' 
misconduct. 
However, some courts take a stricter approach when identifying the action. 
According to them, the 'disproportionate impact' of the misconduct on the 
341 O'Neal & Thompson (2004), Section 9.22. 
342 For a discussion of this case, see also Section 3.2.3.4.3. 
343 140 N.C.App. 390, 537 S.E.2d 248 (N.C.App., 2000). 
344 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989). 
345 548 N.E.2d 217, 220-221 (Ohio 1989). 
346 548 N.E.2d 217,221 (Ohio 1989). 
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plaintiff shareholder is not enough to support a direct action. On the conh·ary, the 
plaintiff shareholder must establish 'freeze-outs' in order to bring a direct claim. 
For example, in Bessette v. Bessette, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held that overcompensation alone could not be cognizable iajury to the 
shareholder and so warrant a derivative action to redress it.347 In Crosby v. Beam, 
Justice Wright, as a minority, also gave his dissenting opinion that where the 
controllers used their control to deprive minority shareholders of their investment, 
a direct action could only be brought 'where the plaintiff can demonsh·ate an 
effort to 'freeze him out' as a stockholder or where he is directly affected through 
loss of dividends, company employment or the like'. If this is not the case, then 
derivative action rules should be inapplicable.348 
3.3.3.2.2 The concern that justifications for derivative actions may not exist 
in close corporations 
Some cases have recognized that there should be an exception to the general rule 
of distinction 'which looks to the reasons requiring derivative actions to 
determine if they are applicable'. 349 
In Thomas v. Dickson350, the controlling shareholders of a close corporation 
paid themselves increased salaries rather than distributing dividends to all 
shareholders. When deciding whether a shareholder's direct action should be 
permitted regarding this overcompensation, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
realized that 'in exceptional situations this Court and our other State Courts 
should look at the 'realistic objectives' of a given case to determine if a direct 
action is proper'. 351 In this case, the court held that the reasons requiring 
derivative actions did not exist. Since the plaintiff was the sole injured share-
holder, there could be no multiplicity of lawsuits and there was no consideration 
that the direct recovery would prejudice the rights of other shareholders. Since the 
benefit of corporate recovery to an individual shareholder lay in the increase in 
the value of his shares and since there was no ready market for the shares in the 
close corporation, the plaintiff shareholder would not have been adequately 
compensated if a corporate recovery were to be granted. Additionally, in this case 
the protection of creditors did not exist either.352 Justice Smith went even further 
in this case. He gave his own opinion that: 
It would be a serious error to limit direct actions for recovery of mis-
appropriated corporate funds to cases where only one shareholder is injured, 
347 385 Mass. p. 806, 808-10 (1982). 
348 Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 222-223 (Ohio 1989). 
349 Thomas v. Dickson, 301 S.E.2d 49, 51 (Georgia 1983). 
350 301 S.E.2d 49 (Georgia, 1983). 
351 301 S.E.2d 49, 51 (Georgia, 1983). 
352 301 S.E.2d 49, 51 (Georgia, 1983). 
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or to declare flatly that such actions lie only in the context of closely held 
corporations .... In my view a direct action should be available, where justice 
requires, based on a careful evaluation of the facts of each case. 353 
As mentioned, the ALI Principles also took the same approach in Section 
7.0l(d).354 
3.3.3.2.3 Prevention of unjust enrichment 
Prevention of unjust enrichment to the wrongdoing shareholders is also a ground 
for the court to allow a direct action in the case of corporate injury. In Crosby v. 
Beam, one of the reasons that the court declined to award a derivative action, 
although it was not the most important reason, was that 'a derivative remedy is 
not an effective remedy because the wrongdoers would be the principal 
beneficiaries of the recovery'. 355 
The Delaware Court of Chancery has also applied the 'unjust enrichment 
exception' to classify actions in some cases.356 In Fischer v. Fischer357, the 
defendant shareholders caused the corporation to sell real estate too cheaply to 
another entity owned by the defendants; the plaintiff shareholder was the only 
shareholder in the corporation who did not have any ownership in the third entity 
and so suffered losses as a result. Vice Chancellor Steele, as he was then, held that 
in such a case the plaintiff was allowed to bring a direct action since she suffered 
special injury distinct from that suffered by the other shareholders.358 In addition: 
... if I were to dismiss plaintiff's individual claims, I would place plaintiff in 
the awkward position of continuing a purely derivative action with any 
relevant relief benefiting Fischer Enterprises alone. An eventual victory for 
plaintiff, would achieve little since the individual defendants own an 
ove1whelming interest in [the nominal defendant corporation]. The pleaded 
fundamental wrong alleged underlies both the asserted individual and 
derivative claims. Equity's appropriate focus should be the alleged wrong, not 
the nature of the claim which is no more than a vehicle for reaching the 
remedy for the wrong. As equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy, I 
must permit plaintiff's individual claims to proceed.359 
353 301 S.E.2d 49, 52 (Georgia, 1983). 
354 For the details of Section 7.0l(d) of the ALI Principles, please see Section 3.3.3.1. 
355 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989). 
356 In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P., 2000 WL 130629 (Jan. 27, 2000), 111 re Gaylord 
Container Corp. Shareholders, 747 A.2d 71, 81 (Del. Ch.1999), and Fischer v. Fischer, 1999 
WL 1032768, (Del. Ch. Nov. 4, 1999). 
357 1999 WL 1032768, (Del.Ch. Nov. 4, 1999). 
358 1999 WL 1032768, (Del.Ch. Nov. 4, 1999), at p. 3. 
359 1999 WL 1032768, (Del.Ch. Nov. 4, 1999), at p. 4. 
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Nevertheless, in Agostino v. Hicks, the Delaware Court of Chancery did not apply 
the 'unjust enrichment exception', partly on the basis that it 'would only add to 
the confusing ambiguities surrounding the direct/derivative distinction' .360 
3.3.3.2.4 The procedural ground 
Another reason that some courts permit a direct action in the case of corporate 
injury is the procedural ground: there will be no remedy if only a derivative action 
is allowed where the corporation has been sold or dissolved.361 For example, in 
Watson v. Button362, one former shareholder of the corporation discovered mis-
appropriation of the corporate assets by the other former shareholder, who was 
also a general manager, after the corporation was sold to a third party. The mis-
appropriation happened before the sale of the corporation and led to joint liability 
for both shareholders. The plaintiff shareholder could not bring a derivative action 
against the misappropriation since he was not a shareholder anymore and the 
corporate cause of action was given up by the present owner of the corporation. 
Finding that in the current case the justifications for a derivative action did not 
exist, since, for example, no rights of creditors or other shareholders would be 
prejudiced, and there was no possibility of a multiplicity of suits, the Ninth 
Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of the District 
Court for the District of Oregon, allowed the direct action initiated by the plaintiff 
shareholder and awarded an individual recovery to him. Kirk v. First Nat. Bank of 
Columbus seemed to go further. 363 It allowed former shareholders to bring a direct 
action against the corporate injury where there were non-party shareholders. 
3.3.3.2.5 Other concerns 
In Barth v. Barth364, the Supreme Court of Indiana set new standards for the 
distinction. First, the court should consider 'whether the corporation has a 
disinterested board that should be permitted to consider the lawsuit's impact on 
the corporation'. 365 Second, the court should consider whether permitting a direct 
action will also benefit the corporation. For example, in a direct action the 
defendant can also file a counterclaim against the plaintiff, even though such a 
counterclaim is normally not allowed in a derivative action. Third, the legal 
expenses should also be considered: in a derivative action, the successful plaintiff 
generally will be allowed to recover attorneys' fees from the corporation while in 
360 845 A.2d 1110, 1125 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
361 Thompson (1993), p. 734. 
362 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956). 
363 439 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D.Georgia 1977). 
364 659 N.E.2d 559, 562-563 (Indiana 1995). 
365 Also see ALI (II), Section 7.01, Comment E. 
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a direct action the plaintiff shareholder has to pay his own attorneys' fees even if 
he succeeds.366 
3.3.4 Direct pro rata recove,y to the individual shareholder in 
derivative actions 
As mentioned, in situations where the award of corporate recovery in derivative 
actions will benefit the wrongdoer majority shareholders as well and 
incompletely compensate the injured shareholders, the court may flexibly allow a 
direct action instead of a derivative one. Nevertheless, this is not the only solution 
for these cases where the corporate recovery is not appropriate. In fact, American 
case law sometimes awards direct pro rata recovery to the individual shareholders 
in derivative actions. Although this issue does not relate to the distinction 
problem, it is still worthy of discussion here. 
In a few derivative action cases, American courts may award direct pro rata 
recovery, which reflects the percentage of their shares, to the individual share-
holders instead of awarding corporate recovery. This direct pro rata recovery in 
derivative actions should be distinguished from the direct damages in a 
shareholder's direct action. When deciding whether to award direct pro rata 
recovery or corporate recovery, the court normally will consider factors such as 
whether the creditors' interests will be unfairly affected, whether the wrongdoers 
still have conh·ol of the company, whether the wrongdoing shareholders will get 
windfalls, or whether the direct pro rata recovery will facilitate the distribution of 
corporate funds. 367 Those special situations where the court will grant direct pro 
rata recovery include: (1) where the corporation is in the process of liquidation, 
(2) where the wrongdoers retain control of the corporation and so a corporate 
recovery would revert to their control, (3) where the defendants sell corporate 
control for an unlawful premium and the purchasers of these wrongdoers' shares 
would acquire windfalls via a corporate recovery, (4) where a majority of the 
shareholders will not bring derivative actions because they are personally 
involved in the wrongdoing or have ratified the wrongdoing, and (5) where the 
shareholders are differently situated and a direct pro rata recovery would fairly 
resolve the differences.368 
Nevertheless, a direct pro rata recovery may pose the problem of interfering 
with corporate management because, if the recovery goes back to the corporation, 
it would be a corporate business decision whether to distribute the fund to the 
shareholders or keep it for corporate business purposes.369 In addition, a direct 
pro rata recovery may give rise to procedural issues. For example, res judicata 
366 Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 562-563 (Indiana 1995). As to a further discussion of the 
allocation of litigation costs, please refer to Section 3 .4.4.1. 
367 Cox & Hazen (2002), Chapter 15.03, p. 425. 
368 Cox & Hazen (2002), Chapter 15.03, pp. 425-426. 
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will not bar non-party shareholders; some courts have denied attorneys' fees to 
successful plaintiffs in derivative actions simply because the recovery went to the 
shareholders rather than the corporation.370 In point of fact, American courts only 
apply the direct pro rata recovery in special situations and 'do not lend 
themselves to generalization or abstraction into a rule' .371 
3.4 Strildng a balance between corporate efficiency and 
protection for the corporation and the minority 
shareholders 
Under American law each single shareholder prima facie has the right to initiate 
a derivative action against corporate misconduct. Nevertheless, this right is 
subject to several substantive and procedural restrictions, such as the business 
judgment rule and the demand requirement. In the end, both by facilitating and 
controlling derivative actions, American law does try to strike a fair balance 




Substantive limitations to the scope of derivative actions 
Whose misconduct may lead to a derivative action 
Causes of derivative action under American law may arise from a breach of duties 
to the corporation by a wide range of persons, including a third party who owes 
duties other than fiduciary duties to the corporation. 372 This wide scope for causes 
of action may be due to the historical development of American derivative action 
rules. As mentioned in Section 3 .1.1, originally derivative actions were often 
applied against third parties such as tax collectors. 
Nevertheless, the requirements for bringing derivative actions, such as the 
demand requirement and the lenient approach of judicial review of the board's 
litigation decision, actually make it difficult for an individual shareholder to 
challenge any breach of duties by persons other than corporate fiduciaries. 373 In 
fact, in the United States derivative actions are mainly initiated against corporate 
fiduciaries such as directors, officers or controlling shareholders instead of 
against third parties. 
369 Note (1956), p. 1319. 
370 Cox et al. (2001), Chapter 15.4, p. 15.33. 
371 DeMott (2003), Section 7:6, p. 7-45. 
372 DeMott (2003), Section 1:1, p. 1-2. 





Nature of the defendant's misconduct that may lead to a 
derivative action: the business judgment rule 
Introduction to the business judgment rule 
The business judgment rule may also play a role as a substantive restriction on a 
shareholder's right to derivative actions. Although American rules on derivative 
actions do not explicitly restrict the application of derivative actions to certain 
misconduct, American courts in fact rarely hold the corporate directors or officers 
liable for mere negligence. This situation may result, at least partly, from the 
application of the business judgment rule.374 
The business judgment rule is a judge-made principle widely adopted in the 
US. The most oft-cited expression of the rule is that given by the Delaware 
Supreme Court: it is 'a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company'. 375 
Although formulations and judicial applications of the rule do vary376, the 
basic feature of the rule is that, when evaluating a business decision, the court 
should principally examine the process or procedure by which the decision was 
made instead of examining the merits or the substantive aspect of the decision 
(the outcome or quality of the decision), although the test of 'rational belief' does 
include a certain degree of examination of the substantive aspect.377 Effectively, 
the rule acts as a shield to protect directors from liability for their decisions if they 
satisfy the requirements of the rule, such as having acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests 
of the company, even though the decision may have turned out badly from the 
perspective of the corporation. 378 The rule also has an effect on the validity of the 
decision in addition to the director's liability: a rational decision made with due 
process will be valid and binding on the corporation even if it turns out badly 
later.379 Nevertheless, I will only focus on the rule's effect on the director's 
liability since the issue of the validity of a decision is beyond the scope of this 
book. 
The business judgment rule plays a pivotal role in derivative actions. The function 
this rule plays in derivative actions is twofold. First, it decides under what 
374 Bradley & Schipani (1989), p. 23. 
375 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Delaware 1984). See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858, 872 (Delaware 1985); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Delaware 2000). 
376 For a detailed discussion of the formulation and judicial application of this rule, please refer to 
Section 3.4.1.2.3 and Section 3.4.1.2.4, respectively. 
377 Hamilton (2000), p. 455; Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), p. 1449. 
378 Hamilton (2000), p. 455; Ferrara et al. (2005), S 5.01. 
379 Hamilton (2000), p. 453. 
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circumstances the director will be held liable for his breach of duties, or in other 
words, it limits the director's liability for certain kinds of breach of duties. 
Although directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, not every breach may 
give rise to director's liabilities according to the rule. Second, the rule is also 
applied to review the litigation decision of the board and in some states the 
decision of the special litigation committee. Since a litigation decision is also a 
business decision, it should be governed by this rule as well. In this section, I will 
only discuss the first application of the rule. The second type of application will 
be discussed in Section 3.4.2.2.2.3. 
3.4.1.2.2 Rationale for and necessity of the rule 
The standard of conduct versus the standard of liability (or the standard of 
review) 
The business judgment rule in fact establishes a standard of liability ( or a 
standard of judicial review) which is different from the standard of directors' 
conduct. As we know, directors bear the fiduciary duty of loyalty and duty of care 
when managing the corporation. However, this fiduciary duty is only a standard 
of conduct for directors rather than 'the operative test for determining whether 
directors are liable for damages for failing to exercise reasonable care' .380 The 
appropriate test for liability is the business judgment rule. These different 
standards of conduct and of liability are generally recognized by the MBCA381 , 
the ALI Principles382, as well as by Delaware law. 
The question may arise as to why there should be a standard of liability separate 
from the standard of conduct for directors. This phenomenon of separation of 
standards is not very common. The fact is that in most areas of law, such as those 
regarding the liability of drivers or of agents, the two standards are identical, and 
so people often ignore the difference. 383 
Rationale for and necessity of the business judgment rule 
According to Eisenberg 'whether the two standards are or should be identical in 
any given area is a matter of prudential judgment.'384 He points out that: 
Perhaps standards of conduct and standards of review in corporate law would 
always be identical in a world in which information was perfect, the risk of 
380 Hamilton (2000), p. 449. 
381 The 1999 amendments to the MBCA added a new Section 8.31 entitled 'standards of liability 
for directors,' as distinguished from Section 8,30 entitled 'standards of conduct for directors.' 
382 See ALI (I), Section 4.0l(a) and (c). 
383 Eisenberg (1993), p. 437. 
384 Eisenberg (1993), p. 437. 
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liability for assuming a given corporate role was always commensurate with 
the incentives for assuming the role, and institutional considerations never 
required deference to a corporate organ. In the real world, however, these 
conditions seldom hold, and the standards of review in corporate law 
pervasively diverge from the standards of conduct.385 
There have been many elucidations of the rationale for and the necessity of the 
business judgment rule.386 Several points may account for the rule. First, it is 
accepted that directors rather than shareholders are granted discretion in 
managing the corporation; this discretion, if rationally exercised, should not be 
submitted to judicial review. 387 Second, it is also acknowledged that there are 
inherent risks in business decisions due to reasons such as insufficient in-
formation or unexpected changes in events. Therefore, the evaluation of business 
decisions should focus on the process of decision-making rather than on the 
merits with the benefit ofhindsight.388 In this way, directors are also encouraged 
to take entrepreneurial risks that may result in high profits for the corporation in 
return.389 Third, due to the high risks of business decisions and the serious losses 
a bad decision may cause, a qualified person will be less willing to serve as a 
director if it is probable that he will find himself faced with liabilities for his 
directorial decisions. Moreover, the higher risk of a director's liability may also 
lead to higher costs for the corporation since, for example, the corporation may 
have to pay more for the director's liability insurance.390 Last but not least, the 
business judgment rule also reflects the tradition that courts will not interfere in 
business matters ( or in other words, will not second-guess the business decisions 
of directors) since judges are not business experts and are less qualified than 
directors to cope with business issues.391 
In short, the above points reveal the central purpose of the business judgment 
rule, which is also the central purpose of corporate governance.392 The business 
judgment rule attempts to strike a balance between the two competing policies on 
a case-by-case basis: one is the need to preserve the director's decision-making 
discretion as well as corporate efficiency, and the other is the need to make the 
wrongdoing directors liable while protecting the corporation and investors. 393 
385 Eisenberg (1993), pp. 437-438. 
386 See, for example, Hamilton (2000) p. 449, p. 454; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 5.02; ALI (I), 
Part IV, Chapter 1, Introductory Note A, p.135; Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1422-1423. 
387 Hamilton (2000), p. 454; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 5.01. 
388 Hamilton (2000), p. 449. 
389 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1422-1423. 
390 Hamilton (2000), p. 449. See also the empirical study of the immediate effects on the market 
regarding director and officer liability insurance by Smith v. ran Gorkom and section 102(b )(7) 
ofDGCL (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. s 102(b)(7)); see Bradley & Schipani (1989). 
391 Hamilton (2000), p. 454; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 5.02. 
392 Bainbridge (2004), p. 84. 
393 Bainbridge (2004), p. 84. 
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3.4.1.2.3 Prerequisites for applying the business judgment rule 
(formulations or elements of the rule) 
The business judgment rule is regarded as 'one of the least understood concepts 
in the entire corporate field'. 394 This difficulty is embodied, at least partly, in the 
formulations of the rule and the judicial approaches to the application of the rule. 
I will discuss the former issue in this section and the latter one in the next section. 
As mentioned, the business judgment rule shields directors from liabilities in 
certain situations even if their actions have caused damage to the corporation. The 
issue, therefore, is what the prerequisites of the rule are. Or, in other words, under 
what circumstances may directors be shielded from liabilities. Although the 
specific formulations of the rule vary, normally the rule will be applicable if a 
director acted on an informed basis, in good faith and rationally believed that the 
action was being taken in the best interests of the company. For example, Section 
4.01 ( c) of the ALI Principles states that: 
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills the 
duty under this Section if the director of officer: 
( 1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment; 
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the 
extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the 
circumstances; and 
(3) rationally believed that the business judgment is in the best interests of the 
corporation. 
The newly added MBCA Section 8.31, entitled 'Standards of Liability', also 
states that in order to be protected from liability, the director should act in good 
faith, should reasonably believe that the decision was in the best interests of the 
corporation, should be informed to an extent the director reasonably believed 
appropriate under the circumstances, should make the decision objectively and 
independently, and should not receive a financial benefit to which the director 
was not entitled, and so on. 
Delaware law also includes prerequisites similar to those in the ALI Principles 
or the MBCA. In Brehm v. Eisner, the Delaware Supreme Court restated that: 
The business judgment rule has been well formulated by Aronson and other 
cases. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 ('It is a presumption that in making 
a business decision the directors ... acted on an informed basis, in good faith 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
corporation.'). Thus, directors' decisions will be respected by courts unless the 
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not 
act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational 
394 Manne (1967), p. 270. 
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business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that 
includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available. 395 
Prerequisite of a positive action 
It is generally agreed that in order to be protected by the business judgment rule, 
directors must take positive action. 'Business judgment' means that 'a decision 
must have been consciously made and judgment must, in fact, have been 
exercised' .396 Therefore, abdication of their duties and simply doing nothing will 
not be protected by the rule. Nevertheless, a positive decision not to do anything 
will be protected if other prerequisites are also satisfied since this involves 
conscious judgment.397 An informed delegation of authority may also amount to 
business judgment.398 
Prerequisite of being uninterested in the subject of the business judgment or being 
independent when maldng the decision (Prerequisite of no conflict of interest) 
The business judgment rule does not apply when the director is self-interested 
with respect to the transaction. If the plaintiff shareholder can establish that it is 
a conflicted interest transaction, the business judgment rule may be rebutted. 
However, the interested director may be shielded from liability under certain 
circumstances: if the interested director can establish that the conflicted interests 
transaction has been authorized by a majority of the disinterested directors or by 
a vote of the disinterested shareholders after a full disclosure, the business 
judgment rule will apply again; in addition, the interested director can also be 
discharged from liability if he can prove that the transaction is entirely fair to the 
corporation. 399 
In order for the board's decision to be protected by the business judgment rule, 
a majority of the directors must also make their decisions independently, without 
the dominance or control of the person who was interested in the transaction.400 
Prerequisite of an informed decision 
A widely accepted prerequisite for being protected by the business judgment rule 
is that the director must make an informed decision.401 This requirement for an 
395 Brehm 1\ Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264, Footnote 66 (Del.Supr. 2000). 
396 ALI (I), Section 4.01, Comment to s 4.0l(c), c, p. 174. 
397 Hamilton (2000), p. 454. 
398 See, for example, Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Delaware 1985); Canal Capital 
C01p. v. French, 1992 WL 159008 (Del. Ch., 1992). Also see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 
5.03, [l], Footnote 2. 
399 See, for example, DGCL sl44(a) (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. s 144(a)); MBCA ss8.6l(b), 
8.62, 8.63; Bainbridge (2002), pp. 310-320. 
400 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 5.03, [2] [b]. 
401 See, for example, ALI (I), Section 4.01, Comment to s 4.0l(c), e, p. 177. 
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informed decision reflects the attitude that the business judgment rule focuses on 
the process of the decision rather than on the quality of the decision: the 
requirement 'focuses on the preparedness of a director or officer in making a 
business decision'. 402 Specifically, directors must make their decisions on the 
basis of 'all material information reasonably available to them' .403 In order to do 
that, a director must gather and consider material information with reasonable 
diligence and take adequate time to consider the decision.404 If 'grossly 
negligent', the director will not be protected by the business judgment rule.405 
In making a decision, it is possible and necessary for the director to rely on 
information, such as reports and opinions, provided by other directors, officers 
and employees of the corporation, as well as by outside professionals and experts. 
If such reliance is in good faith, the director's decision will be protected by the 
business judgment rule.406 
Prerequisite of the 'rational belief' 
The ALI Principles and many Delaware cases have recognized that the 'rational 
belief' is a prerequisite to the application of the business judgment rule.407 The 
'rational belief' means that, when performing his duty, the director must h·uly 
believe that the action is in the best interests of the corporation and the belief must 
be objectively rational. In fact, the test has both a subjective and an objective 
perspective, and includes a certain degree of examination of the substantive 
aspect of the director's decision. 408 
Courts may also use terms such as 'reckless disregard' or 'recklessness' or 
'gross negligence' instead of the 'irrational belief' .409 No matter what terms are 
applied, they generally give directors more discretion and protection than the term 
of 'reasonableness.' By using the 'rational belief', the ALI and many courts 
intend to give directors greater latitude for their business judgment.410 Actually, 
402 ALI (I), Section 4.01, Comment to s 4.01 ( c ), e, p. 177. 
403 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Delaware 1984). 
404 Smith v. Tim Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Delaware 1985); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM 
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,274 (2d Cir. 1986); Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 5.03, [3], text 
accompanying Footnote 46. 
405 Smith " Tim Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874-879 (Delaware 1985). 
406 See, for example, DGCL s 141(e) (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. s 14l(e)); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244 (Delaware 2000); also see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 5.03, [3], Footnote 47. 
407 Such as Parnter \\ Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981), Unocal C01p v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,954 (Delaware 1985), and Sinclair Oil C01p. v. Levien, 280 
A.2d 717, 720 (Delaware 1971); see ALI (I), Section 4.01, Comment to Section 4.0l(c), f, p. 
179. 
408 ALI (I), Section 4.01, Comment to Section 4.0l(c), f, p. 179; Hamilton (2000), p. 455. 
409 ALI (I), Section 4.01, Comment to Section 4.0l(c), f, p. 180. 
410 ALI (I), Section 4.01, Comment to Section 4.0l(c), f, p. 180. 
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the ALI rejected both the sh·icter approach of accountability in the 'reason-
ableness' test and the more lenient approach of a purely subjective good faith test 
that shields an objectively irrational action from liability.411 
Prerequisite of good faith 
Although 'good faith' is a well-recognized requirement for applying the business 
judgment rule, its meaning is indeed very unclear. Knowingly acting to cause a 
corporation to violate the law surely breaches the duty of 'good faith' .412 
Nevertheless, 'good faith' has a much wider meaning than that. In Desert 
Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P.413 , the Supreme 
Court of Delaware distinguished 'bad faith' from 'fraud.' It quoted the definition 
in Black's Law Dictionary 72 (5th ed. 1983)) on 'bad faith': 
[The] term 'bad faith' is not simply bad judgement or negligence, but rather it 
implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral 
obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it 
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill 
will.414 
In Nagy v. Bistricer415, the Delaware Court of Chancery suggested two elements 
of the duty of good faith: first, a director should not act disloyally, even if for 
reasons other than his personal pecuniary interest; second, a director should not 
consciously ignore his duties to the corporation, no matter what his motive.416 
Veasey, the former chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, together with 
Guglielmo, defines good faith in a broader sense: 
Whether good faith is an objective standard, a subjective standard, or a 
placeholder, it means that directors must not act irrationally, irresponsibly, 
disingenuously, or so umeasonably that no reasonable director would accept 
the decision or conduct. It demands an honesty of purpose and does not 
tolerate the disingenuous conduct of a director who appears or claims to act 
for the corporate good, but who truly does not care for the constituents to 
whom she owes a fiduciary duty.417 
411 ALI (I), Section 4.01, Comment to Section 4.0l(c), f, pp. 180-181. 
412 ALI (I), Section 4.01, Comment to s 4.0l(c), d, p. 177. 
413 624 A.2d 1199, (Delaware 1993). 
414 624 A.2d 1199, 1208, Footnote 16 (Delaware 1993). 
415 770 A.2d 43, (Del. Ch. 2000). 
416 770 A.2d 43, 48, Footnote 2, (Del. Ch. 2000). 
417 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), p. 1453. 
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Historically, a director only had twofold duties which already subsume the duty 
of good faith: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.418 Although the principle 
of 'good faith' has been 'an immutable ingredient of the business judgment rule' 
in Delaware law4 19, it has not been common for the court to separately examine 
the issue of good faith. The examination of the duty of loyalty and the duty of care 
already covered the good faith issue.420 Nevertheless, recent Delaware cases have 
shown a trend towards courts specifically paying attention to the issue of 'good 
faith' when applying the business judgment rule to decide directors' liability.421 
The separate focus on the issue of' good faith' has generated the argument that 
there is a free-standing duty of good faith and, therefore, the director's fiduciary 
duty is a triad, threefold instead of twofold: the duty of loyalty, the duty of care 
and the duty of good faith. Nevertheless, Veasey and Guglielmo hold that it may 
be difficult to clearly distinguish the bad faith case and the gross negligence case 
in practice and doubts the importance of labeling the duty.422 Instead, they posit 
that 'The real issue is understanding the definition, scope, and operational 
application of the amorphous concept of good faith' .423 After analyzing the 
meaning of 'good faith,' they think that this new trend toward focusing on 'good 
faith' is a judicial reaction to Section 102(b)(7) of Delaware General Corporation 
Law 1986 and there is nothing new in this concept424 : 
Good faith has been in our law for decades and is not a new concept. Thus, it 
should not now have any more sharp edges than it has always had. It has come 
to the fore recently as a result of fresh insights into the expected processes of 
directors in modern times and because of more precise pleading. The new 
realization is that the 1986 statute, section 102(b )(7), will not permit 
exoneration for directors who do not act in good faith. We will just have to see 
how it plays out in the Delaware Supreme Court.425 
418 But there have been different approaches as to which limb the duty of good faith belongs. For 
example, the ALI held that good faith is an aspect of duty of care, see ALI (I) Section 4.0l(a); 
but Bradley and Schipani, as well as others, held that the duty of loyalty includes a director to 
'act in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken is in the best interests of the 
corporation'; Bradley & Schipani (1989), p. 25. 
419 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), p. 1442. 
420 Hintmann (2005), pp. 579-580. 
421 See for example, McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001), In re the Abbot Laboratories 
Derivative Shareholders Litigation, 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003), and /11 re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). For a detailed discussion of the issue, 
please refer to Hintmann (2005). 
422 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1447-1448, p. 1451. 
423 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1447-1448, p. 1452. 
424 As to Section 102(b)(7) of the 1986 statute, please see Section 3.4.5.1. 
425 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1447-1448, pp. 1453-1454. 
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3.4.1.2.4 Judicial applications of the business judgment rule 
Substantive and procedural aspects of the rule 
The business judgment rule has both substantive and procedural aspects. The 
substantive aspect prevents the court from interfering with corporate business 
matters. This substantive aspect reflects the rationale behind the rule. It is also 
consistent with the English rule that the court will not interfere in business 
matters. In fact, this substantive aspect of no judicial interference in corporate 
matters has been widely accepted in Western jurisdictions. 
The rule also has its procedural aspect. It creates a presumption that in making 
his business judgment, a director or officer is fulfilling the required fiduciary 
duties to the corporation. If he wants to rebut the presumption of the rule, the 
plaintiff must prove that the director or officer did not satisfy the prerequisites of 
the rule, that is, that the director or officer did not act on an informed basis, in 
good faith, or in the honest belief that the action was in the best interest of the 
corporation. As a result, the rule places the burden on the plaintiff to prove that 
the director did not satisfy the prerequisites of the rule. 
The traditional approach of judicial application of the rule as an abstention 
doctrine (a safe harbor rule) 
Both traditional Delaware case law and the ALI Principles take the approach that 
the rule performs as an abstention doctrine or safe harbor rule.426 This concept is 
such that the presumption created by the business judgment rule that directors 
have fulfilled their fiduciary duty actually builds a safe harbor for the directors 
and lays down hurdles for the complaining party to initiate a suit against them. 
Unless the plaintiff can rebut the rule by proving a breach of any of the pre-
requisites of the rule, the court will abstain from reviewing the substantive merits 
of the director's business decision. Hence, by applying the business judgment rule 
as an abstention doctrine, the court has in fact subsumed the substantive aspect 
into the procedural one. 
However, if the plaintiff can prove non-satisfaction of one of the prerequisites, 
the business judgment rule will not be applied. The court will hear the case, but 
based on other standards such as the 'entire fairness' standard.427 The burden of 
proof also shifts from the plaintiff to the defendants.428 A further discussion of 
these standards is beyond the scope of this book. 
426 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), p. 1422; ALI (I), Chapter IV, comment to S 4.0l(c), a, p.173; 
Bainbridge (2004). 
427 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1428-1429; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 5.01 [2]. 
428 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1428-1429; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 5.01 [2]. 
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The judicial approach taken in Cede & Co. v. Technicolo1; Inc. 
The recent Delaware case of Cede & Co. v. Technicolm; Inc. has taken a different 
approach from the traditional one.429 According to Technicolor (also referred to 
as Cede), if the plaintiff shareholder can establish that the defendant director 
breached any one of the triads of his fiduciary duty ( loyalty, duty of care or good 
faith, he is entitled to initiate an action against the director. This scope of 
actionable breach is much wider than the traditional prerequisites of the business 
judgment rule, which we mentioned in Section 3 .4.1.2.3. The court held that: 
Thus, a shareholder plaintiff challenging a board decision has the burden at 
the outset to rebut the rule's presumption ... To rebut the rule, a shareholder 
plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching 
their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary 
duty ( good faith, loyalty or due care ... If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet 
this evidentiary burden, the business judgment rule attaches to protect 
corporate officers and directors and the decisions they make, and our courts 
will not second-guess these business judgments ... If the rule is rebutted, the 
burden shifts to the defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged 
transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the 'entire fairness' of the transaction 
to the shareholder plaintiff.430 
Therefore, in Technicolor the procedural aspect and the traditional safe harbor 
role of the business judgment rule have been eliminated. 431 
There have been many criticisms of Technicolor. Johnson considers that the court 
made some mistakes: it subsumed the duty of care ('a pervasive duty,' the 
standard of conduct) under the business judgment rule ('a specialized judicial 
review policy,' the standard of review)432; it also wrongfully associated the duty 
of care with the element of 'informedness' in the business judgment rule433; in 
addition, the application of the 'entire fairness' standard in a duty of care case was 
unprecedented. 434 
Bainbridge also raises several doubts about the approach of Technicolor.435 
Firstly, the business judgment rule loses its most important function under this 
approach. Under Technicolor, the plaintiff only needs to prove the defendant's 
429 634 A.2d 345 (Delaware 1993). The case is followed by, for example, Emerald Partners v. 
Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, (Delaware 1999), and McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Delaware 
2000), see Bainbridge (2004), at p. 94, Footnote 66. 
430 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Delaware 1993). 
431 Bainbridge (2004), p. 87. 
432 Johnson (1999), p. 803. 
433 Johnson (1999), p. 803. 
434 Johnson (1999), p. 799. 
435 Bainbridge (2004), at pp. 101-102. 
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breach of any aspect of the fiduciary duty. This burden of proof lies with the 
plaintiff in most civil litigations (except those of no-fault liability). Secondly, 
while under the traditional abstention approach the business judgment rule 
prevents the court from judging whether the director breached his duty of care, 
the approach of Technicolor may broaden the scope of judicial review and 
increase the risk of strike suits as well. Bainbridge compares the approach of 
Technicolor with the traditional one and concludes 'Technicolor's formulation 
suggests far less judicial deference to the board ... '.436 He also comments that: 
Notice how the court puts the cart before the horse. Directors who violate their 
duty of care do not get the protections of the business judgment rule; indeed, 
the rule is rebutted by a showing that the directors violated their fiduciary duty 
of 'due care.' This is exactly backwards. As we shall see, the abstention 
doctrine approach to the rule prevents plaintiff from litigation that very issue. 
Put another way, the whole point of the business judgment rule is to prevent 
courts from even asking the question: did the board breach its duty of care?437 
Nevertheless, Veasey and Guglielmo consider that Technicolor may not make a 
big difference in practice due to the limitation of directors' personal liability for 
money damages to the corporation or its shareholders.438 I will discuss this 
limitation in Section 3.4.5.1. 
3.4.2 
3.4.2.1 
Procedural requirements on plaintiffs to bring derivative actions 
The standing requirements 
In order to bring a derivative action, the plaintiff must meet several standing 
requirements. Although specifically federal and state rules differ on the standing 
requirements, the most common requirements are as follows. First, the plaintiff 
must be a shareholder, either a record owner of shares or have some beneficial 
interest in an equity security, when the suit is brought. For this purpose, a 
shareholder of a parent company may also bring a derivative action on behalf of 
the subsidiary of the parent company. This is the so-called double derivative 
action. Second, the plaintiff must have been a shareholder at the time of the 
transaction of which he complains, or by operation of law acquired the shares 
from a former holder who owned the shares at the time of the transaction. This is 
the commonly referred to 'contemporaneous ownership' rule. Third, the plaintiff 
must continuously have been a shareholder at the time of the action and through-
out the pendency of the action. This is referred to as the 'continuing ownership' 
436 Bainbridge (2004), at p. 94. 
437 Bainbridge (2004), at pp. 94-95. 
438 Such as section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. s 102(b)(7)). The facts of 
Technicolor happened in 1982-1983, before the enachnent of section 102(b)(7) in 1986; see 
Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), p. 1428. 
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requirement. Fourth, the plaintiff must be able to represent fairly and adequately 
the interests of the shareholders.439 
Since the requirements of 'contemporaneous ownership' and 'continuing 
ownership' generate more problems than do others, I will need to discuss them in 
detail in the following sections. 
The contemporaneous ownership rule 
The contemporaneous ownership rule is the most controversial of the above-
mentioned standing requirements. The original purpose of the contemporaneous 
ownership rule was to prevent collusion in manipulating the case to create federal 
jurisdiction and, generally speaking, to engage in forum shopping.440 This is still 
the major purpose of the rule under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.441 
Nevertheless, the focus of the rule nowadays, especially for state rules, is more on 
the prevention ofunjust emichment and the prevention of purchase ofsuits.442 
The controversy surrounding the rule mainly lies in the fact that these purposes 
may not exactly explain why the rule is needed. In fact, in some quarters it is 
regarded that the real ground for the contemporaneous ownership rule may, to a 
greater extent, lie in a distasteful attitude towards derivative actions rather than 
the purposes of prevention of unjust emichment and prevention of purchase of 
suits.443 For example, if the prevention of purchase of suits is the real concern, the 
rule may be relaxed so that a shareholder who discovered the misconduct after he 
bought the shares will be allowed to bring a derivative action, even if he was not 
a shareholder at the time the misconduct was committed.444 
The mere purpose of prevention of unjust enrichment may also change the 
rule. Actually, whether a person suffers losses through the misconduct against the 
corporation is not decided by the fact of whether or not he was a shareholder at 
the time the misconduct was committed; instead, it is actually decided by the price 
at which he bought or sold shares. For example, if he bought shares after the 
misconduct had been committed but before the misconduct was disclosed, he still 
paid the higher price as if there had been no wrongdoing. Therefore, in order to 
prevent unjust emichment, it is better to lay down the standard that the plaintiff 
should have bought the shares before the misconduct was known instead of the 
standard of contemporaneous ownership. The ALI Principles actually suggest 
adopting the standard of having bought shares before the misconduct was known 
439 As to the requirements, see, among others, ALI (II), Section 7.02; MBCA, s 7.41; Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.1; Cox & Hazen (2002), pp. 445-450; Ferrara et al. (2005), 
Section 4.02, etc. 
440 Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); see also Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 4.02, [2]. 
441 Hamilton (2000), p. 544. 
442 See, for example, ALI (II) Section 7.02, Comment C, p. 37, Hamilton (2000), pp. 543-544. 
443 Hamilton (2000), p. 544. 
444 Hamilton (2000), pp. 543-544. 
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and so they do depart from the contemporaneous ownership rule. The Principles 
propose in Section 7 .02( a)(l) that in order to commence and maintain a derivative 
action, the shareholder should have acquired the shares 'before the material facts 
relating to the alleged wrong were publicly disclosed or were known by, or 
specifically communicated to, the holder.' California law also takes a similar 
approach to that of the ALI Principles.445 
In fact, the purpose behind prevention of unjust enrichment itself is also 
doubted. Since recovery in a derivative action will go to the corporation, all 
current shareholders will benefit from the recovery, no matter when they became 
shareholders. Therefore, a windfall for some shareholders is unavoidable. In fact, 
the requirement that only injured shareholders are allowed to bring derivative 
actions is, to a greater extent, aimed at ensuring that plaintiffs have sufficient 
incentives to act in the best interests of the company, and at preventing 
speculation through litigations.446 Prevention of unjust enrichment is only the 
prima facie purpose.447 Besides, the justifications behind prevention of unjust 
enrichment is mainly based on the approach that derivative action plays a 
compensatory function. From the perspective of a deterrent function, these 
justifications may not be persuasive.448 For example, if a derivative action is 
allowed even if the corporation did not suffer losses, the distinction between 
contemporaneous and non-contemporaneous ownership is meaningless as far as 
the prevention of unjust enrichment is concerned.449 
Due to doubt over the contemporaneous ownership rule, Pennsylvania has 
taken a more liberal approach towards it. It allows a non-contemporaneous 
shareholder to bring a derivative action in order to avoid the injustice of a serious 
wrong to the corporation going unredressed.450 
The contemporaneous ownership rule also has an exception that is known as the 
'continuing wrong doctrine.' This exception indeed makes the contemporaneous 
ownership rule more complicated. Under the continuing wrong doctrine, a 
shareholder may bring a derivative action if the alleged wrong was still continuing 
at the time that he bought his shares, even if the wrong arose before that time. The 
continuing wrong doctrine properly acknowledges the fact that some wrongs to 
the corporation involve a series of transactions instead of a single one. When the 
wrong continues, the person who bought shares after the commencement of the 
445 West's Ann. Cal. Corp. Code Ann. s 800(b)(l); also see Cox (1999), p. 39; ALI (II), Section 
7.02, Comment C, p. 38. 
446 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 4.02, [2). 
447 Cox (1999), p. 10, Footnote 18. 
448 See, for example, Cox (1999), p. 39. 
449 For example, see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 
(1969); see Cox (1999), p. 10, Footnote 18. 
450 Pa. Bus. Corp. Laws 1782(b) (Westlaw: 15 Pa.C.S.A. s l 782(b)); see Cox (1999), p. 39; ALI 
(II) Section 7.02, Comment C, p. 38. 
158 
THE UNITED STATES 
wrong, but before its effect came into force, is also injured. The problem is, 
however, how to define 'continuing wrong.' Different standards have been 
applied.451 Normally the mere fact that the effect of a wrong continues to harm is 
not enough.452 
On the other hand, being afraid that the 'continuing wrong doctrine' might 
swallow the contemporaneous ownership doctrine, some courts, including the 
Second Circuit of the Federal Court, as well as some scholars, refuse to accept the 
continuing wrong doctrine.453 
The continuing ownership rule 
The continuing ownership rule requires that the plaintiff continue to hold shares 
in the corporation until the time of judgment.454 The rule is aimed at avoiding 
abuse of derivative actions: since a former shareholder in the corporation cannot 
benefit from the derivative action under which, if successful, recovery will be 
awarded to the corporation, there is a higher risk for the plaintiff to abuse the 
action. 455 The rule is generally logical. Nevertheless, it may cause problems in 
special situations such as mergers. Therefore, some states have developed 
exceptions to the rule.456 For example, Delaware courts generally recognize two 
exceptions: first, when the merger itself is for the purpose of depriving 
shareholders of the standing to sue or is the subject of a claim of fraud, a former 
shareholder may bring a derivative action; second, when shareholders receive 
different securities due to the merger but effectively remain the owners of the 
same business, they too can bring derivative actions.457 The ALI Principles also 
recognize two exceptions. Section 7.02(a)(2) allows a former shareholder to 
commence a derivative action if his failure to own shares until the time of 
judgment is: 
... the result of corporate action in which the holder did not acquiesce, and 
either (A) the derivative action was commenced prior to the corporate action 
terminating the holder's status, or (B) the court finds that the holder is better 
able to represent the interests of the shareholders than any other holder who 
has brought suit.458 
451 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 4.02 [3] [b]. 
452 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 4.02 [3] [b]. 
453 See, for example, In re Bank of New York Derivative Litigation., 320 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Robinson (2005). 
454 See, for example, ALI (II) Section 7.02(a)(2). 
455 ALI (II) Section 7.02, Comment D, pp. 38-39. 
456 See ALI (II) Section 7.02, Reporter's Note 4, pp. 46-49. 
457 ALI (II) Section 7.02, Reporter's Note 4, p. 47; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 4.03. 





The demand requirement 
Overview 
The demand requirement is regarded as one of the most significant barriers under 
American law to shareholders' derivative actions.459 This requirement, laid down 
even earlier than the important Supreme Court decision in Hawes v. Oakland460, 
is regarded as being greatly influenced by, but having developed in a different way 
from the English Foss v. Harbottle rule.461 
The purpose of the demand requirement is 'to permit the corporation to 
reconsider its decision not to assert a claim and to control the litigation with 
respect to the claim' .462 Because the cause of action belongs to the corporation, a 
shareholder who intends to initiate a derivative action must first make a demand 
on the corporation to challenge the alleged misconduct. Generally, the board of 
directors is granted the power to execute business matters, including the decision 
to bring the corporate suit or not. Therefore, a demand must be made on the 
corporate board of directors. In addition, the shareholders collectively (the 
general meeting of shareholders) may also have the right to make a litigation 
decision for the corporation. Thus, a demand on shareholders collectively may 
also be needed. I will discuss the demand on the board and the demand on the 
shareholders in turn. 
Since the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. I also provides for the demand 
requirement as state laws do, we should clarify the source for the law on the 
demand requirement in federal courts. In fact, federal courts when hearing 
derivative suits, which have arisen from diverse jurisdictions and are based on 
state law, must apply state law concerning the demand requirement. In addition, 
federal courts when hearing derivative claims based on violations of federal law 
must also apply state law concerning the demand requirement unless the state 
requirements conflict with policies underlying the federal law.463 As a result, the 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 .1 does not provide a substantive rule of law; 
it 'speaks only to the adequacy of the shareholder representative's pleadings'.464 
459 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.06; Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 429. 
460 The first case to lay down the demand requirement was the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
decision of Brewer v. Proprietors of Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378 (1870); see Section 
3.1.1.2.1. 
461 Boyle (1965), pp. 323-325. 
462 Lockwood & Barsch (1996), p. 656. 
463 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1716-1717 (1991). For a detailed discussion of 
the issue, see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 3.05; DeMott (2003), Section 5:8. 
464 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1716 (1991). 
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3.4.2.2.2 Demand on the board requirement 
3.4.2.2.2.1 Overview 
Rationale behind the demand on the board requirement465 (pwposes of the de-
mand requirement) 
The demand requirement gives the board the opportunity to consider the disputes 
before the individual shareholder brings the issue before the court. It reflects the 
basic principle of corporate law, which is that the power to manage corporate 
business, including the power to make a litigation decision, is granted to the board 
of directors rather than to individual shareholders. It also reflects the conside-
ration that the board is normally more competent than an individual shareholder 
to make a litigation decision for the corporation. Furthermore, the demand 
requirement also functions as a support for judicial economy. The requirement 
may encourage intra-corporate dispute solutions and thus avoid unnecessary 
suits. In fact, courts normally will not interfere in internal business matters unless 
all intra-corporate remedies have been exhausted.466 Finally, by acknowledging 
the board's power to dismiss a shareholder's derivative action, the demand 
requirement also discourages any shareholder's strike suits and protects the 
directors from unjust harassment, provided the board exercises its power in the 
right way. 
Major issues around the demand on the board requirement 
The requirement to make a demand on the board raises many theoretical and 
practical issues. Among them two basic and important issues attract much 
attention. Firstly, can the demand be excused in special situations and, if yes, 
under what circumstances? Secondly, what is the effect of the board's decision? If 
the board's decision is not decisive, what kind of standard will the court apply 
when it reviews the board's decision, especially the decision to dismiss a 
derivative action? These two issues are interrelated. For example, the standard of 
judicial review may differ in the demand-required and demand-excused cases. In 
the following sections I will discuss the issues in turn. 
3.4.2.2.2.2 Recognition of the demand futility exception or not 
3.4.2.2.2.2.1 Recognition of the demand futility exception (the distinction 
between the demand-required and demand-excused cases) 
Most states will excuse demand in certain situations. For example, where the 
majority of the board is involved in the alleged misconduct or is controlled by the 
465 For a detailed introduction of the rationale, see, for example, Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 3.02; 
Clark R. C. (1986), Section 15.2, p. 641. 
466 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 3.02, text accompanying Footnote 2. 
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wrongdoer and therefore could not make a sound litigation decision, it would be 
futile for the plaintiff shareholder to make a demand on the board. Therefore, in 
order to avoid fruitless behavior467, these states normally will excuse demand if 
the shareholder can establish that a demand on the board would be futile. 
The standards for determining futility vary widely in different states. In 
Delaware, which has the most developed law in terms of standards for the demand 
futility cases, a two-pronged standard has been established.468 In order to satisfy 
demand futility, the plaintiff shareholder must establish that: 
(1) whether threshold presumption of director disinterest or independence are 
rebutted by well-pleaded facts; and, if not, (2) whether the complaint pleads 
particularized facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the challenged 
transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment [by the 
board].469 
Nevertheless, where the case involves a board's alleged failure to take action, the 
second prong will be inapplicable since no business judgment has been made by 
the board; therefore only the first prong will apply.470 
Although states differ on the standards applied to decide demand futility, most 
of them, as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, require that the plaintiff 
pleading demand futility must plead with particularized facts that the standards 
have been met.471 For example, the mere fact that the directors were nominated or 
elected by the defendant, or mere proof of a majority ownership by the defendant, 
or the mere allegation that the majority of the board approved of or acquiesced to 
the challenged transaction is insufficient to render a demand futile. 472 This 
requirement to plead with particularity indeed puts a significant burden on the 
plaintiff, especially considering the fact that normally the plaintiff is not allowed 
discovery at this stage.473 
If the plaintiff shareholder cannot demonstrate successfully that a pre-suit 
demand would be futile, he must take his demand to the board. The distinction 
between demand-required and demand-excused cases may not only be procedural 
but may also have a substantive effect. For example, in Delaware if the plaintiff 
shareholder pleads a demand on the board, the demand pleaded necessarily 
suggests that there are no situations of 'demand futility' such as the existence of 
the majority directors' interestedness or independence. In other words, the 
467 Swanson (1993), p. 1351, Footnote 71. 
468 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 6.03[1]. 
469 Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Delaware 1991). The first Delaware case to initiate the 
two-pronged test was Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Delaware 1984). 
470 Ra/es v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-934 (Delaware 1993). 
471 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 6.02. 
472 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-815 (Delaware 1984). 
473 Swanson (1993), pp. 1376-1377. 
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plaintiff cannot later claim these situations in order to prove the board's 'wrongful 
refusal' of the demand.474 In addition, under Delaware law, whether the case is a 
demand-required one or a demand-excused one may well decide the outcome of 
the case because the standard of judicial review of the board's decision will be 
different in both cases.475 Therefore, it is not surprising that shareholders will 
always plead demand futility under Delaware law.476 However, if later the court 
decides in this case that a demand is required, the plaintiff cannot change his 
position and make such a demand, rather, the case is simply over.477 In fact, the 
Delaware law on demand is regarded as 'being extremely favorable to 
defendants' .478 
3.4.2.2.2.2.2 A universal demand requirement 
Recognition of the demand futility exception may generate the problem of 
collateral litigation. Because there is no clear and consistent standard for deciding 
demand futility, and because the distinction of demand-required and demand-
excused cases has significant substantive and procedural effects on the outcome 
of the derivative action, a collateral suit in addition to the derivative action may 
be initiated to identify whether the case is demand-excused or not. In fact, this has 
generated 'a considerable amount of litigation, with inconsistent and confusing 
results'. 479 
Partly due to this problem that is intrinsic in the demand required/demand 
excused distinction, there has been a trend toward abolishing the distinction and 
accepting a universal demand requirement.480 According to the universal demand 
requirement, a demand on the board would be required in all cases except where 
such a demand would result in irreparable injury to the corporation.481 This 
universal demand requirement was first adopted in the MBCA in 1989 and has 
been subsequently followed in some states.482 The ALI Principles also take this 
approach.483 The Pennsylvanian Supreme Court adopted this approach as its first 
supporting judicial decision. 484 
It is thought that a universal demand requirement might reduce the problem of 
collateral litigation, which arises when distinguishing between demand-required 
474 Singhof & Seiler (1998), pp. 547-548; Swanson (1993), p. 1349. 
475 As to the different standards of judicial review, please see Section 3.4.2.2.2.3. 
476 Hamilton (2000), p. 551. 
477 Hamilton (2000), p. 552. 
478 Hamilton (2000), p. 552. 
479 Fenara et al. (2005), Section 6.03. 
480 ALI (II) Section 7.03(b), Comment E, p. 57; Ferrara et al. (2005), Sections 3.01, 6.03. 
481 See, for example, MBCA, s7.42(2). But according to the ALI, even in such cases, demand 
should be made promptly after commencement of the action, see ALI (II) Section 7 .03(b ). 
482 MBCA, section 7.42. States adopting this approach include Florida, Georgia, Michigan, 
Virginia, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming; see Ferrara et al. (2005), 
Section 3.01, Footnote 9; DeMott (2003), Section 5:9, pp. 5-33 - 5-34. 
483 ALI (II) Section 7.03(b). 
484 Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042 (Pa. 1997); Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 3.07. 
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and demand-excused cases.485 In addition, there are other arguments for the 
universal demand requirement. For example, it is said that the universal demand 
requirement would promote efficiency: elimination of pre-suit litigation to decide 
whether the demand is futile or not will save on these costs, which would exceed 
the costs of making a demand.486 The universal demand requirement also 
forcefully draws the board's attention to the plaintiff's claim and so may promote 
alternative dispute resolutions.487 Finally, as compared to Delaware's dual 
standards for judicial review of the board's decision, which is based on the 
demand-required and demand-excused distinction, a universal demand require-
ment is regarded as offering a clearer and simpler standard.488 
Nevertheless, there have also been doubts about the approach of a universal 
demand requirement. The most famous objections were made by the Supreme 
Court in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc. 489 The Court held that a 
universal demand requirement would make any corporate decision uncertain and 
less predictable.490 In addition, the advantage of eliminating collateral litigation 
was also brought into doubt since the universal demand 'will merely shift the 
focus of threshold litigation from the question whether demand is excused to the 
question whether the directors' decision to terminate the suit is entitled to 
deference under federal standards' .491 Finally, the court did not agree that the 
universal demand requirement provided an effective alternative approach to 
dispute resolution.492 
Due to these controversies, although many states have adopted the universal 
demand requirement, it is still unclear whether it will replace the traditional 
approach of allowing the demand-excused exception in certain situations.493 
3.4.2.2.2.3 The effect of litigation decisions of the board or a litigation 
committee (the standard of judicial review) 
3.4.2.2.2.3.1 Overview 
In demand-required cases, plaintiff shareholders must make a demand on the 
board before initiating a derivative action. The board must respond within a 
reasonable time; otherwise, the demand is deemed satisfied.494 The board may 
485 ALI (II) Section 7.03(b), Comment E, p. 57. 
486 ALI (II) Section 7.03(b ), Comment E, pp. 57-58; MBCA Ann. S7.42, Official Comment at 7-
342 (3d ed.); see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 3.07. 
487 ALI (II) Section 7.03(b), Comment E, p. 57; MBCA Ann. S7.42, Official Comment at 7-342 
(3d ed.); see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 3.07. 
488 ALI (II) Section 7.03(b), Comment E, p. 58. 
489 500 U.S. 90, 111 S.Ct 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991). 
490 500 U.S. 90, 104 (1991). 
491 500 U.S. 90, 104 (1991). 
492 500 U.S. 90, 106 (1991). 
493 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 6.03. 
494 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 430. 
164 
THE UNITED STATES 
undertake investigations as necessary and make decisions by itself. It may also 
appoint a committee or others to do the investigation and make decisions by 
themselves based on this investigation. Or it may even delegate full authority to a 
special litigation committee to respond to the demand even in demand-required 
cases. Full delegation of authority to a special litigation committee does not 
necessarily concede that the board is lacking in independence with respect to the 
demand, which would thus make the demand futile.495 
There are several ways the board may respond to the demand. The board may, 
although rarely, agree to initiate an action against the alleged misconduct in the 
name of the corporation. In such cases, a derivative action is no longer necessary; 
the board will bring the action in the name and on behalf of the corporation. 496 
Similarly, the board may take measures other than litigation to address the 
problems raised by the shareholder. The board may also claim that the share-
holder's demand was inadequate. However, in most cases, the board will take a 
negative attitude toward the shareholder's proper demand. The board will decide 
not to sue in the name of the corporation and seek for dismissal of the share-
holder's derivative action if it has been initiated. Therefore, since the shareholder 
and the board take different attitudes, the following problem will arise: Does the 
board's decision not to sue have a binding effect? Or, in other words, can the 
shareholder have any basis for challenging the board's decision and to what extent 
should the court defer to the board's decision? I will discuss these problems in 
Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.2. 
Shareholders may also bring a derivative action without making a pre-suit 
demand by alleging that the demand should be excused based on demand futility 
exceptions. Until recently, if the shareholder had successfully pleaded the excuse 
of a demand, the board played no role in deciding whether the litigation should be 
pursued and the derivative action maintained497 since obviously an interested or a 
dependent board would only make a decision not to sue and such a decision 
would carry no weight. However, since the mid-1970s, courts have begun to 
recognize that a special litigation committee appointed by the board of directors 
might make a litigation decision for the corporation. Questions surrounding the 
special litigation committee have arisen, such as the qualifications of the 
committee and the standard of judicial review of the committee's decisions. I will 
discuss these issues in Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.3. 
Where the distinction between demand-required and demand-excused cases is 
recognized, most states acknowledge that different standards of judicial review of 
the board's or the committee's decisions will be applied.498 However, where a 
495 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7 .07. 
496 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7.02; DeMott (2003), Section 5:10, p. 5-41. 
497 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.01. 
498 See Sections 3.4.2.2.2.3.2 and 3.4.2.2.2.3.3. 
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universal demand requirement is needed, what should the standard be? I will 
discuss the issue in Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.4. 
3.4.2.2.2.3.2 The standard of judicial review in demand-required cases 
If the board refuses to sue after the complaining shareholder has made a proper 
demand on it or if it seeks for dismissal of the derivative action initiated, the 
plaintiff cannot challenge the board's refusal or dismissal unless the refusal or 
dismissal is wrong. 499 This is the so-called 'wrongful refusal' rule. 500 The judicial 
deference to the board's decision has some justifications. First, as mentioned, a 
corporate litigation decision is a business decision and is left to the discretion of 
the board of directors. The board can decide whether to sue based on several 
factors, such as the cause of action, the cost and the benefit the action will bring 
to the corporation.501 If the action is not in the best interests of the corporation, 
the board may decide not to sue. Like normal business decisions, the board's 
litigation decision also falls within the scope of the business judgment rule. 502 
Second, this judicial deference is also a natural consequence of the demand 
requirement. 503 If the board's negative response to the demand is not respected by 
the court, the demand requirement would become meaningless and just be 'an 
empty formality' .504 
However, this in no way means that the court should defer to all the board's 
decisions. The court will apply its own standard to decide to what extent it will 
defer to the board's decision. In demand-required cases, the court normally will 
apply the business judgment rule to decide whether the decision should be 
deferred to or not.505 In other words, in order to set aside the board's negative 
litigation decision, the plaintiff shareholder must allege a reasonable doubt that a 
majority of the board was in fact disinterested or independent, or that it acted in 
good faith and with due care, or that it rationally believed the decision was in the 
best interests of the corporation. 506 The plaintiff must allege his complaint with 
particularity; conclusory allegations alone are not sufficient. 507 
499 For example, Levine 1'. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Delaware 1991). 
500 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7.02. 
501 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 429; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7.08. 
502 See, for example, Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 
487, 99 S.Ct. 1831, 60 L.Ed.2d 404 (1979); United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated 
Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-264, 37 S.Ct. 509, 61 L.Ed. 1119 (1917). Also see Ferrara et 
al. (2005), Section 5.04; Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 429. 
503 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7.02. 
504 Spiegel v. Bu11trock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Delaware 1990); also see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 
7.02, Footnote 8. 
505 For example, Aro11so11 v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (1984); also see Ferrara et al. (2005), 
Section 7.02, Footnote 5. 
506 See, for example, Levi11e v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Delaware 1991); also see Ferrara et al. (2005), 
Section 7.02. 
507 See, for example,Levi11e v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Delaware 1991); also see Ferrara et al. (2005), 
Section 7.02. 
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The application of the business judgment rnle to the board's refusal of the 
demand may, nevertheless, impose too much of a burden of proof on the plaintiff 
shareholder, especially in view of the fact that in Delaware, for example, dis-
covery is not available to the plaintiff and, therefore, it is difficult for the plaintiff 
to acquire the necessary evidence.508 Nevertheless, this burden may well be 
reduced by the recent development in Delaware law, which encourages the 
plaintiff to use section 220 of the DGCL to improve his pleading.509 New Jersey 
went further to ease the plaintiff's burden by adopting a modified business 
judgment rule. Where a board has refused to sue after a demand has been made 
on it, the board bears the burden of proving that it was disinterested and 
independent, that its decision was made in good faith and with due care, and that 
the decision was reasonable. 510 The New Jersey Supreme Court also held that the 
parties were entitled to discovery before the court made its decision. 511 
Another aspect of Delaware law may make it more difficult to challenge the 
board's refusal of the demand in Delaware. According to Delaware law the 
plaintiff shareholder, by making a demand on the board, concedes that a majority 
of the board was independent; therefore, he can only challenge the board's refusal 
by alleging that the board was lacking in good faith or due care. 512 On the other 
hand, the board's delegation of its power to make a decision to a special litigation 
committee does not necessarily concede that the board was interested or 
dependent. 513 
3.4.2.2.2.3.3 The standards of judicial review in demand-excused cases: the 
special litigation committee 
3.4.2.2.2.3.3.1 The increasing role of the special litigation committee 
As mentioned, until recently, if the plaintiff shareholder successfully pleaded 
demand futility, the board, which was generally interested in the transaction or 
was controlled by the wrongdoers, was regarded as not the appropriate body to 
make a fair litigation decision for the corporation. Therefore, the plaintiff was 
free to initiate a derivative action. However, this approach has been changed. 
Since the mid-1970s an independent body within the corporation, the special 
litigation committee, has been regarded in most states as being competent and 
appropriate for making a litigation decision for the corporation.514 Hence, if the 
special litigation committee decides in the best interests of the corporation not to 
508 DeMott (2003), Section 5.11, p. 5-48; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7.03. 
509 For a discussion of the application of Section 220 in derivative action cases, see Section 3 .4.6. 
510 In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 173 N.J. 258, 286, 801 A.2d 295, 312 (2002); DeMott 
(2003), Section 5.11, p. 5-49; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7.04. 
511 In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 173 N.J. 258, 288, 801 A.2d 295, 313 (2002); DeMott 
(2003), Section 5.11, p. 5-49; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7.04. 
512 DeMott (2003), Sections 7.05, 7.06. 
513 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7.07. 
514 DeMott (2003), Section 5.14, p. 5-90; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.01. 
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sue, such a decision may, under certain conditions, have a binding effect and then 
bar any derivative action initiated by the shareholder. The fact is that the special 
litigation committee is regarded as a recently developed mechanism that has a 
substantial negative effect on the function of derivative actions. 515 
A special litigation committee is comprised of independent directors who were 
appointed by the board of directors for the purpose of deciding whether the 
corporation should seek dismissal of a derivative action, which will affect a 
majority of the board of directors.516 In order to be capable of making this 
decision in the best interests of the corporation, the committee must be given full 
authority to make that decision and must be disinterested or independent.517 
3.4.2.2.2.3.3.2 The standards of judicial review of the special litigation 
committee's decision 
Overview 
There is an argument that the board's litigation decision differs from its normal 
business judgment in certain aspects and should not be accorded the same degree 
of judicial deference as a normal business judgment. Therefore, the normal 
business judgment rule may be inappropriate for reviewing the board's litigation 
decision.518 There are several reasons in support of this argument. 519 First, unlike 
investment decisions, directors are normally under less pressure to make litigaion 
decisions and face less uncertainty. Second, directors are unlikely to be liable for 
their decision not to sue since such a decision generally will not cause damage to 
the corporation. Therefore, the rationale under the business judgment rule for 
encouraging business risk-taking is not applicable in making litigation decisions. 
Third, the rationale under the business judgment rule that judges are not business 
experts and should not take advantage of ex post judgment may not apply to 
litigation decisions because litigation decisions obviously involve issues such as 
merits of the action, which the court is more capable of considering than directors 
are, and because litigation decisions are normally retrospective rather than pre-
dictive. 
However, as mentioned in Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.2, in demand-required cases 
where the action is normally against a third party and the board is disinterested 
and independent, the argument mentioned above is not paid attention to and 
courts generally still apply the business judgment rule to review the board's 
litigation decision. 
515 See, for example, Coffee & Schwartz (1981), p. 262. 
516 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.01. 
517 DeMott (2003), Section 5.23. 
518 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), pp. 280-284; Cox & Hazen (2002), pp. 429-430. 
519 For a detailed discussion of the reasons, see Coffee & Schwartz (1981), pp. 280-284; Cox & 
Hazen (2002), pp. 429-430. 
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It may be different for those cases where a majority of the board has an interest 
in the challenged transaction or is controlled by the wrongdoer. In such cases a 
demand on the board may then be excused but a special litigation committee is 
authorized by the board to make the litigation decision against the transaction. It 
is argued that the business judgment rule may not be applicable to a review of the 
committee's decision. The most important concern, besides the reasons 
mentioned above, is the 'structural bias' problem. Since the committee members 
are normally appointed by the 'tainted' board and work closely with the directors 
charged, they tend to perceive their role 'as that of a buffer by which to shelter 
and protect management from hostile and litigious stockholders'. 520 'In particu-
lar, a derivative action evokes a response of group loyalty, so that even a 
"maverick" director may feel compelled to close ranks and protect his fellows 
from the attack of the "strike suiter"'. 521 Therefore, the committee members, 
when making the litigation decision, may act with a 'there but for the grace of 
God go I' attitude and show sympathy for their colleagues.522 The fact that in 
practice in a substantial number of cases the special litigation committee has 
recommended not suing their colleague directors may support the likelihood of 
the 'structural bias' problem. 523 
Of course, the likelihood of the structural bias problem and its influence on 
the special litigation committee's decision should be identified on a case-by-case 
basis. Nevertheless, a relevant issue is what standard the court should apply when 
it reviews the special litigation committee's decision not to sue. Should the court 
take a stricter approach than the business judgment rule, taking into consideration 
the likelihood of structural bias? Or should the court simply stick to the business 
judgment rule? The answer to this issue directly affects the function of the special 
litigation committee in derivative actions and therefore the function of derivative 
actions as well: a stricter standard of judicial review may to a greater extent 
invalidate the committee's decision not to sue and give shareholders more chances 
to bring derivative actions, and vice versa. In the United States, this is an issue of 
state law unless a federal policy would be frustrated. 524 In reality, jurisdictions 
have differed widely on this issue. There are three basic approaches that I will 
discuss in the sections to follow. 
The New York Rule 
The New York Court of Appeal's decision in Auerbach v. Bennett in 1979 was one 
of the first state court-of-last-resort decisions to deal with the issue of the 
standard of judicial review of a special litigation committee's decision in demand-
520 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), p. 283. 
521 Coffee & Schwartz (1981), p. 283. 
522 Zapata Corp! v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Delaware 1981). 
523 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.01, text accompanying Footnote 7. 
524 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 60 L. Ed. 2d 404, 99 S Ct 1831 (1979). 
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excused cases.525 In this case, the court held that the business judgment rule 
would protect the substance of the special litigation committee's decision from 
judicial review. Recognizing that the committee's decision had two aspects, the 
process by which the decision was made and the substance of the decision itself, 
the court would only review the process as well as the independence of the 
committee, and not the substance of the decision. Therefore, Auerbach also 
followed the standard of the business judgment rule for reviewing the special 
litigation committee's decision in demand-excused cases, the same standard as 
that in demand-required cases, and thus rejected the claim that the special 
litigation committee was tainted by structural bias. 526 The case has been followed 
in New York as well as in some other states.527 
Nevertheless, the Auerbach approach has been criticized for giving too much 
deference to the special litigation committee's decision.528 It is argued that where 
a majority of the board is not sufficiently disinterested when making a litigation 
decision, more judicial scrutiny should be applied to review the committee's 
decision not to sue on the grounds of protecting the interests of the corporation 
and shareholders. 529 
The Iowa Rule 
The Iowa Supreme Court took the opposite approach to that of the New York rule. 
In Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc. 530, it held that under no circum-
stances should the special litigation committee's decision not to sue be deferred 
to because, where the majority of the board was incapable of making a litigation 
decision, it had no authority to delegate such a power to a special litigation 
committee. This 'prophylactic rule' of the Iowa court in fact reflects the court's 
strong suspicion concerning the director's structural bias. 531 
The Delaware Rule 
Most states actually take a position between New York and Iowa. They acknow-
ledge that the special litigation committee's decision deserves a certain degree of 
deference, but adopt a stricter standard of judicial review of the decision than the 
New York standard of the business judgment rule. Therefore, the standard applied 
in these demand-excused cases should be different from the standard applied in 
the demand-required cases. Nevertheless, the specific standard of review varies 
in these states. I will discuss the Delaware rule here as a case in point. 
525 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.02; DeMott (2003), Section 5.15, p. 5-91. 
526 Matejka (1982), p. 1201. 
527 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.02. 
528 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.02, text accompany Footnote 19. 
529 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.02. 
530 336 N.W2d 709 (Iowa 1983). 
531 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.02; DeMott (2003), Section 5:16, p. 5-95. 
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The Delaware standard is well illustrated by the famous case of Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado. 532 In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated a two-step test 
to review a special litigation committee's decision. First, the court must 'inquire 
into the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting 
its conclusions' .533 Unlike the application of the business judgment rule, here the 
corporation should 'have the burden of proving independence, good faith and a 
reasonable investigation'; independence, good faith and reasonableness should 
not be presumed.534 Courts may at their discretion allow limited discovery. 535 
Second, even if the corporation meets the burden of the first-step test, the court 
can still detennine through 'its own business judgment' whether to dismiss the 
suit.536 When applying its own business judgment, the court should give 'special 
consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's 
best interest' .537 
The Zapata approach reflects the court's effort to strike a balance between the 
protection of the director's management and the interests of the corporation and 
shareholders. Recognizing the structural bias problem, the court realized that a 
business judgment rule was not sufficient to guard against a director's 
misconduct. Indeed, the court regarded the second step as 'the essential key in 
striking the balance between legitimate corporate claims as expressed in a 
derivative stockholder suit and a corporation's best interests as expressed by an 
independent investigating committee' .538 
Nevertheless, the Delaware rule has also been criticized. The criticisms 
include, for example, that the application of the court's own business judgment 
may threaten traditional policies under the business judgment rule. 539 The 
different standards applied to demand-required and demand-excused cases may 
make a pre-suit trial unavoidable.540 The linkage between the standards of judicial 
review and the demand-required/demand-excused distinction is regarded as 
unfortunate since the two issues are 'logically distinct and should be governed by 
different criteria' .541 The court may also have to determine 'whether the action 
should proceed before the board or committee has had an adequate opportunity 
to conduct a review and evaluation' of the derivative action.542 
532 430 A.2d 779 (Delaware 1981). 
533 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Delaware 1981). 
534 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Delaware 1981). 
535 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Delaware 1981). 
536 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Delaware 1981). 
537 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Delaware 1981). 
538 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Delaware 1981). 
539 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.03. 
540 ALI (II) Section 7.03(b), Comment E, p. 58. 
541 ALI (II) Section 7.03(b), Comment E, p. 58. 




In conclusion, although the standard of judicial review of the special litigation 
committee's decision varies significantly in various states, the difference mainly 
exists as far as the review of the substance of the decision is concerned. It is 
generally recognized that the procedure by which the decision was made should 
be subject to judicial review. In other words, the independence, good faith and due 
care of the special litigation committee should be subjected to judicial review. 
3 .4 .2 .2 .2 .3 .4 The standards of judicial review in universal demand cases 
As mentioned, some states as well as the MBCA and the ALI Principles take the 
approach of a universal demand requirement. Nevertheless, they also follow 
different standards for judicial review of the board or the special litigation 
committee's decision. 
MBCA 
MBCA Section 7.44(a) states that: 
A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the 
corporation if one of the groups specified in subsections (b) or (f) has 
determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its 
conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not 
in the best interests of the corporation. 
Therefore, the board or the special litigation committee's decision, if made in 
good faith and with due care, will be respected by the court. Nevertheless, unlike 
the business judgment rule, the MBCA shifts the burden of proof that the above 
conditions have been met from the plaintiff to the corporation 'ifa majority of the 
board of directors does not consist of independent directors at the time the 
determination is made'. 543 If a majority of the board of directors consists of 
independent directors, the plaintiff still bears the burden of proving that the 
requirements have not been met in order to bring a derivative action. 544 The 
burden of proving the board's dependency lies with the plaintiff shareholder. 545 In 
conclusion, the MBCA applies the same standard of review to all board or 
committee decisions, but distinguishes the burden of proof according to the 
dependency of the majority of the board. 
By shifting the burden of proof to the corporation, where a majority of the 
board is not independent, the MBCA takes a more shareholder-favoring approach 
than the business judgment rule. Nevertheless, this limited progress, along with 
the shareholder's initial burden of proving the board's dependency, is regarded as 
543 MBCA, S7.44 (e). 
544 MBCA, S7.44 (e). 
545 MBCA, S7.44 Official Comment at 207; as cited in Swanson (1993), p. 1369. 
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restricting judicial inquiry too greatly and limiting a shareholder's right to 
derivative actions. 546 
ALI Principles 
The approach taken by the ALI Principles has several characteristics. First, it 
recommends that the standard of judicial review of the board or of the com-
mittee's decision be linked to the defendant's identities. If the defendant is a third 
party rather than corporate insiders, specifically directors, senior executives or 
persons in control of the corporation, the business judgment rule should apply. 
While if the defendant is an insider ( for the sake of simplicity, hereinafter referred 
to as directors), a bifurcated standard, as discussed below, should apply.547 
The second and the more important characteristic is the recommendation that 
the standard of judicial review be linked to the nature of the claim. First of all, the 
court shall consider whether the 'dismissal would permit a defendant, or an 
associate ... to retain a significant improper benefit'; if the plaintiff can establish 
that, the court shall not dismiss the action in certain circumstances. 548 If there is 
no retention of significant improper benefit, the standard is twofold: if the claim 
is against the director's violation of duty of care, the business judgment rule 
should apply. On the other hand, if the claim is against the director's violation of 
duty of loyalty, a closer judicial scrutiny should apply. This standard should 
encompass whether 'the board or committee was adequately informed under the 
circumstances and reasonably determined that dismissal was in the best interests 
of the corporation, based on the grounds that the court deems to warrant 
reliance'. 549 This dual standard is intended to strike a balance between 'the need 
for judicial review and the danger of litigation that it is contrary to the 
corporation's best interests to pursue' .550 The more lenient approach to standards 
with regard to the claim against directors' duty of care is based, at least partly, on 
the ALi's conclusion that historically the derivative action plays a less important 
role in enforcing the duty of care than it does the duty of fair dealing.551 It is said 
that 'S 7 .10 rests on the judgment that the more important role of the derivative 
action has been to police unfair self-dealing, not unwise business decisions'. 552 
Although the ALI criticizes the Delaware approach of linking the standard of 
judicial review to the demand-required/demand-excused distinction, which is a 
'structural test' mainly based on whether a majority of the board is 'interested' or 
546 Swanson (1993), pp. 1369-1370. 
547 ALI (II), Section 7.07. 
548 ALI (II), Section 7.1 0(b ). 
549 ALI (II), Section 7.l0(a). 
550 ALI (II), Section 7.10, Comment C, p.133. 
551 ALI (II), Section 7.10, Comment C, pp.133-135. 
552 ALI (II), Section 7.10, Comment C, p.135. 
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not553 , the ALI does seem to agree with the Delaware law that a higher standard 
of judicial scrutiny should be applied to cases where it is doubtful whether the 
board can fulfill its duty of loyalty. 554 
The ALI's approach also has its disadvantages. The nature of the claim, that is, 
whether the misconduct is a breach of duty of care or of duty of loyalty, is not as 
easy to distinguish as it seems. Furthermore, the board may try to protect itself by 
arguing that the wrong is a breach of duty of care rather than a breach of duty of 
loyalty. 555 
3.4.2.2.2.3.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in the United States there are no set standards of judicial review 
for the board or committee decision to dismiss a derivative action. More 
especially, the controversy lies within those cases where a majority of the board 
is incapable of making a right decision for the corporation and therefore the 
device of a special litigation committee is used. The great differences among 
various states as well as the MBCA and the ALI Principles make it difficult to 
predict the trend of development in this area556, although the issue of the standard 
is pivotal to the function of derivative actions. 
3.4.2.2.3 Demand on the shareholders 
In addition to the requirement of making a demand on the board of directors, a 
minority of states requires that the plaintiff shareholder either make a demand on 
the other shareholders before initiating a derivative action or give an adequate 
reason for not doing so.557 The policies underlying this requirement are almost the 
same as those underlying the demand on the board requirement.558 First, a 
plaintiff shareholder should exhaust intra-corporate remedies before initiating a 
derivative action; where the board is not capable of making a litigation decision 
for the corporation, shareholders as a group should have such a power. Second, 
through such a demand shareholders may be given the opportunity to ratify the 
misconduct and therefore a derivative action would not be necessary anymore. 
Third, such a demand requirement may deter vexatious litigation. 
However, there have also been arguments against the demand on shareholders 
requirement.559 First of all, making a demand on shareholders normally costs a 
553 ALI (II), Section 7.10, Comment C, pp.134-135. 
554 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.11. 
555 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 8.11. 
556 DeMott (2003), Section 5:16, pp. 5-100- 5-101. 
557 For example, Hamilton (2000), p. 545. 
558 For a detailed discussion of the policies, see, for example, Clark R. C. (1986) p. 650; Ferrara 
et al. (2005), Section 3.04. 
559 For example, Clark R. C. (1986), p. 649; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 3.04; Cox & Hazen 
(2002), pp, 426-427. 
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great deal of time and money, especially in public corporations; therefore it will 
place an extra burden on the plaintiff shareholders and may delay a derivative 
action. Second, since in public corporations shareholders normally do not 
participate in corporate management, they are not an appropriate body for making 
litigation decisions for the corporation. Third, most of the misconduct challenged 
by derivative actions cannot be ratified by a majority of shareholders. Fourthly, as 
far as deterring vexatious derivative litigation is concerned, a demand on directors 
is generally regarded as sufficient. Although some of the arguments are based on 
those situations found in public corporations, courts have not made a distinction 
between public and private corporations in any clear-cut way with regard to the 
requirement. 560 
Nowadays, the prevailing approach is to abolish the demand on shareholders 
requirement. Some influential states such as Delaware and New York, as well as 
the MBCA and the ALI Principles, have either explicitly abolished the require-
ment561 or omitted any reference to such a requirement by simply referring to 
making a demand 'upon the corporation'. 562 
Even in those states where a demand on the shareholders is required, a number 
of grounds have been accepted to excuse the demand. In fact, recent cases have 
shown that the requirement has hardly ever been required in practice. 563 Although 
the specific grounds for excusing the demand vary from state to state, the most 
common grounds are: (1) where the misconduct complained of cannot be ratified 
by the shareholders so that it is useless to make a demand; (2) where a majority 
of the shareholders are interested in the misconduct so that a demand would be 
futile; and (3) where the number of the shareholders is so large that making a 
demand would be unreasonably costly and burdensome.564 
3.4.2.2.4 Conclusion 
To summarize, the demand requirement plays an important role in restricting the 
individual shareholder's right to derivative actions. The demand requirement may 
make it difficult for a plaintiff shareholder to initiate derivative actions from 
several perspectives, such as limited scope of demand-excused exceptions, role of 
the special litigation committee, loose approach of judicial review, and the 
plaintiff's burden of proof. 
560 Clark R. C. (1986), p. 649. 
561 Del Ch R 13.1; N.Y. Bus Corp Ls 626(c) (Westlaw: McKinney's Business Corporation Laws 
626(c)); ALI (II) Section 7.03; also see DeMott (2003), Section 5.2, pp. 5-3- 5-4, Footnote 1. 
562 MBCA s7.42.The official comment on the section states that the appropriate organ for 
reviewing the demand is in most cases the board of directors, and in occasional cases the 
officers. It does not mention the shareholders. See DeMott (2003), Section 5.2, p. 5-4, Footnote 
2. 
563 DeMott (2003), Section 5.2, p. 5-4. 
564 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 3.04; Hamilton (2000), 545. 
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3.4.2.3 Security-for-expenses provided by plaintiffs 
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1.3, the mechanism of the security-for-expenses 
statute has been introduced since the 1940s in sixteen states, including New York, 
in order to deter abusive use of derivative actions. According to the security-for-
expenses statute, derivative action plaintiffs, when holding less than the 
statutorily required minimum interest in the corporation, can be required by the 
corporation at any stage to post security for reasonable expenses. The statutes 
vary on the minimum interest; typically, a holding of five percent of the shares or 
a holding of shares exceeding an aggregate market value such as $50,000 is 
required. 565 As to the amount of the security, normally the plaintiffs will be 
required to post security for reasonable expenses which may be incurred by the 
corporation and by other defendants for which the corporation may become liable 
because of indemnification or otherwise with regard to the litigation, including 
attorney's fees in some states.566 It is common for this amount to run into 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.567 The security-for-expenses statute has another 
deterrent effect on the shareholders since, when being applied, it requires the 
plaintiff shareholders to pay the expenses of both sides of the litigation if they 
fail. 568 The normal American rule is that, with a few exceptions, both parties bear 
their own litigation expenses including the attorney's fees.569 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 3.1.1.3, the security-for-expenses statute 
has not worked well in deterring 'strike suits' since the plaintiff shareholders can 
avoid the requirement by several means. For example, the plaintiff shareholders 
may plead a federal cause of action instead of a state one; or the plaintiffs may 
look for other shareholders to join in the case in order to satisfy the minimum 
holding condition and so avoid the security-for-expenses requirement. 570 The 
plaintiffs' seeking joiners in a case may also be enough to cause the corporation 
to give up their demand for security from the plaintiffs because such a search 
might lead to publicity about the dispute, which the corporation does not want.571 
On the other hand, since most of the security-for-expenses statutes base the 
application of the requirement on the share interests held by the plaintiffs rather 
than on the cause of the action, it may deter meritorious cases as well. Therefore, 
most states including Delaware, as well as the revised MBCA and the ALI 
Principles, have not adopted this requirement. 
565 Such as N.Y. Bus. Corp. L. s 627 (Westlaw: McKinney's Business Corporation Law s 627). 
Also see DeMott (2003), Section 4.06. 
566 Hamilton (2000), pp. 546-547; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 4.06. 
567 Hamilton (2000), pp. 546-547; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 4.06. 
568 Hamilton (2000), p. 547. 
569 DeMott (2003), Section 3.1, p. 3-3. For a discussion of the allocation of litigation costs in 
American law, see Section 3.4.4.1. 
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3.4.3 The independent body's view 
Under American law the board of directors is generally regarded as the 
appropriate body to make litigation decisions for the corporation. As mentioned 
in Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.3, where a majority of the board is not disinterested or 
independent, an independent body, the special litigation committee, which is 
composed of disinterested and independent members, may be authorized to make 
such a decision. The binding effect of the special litigation committee is subject 
to the standard of judicial review, which varies greatly in different jurisdictions. 
For a detailed discussion of the issue, please refer to Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.3. 
3.4.4 
3.4.4.1 
Incen fives for the plaintiff to pursue derivative actions 
Litigation costs and indemnity to the plaintiff shareholder 
Unlike the English principle of costs allocation where 'the costs follow the 
event' 572, the general American rule is that each party bears his own litigation 
costs including attorney's fees; the prevailing party's costs will not be shifted to 
the non-prevailing party.573 Nevertheless, there is one exception to the rule, which 
is known as the 'common fund' doctrine.574 According to this doctrine, the 
plaintiff who produced or preserved a 'common fund' that benefits others can 
recover attorney's fees out of the fund based on the principle of unjust 
enrichment.575 Since in almost all derivative actions the corporation rather than 
the plaintiff shareholder gets the recovery, if any, the 'common fund' doctrine in 
fact governs the allocation of fees in derivative actions. 576 Furthermore, in order 
for the corporation to pay the attorney's fees in derivative actions, it is not 
necessary for the corporation to be awarded an actual recovery. A substantial or 
tangible benefit such as non-pecuniary remedies to the corporation is sufficient, 
for example, nullification of an election of directors, cancellation of a 
disadvantageous contract or transaction, obtaining an injunction against mis-
management, or making some procedural changes.577 
570 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 4.06. 
571 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 4.06. 
572 See Section 2.4.1.4.1. 
573 DeMott (2003), Section 3:1, p. 3-3. 
574 Coffee (1986), p. 670, Footnote 2. 
575 Coffee (1986), p. 670, Footnote 2; DeMott (2003), Section 6:12, pp. 6-32 - 6-33. 
576 The allocation of attorney's fees in class actions is also governed by the 'common fund' 
doctrine since in class actions other shareholders rather than the plaintiff shareholder also 
benefit from the litigation. Coffee (1986), p. 670, Footnote 2; De Mott (2003), Section 6: 12, pp. 
6-32- 6-33. 
577 Cox & Hazen (2002), 466-467; DeMott (2003), Section 6:15. However, we should note that 
due to the 'common fund' doctrine and the indemnification of costs to directors, the 
corporation in derivative actions will indeed bear the legal expenses of both plaintiffs and 
defendants; DeMott (2003), Section 6: 1, pp. 6-2 - 6-3. 
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Although the fundamental justification for indemnifying the plaintiff 
shareholder in derivative actions is to prevent unjust enrichment and to achieve 
fairness578, shifting the costs from the plaintiff shareholder to the corporation also 
relieves the financial burden from the plaintiff and therefore reduces the plain-
tiff's under-incentive problem as far as bringing derivative actions is concerned. 
3.4.4.2 The contingency fee arrangement 
A plaintiff shareholder in a derivative action, even ifhe has failed in the litigation, 
may not be burdened with litigation costs because of the contingency fee 
arrangement, which has been available in the United States for over a hundred 
years and is widely applied in derivative actions.579 According to the contingency 
fee arrangement, the plaintiff's attorney will receive compensation only if the suit 
is successful on the merits or if the case settles. Unlike the English negative 
attitude towards the contingency fee arrangement, American law takes a favorable 
approach since it may encourage private enforcement of rights.58° First, with the 
contingency fee arrangement, a plaintiff who has no financial support is then able 
to bring actions. Additionally, a shareholder may also be more willing to bring 
representative actions (including both derivative actions and class actions) since 
he need not worry about the attorney's fees if he loses the case. Second, as the 
attorney will be compensated only by winning or settling the case, there is an 
incentive to find and take meritorious cases. Unlike the traditional English 
concern that such an arrangement may violate public policy, 'Americans sincerely 
feel that a lawyer who satisfies himself as to the merits before taking a cause and 
who relies for compensation entirely upon a successful result cannot be 
considered as having a lower standard of ethics than one who prosecutes or 
defends for an assured fee - regardless of the merits'.581 
However, despite the justifications for it, the contingency fee arrangement has 
given rise to the notorious problem of attorney-driven derivative actions, which I 
will discuss in the following section. 
3.4.4.3 The attorney-driven problem 
Few of the consequences of litigation born by the plaintiff shareholder 
The plaintiff shareholder in a derivative action in fact bears few of the con-
sequences of litigation, no matter whether he prevails or not. If the plaintiff 
prevails, on the one hand, the recovery will be awarded to the corporation and the 
plaintiff will be only indirectly benefited via the increase of value of the shares, 
578 DeMott (2003), Section 6:16. 
579 Hornstein (1967), p. 286. 
580 For this American approach and the reasons, see for example Hornstein (1967), p. 286; Coffee 
(1986), p. 679. 
581 Hornstein (1967), p. 286. 
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which is generally only nominal; on the other hand, the attorney's fees will be paid 
by the corporation due to the 'common fund' doctrine. If the plaintiff fails in the 
case, he will not lose much either; he will not need to pay the attorney's fees due 
to the contingency fee arrangement. 582 In addition, the plaintiff cannot be paid for 
any work on the case.583 In fact, although the plaintiff has no under-incentive 
problem in initiating a derivative action, neither has he a positive incentive to do 
so especially in large public corporations because of the rational apathy or free-
ride problem. 
Problems entailed in the attorney-driven feature 
Unlike the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney has a direct interest in derivative 
actions due to the contingency fee arrangement. This, together with the fact that 
attorneys in derivative actions are generally specialists in the area, generates the 
feature of attorney-driven derivative actions: the plaintiff's attorney may be the 
real moving force behind the derivative action. 584 
Although the attorney-driven feature does have the advantage of encouraging 
the private enforcement of rights and disciplining corporate management, it also 
causes problems. On the one hand, due to the plaintiff's nominal stake in the 
derivative action and the problem of rational apathy, there is hardly any client 
control of the attorney's pursuit of his personal interests.585 On the other hand, the 
attorney's interests are generally not congruent with the interests of the corpo-
ration and its shareholders. Therefore, derivative actions are mainly pursued for 
the best interests of the attorney rather than the corporation and its shareholders. 
For example, generally settlement is more favorable to the attorney than a trial 
since the attorney normally prefers an assured amount awarded by the settlement 
to the uncertain result of a trial. 586 In addition, since the attorney's interest lies in 
the amount of money he receives less the costs spent on the case, the attorney's 
interest is usually better served by settlement because he can receive a relatively 
high attorney's fee with less costs than the work required to prepare and take the 
case to trial. 587 Whether the corporation can obtain sufficient recovery is beyond 
the attorney's concern. This is the reason why most derivative actions are settled 
and do not go to trial and appeal. 588 
The attorney-driven feature may also cause a problem of over-enforcement. 589 
Attorneys may bring actions of doubtful merit solely for their nuisance settlement 
582 Cox (1999), p. 31. 
583 DeMott (2003), Section 6:12, pp. 6-33 - 6-34. 
584 DeMott (2003), Section 6:2, p. 6-4; Hamilton (2000), p. 539. 
585 Coffee (1986), pp. 679-680. 
586 DeMott (2003), Section 6:3, p. 6-7; 
587 Saylor 1i Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-901 (2d Cir. 1972); also see Cox (1999), p. 33. 
588 Hamilton (2000), p. 540. 
589 Coffee (1986), pp. 680-681. 
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value, in disregard of corporate interests.590 This over-enforcement may unjustly 
interfere with corporate management. 
Restrictions on the settlement of derivative actions 
In order to reduce the negative effect of the attorney-driven feature, American law 
has adopted several mechanisms to restrict the bringing of derivative actions and 
to protect directors, which I have discussed. In addition, in order to prevent the 
plaintiff's attorney from serving his own interests rather than the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders, there have been restrictions placed on the 
settlement of derivative actions. The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure section 23 .1 
requires that the proposed settlement or dismissal of derivative actions should be 
approved by the court and 'notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall 
be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.' The 
requirement of judicial approval for the proposed settlement or dismissal has been 
adopted by most state law as well as by the MBCA and the ALI Principles. 591 
However, different approaches have been taken toward the notice requirement. 
For example, some states also adopt the notice-to-shareholders requirement, 
while others give the court the discretion to decide whether such a notice is 
necessary. In Delaware notice is required unless the dismissal of the action is 
without prejudice to the plaintiff.592 The MBCA provides that 'If the court 
determines that a proposed discontinuance or settlement will substantially affect 
the interests of the corporation's shareholders or a class of shareholders, the court 
shall direct that notice be given to the shareholders affected'. 593 A similar 
approach to the MBCA has been taken by the ALI Principles.594 
3.4.5 Limiting directors 'financial exposure to the risks and costs of 
litigation 
In order to strike a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for 
minority shareholders, American law also provides defendant directors protection 
by limiting their financial exposure to the risks and costs of litigation. Such 
590 Coffee (1986), pp. 680-681; DeMott (2003), Section 6:3, p. 6-7. However, it is also argued that 
the strike suit in derivative actions is relatively uncommon because settlement for strike suits 
would establish defendants, as repeat players with a reputation as 'an easy mark,' and involve 
them in more strike suits and because bringing a strike suit would also incur substantial risk to 
the plaintiff attorney; in addition, strike suits are unlikely to cause great burden on defendants 
since the plaintiff's attorney is likely to settle the case for a very low figure; see Macey & 
Miller (1991), p. 78. 
591 See, for example, Del. Ch. R. 23.1, N.Y. Bus. Corp. L. section 626(d) (Westlaw: McKinney's 
Business Corporation Law 626(d)), the MBCA, section 7.45, ALI (II) Section 7.14(a); see 
Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 14.01. 
592 DeMott (2003), Section 7:1, p. 6-51. 
593 MBCA, S7.45. 
594 ALI (II) Section 7.14( c ). 
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protection, like the business judgment rule, is intended to encourage more 
capable people to serve as directors and therefore benefit the corporation and 
shareholders in the end.595 Such methods of protection include exculpation of 
directors' personal liability to a certain extent, indemnification of directors' 
litigation expenses by the corporation, and D&O insurance provided by the 
corporation. I will discuss these methods in the following sections in turn. 
3.4.5.1 
Background 
Eliminating or limiting (exculpation of) directors' personal 
liability 
Most states' corporation statutes allow for a corporation's articles or certificate of 
incorporation to include a provision to eliminate or limit directors' personal 
liability for financial damages to the corporation or its shareholders, with certain 
limited exceptions. This legislative practice started with section 102(b )(7) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), which was added in 1986. 
Section 102(b )(7) of DGCL was the direct statutory reaction to the Delaware 
Supreme Court case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.596 The Van Gorkom case was 
regarded as Delaware law tightening the legal constriction on directors. 597 In this 
case, the Delaware Supreme Court, by a 3(2 vote, held that the directors of Trans 
Union Corporation could not be protected by the business judgment rule because 
they had acted with gross negligence and had then violated their fiduciary duty 
by accepting a merger proposal after only two hours of consideration and without 
examining relevant documentation, although in this case, the price of the offer 
was substantially higher than the market price.598 While the court, in making its 
decision, properly focused on the process of the decision rather than the outcome 
of the decision599, the case has been greatly criticized for its strict application of 
the business judgment rule. Dissenters argued that the facts of the case could not 
show that the directors were not acting on a well-informed basis or had acted with 
gross negligence. On the contrary, the directors were sophisticated businessmen 
and 'were more than well qualified to make on the spot informed business 
judgments concerning the affairs of Trans Union including a 100 percent sale of 
the corporation' .600 
Before the Van Gorkom case, courts hardly ever found directors grossly 
negligent or examined business decisions without evidence of bad faith. 601 
595 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), p. 1433. 
596 488 A.2d 858 (Delaware 1985). 
597 Bradley & Schipani (1989), p. 42. 
598 488 A.2d 858, 874-876 (Delaware 1985). 
599 488 A.2d 858, 878 (Delaware 1985). 
600 488 A.2d 858, 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting) (Delaware 1985). 
601 Bradley & Schipani (1989), p. 42, p. 44. 
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Therefore, the case inevitably generated the concern that the decision would 
weaken the business judgment rnle and expose directors to serious liabilities.602 
In fact, there was an immediate response to the Van Gorkom case in the business 
community: D&O liability insurance premiums increased and fewer qualified 
people were willing to serve as directors. 603 These changes directly led to the 
enactment of Section 102(b )(7) of the DGCL, which was intended to alleviate the 
negative effect of the Van Gorkom case and provide protection for directors. 
Section 102(b)(7) of DGCL 
Section 102(b)(7) ofDGCL permits a corporation's certificate of incorporation to 
include: 
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetaiy damages for breach of fiduciary 
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the 
liability of a director (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the 
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) 
under section 174 of this Title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the 
director dedved an improper personal benefit. No such provision shall 
eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any act or omission occurdng 
prior to the date when such provision becomes effective ... 604 
As we have seen, exculpation of directors' liability under section 102(b )(7) entails 
certain restrictions. First, section 102(b )(7) provides an 'opt in' election and, 
therefore, the corporation's certificate of incorporation must be amended to 
include such a provision in order to exculpate directors from liability. Directors' 
liability for any act or omission occurring before the date when such provision 
becomes effective will not be exculpated .either. Second, only directors (not 
officers or other agents) may be protected by such a provision. Third, such a 
provision may only exculpate directors from liability for financial damages; other 
remedies, such as injunction or setting aside a transaction, are beyond the 
provision's protection.605 Fourthly, only a director's liability to the corporation and 
its shareholders, rather than to third parties, may be exculpated by such a 
602 Bradley & Schipani (1989), p. 7. 
603 Hamilton (2000), pp. 458-459; Bradley & Schipani (1989), p. 7, p. 43; Veasey & Guglielmo 
(2005), p. 1432. Bradley and Schipani also did empirical studies on the effect of the case on 
the market for directors' and officers' liability insurance, see Bradley & Schipani (1989), pp. 
49-57. 
604 DGCL s 102(b )(7) (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. s 102(b )(7) ). Section 17 4 of Title 8 imposes 
joint and several liability on directors under whose administration a corporation unlawfully 
pays a dividend or unlawfully purchases or redeems stock. 
605 DeMott (2003), Section 1:7, p. 1-31; Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1432-1433. 
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provision. Finally, such a provision can only exculpate directors from liability for 
duty-of-care violations. 
Statutes in other states, the MBCA and the ALI's Principles 
Section 102(b )(7) of DGCL was obviously welcomed. After its enactment, many 
corporations amended their certificates of incorporation to include such an ex-
culpation provision. 606 Soon after Delaware, many other states also introduced a 
similar section into their own corporation statutes, as well as the MBCA.607 Some 
of the states and the MBCA take a more pro-management approach than does 
Delaware in a few details. For example, Section 2.O2(b)(4) of the MBCA narrows 
the exceptions to exculpable liability more than does section 1O2(b)(7) of the 
DGCL. Therefore more violations by directors may be exculpated from liabili-
ty.608 Instead of Delaware's opt-in approach, some states choose to have the 
statutes automatically limit directors' personal liability under certain circums-
tances.609 In addition, some states permit officers, as well as directors, to be pro-
tected by such an exculpation provision.610 
The ALI Principles also include a similar limitation on directors' liability in 
section 7 .19. Furthermore, section 7 .19 suggests that such a provision in a 
certificate of incorporation to limit directors' liability for certain violations of the 
duty of care should be upheld by the court even in the absence of an enabling 
statute, except as otherwise provided by statute. 
Effects of the exculpation of directors' liability on the cmporation and its share-
holders 
Section 102(b )(7) of the DGCL and those following are intended to protect 
directors and encourage more competent people to serve as directors and, 
therefore, reverse the trend towards stricter constraint on directors created by the 
Van Gorkom case.611 Since under such a regulation directors who were held liable 
606 Hamilton (2000), P. 459. 
607 MBCA, Section 2.02(b)(4). For a detailed introduction to the statutes in various states, see 
DeMott (2003), Section 1:7. 
608 Section 2.02(b )( 4) of the MBCA provides that the articles of incorporation may set forth 'a 
provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the corporation or its shareholders 
for money damages for any action taken, or any failure to take any action, as a director, except 
liability for (A) the amount of a financial benefit received by a director to which he is not 
entitled; (B) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders; (C) a 
violation of Section 8.33; or (D) an intentional violation of criminal law.' Section 8.33 of the 
MBCA imposes directors' liability for voting or assenting to unlawful distributions. 
609 Such as India and Ohio; see DeMott (2003), Section 1 :9. 
610 Such as Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire and New Jersey; see DeMott (2003), Section 1 :7, 
pp. 1-33 - 1-34. 




to the corporation and its shareholders may be exculpated from financial damages 
to the corporation and its shareholders, a concern may arise as to whether this 
exculpation might injure the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. The 
answer may be negative. First of all, the statutes normally include a wide scope 
of exceptions. The major causes of derivative action, such as an unlawful act or 
the breach of duty of loyalty, are probably not exculpated. Second, the willingness 
of more competent people to serve as directors and the ensuing lower price for 
D&O liability insurance may improve corporate management and at the same 
time lower its costs.612 Third, where directors' liability can be exculpated, the 
court may tend to examine the board's decision more closely without fearing that 
the substitution of the court's judgment for the board's decision would make 
individual directors liable.613 This tendency may make it easier for the plaintiff 
shareholder to access derivative actions and acquire remedies other than money 
damages. 614 Fourth, the statute may encourage plaintiff shareholders to bring 
derivative actions as soon as possible in order to prevent misconduct to the 
corporation rather than to wait and seek damages after injury has been caused.615 
Fifth, the exculpation of money damages will not affect the plaintiff's incentive 
to bring derivative actions because the plaintiff can still have his attorney's fees 
indemnified by the corporation if appropriate equitable relief is awarded.616 
Finally, it is quite normal that the wrongdoers cannot pay all damages even if 
there is no such exculpation. 
3.4.5.2 Indemnification of directors 
All American states have indemnification statutes that mandate or permit 
corporations to reimburse their directors or officers for litigation costs that are 
directly related to the performance of their duties.617 Indemnification applies to 
all kinds of litigation. Depending on the circumstances, the costs that may be 
indemnified include (1) expenses i1;1curred in defending the case including legal 
fees, and/or (2) fines,judgments, or amounts incurred in settlement of the case.618 
The rationale behind the indemnification principle is that acting as agents of 
the corporation the directors and officers should be able to be compensated by the 
corporation for costs arising from the performance of their duty if the 
performance is faithful. 619 Another consideration is to provide protection for 
612 The empirical study done by Bradley and Schipani shows the response of the D&O liability 
insurance market to the statute; see Bradley & Schipani (1989), pp. 49-57. 
613 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 201. 
614 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 201. 
615 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 201; Hamilton (2000), p. 460. 
616 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 201. 
617 For a detailed introduction to state statutes as well as federal law, see, for example, DeMott 
(2003), Sections 6.35-6.44. 
618 Hamilton (2000), p. 524. 
619 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.01. 
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directors and officers.620 As mentioned in Section 3.4.4.1, the general American 
rule is that each party bears its own litigation costs including attorney's fees; the 
prevailing party's costs will not be shifted to the non-prevailing party. 621 
Therefore, the indemnification principle is important for directors and officers. 
Indemnification may be mandatory or permissive. For example, the Delaware 
statute provides that a director, officer, employee or agent of a corporation, in 
defense of any action, suit or proceeding, 'shall be indemnified against expenses 
(including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection 
therewith' to the extent that he 'has been successful on the merits or otherwise'. 622 
When the director is not successful, the Delaware statute permits, but does not 
require, corporations to indemnify him under certain circumstances.623 
Most indemnification statutes are non-exclusive.624 Therefore, a corporation 
may also assume an indemnification obligation, either mandatory or discretioary, 
for its directors or officers by means of a provision in the articles of incor-
poration, through by-laws or by an agreement with the individual director or 
officer, subject to the restrictions in the statute and public policy.625 
Courts may also have the discretion of deciding whether to grant indem-
nification based on certain considerations, for example, whether the indemnifica-
tion is fair and reasonable.626 
It is important to note that most indemnification statutes distinguish third-party 
litigation from actions brought by or on behalf of the corporation (that is, the 
derivative action).627 Where the litigation is based on a third-party's right, the 
director may be indemnified by the corporation against both (1) reasonably 
incurred expenses (including attorneys' fees and fees incurred in prosecuting an 
indemnification claim) and (2) judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement, 
provided he satisfied the statutory standards such as acting in good faith and 
reasonably believing that the conduct was in, or not opposed to, the best interests 
of the corporation and was not illegal. 628 However, while the action was brought 
by or on behalf of the corporation, the director may only be indemnified against 
reasonably incurred expenses if the statutory standards for the indemnification 
are satisfied. There can be no indemnity against judgments or amounts paid in 
620 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.01. 
621 DeMott (2003), Section 3: l, p. 3-3. 
622 DGCL, s 145(c) (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. s145(c)). 
623 DGCL, s 145(a)(b) (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. sl45(a)(b)). 
624 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.07. 
625 Ferrara et al. (2005), Sections 12.05 and 12.07. 
626 See, for example, DGCL, s 145(b) (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. s145(b)); ALI (II) Section 7.20 
(b)(c); MBCA, section 8.54. For a detailed introduction to court-ordered indemnification, 
please see, for example, Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.08. 
627 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.06; Bradley & Schipani (1989), p. 31. 
628 See, for example, DGCL, s 145(a) (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. s145(a)). 
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settlement.629 The rationale is that indemnification against judgments or amounts 
paid in settlement would cause an unwanted circular transfer of funds: the money 
paid by the liable director to the corporation would go back to the director 
through the indemnification.630 
However, both the ALI Principles and the MBCA take a more pro-
management approach. The ALI suggests that a court should have the discretion 
to order indemnification for amounts paid in the settlement of a derivative 
action. 631 The MBCA goes further. According to the MBCA, with regard to a 
proceeding by or on behalf of the corporation, even if a director was adjudged 
liable and failed to meet the relevant standard of conduct set forth in Section 
8.51(a) of the MBCA, a court can still order indemnification for him, but the 
indemnification 'shall be limited to reasonable expenses incurred in connection 
with the proceeding.' 632 Therefore, according to the MBCA, amounts paid in 
settlement of, or judgments resulting from, derivative actions may be indemnified 
if it is reasonable to do so. 633 There is also a trend among some states to take a 
more liberal approach: a wider scope of expenses, such as amounts paid in 
settlement or even judgment, may be indemnified in de1ivative actions in some 
states.634 
Almost all statutes permit, but do not require, a corporation to advance funds for 
expenses to directors before the final termination oflitigation.635 This advance for 
expenses is important in a practical way for directors since they may face 
financial difficulty in defending against litigation without such an advance.636 
However, in order to obtain the funds, the director may need to satisfy several 
conditions.637 The director must repay the funds if found in the end not to be 
entitled to the indemnification. 638 
3.4.5.3 D&O insurance 
Most state statutes expressly allow the corporation to purchase liability insurance 
on behalf of its directors, officers and agents, which is generally known as D&O 
insurance. 639 The coverage of a typical D&O policy includes two parts: one part 
629 See, for example, DGCL, s 145(b) (Westlaw: 8 Del. Code Ann. s145(b)); ALI (II) Section 
7.20(b)(l)(D). 
630 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.06, [2]. 
631 ALI (II) Section 7 .20( c )(2). 
632 MBCA, section 8.54(a)(3). 
633 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.08. 
634 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.06, [2]. 
635 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.11. 
636 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.11. 
637 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.11. 
638 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 12.11. 
639 Hamilton (2000), p. 534; DeMott (2003), Section 6:45, p. 6-190; Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 
13.02. 
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reimburses the corporation for its losses arising from indemnification payments 
made to its directors and officers; the other part reimburses the individual 
directors or officers for their losses for which indemnification by the corporation 
may not be available.640 Recently, a new entity coverage, which provides direct 
liability coverage for claims against the corporation, has also been developed.641 
D&O insurance obviously benefits the corporation as well as its directors and 
officers. Via the insurance, the corporation can transfer to the insurer at least part 
of its losses arising from the indemnification.642 The individual directors and 
officers also benefit as the insurer may reimburse them against losses that the 
corporation may not indemnify. Moreover, the insurance will make sure that they 
will be indemnified even if the corporation has financial problems or is in 
reorganization. 643 
The D&O policy may cover a wider range of losses than those that could be 
indemnified by the corporation, while at the same time being subject to less 
restriction. 644 This is due to the different bases for the insurance and indem-
nification. Exculpation ofliability and indemnification in fact shift the burden of 
financial costs, which arose from the director or officer's actual or alleged 
misconduct, from the individual director or officer onto the corporation, while the 
D&O insurance then actually shifts the burden of financial costs to a third-party 
insurer, who acquires premium payments in return.645 The major concern under 
indemnification is fairness, while under the D&O insurance arrangement it is risk 
spreading. 646 
However, the scope of D&O insurance coverage may be limited. Some states, 
such as New York, place statutory restrictions on that scope. 647 Public policy may 
also void the insurance in cases of certain types of misconduct.648 In practice, 
although D&O policies vary greatly from insurer to insurer, they generally place 
a restriction on the scope of the coverage. It is common for dishonest acts, acts in 
bad faith and acts intentionally in violation of law to be excluded from the 
coverage. 649 
640 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 13.01; DeMott (2003), Section 6:45, p. 6-191; Cox & Hazen 
(2002), pp. 476-477. 
641 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 13.01. 
642 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 13.01; Hamilton (2000), pp. 532-533. 
643 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 13.01; Hamilton (2000), pp. 532-533. 
644 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 13.01. 
645 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 13.01. 
646 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 13.01. 
647 N.Y. Bus. Corp. L. s 726 (Westlaw: McKinney's Business Corporation Law s 726). Ferrara et 
al. (2005), Section 13.02; Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 477. 
648 Cox & Hazen (2002), p. 477. 
649 Hamilton (2000), p. 533. Also see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 13.04[1]. 
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3.4.6 The shareholder's right to information 
Whether the plaintiff shareholder can acquire enough evidence is, for practical 
purposes, important in the exercise of his right to derivative actions. Generally, 
American law is unfavorable to the plaintiff shareholder in this respect, who has 
to bear the burden of proof in order to rebut the business judgment rule or to plead 
demand futility. 650 At the same time discovery is generally not available to the 
plaintiff and so it remains difficult to acquire the evidence necessary for the case. 
In order to improve the plaintiff's position, recent Delaware law has encouraged 
plaintiffs to use the 'tools at hand.' Section 220 of the DGCL actually does 
provide shareholders with the right to inspect certain corporate books and records 
in order to obtain information for the purpose of their pleadings in derivative 
actions.651 This application of section 220 has, in fact, contributed to the function 
of derivative actions in Delaware. 652 
3.5 Conclusion 
3. 5.1 The function of derivative action in American c01porate 
governance 
It is generally acknowledged that derivative actions play an important role in 
American law, protecting the corporation and its minority shareholders. This is 
still true, even though such a role is not as important as it used to be because of 
the development of other mechanisms of corporate governance and also because 
of the recently added restrictions on the shareholder's right to derivative actions, 
such as the special litigation committee. We should also note that derivative 
actions may play a less important role in close corporations than in public 
corporations due to the special treatment given to close corporations. Lastly, our 
study also shows that even in the United States, where derivative actions do play 
an important role, the debate on how important that role should be is still 
ongoing. 
650 See Sections 3.4.1.2 and 3.4.2.2.2.2.1. 
651 For example, Grimes v. DSC Communications, Corp., 724A.2d 561 (Del. Ch. 1998); Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Delaware 2000); Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, (Del. Ch. 2003). Also 
see Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 7.03; Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1466-1468. 
652 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), p. 1497. 
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3.5.2 The American model of striking a balance between corporate 
efficiency and protection of the interests of the c01poration and its 
minority shareholders 
3.5.2.1 Overview 
As mentioned, derivative actions have played an important role in the United 
States in protecting the interests of the corporation as well as its shareholders and 
in disciplining corporate management. Compared with other countries such as 
England and Germany, American law has tried to strike a fair balance between 
these two competing interests, rather than favoring one over the other. For 
example, as mentioned by Veasey and Guglielmo, Delaware law, the most 
important state corporate law, takes 'a bilateral approach to balancing corporate 
interests' by favoring both stockholder and managers, and the Delaware Supreme 
Court also tends toward consensus.653 This balance is regarded as helping to 
ensure that Delaware maintains 'its competitive edge in the incorporation race -
an edge which would be lost were Delaware law to favor one corporate con-
stituency over another'. 654 Even after the legal changes in the aftermath of Enron 
and other corporate scandals, this tendency toward balancing has still been 
maintained. 'Delaware courts today are not any more "pro-stockholder" and less 
"pro-director" or "pro-manager" than they were in the past, or vice versa'.655 
The historical development of derivative actions also shows the efforts of 
American legislatures and courts to strike such a balance. As mentioned in 
Section 3 .1.1, originally it was relatively easier for an individual shareholder to 
bring a derivative action and the scope for causes of derivative action was also 
wider. However, due to the emergence of strike suits and changes in society, new 
obstacles were then developed in order to restrict derivative actions. In sum, the 
history of the derivative action is indeed 'an expression of the tension between 
shareholders and management'. 656 
After more than a hundred years of development, American law, when it 
comes to striking a balance, has its own features, which I will discuss in the 
following sections. 
3.5.2.2 The appropriate body to make c01porate litigation decisions 
There is no doubt that an individual shareholder has the right to enforce corporate 
claims by initiating a derivative action. Nevertheless, when it comes to which is 
the more appropriate body to make these corporate litigation decisions apart from 
653 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1501-1502. 
654 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), pp. 1501-1502. 
655 Veasey & Guglielmo (2005), p. 1496. 
656 Ferrara et al. (2005), Section 1.03. 
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the individual shareholders themselves, American law has undergone some 
changes. 
As in other countries, American law has traditionally regarded the board of 
directors as the most appropriate body for making corporate litigation decisions. 
Therefore, a plaintiff shareholder must put a demand before the board before he 
initiates a derivative action. Nevertheless, American law also recognizes the fact 
that the board may not make a fair litigation decision due to various reasons such 
as conflict of interest. Therefore, a demand made on the board may be excused in 
certain situations and the board's litigation decision may also be subjected to 
judicial review. 
Although shareholders collectively were regarded as the appropriate body to 
make corporate litigation decisions, many American states have abandoned this 
approach. As a result, only in a minority of states is a demand on the general 
meeting of shareholders now required before initiating a derivative action. And 
such a demand on the general meeting may also be excused in certain situations. 
Since the mid-1970s, in some states an independent body in the corporation, 
the special litigation committee, has begun to play an important role in making 
corporate litigation decisions where the board had a conflict of interest and is 
regarded as inappropriate for making these decisions. Such a special litigation 
committee, which is composed of independent directors, may make a decision not 
to sue against the corporate claims and therefore bar a shareholder's derivative 
action. In fact, the special litigation committee can be a significant obstacle to the 
shareholder's right to bring derivative actions. Of course, the decision of the 
special litigation committee is also subject to judicial review, the standard of 
which differs greatly from state to state. 
By exercising its judicial review over the board or the special litigation 
committee's litigation decision, and by approving a proposed settlement or dis-
missal of a derivative action, American courts also play an important role as far 
as the corporate litigation decision is concerned. 
3.5.2.3 Both facilitating and controlling derivative actions 
American law tries to strike a balance by both facilitating and controlling 
derivative actions. On the one hand, it is easier for an individual shareholder to 
bring a derivative action for reasons of corporate misconduct in the United States 
than it is in other countries. For example, there is no capital threshold requirement 
for bringing derivative actions, the standing requirements are not strict and there 
is a wide scope of causes of derivative action. 
On the other hand, American law at the same time has developed several 
mechanisms to control derivative actions and to avoid strike suits. For example, 
the plaintiff shareholder must make a demand on the board of directors or plead 
demand futility before initiating a derivative action. In some states, a demand on 
the shareholders collectively or a pleading of such a demand futility is also 
necessary. Even in demand-excused cases, the special litigation committee's 
decision not to sue may also bar a derivative action. In some states, a plaintiff 
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shareholder, who holds less than the statutorily required minimum interest in the 
corporation, may be required to post security for reasonable expenses. In 
addition, a proposed settlement or dismissal of a derivative action generally 
should be approved by the court, and in some states a notice to shareholders of 
such a settlement or dismissal is also required. These mechanisms, although 
having their own particular history and rationale, are all purported to screen and 
dismiss non-meritorious strike suits, without excessively disqualifying merito-
rious suits.657 
3.5.2.4 Providing protection for directors 
It is widely accepted in the United States that qualified persons, when facing the 
high risk of liabilities for their decisions, may be unwilling to serve as corporate 
directors. This would, in reverse, negatively affect the interests of the corporation 
and its shareholders. Therefore, American law has adopted several mechanisms to 
limit directors' exposure to liabilities. The most important one is the business 
judgment rule, which restricts judicial review of a director's behavior to a certain 
extent and provides a safe harbor for directors. There are also mechanisms that 
eliminate or limit directors' financial exposure to the risks and costs of litigation 
in certain circumstances, even if they have been held liable. The mechanisms 
include, for example, provisions in the articles or certificates of incorporation to 
eliminate or limit a defendant director's personal liability to a certain extent, 
along with indemnification of directors' litigation expenses by the corporation, 
and D&O insurance provided by the corporation. 
3.5.2.5 Distinguishing between duty of loyalty and duty of care658 
Under American law the duty of loyalty, including the duty to act in good faith 
and in the best interests of the corporation, is generally more rigorously enforced 
than the duty of care.659 For example, those mechanisms which are mentioned in 
Section 3.4.5 to protect directors are generally not applicable to a director's 
breach of duty ofloyalty.660 Another example is Delaware's different standards of 
judicial review concerning directors' litigation decisions in demand-required and 
demand-excused cases. In demand-excused cases where it is more doubtful 
whether directors can fulfill their duty of loyalty, a higher standard of judicial 
657 Scott (1983), p. 942. 
658 Although there is disagreement whether good faith belongs to the duty of loyalty or the duty 
of care, I take the approach that the duty of loyalty includes the duty to act in good faith and 
in the best interests of the corporation, as well as including no self-dealing. Also see Veasey & 
Guglielmo (2005), p. 1451. 
659 Butler (2000), p. 591. 




review is applied than that applied in demand-required cases.661 In fact, in 
practice there are very few cases that impose liability merely based on the breach 
of duty of care.662 
By acknowledging that derivative actions historically play a less important 
role in enforcing the duty of care than they do in enforcing the duty of fair 
dealing, the ALI Principles also suggest a dual standard of judicial review: a 
closer judicial scrutiny should apply to the directors' breach of duty of loyalty 
than that applied to the breach of duty of care.663 
This differing enforcement of the duty of loyalty and of the duty of care does, 
in fact, generate debate, at least among scholars, as to whether completely 
different sets of legal rules should apply to the two kinds of breaches.664 Scott 
even suggests abolishing derivative actions based on the breach of duty of care. 665 
3.5.2.6 The court's role in derivative actions 
American courts have been playing an important role in derivative actions by 
balancing corporate management and the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders. For example, the application of the business judgment rule to 
restrict a director's liability for certain breaches of duties, as well as the demand 
requirement, which are the two most important restrictions on derivative actions, 
both involve the court's participation. In fact, the court's attitude has played a 
decisive role in the effect of derivative actions. Smith v.van Gorkom is an obvious 
illustration of this role. In addition, because a proposed settlement or dismissal of 
derivative actions must be approved by the court, the court also plays an 
important role in derivative actions when the high percentage of settlements in 
derivative actions cases is taken into account. 
661 See Section 3.4.2.2.2.3. 
662 Scott (1983), p. 933; Bishop (1968), p. 1099. 
663 See Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.4. 
664 Ribstein (1986), pp. 367-371. 
665 Scott (1983), pp. 935-937. Scott's suggestion has been disagreed with by other scholars, such 




4.1 Introduction to the German rules 
German law on derivative actions has recently experienced changes. Historically 
the derivative action in the common law sense did not exist for Germany except 
in groups of companies. 1 Previous German law strictly insisted on the general 
principle that an action enforcing corporate claims had to be brought in the name 
of the company. Although minority shareholders had the right to enforce cor-
porate claims, they only had the right to initiate the assertion of corporate claims 
( or in other words, the right to cause the company or a special representative to 
bring corporate claims) rather than the right to bring a derivative action as in 
England and the United States. However, this situation changed on November 1, 
2005, when a new statutory derivative action was introduced into German law as 
part of the new German Act Regarding Integrity of Companies and Moderni-
zation of Shareholder Suits (Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegritat und Moder-
nisierung des Anfechtungsrechts), the so-called UMAG, which came into force 
on that date. The UMAG significantly amended the German Stock Corporations 
Act (the AktG) in many respects, including the shareholders' right to bring a 
derivative action. 
In this chapter I will be discussing these new rules for derivative actions under the 
UMAG, as well as the former rules covering the shareholders' right to cause the 
company or a special representative to enforce corporate claims. It is necessary 
to discuss these previous rules because the UMAG has been effective for only a 
short period and so its effect still remains to be seen, and in addition, because a 
comparison of the current and the former rules will help us better understand the 
German law. 
4.1.1 Background 
Some knowledge of the background of corporate structure in Germany is also 
necessary for us to understand German law and to compare it with the laws found 
in other countries. Therefore, this chapter will start there. 
For details of the rules, please see Section 4.1.3. 
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First, as in England and the United States, there are two forms of companies that 
are separate legal entities in Germany: the Aktiengesellschaft (the AG) and the 
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (the GmbH). The AG is generally regarded 
as the equivalent of the English public company or the American publicly held 
corporation, while the GmbH is related to the English private limited company or 
the American closed corporation. However, the differences between these two 
types of companies under German law are greater than those found under English 
or American law.2 In Germany, the two companies are regulated by two separate 
acts: the Stock Corporations Act (AktG)3 for the AG and the Limited Liability 
Company Act (GmbHG)4 for the GmbH. Although several basic principles, such 
as the separate legal entity principle and the duties of directors, are similar, many 
aspects of the two laws are different. For example, the structures of intra-
corporate bodies, the division of powers among the bodies, the protection for 
minority shareholders, as well as the enforcement of directors' liabilities, differ 
considerably under the two acts. 5 Therefore, in this chapter, many issues will be 
discussed separately for these two different types of companies. 
Second, as far as corporate structure is concerned, German company law is based 
on a two-tier system.6 This means that there are two boards within a company: the 
management board (Vorstand) and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The 
supervisory board is mandatory for AGs and large GmbHs in which there are 
more than five hundred employees.7 The management board runs the day-to-day 
business, while the main task of the supervisory board is supervising the 
operations of the management board. 8 As 'the hinge between shareholders and 
directors' 9, the supervisory board is especially intended to protect shareholders 
from any misconduct by the management board. 10 While there is one body of 
opinion that considers that in practice the two-tier system does not differ so 
greatly from the Anglo-American one-tier system because in the latter there is 
also division between 'inside' directors and 'outside' directors11 , in point of fact 
this two-tier feature does contribute substantially to the difference between 
German law and Anglo-American law. 
2 SeeBaums (1996), atp. 318. 
3 It was enacted in 1965, and the latest amendment to it was made by the UMAG. 
4 It was originally enacted in 1892 but is now in amended form. The latest revision was made in 
June 1998. 
5 For example, see Baums (1996) p. 318; Hopt (1992), p.117. 
6 Nevertheless, a Societas Europaea (European Company) may choose between the two-tier 
board system and the one-tier board system. 
7 See Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952 (the Labor Management Relations Act 1952), para. 77; as 
cited in Shearman (1995), p. 519. 
8 AktG section 111. 
9 Stengel (1998), at p. 49. 
10 Chantayan (2002), p. 439; Baums (2002), p. 5. 
11 See, for example, Stengel (1998), at p. 49; Baums (2002), p. 5. 
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Third, the interests of shareholders, especially minority shareholders, are tradi-
tionally less prominent in Germany. 12 This is especially the case in public 
companies. Traditionally Germany favors a stakeholder culture. 13 Shareholders 
are neither the only, nor the most important concern in German corporate 
governance. The interests of other 'stakeholders' such as creditors, employees, as 
well as managers are also taken into consideration by German law, especially in 
the AG. 
Due to this culture, protection of minority shareholders has traditionally been 
poor under German law and it is generally accepted that to a certain extent 
minority shareholders have been ignored. In practice, the board of directors 
usually considers the interests of major shareholders such as banks 14, and neglects 
the role of individual shareholders. The following quote reflects this attitude well: 
'Shareholders are dumb when they buy stock and impertinent because they also 
want a dividend' .15 This insufficient acknowledgment of the function of minority 
shareholders may partly be explained by the lack of mature capital markets. In 
Germany, a largely dispersed shareholding structure does not exist. For example, 
the shares of most AGs are still in the hands of a relatively small group of 
investors, especially banks. 16 These banks, as controlling shareholders, also offer 
loans to the company. The capital market is not the main source of financing for 
companies. In addition, individual shareholders normally grant proxies to the 
banks thrnugh which they bought their shares. 17 Therefore, protection of minority 
shareholders, who invest through capital markets, is not the main concern. 18 
However, for the last decade there has been a trend towards paying more 
attention to shareholder value in Germany19, and reforms for improving 
protection for minority shareholders have been adopted. 
12 This issue, regarded as a weakness under German law, was pointed out by Dr. Gerhard Crom-
me, the Chairman of the German Corporate Governance Code Commission, in his remarks 
upon publication of the draft German Corporate Governance Code on December 18, 200 I . The 
Code was adopted in February of 2002. In May 2002, the German Parliament passed the 
Transparency and Disclosure Act which provides a legislative basis for the Code. For the 
English version of Dr. Gerhard Cromme's remarks, please refer to http://www.corporate-
governance-code.de./eng/news/rede-crommes.html (last visited: August 2006); for the English 
version of the German Corporate Governance Code, as amended on June 12, 2006, please refer 
to http://www.corporate-governance-code.de./eng/kodex/index.html (last visited: August 
2006). 
13 See, for example, Andre (1998), p. 105. 
14 Chantayan (2002), pp. 445-446. 
15 Biindnis fiir Aufschwung; Risikokapital--Der Neue Pflegedienst, Focus Magazin, Mar. 25, 
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File ('Aktionare sind dumm, weil sie Aktien 
kaufen und frech, weil sie auch noch Dividende kassieren wollen.'), as cited in Andre ( 1998), 
p. 105. Also see Chantayan (2002), p. 445. 
16 According to the statistics, in the 1990s nearly 85% of the largest listed companies in Germany 
had at least one shareholder owning more than 25% of the shares; while in the UK the 
percentage of such companies was only 16%; see Hirt (2004b), p. 30. 
17 Chantayan (2002), pp. 445-446. 
18 See Kraakman et al. (2004), p. 129. 





Recent reforms concerning c01porate governance 
The reasons for these reforms 
Measures to reform corporate governance, including improving protection for 
minority shareholders and disciplining corporate management, have been 
adopted in Germany over the last decade. Several factors may account for this 
reform.20 The major reasons might well be simply the globalization of the 
economy and the need to attract investment from both domestic and foreign 
investors either through foreign capital markets or domestic markets.21 For these 
purposes, German law, which is generally regarded as less shareholder-friendly 
and lacking in judicial control over directors, needed to be changed. Furthermore, 
the development of European company law has also accelerated the reform of 
German company law. 
Another reason for reform is that the efficiency of the h·aditional German 
corporate governance system has been called into question due to the stagnancy 
of the economy at least since the 1990s, and also due to recent corporate 
governance scandals in some well-known companies.22 As mentioned, a feature 
of German corporate governance is the two-tier system, that is, it is the task of the 
supervisory board to discipline corporate management and to protect the interests 
of the company. The power to enforce corporate claims against the managing 
directors is also granted to the supervisory board. However, the effectiveness of 
the supervisory board, including the performance of the task of filing a lawsuit 
against the managing directors, has recently been the target of criticism. Several 
weak points have been identified. First, the supervisory board is short on the 
information necessary for it to perform its supervisory task. The separation of 
powers in the AktG keeps the supervisory board away from management and then 
makes it difficult for the supervisory board to acquire essential information. The 
supervisory board normally acquires information from the management board 
rather than from other sources23 , while the management board usually does not 
provide the supervisory board with the relevant information.24 Furthermore, less 
power and less information has been awarded to the supervisory board under the 
codetermination system.25 In this system, the supervisory board is made up of 
members who are partly elected by shareholders and partly appointed by the 
employees, and therefore it represents the interests of employees as well as 
20 See, for example, Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 563; Baums (2002) p. 2. 
21 See recommendations of the Regierungskommission Corporate Governance, 'Forward', as 
cited in Baums (2002), p. 12. 
22 Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 563. 
23 Hirt (2004b), p. 269. 
24 Buxbaum (1983), p. 513, Footnote 5. 
25 Buxbaum (1983), p. 513, Footnote 5. 
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shareholders. As a result, shareholders, especially controlling shareholders, try to 
give less power to the supervisory board. 
Second, the independence of members of the supervisory board has come 
under suspicion. This is also one of the main criticisms of German corporate 
governance.26 This lack of independence may be caused by the involvement of the 
members of the supervisory board in management.27 It may also be because the 
members of the supervisory board are so closely related to the management board 
that they are reluctant to file an action against the management board.28 
Moreover, the influence of the controlling shareholders on the supervisory board 
may prohibit the supervisory board from bringing an action with which the 
controlling shareholder may disagree. 29 It is normal for the supervisory board to 
pursue the interests of the conh·olling shareholders and their trustees rather than 
the interests of the company and all its shareholders.30 
Third, the supervisory board lacks any incentive to enforce the corporate 
claim: it is short on financial, moral or reputation-oriented incentives.31 Fourth, 
the operation of the supervisory board is not efficient. The board does not work 
on a daily basis and, in fact, its members tend only to meet quarterly.32 It is 
difficult then for them to detect problems and respond efficiently. In addition, the 
large size of the board33 and the codetermination system, which has caused 
fractionalization34, both undermine the function of the supervisory board. Finally, 
the supervisory board can be used to secure personal benefits for its members.35 
Another mechanism in the German corporate governance system, the 
exclusion of the voting rights of interested shareholders, is also a subject of doubt 
as far as its function is concerned. According to section 136 of the AktG, the 
shareholders against whom the decision is made may not vote, either on their own 
behalf or on behalf of other persons; nor may their voting rights be exercised by 
any other person. However, the exclusion of these voting rights is limited to the 
26 Dr. Gerhard Cromme also made such a comment in his remarks on the publication of the draft 
German Corporate Governance Code on December 18, 2001. Other criticisms include 'an 
inadequate focus on shareholder interests,' 'the two-tier system of management and 
supervision board,' 'the inadequate transparency of German corporate governance,' and 'the 
limited independence of auditors.' 
27 Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 561. 
28 Hirt addresses the problem as a 'residual conflict of interest.' He points out that the problem 
results from 'the social and institutional solidarity between members of the Vorstand and the 
Aufsichtsrat that are caused by the structural arrangement of the two-tier board system,' see 
Hirt (2004b), p. 268. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, please refer to Hirt (2004b), 
pp. 271-276; also see Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 562. 
29 See Hirt (2004b), p. 268, pp. 277-278. 
30 Singhof & Seiler (1998), pp. 561-562. 
31 Hirt (2004b), p. 268, pp. 276-277; Manchester University (1999), 'Germany', p. 29. 
32 Manchester University (1999), 'Germany', p. 29. 
33 The average number of members is 13.25; see Hopt (1998), at pp. 248-249. 
34 Hopt (1998), at p. 247. 
35 Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 561. 
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disputed shareholders; other shareholders, even if they are closely related to the 
disputed shareholders, can still vote. Thus, the exclusion of voting rights only 
applies to 'the most obvious and basic conflict of interest' and therefore its 
function may be limited. 36 As to enforcing corporate claims, this mechanism 
hardly plays any role since generally in AGs the decision to assert a corporate 
claim against shareholders is made by the management board, and the approval of 
the shareholders' meeting may not be needed. 
4.1.2.2 A brief histmy of the current reforms 
The current reforms to the German corporate governance system can be traced 
back to the end of the 1980s and are still ongoing. 37 These reforms cover many 
aspects, such as company law, securities law and accounting law, with the 
intention of improving the German corporate governance system both by 
amending the traditional German explicit system of corporate control which 
requires direct investor influence (such as the law on the supervisory board and 
the law on the shareholders' meeting) and by introducing market-oriented 
corporate governance mechanisms (such as increasing market transparency).38 As 
a result of these reforms, new legislation has been passed and quasi-legislative 
steps such as publishing the German corporate governance code have been taken 
over the past few years. 39 Indeed, these reforms are characterized as 'permanent' 
due to their length and intensity.40 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the latest amendment to company 
law was made by the UMAG, which came into force in November 2005. This is 
a further important step in implementing the proposals of the Regierungskom-
mission Corporate Governance (Government Commission on Corporate Gover-
nance). In 2000, the German Federal Chancellor started a new round of reform of 
company law and established a Regierungskommission Corporate Governance, 
chaired by Prof. Theodor Baums, to examine German company law and come up 
with suggestions for reform. In July 2001, the Regierungskommission Corporate 
· Governance submitted a report containing one hundred and fifty proposals on 
how to improve the German corporate governance system and how to amend 
36 Hirt (2004b), p. 287. 
37 Noack & Zetzsche (2005). 
38 Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. 1039, 
39 For a detailed discussion of the reforms, please refer to Noack & Zetzsche (2005). 
40 W Zoellner, 'Aktienrecht in Permanenz- Was wird aus den Rechten des Aktioniirs' (transl. The 
Permanent Corporate Law Reform - What happens to the rights of shareholders?) DIE 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (1994) p. 336; U Seibert, 'Aktienrechtsreform in 'Permanenz'?' 
(Transl. Permanent Corporate Law Reform?) DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (2002) p. 417; 
as cited in Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p, 1037. 
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company law.41 In February 2003 the German federal government transformed 
these proposals into a 'Ten-Step Program for Corporate Integrity and Investor 
Protection' (henceforth Ten-Step Program)42, which was basically followed by the 
UMAG. 
According to these proposals, three steps should be taken to accomplish this 
reform: first, there should be a Code of Best Practice; the second step should be 
an initial implementation of these recommendations into German law; and the 
final step should be comprehensive reform of company law.43 These steps have 
been gradually carried out. In February 2002 the German Corporate Governance 
Code was adopted.44 In May 2002, the German Parliament passed the 
Transparency and Disclosure Act which provides a legislative basis for the Code. 
In addition, several acts have come into force in the wake of the Ten-Step 
Program, including the UMAG. The UMAG revises the AktG in terms of three 
important aspects of corporate governance: the liability of corporate managers 
and the enforcement of this liability, shareholder meetings and challenging 
shareholder meeting resolutions.45 
4.1.3 German rules on enforcing c01porate claims 
As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, AGs and GmbHs are subjected to the AktG and 
the GmbHG respectively, whose aspects vary in many ways. The rules on 
enforcing corporate claims also differ significantly with regard to these two types 
of companies. Therefore, I will discuss the rules for both types of companies 
separately. In addition, under German law groups of companies (Konzernrecht) 
are regulated by special rules, which are mainly embodied in Book Three of the 
AktG as well as in case law and jurisprudence. This special law on groups of 
companies also provides different rules for enforcing corporate claims on groups 
of companies, which I will discuss in a separate section. 
4.1.3.1 The lmv on the AG 
As in England and the United States, the proper plaintiff rule is also generally 
recognized in Germany. According to German law, only the injured company can 
41 T. Baums (ed.), Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance: Unternehmens-
fiihrung- Unternehmenskontrolle - Modernisierung des Aktienrechts (Kolon: Schmidt, 2001 ); 
For an introduction to the Report and an English version of the summary of the Re-
commendations, please refer to Baums (2002), Part VII. 
42 Federal Secretaries of Justice and Finance, 10-Punkte-Programm der Bundesregierung zur 
Verbesserung der Unternehmensintegritiit und des Anlegerschutzes, 25.02.2003, available at 
http:/ /www.bmj.bund.de/enid/fa8a71 ef4a25638be7 eel 84cc9d06cdd,0/ai.htrnl; as cited in 
Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. 1040. 
43 Baums (2002), pp. 3-4. 
44 See Supra note 12. 
45 Noack & Zetzsche (2005), pp. 1041-1046. 
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bring an action to enforce its claims. Although the shareholders also suffer from 
the loss in value of shares, the loss is no more than indirect damage and the 
shareholders cannot bring actions directly.46 
German law also considers the issue of who should be the appropriate body to 
enforce corporate claims. As in other jurisdictions, the general rule is that the 
pursuit of corporate claims is a business matter and should be left to the 
management board, which is responsible for corporate management.47 However, 
German law differs from Anglo-American law in cases where the management 
board has a conflict of interest in making litigation decisions. Under German law, 
where the corporate claim is against a member of the management board, it is the 
supervisory board that decides whether to pursue a corporate suit. The super-
visory board not only has the right but also the duty to do so.48 As mentioned, 
German company law is based on the two-tier structure and the main function of 
the supervisory board is to supervise the management board, which includes 
bringing an action against the members of the management board when 
necessary. This approach is based on the understanding that the management 
board will not bring claims against its own members. 
However, as mentioned in Section 4.1.2.1, the function of the supervisory 
board, including the function of enforcing corporate claims against the managing 
directors, is open to debate. It is possible that the supervisory board will unduly 
refuse to enforce corporate claims in certain circumstances, especially against 
their colleagues. As a result the issue then arises as to whether minority share-
holders should be given the power to enforce corporate claims. As we know, 
German law on this issue has experienced a great many changes since the 
implementation of the UMAG. Therefore, I will discuss the rules before and after 
the UMAG separately. 
Prior to the UMAG 
In contrast to the relatively pragmatic approach in common law jurisdictions 
where an exception to the proper plaintiff rule for derivative actions has been 
46 Section 117 (1), AktG. Also see Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 554. 
47 AktG section 78(1) states that 'the management board shall represent the company in and out 
of court'. 
48 AktG section 112 provides that: 'the supervisory board shall represent the company both in and 
out of court as against the members of the management board.' In the case of 
ARAG/Garmenbeck (BGHZ 135, 244, pp. 249-250 and pp. 252-253) 1997, the Federal 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) clearly held that the supervisory board not only has the 
right but the duty, based on its discretion, to decide and pursue claims against members of the 
management board in certain circumstances; before this case the supervisory board's duty to 
enforce such a claim was still uncertain. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not consider 




allowed49, the German approach prior to the UMAG was extremely literal and 
strict. Under previous German law, minority shareholders could not enforce 
corporate claims in their own names except within groups of companies, even if 
the claims were aimed at wrongdoing directors. 50 Therefore, strictly speaking the 
common law sense of the derivative action generally did not exist in Germany. 
Nevertheless, the previous German law did recognize the possibility that the 
injured company could not seek remedies by itself where there was conflict of 
interest. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of the company and the 
minority shareholders, the previous German law, in section 14 7 of the AktG 
(1998)51 , granted a group of minority shareholders the right to force the company 
to bring a corporate claim.52 According to this section, the minority shareholders 
still could not bring an action on behalf of the company in their own names, 
rather, the action had to be brought in the name of the company by the corporate 
bodies or the special representatives appointed by the court.53 Nevertheless, the 
minority shareholders' right under section 147 of the AktG (1998) ended up 
playing the same role as the derivative action in the sense that it also provided 
minority shareholders with the right to enforce corporate claims and discipline 
the wrongdoers, and therefore was basically analogous to common law derivative 
actions. 
The UMAG 
Since section 147 of the AktG (1998) did not perform its role satisfactorily, 
reform was suggested and then implemented in the UMAG. 54 The UMAG 
changes section 147 of the AktG (1998) significantly. It amends section 147 and 
inserts a new section 148 of the AktG which allows a shareholders' derivative 
action in the common law sense. In other words, according to this amendment, a 
group of minority shareholders, as long as they meet the requirements stated in 
the section, can enforce corporate claims in their own names. More significantly, 
the UMAG amends the requirements for the minority shareholders when en-
forcing such a right. 55 For example, it considerably lowers the standing threshold 
for minority shareholders to bring such an action and grants more power to the 
court so that it can balance corporate efficiency with the interests of the company 
and of minority shareholders. 
49 Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 553. 
50 For the rules regarding groups of companies, see Section 4.1.3 .3. 
51 The last revision of section 14 7 of the AktG before the UMAG was made in 1998; therefore, I 
refer to it as 'the AktG (1998)' in this book. 
52 For a detailed discussion on the section, please refer to Section 4.4.1. 
53 For more details, see Section 4.4.1. 
54 For a detailed discussion of the reasons behind this, see Section 4.4.2.1. 
55 For a detailed discussion of the amendments, please refer to Section 4.4.2. 
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4.1.3.2 The law on the GmbH 
Both the principle of proper plaintiff rule and the principle that shareholders 
cannot claim for reflective losses directly have also been accepted into the GmbH 
law. Moreover, as in the AG, generally the management board or the managing 
director in the GmbH has the power to enforce corporate claims.56 Where the 
corporate claim is against corporate directors, shareholders via a resolution of the 
shareholders' meeting can decide whether to initiate an action against the 
directors and may pursue this action in the name of the company.57 Nevertheless, 
in large GmbHs, where a supervisory board is compulsory, it is the supervisory 
board that enforces corporate claims against the members of the management 
board.58 In addition, shareholders in the GmbH via the resolution of the 
shareholders' meeting can also enforce corporate claims against a shareholder59, 
provided that 'the shareholder against whom it is proposed to bring an action has 
no right to vote in that case'. 60 
There is no provision in the GmbHG equivalent to sections 147 and 148 of the 
AktG (the UMAG), which grants minority shareholders the right to bring 
derivative actions. However, in recent years German case law has developed the 
so-called right of actio pro socio (or actio pro societate), which grants individual 
shareholders of the GmbH the right to enforce corporate claims against fellow 
shareholders of the company in his own name, provided that the shareholders' 
meeting has already decided not to pursue these corporate claims (with the 
accused shareholders unable to vote regarding the decision61 ) and that the 
decision not to sue has constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty by the 
shareholders who made the decision.62 The remedies in the actio pro socio go to 
the company directly rather than to the individual plaintiff shareholders.63 
Although it is debatable, the prevailing view is that an individual shareholder 
cannot apply the right of actio pro socio to enforce corporate claims against 
directors or third parties. 64 The claims to such a right are limited to those arising 
from the relationship between shareholders, such as the payment of contributions 
56 GmbHG section 35(1). 
57 GmbHG section 46(8). 
58 GmbHG section 52(1). 
59 GmbHG section 46(8). 
60 GmbHG section 47(4). 
61 GmbHG section 47(4). For a detailed discussion of the restriction on the interested 
shareholder's voting rights, see Section 4.2.3.2. 
62 Kleindiek (1993), at p. 144; Stecher (1997a), p. 94. 
63 Stecher (1997a), p. 94. 
64 For example, Baums holds that there is no tight of action against the managing directors for 
single shareholders or for a minority in the limited liability company; Baums (1996), p. 322. 
Baums refers to Bundesgerichtshof, 28 June 1982, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen 1982, p. 928 for 
his conclusion; see Baums(1996), p. 322, Footnote 41. Also see Stecher (1997a), p. 94; 
Kleindiek (1993), at p. 144. 
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on shares that are already due and the termination of unfair competition by a 
fellow shareholder.65 Due to the limitations mentioned above, the right of actio 
pro socio under German law is generally regarded as being different from the 
right to derivative action. Hopt regards the right of actio pro socio as a 
'subspecies of the derivative action'. 66 In fact, he considers that the unique 
character of the actio pro socio lies in that 'it has its basis in membership', 
therefore, it is more correctly regarded as a personal right of the shareholder 
rather than a right to derivative action.67 For the same reason, I will not treat the 
right of actio pro socio as a derivative action either and will not be including it in 
my discussion of the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims 
under German law. 
4.1.3.3 The law on groups of companies 
As mentioned, groups of companies in Germany are subject to specific rules. The 
German law distinguishes three kinds of groups of companies: those where a 
control agreement exists68 , those where no control agreement exists but a 
controlled company may be harmed69, and those where an integrated contract 
exists. 70 
In groups of companies, an individual shareholder of a controlled company can 
in his own name assert claims for the company for damages against the con-
trolling enterprise, against the legal representatives of the controlling enterprise, 
or against the members of the management board and the supervisory board of 
the controlled company in certain circumstances. 71 In this action, the plaintiff 
shareholder can 'only demand that compensation be paid directly to the 
company ... '. 72 Although the majority opinion regards this individual share-
holder's right under section 309(4) as a right to derivative action73 , a minority has 
submitted that it is actually similar to an actio pro socio and therefore that it 
should be treated as a personal right of the shareholder.74 
65 Stecher (1997a), p. 94. 
66 Hopt (1997), pp. 272-273. 
67 Hopt (1997), pp. 272-273. 
68 Sections 308-310 of the AktG. 
69 Sections 311-318 of the AktG. 
70 Sections 319-327 oftheAktG. 
71 Sections 309, 310, 317, 318 and 323 of the AktG. For the limited application, see next 
paragraph. 
72 Section 309( 4) of the AktG. 
73 This individual shareholder's right is first provided in section 309(4) of the AktG and therefore 
will be referred to as the right under section 309( 4) hereinafter. 
74 Hopt (1997), p. 279. 
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The right under section 309( 4) hardly has significance in practice. In fact, it 
seems that the right has never been exercised since it was introduced.75 Hirt 
identified two reasons for the practical insignificance of section 309(4).76 The 
first reason is that the application of the right is rather limited.77 For example, in 
the case of groups of companies where a control agreement exist, the minority 
shareholder's right under section 309(4) may only apply to cases where the legal 
representatives of the controlling enterprises, in issuing instructions to the 
controlled company, violate their duty and cause damage to the controlled 
company. 78 The second reason pointed out by Hirt concerns the allocation of 
costs: although the compensation should be paid to the company, the individual 
shareholder, who initiated the action in his own name, bears the litigation costs, 
and there is no obligation for the company to indemnify the plaintiff shareholder. 
Therefore, an individual shareholder has no incentive to initiate such an action. 79 
In addition, there is a third reason that the difficulty in obtaining information may 
also frustrate an individual shareholder in initiating such an action. Because of the 
insignificance of the shareholder's right of derivative action in groups of 
companies, I will not discuss the right in detail here. 80 
4.2 The role of the minority shareholders' right to enforce 
corporate claims in Germany 
4.2.1 The unimportant role of the minority shareholders' right to 
enforce c01porate claims in German c01porate governance 
Generally speaking, the minority shareholders' rights to enforce corporate claims 
have played an unimportant role in German practice. As will be seen in Section 
4.4.1, the scope of section 147 of the AktG (1998) was limited: it was intended to 
grant minority shareholders the right to cause corporate claims against board 
members to be enforced rather than to be used against controlling shareholders. 
Moreover, this right has hardly ever been exercised in practice. The pertinent 
sections in the AktG were regarded as 'dead letters'. 81 Hermann Abs, former CEO 
of Deutsche Bank AG, quipped that 'It is easier to grab a pig at its soapy tail than 
to hold the manager of a German corporation liable' .82 In fact, although under 
German law the standard of the duty owed by directors is high, the general 
enforcement of the directors' duty, not only by minority shareholders, but also by 
75 Hirt (2004b), p. 310; Kraakman et al. (2004), p. 125. 
76 Hirt (2004b), pp. 314-315. 
77 Hirt (2004b ), p. 314. 
78 Sections 309(1) and 310 of the AktG. See Hirt (2004b), p. 314. 
79 Hirt (2004b), pp. 314-315. 
80 Hirt (2004b), p. 315, Footnote 220. 
81 See Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 558. 
82 See Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 558, Footnote 269. 
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the company, is poor in Germany. Under German law directors are under the 
obligation to act 'with the care of a diligent and conscientious manager'. 83 This is 
an objective standard. A director may not discharge his duty by acting only with 
the care that would be exercised in his own affairs. Therefore, it is a comparatively 
high standard. 84 However, there are only a few court decisions on enforcing the 
directors' duty, and most of them deal with two specific situations: one is when 
the company is bankrupt and the trustee of the bankrupt company sues the former 
directors of the company; the other is when by suing the former director the 
company defends itself against claims by a former director for his pension claims 
or payments.85 A statistic from an insurance company showed that ninety percent 
of all disputes between directors and companies were settled outside the 
courtroom. 86 
In the GmbH, which is the most common type of company in Germany, minority 
shareholders simply have no exact equivalent to section 14 7 of the AktG. There-
fore, they cannot cause corporate claims against board members and/or third 
parties to be enforced. Although they can enforce corporate claims against fellow 
shareholders via the actio pro socio, the application of such a right is rather 
limited due to the restrictions imposed on this right. 
4.2.2 The reasons behind this unimportant role 
The most important reason behind the unimportant role of the minority 
shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims is the restricted scope of the right 
and the stringent requirements for applying the right in the AktG (1998). The high 
thresholds established by section 14 7 of the AktG (1998) are generally regarded 
as being too stringent to overcome and the allocation oflitigation costs has proved 
a negative incentive for those minority shareholders who might have exercised 
this right. 87 In addition, it is difficult for minority shareholders to obtain in-
formation that is needed to pursue such a case; this has especially been the case 
for minority shareholders who wanted to initiate the assertion of a corporate 
action according to section 147(3) of the AktG (1998) because they might not 
have the right to require a special audit. Such a special audit is carried out by an 
expert under the control of the court who audits the management of the AG and 
therefore supplements the information right of shareholders.88 Under section 
83 AktG sections 93(1) and 116; GmbH section 43(1). 
84 See Singhof & Seiler (1998), pp. 550-553; Baums (1996), at p. 321. 
85 Baums (1996), at p. 319. This is also the situation with the members of a supervisory board; 
see Theisen (1998), at pp. 263-264. 
86 Chubb Insurance Co. of Europe SA, Dilsseldorf, 'Managerhaftung' (1993), at 3; as cited in 
Baums (1996), at p. 319, Footnote 8. 
87 For a detailed discussion of the requirements and allocation of costs under section 147 of the 
AktG (1998), see Section 4.4. 
88 For a more detailed discussion on the right to a special audit, see Section 4.2.3.1.1. 
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147(3) of the AktG (1998) the capital threshold for minority shareholders to 
exercise the right was five percent, however, according to section 142(2) of the 
AktG (1998), only shareholders 'whose aggregate holdings equal or exceed one-
tenth of the share capital or the pro rata amount of EUR 1 million' could apply 
for the appointment of special auditors. The obstacles in section 147 of the AktG 
(1998) to the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims were 
widely recognized and therefore the UMAG has significantly changed the old 
rules, which I will discuss in Section 4.4 in detail. However, whether the changes 
in the UMAG will encourage minority shareholders to enforce corporate claims 
in practice remains to be seen. 
Another reason for the unimportant role of the minority shareholders' right to 
enforce corporate claims is that German company law contains a wide range of 
alternative mechanisms for protecting the interests of the company and the 
minority shareholders and for disciplining corporate management. I will discuss 
these later. 
This unimportant role may further be explained by the traditional German attitude 
towards minority shareholder protection and corporate management. First of all, 
as mentioned in Section 4.1.1, the German 'stakeholder' culture and the lack of 
mature capital markets in Germany result in less attention being paid to minority 
shareholder protection. Second, traditionally directors are trusted in Germany89, 
at least partly due to the successful economy in years past.90 Last, and perhaps 
most important, with regard to the conflict between the efficiency of corporate 
management and the protection of the interests of the company and the 
shareholders, German law traditionally favors the former. Minority shareholders' 
litigation is usually not ttusted under German law91 , at least partly due to the 
existence of many abusive shareholder suits, such as the strike suits used to set 
aside the resolutions of the general meeting.92 Under German law, thresholds for 
minority shareholders to enforce corporate claims are high, class actions are 
generally unknown93, and shareholders almost have no right to bring a direct 
action to challenge the board's decision even if it has violated the constitution of 
the company. 94 When considering the requirements for the minority shareholders' 
right to enforce corporate claims, generations oflegislators, from 1884, when the 
antecedent of the current section 14 7 was enacted, until now, have worried about 
the risk that the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims would 
lead to unjust intervention in corporate management and generally discourage 
89 Kraakman et al. (2004), pp. 129-130. 
90 See Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 563. 
91 Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 563; Herbert Wiedemann, Organverantwortung und 
Gesellschafterklagen 49 (1989), p. 42; as cited in Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 562. 
92 Hopt (1997), pp. 267-268. 
93 Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 555. 
94 For a detailed discussion, see Section 4.3.1. 
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directors' enthusiasm.95 Thus, German law has always had a less positive attitude 
towards shareholder litigation. Lawyers, even those who admit that shareholder 
litigation should play a more important role, regard it as a necessary but only a 
subsidiary mechanism.96 Shareholder litigation is unlikely ever to be in the 
forefront of German corporate governance. 
4.2.3 The alternative mechanisms in German corporate governance 
As mentioned above, the mechanisms applied to protect the rights of the company 
and the shareholders vary according to the type of company. Therefore, I will 
discuss the major mechanisms regarding the AG and the GmbH separately. 
4.2.3.1 In theAG 
Both the conflict between majority shareholders and minority shareholders and 
the conflict between shareholders and directors may exist in German AGs. 
Therefore, the AG and shareholders may face the risk of being harmed by 
majority shareholders and/or directors.97 Nevertheless, the main mechanisms 
dealing with these two agency problems under German law are not always 
identical. 
4.2.3.1.1 Alternative mechanisms against the directors' abuse of power in 
theAG 
The regulations of the AktG reflect the fact that conflict between shareholders and 
directors is a major concern for the legislature. The reason is that in the AG the 
management board is exclusively responsible for corporate management and 
enjoys great freedom in the exercise of its authority.98 There is no hierarchy within 
the company's three bodies: the general meeting of shareholders, the management 
board and the supervisory board. In addition, directors cannot be removed 
without cause99 and therefore, in practice, it is very difficult to remove a director 
from the board. 100 
German law has provided a wide range of legal mechanisms for disciplining 
corporate management and protecting the interests of the company and share-
holders. In addition to the mechanism of charging directors with liability101 and 
95 See Hirt (2004b), pp. 280-281, pp. 318-320. 
96 See, for example, Hirt (2004b), p. 279. 
97 See Hirt (2004b), p. 257. 
98 Section 76(1) of the AktG states that: 'The management board shall have direct responsibility 
for the management of the company.' Also see Kleindiek (1993), at pp. 138-139. 
99 See 84(3) oftheAktG. 
100 Chantayan (2002), pp. 439-440. 
101 Section 93 of the AktG. 
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awarding the shareholders, either collectively or in a small group, the right to 
enforce that liability102, there are two other mechanisms that deserve attention. 
The first mechanism, which is also regarded as the most important one, is the 
two-tier system which provides a well-organized system of checks and balances. 
Under German law, a supervisory board is compulsory in the AG in order to 
supervise the operation of the management board ex ante and enforce directors' 
liabilities ex post ifthere has been a breach of duty by directors. This is the major 
mechanism under German law for disciplining corporate management: the ex 
ante supervision of the supervisory board can reduce the risk of directors' breach 
of duty, and the ex post enforcement can redress the loss caused by that breach. 
Although there are more and more doubts about the role of the supervisory 
board103 , the traditional belief is that the German two-tier system has worked 
effectively and that the supervisory board has generally served its supervisory 
function in preventing directors' breach of duties. This has contributed to the 
success of the German economy in the past. 104 This perceived effectiveness of the 
supervisory board partly explains why the role of the derivative action has been 
generally neglected both in statutes and in practice. 
The second mechanism is the shareholders' right to a special audit. 105 
According to the right to a special audit, shareholders have the right to 'appoint 
special auditors for the examination of matters relating to the formation of the 
company or the management of the company's business, and also, in particular in 
connection with capital increases or capital reductions'. 106 This right can be 
exercised by a simple majority of shareholders. 107 In addition, a group of minority 
shareholders108 can also apply to the court for such a special audit, 'provided that 
facts exist which give reason to suspect that improprieties or gross violations of 
law or the articles have occurred in connection with such matter'. 109 Such a right 
can also be exercised by an individual shareholder of a dependent company 
within a group of companies in order 'to audit the business relations of the 
company with its controlling enterprise or an enterprise affiliated with such 
controlling enterprise ... ' .110 Although the right to a special audit is not widely 
used, the general consensus is that it has a deterrent function. 111 
102 Section 147 of the AktG (1998), sections 147 and 148 of the AktG (the UMAG). 
103 For these doubts see Section 4.1.2.1. 
104 See Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 561, p. 563. 
105 Section 142 of the AktG. 
106 Section 142(1) of the AktG. 
107 Section 142(1) oftheAktG. 
108 Section 142(2) of the AktG (1998) required that shareholders aggregately hold an amount 
equal to or more than one-tenth of the share capital or a pro rata amount of EUR 1 million in 
order to apply this right. However, the threshold has been reduced by the UMAG to one percent 
of the share capital or the pro rat a amount of EUR 100,000. 
109 Section 142(2) oftheAktG. 
110 Section 315 of the AktG. 
111 Hopt (1997), p. 280. 
208 
GERMANY 
4.2.3.1.2 Alternative mechanisms against the majority shareholders' abuse 
of power in the AG 
In AGs the conflict between majority and minority shareholders, which may lead 
to injury to the company and/or to the minority shareholders, can also exist. 
Nevertheless, section 147 of the AktG was not aimed at disciplining majority 
shareholders. 112 Rather, Geiman law has developed several alternative mecha-
nisms for controlling the majority shareholders' conduct. First of all, the gover-
ning power of the majority shareholders has been restricted. In the AG the general 
meeting has hardly any influence on corporate management. Rather, directors are 
solely responsible for the management of the company. 113 In addition, shareolders 
have no right to ratify directors' misconduct retrospectively11 4, and they can only 
waive or compromise corporate claims against the directors 'upon the expiry of 
three years after the claim has arisen' and 'no minority whose aggregate holding 
equals or exceeds one-tenth of the share capital records an objection in the 
minutes' .115 As we know, the majority shareholders may abuse their power via 
either the general meeting or the board of directors. By limiting the power of the 
general meeting, the majority shareholders' abuse via the general meeting can be 
restricted. 116 
Second, the prevention of the interested shareholder from voting may 
minimize the risk of conflict of interest and so play an important role in 
preventing the shareholders' abuse of power. Section 136(1) of the AktG provides 
that: 
No person may exercise voting rights on his own behalf or on behalf of any 
other person in respect of a resolution concerning ratification of his acts, his 
discharge from a liability, or enforcement by the company of a claim against 
him. Voting rights arising from shares which may not be exercised by the 
shareholder himself pursuant to sentence 1 may also not be exercised by any 
other person. 
As will be seen, this restriction is also laid down in the GmbHG. 117 
Third, according to section 241 et seq. of the AktG, an individual shareholder 
in the AG, no matter how many shares he owns 118, has the right to bring actions 
to set aside defective resolutions of shareholders' meetings within one month 
112 But the UMAG changes the approach. For details see Section 4.4. 
113 Brohmer (2000), p. 59. 
114 See section 120 of the AktG. 
115 See section 93( 4) of the AktG. 
116 The possible abuse of power by the majority shareholders via the board is generally treated as 
an agency problem of directors. 
117 See Section 4.2.3.2. l. 
118 Section 245 of the AktG. 
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after adoption of those resolutions. 119 This right is regarded as particularly 
important for minority shareholders in the AG120, especially considering that 
several important measures, such as the alteration of the articles of association, 
the distribution of dividends, and corporate restructuring methods, need 
resolutions by shareholders' meetings. For a detailed discussion of the right, 
please refer to Section 4.3 .1. 
Fourth, shareholders owe a duty of loyalty (Treuepflicht) to the company and 
other shareholders, which is a charactelistic of German law. 121 For AGs this duty 
was recognized later than it was for GmbHs. Although there is a running 
controversy about the contents of this duty, it is generally recognized that the 
extent of the duty varies in different sihrntions: the more influence the shareholder 
may have on the management, the greater the extent of the duty owed by that 
shareholder to the company and other shareholders. 122 As a result, in AGs the 
company or an individual shareholder may bring actions against the controlling 
shareholder for his breach of fiduciary duty owed to either of them. 
Fifth, the principle of equal treatment of shareholders also provides protection 
for minority shareholders. 123 This principle is regarded as a special aspect of the 
shareholder's duty of loyalty. 124 
Last but not least, we should bear in mind that German law on groups of 
companies (Konzernrecht) also plays an important role in regulating the conduct 
of the controlling shareholders of an AG. This approach is different from the 
Anglo-American approach. Under both English and American law, there is no 
specific law on groups of companies. The group problems are mainly regulated 
by the same rules as those regnlating a single company. German law treats group 
relationships differently from the relationship between a mere dominating share-
holder and the company. The reason is that if the dominating shareholder is not 
merely a shareholder, but also pursues business interests in another AG or other 
type of business, there is a greater risk that he will not act in the interests of the 
dominated company. The interests of the dominated company may be sub-
ordinated to the interests of his other business ventures. This specific law on 
groups of companies is also a feature of German law. 
119 Section 246(1) of the AktG. 
120 Stecher (1997a), p. 94. 
121 In Linotype, BGHZ 103, 184 (1988), at p.194, the Federal Supreme Court held that '(a] legal 
duty of loyalty also exists between the shareholders of a stock corporation'; as cited in 
Kleindiek (1993), at p. 142. Also see Hirt (2003c), pp. 525-526. 
122 Kleindiek (1993), at p. 142. 
123 Section 53(a) of the AktG provides that 'shareholders should be treated equally under 
equivalent circumstances.' 




In the GmbH 
Against the controlling shareholders 
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The main agency problem in the GmbH is the controlling shareholders' influence 
on corporate management. Usually it is the controlling shareholders rather than 
the directors who control the management of the company. In the GmbH, the 
shareholders' meeting has superior authority over the management board or 
managing representatives. Shareholders have the right to appoint the managing 
directors and can remove them at any time without restrictions125 ; the right of 
shareholders to be involved in corporate management can be freely structured in 
the contract126; shareholders have the right to decide on the guidelines of com-
pany policy127; the managing directors must obey the instructions of share-
holders 128; and, in practice, directors usually ask for shareholders' consent for 
management decisions. 129 
Few provisions in the GmbHG against the controlling shareholders 
The GmbHG contains only a few provisions aimed at protecting the company and 
minority shareholders from the controlling shareholders' abusive use of power. 
The legislature's consideration is that the GmbH is the proper legal vehicle for 
business organizations which are less complex and more flexible. The share-
holders in the GmbH are presumed to have a closer relationship with each other 
than the shareholders of an AG. As a result, the regulations in the GmbHG are 
deliberately minimized and optional. Shareholders are supposed to protect 
themselves through provisions in the articles of association. 130 
Restrictions on the interested shareholders' right to vote 
Like that in the AktG, an important regulation in the GmbHG, which may prevent 
the controlling shareholders' abuse of power, is the restriction on the share-
holders' right to vote. 131 Section 47( 4) of the GmbHG holds that if a decision 
concerns a waiver of a shareholder's liability or obligation, concerns a transaction 
between a shareholder and the company, or concerns a decision to sue a share-
holder or to seek for other legal solution for the dispute, the shareholder against 
whom the decision is made cannot vote. 
125 Sections 38(1), 46(5) of the GmbHG. 
126 Section 45(1) of the GmbHG. 
127 Section 46 of the GmbHG. 
128 Section 37 (1) of the GmbHG. 
129 Kleindiek (1993), at p. 139. 
130 Kleindiek (1993), at p. 139. 
131 The GmbHG also provides for the minority shareholders' right to call a general meeting (s 50 
(1)) and the shareholders' right to information (s 51a). 
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The shareholders duty of loyalty owed to the company and to fellow shareholders 
German case law has developed other important mechanisms for regulating the 
conduct of shareholders. According to German law, shareholders, both majority 
and minority shareholders, owe a wide duty of loyalty (Treuepflicht) to the 
company as well as to other shareholders. 132 Two reasons may account for the 
imposition of such a duty. First, there is a greater degree of cooperation and 
personal tlust in GmbHs: 'the relationships between a shareholder in the GmbH 
and his fellows are not purely capitalist, but also personal' .133 Second, the con-
trolling shareholders have a greater influence on corporate management and there 
is a greater possibility for them to use this influence. As a result, the power to 
exercise influence on corporate management and other shareholders' interests has 
to be balanced by a legal obligation to consider the interests of the company and 
other shareholders. 134 
The contents and scope of the shareholder's duty of loyalty depend on 
individual circumstances; factors such as the nature of the relationship among 
shareholders, the scope of investment, the duration of the investment and the 
effect of an action on other shareholders will be considered when deciding the 
shareholder's duty of loyalty. 135 Examples of the shareholder's breach of this duty 
in the GmbH include making efforts to dissolve the company so that other 
shareholders cannot continue their business, 136 refusing to join a necessary capital 
increase due to his own interests, 137 and unfairly competing against the company 
through another company by exercising an influence on the management of the 
first company. 138 
The controlling shareholder's breach of the duty of loyalty may give rise to either 
corporate claims or shareholders' personal claims against them, which I will 
discuss in Section 4.3.3. 
132 For a detailed discussion of the shareholders' duty of loyalty, see Kleindiek (1993), pp. 138-
147. 
133 Scogin (1993), p. 182. 
134 Kleindiek (1993), at p. 141. In the ITT case, the German Federal Supreme Court stated that: 
'The possibility for the majority of shareholders to exercise influence on the management and 
therefore to interfere with the business interests of the other shareholders requires as a 
counterpart the legal obligation to consider these interests.' See ITT BGHZ, 65, 15, (1975) at 
p. 19; as cited in Kleindiek (1993), at p. 141. 
135 Stecher (1997a), pp. 96-97. 
136 BGHZ 76, 352, 355 f; BGH NJW 1985, 1901; as cited in Stecher (1997a), p. 97. 
137 BGH WM 1987, 841; as cited in Stecher (1997a), p. 97. 
138 BGHZ 80, 69, p. 74; as cited in Stecher (1997a), p. 97. 
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The remedies of dissolution, withdrawal and expulsion 
German law concerning the GmbH also protects shareholders by providing them 
with highly discretionary remedies. Section 61 of the GmbHG grants share-
holders the remedy of dissolution. It provides that: 
The company may be dissolved by a court decision in case it becomes 
impossible to accomplish the purpose of the company or when there are other 
substantial causes (wichtige Grund) for the dissolution resulting from the 
conditions of the company. 139 
Here these substantial causes focus on the circumstances of the company rather 
than on the individual shareholders. 140 
Since the dissolution remedy is very harsh and since there is no other solution in 
the GmbHG, German case law has developed two additional remedies, the 
withdrawal (Austritt) and the expulsion (Ausschliessung), to protect shareholders. 
Neither of these remedies may be restricted or excluded by the articles of 
associations. 141 With the remedy of withdrawal, the aggrieved shareholders can 
exit the GmbH and are entitled to obtain the fair market value of their interests in 
the GmbH. 142 This is important for the shareholders because of the illiquidity of 
shares in the GmbH. However, German law is silent about whether the aggrieved 
shareholders can be compensated for their reflective losses through the remedy of 
withdrawal where the basis for the relief is, at least partly, an injury to the 
company. On the other hand, the remedy of expulsion provides a good solution 
for those aggrieved shareholders who want to stay in the GmbH rather than 
withdraw. 143 Normally the expelled shareholders will not be fully compensated 
because the German courts generally value companies conservatively. 144 Under 
German case law, even the majority shareholder may be expelled from the 
company. 145 The reason this becomes possible is that, although the expulsion of a 
shareholder needs a shareholders' resolution, the expelled shareholder is not 
allowed to vote with his own shares. 146 Therefore, it is possible that a majority 
shareholder may be expelled from the company by minority shareholders. 147 This 
139 Section 61 of the GmbHG. 
140 Scogin (1993), p. 134. 
141 Scogin (1993), p. 155 and p. 157. 
142 Kleindiek (1993), at pp. 144-145; Miller (1997), p. 396. 
143 Miller (1997), p. 396. 
144 Scogin (1993), p. 179. 
145 Kleindiek (1993), at pp. 141-142. For a detailed discussion on the withdrawal and expulsion, 
see, for example, Scogin (1993); and Miller (1997). 
146 Scogin (1993), p. 157. 
147 Judgment of Apr. I, 1953, BGHZ, 9, 178; as cited in Scogin (1993), p. 157. 
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risk of expulsion from the company plays an effective role in disciplining the 
controlling shareholder's behavior. 148 
A substantial basis (wichtige Grund) has to be established in order for the 
shareholder to be awarded the remedy of withdrawal or expulsion. 149 However, 
unlike the focus on the circumstances of the company found in the remedy of 
dissolution, these two remedies focus on the personal aspects of the relationships 
between shareholders. 150 In the withdrawal remedy, there can be three sources for 
this substantial basis. The first one involves the exit shareholder personally, such 
as his financial situation or health; the second involves the behavior of other 
shareholders, such as the majority shareholders' abuse of power; while the third 
involves a situation such as the changed purpose of the company. 151 In the 
expulsion remedy, the sources for the substantial basis are narrower than those in 
the withdrawal remedy since the expulsion is against the will of the expelled 
shareholders; the substantial basis here must involve the expelled shareholder, 
such as his age, illness, or financial circumstances or behavior. 152 In either 
remedy, the substantial basis requires no element of fault and its broad but vague 
definition gives the court wide discretion in using it to solve disputes among 
shareholders. 153 
The individual shareholder's right to challenge defective resolutions of share-
holders' meetings 
As mentioned, an individual shareholder in AGs has the right to initiate claims 
against defective resolutions of the shareholders' meeting. German courts also 
apply this right to shareholders in GmbHs by analogy but there are special 
circumstances which can make the application in the GmbH inappropriate. 154 
4.2.3.2.2 Against the directors 
As to the conflict between shareholders and directors, normally the shareholders 
via the resolutions of the general meeting have the power to discipline the conduct 
of the directors both ex ante and ex post. Nevertheless, minority shareholders, 
either as a group or individually, may not enforce corporate claims against the 
directors. 
148 Scogin (1993), p. 179. 
149 Scogin (1993), p. 135. 
150 Scogin (1993), pp. 134-135; Miller (1997), p. 396. 
151 Scogin (1993), p. 155. 
152 Scogin (1993), p. 160. 
153 Scogin (1993), p. 135. 
154 Kleindiek (1993), pp. 143-144; Stecher (1997a), p. 95. For more details see Lutter and Hom-
melhoff, GmbH-Gesetz, Cologne, 1991 (13th edn), annex paragraph 47; Raiser in Hachenburg, 
GmbH-Gesetz, Berlin, 1991 (8th edn); Raiser, 'Nichtigkeits- und Anfechtungsklagen', in 
Festschrift 100 Jahre GmbH-Gesetz, Cologne, 1992, at p. 587 onward. 
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4.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between 
corporate action and shareholders' direct action 
4. 3. I Claims to set aside defective resolutions of cmporate bodies 
German law takes different approaches towards the individual shareholder's right 
to directly bring claims to set aside defective resolutions of the board of directors 
and the right to set aside defective resolutions of shareholders' meetings. 
Claims to set aside defective resolutions of the board of directors 
Under German company law the general principle is that directors owe the duty 
to 'employ the care of a diligent and conscientious manager' to the company 
rather than to individual shareholders. 155 There is no direct relationship between 
directors and individual shareholders. As a result, the breach of duties by directors 
only gives rise to corporate claims and an individual shareholder cannot challenge 
directors' management decisions. This principle is very strict under German law. 
An individual shareholder is not only unable to bring direct claims against the 
breach of directors' duties for corporate damages, but is also unable to bring 
direct claims to prevent the execution of a board's decision, even if the board's 
decision was illegal or violated the constitution of the company. The right to 
challenge the board's decision belongs only to the company. 156 This approach 
differs from the English and American approach. Under English or American law, 
although in principal directors also owe fiduciary duties to the company rather 
than shareholders, an individual shareholder still can bring a direct action to 
restrain an illegal act or an act which has violated the constitution of the 
company: the constitution is regarded as a contract between the shareholders and 
the company, any violation of which may give rise to a shareholder's direct action 
to enforce it. 
However, German case law recently moved a step towards the common law 
trend and recognized the individual shareholder's right to interfere with corporate 
management in a limited number of situations. In the case of Holzmiiller, the 
German Supreme Court held that an individual shareholder could challenge the 
board's decision if the decision made by the board was not within the board's 
power but required a decision by the shareholders' meeting. 157 Nevertheless, the 
UMAG does not make any change to the minority shareholder's right to set aside 
defective decisions of the board of directors. 
155 Sections 93 of AktG and section 43 of the GmbHZ. 
156 Kleindiek (1993), at p. 144. 
157 Decision of BGH, 25 Feb. 1982, repr. in 37 Juristenzeitung [JZ] 602, (1982). See Buxbaum 
(1983), where the case is referred to as the 'Miiller' case. 
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Claims to set aside defective resolutions of shareholders' meetings 
Unlike the strict approach towards the individual shareholder's right to bring 
claims to set aside defective board decisions, German law takes a very lenient 
approach towards the shareholder's right to bring direct actions to set aside the 
resolutions of shareholders' meetings. This right is regulated in the AktG, but it is 
also applied to the GmbH by analogy except where there are special 
circumstances that make the application in the GmbH inappropriate. 158 
According to the AktG, the shareholders' resolutions may be void per se or 
voidable. Void resolutions include, for example, those resolutions adopted in a 
shareholders' meeting which was called in violation of the legal requirements, or 
those resolutions that are not compatible with the nature of the company or that 
violate provisions for the protection of creditors of the company. 159 Voidable 
resolutions include those in violation of law or the articles of the company 160, or 
those attempting to serve the purpose of a single shareholder in order to obtain 
special benefits for himself or another person to the detriment of the company or 
other shareholders, unless other shareholders are adequately compensated for 
their losses. 161 A voidable resolution is initially valid but may be set aside by an 
action brought by an individual shareholder, the management board, or any 
member of the management board or supervisory board. 162 The action must be 
brought against the company. 163 
The individual shareholder's right to bring direct actions to set aside defective 
shareholders' resolutions under German law is very broad. According to the 
AktG, in addition to the right to set aside illegal resolutions or resolutions 
violating the articles, the individual shareholder may bring a claim to set aside a 
resolution which tries to obtain unfair special benefits for the controlling 
shareholder. 164 In fact, this right is of utmost importance in Germany. Many 
actions to set aside resolutions have been brought on grounds such as insufficient 
disclosure, the controlling shareholder's breach of duty ofloyalty or the breach of 
the principle of equal treatment. 165 
However, there is a risk that the individual shareholder's right to challenge the 
defective resolutions of shareholders' meetings may unjustly interfere with 
corporate management since the action will prevent implementation of the 
challenged resolution. 166 Such an action may take up to four to five years if the 
158 K.leindiek (1993), pp. 143-144. 
159 Section 241 oftheAktG. 
160 Section 243(1) of the AktG. 
161 Section 243(2) of the AktG. 
162 Section 245 of the AktG. 
163 Section 246 (2) of the AktG. 
164 Section 243 of the AktG. 
165 Hopt (2004), p. 408. 
166 Gunther & Roth (2006); Noack & Zetzsche (2005), pp. 1044-1045. 
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case goes to the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichthof). 167 The business 
opportunities of the company simply cannot be put on hold for so long a period 
of time. This risk is especially real since such a right has in fact been broadly 
abused in German practice, especially where it concerns the directors' duty of 
information to shareholders. 168 According to section 131 of the AktG, an 
individual shareholder can request any information that is related to his voting 
right in the shareholders' meeting and, if unjustly denied, bring an action to 
challenge the resolutions made in the meeting. This right has been abused 
especially by 'professional minority shareholders,' who buy very few shares in 
almost all listed companies and attend shareholders' meetings in order to settle 
with the company in return for hush money. 169 In fact, the abuse of the right and 
its fatal effect on a company is regarded as 'a unique situation in Europe'. 170 
The UMAG is intent on changing this situation and has imposed new 
restrictions on this right. For example, in order to reduce the burden on 
management to answer questions raised by shareholders and to prevent strike 
suits based on insufficient information, the UMAG has made the provision that 
any information, which has been published on the corporate website at least seven 
days before the start of the shareholders' meeting and is constantly accessible 
during the meeting, is considered to be given in the shareholders' meeting. 171 In 
addition to this, it has provided that if an action to set aside any shareholders' 
resolutions is based on insufficient information, such information should be 
considered by an objective shareholder as being essential for the exercise of his 
voting right. 172 The UMAG has also prevented a shareholder from bringing such 
an action if the action is based on insufficient information about the value of the 
company, when these matters can be settled in a special evaluation procedure 
(Spruchverfahren). 173 In order to prevent strike suits generally, the UMAG has 
also provided a new preliminary procedure, by which Regional Courts will decide 
whether the corporate management can execute the resolutions within four 
months of the meeting. 174 If the resolutions, according to the court's decision, can 
be implemented but afterward are found defective, the effect of the resolutions 
will not be affected but the shareholder will be compensated. 175 Therefore, the 
action's influence on corporate management is greatly reduced. 
167 Gunther & Roth (2006); Noack & Zetzsche (2005), pp. 1044-1045. 
168 Gunther & Roth (2006), p. 18; Hopt (2004), p. 408. 
169 Gunther & Roth (2006), pp.17-18. 
170 Gunther & Roth (2006), p. 18. For illustrations of the abusive use of the right, also see 
Hasselbach & Spengler (2005), p. 114. 
171 Section 131(3)(7) of the AktG (the UMAG). 
172 Section 243(4)(1) of the AktG (the UMAG); also see Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. 1044. 
173 Section 243( 4)(2) of the AktG (the UMAG); also see Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. I 044. 
174 Sections 246, 246a of the AktG (the UMAG); also see Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. 1045. 
175 Section 246a of the AktG (the UMAG); also see Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. 1045. 
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4.3.2 Claims arising from the directors breach of fiducia,y duties 
As mentioned, a director's breach of duties generally gives rise to corporate 
claims, either for injunction or for damages. However, an individual shareholder 
may under German law bring a direct action if his own personal right, including 
his membership right, such as the right to participate in the shareholders' meeting 
or the right to dividend decided on, has been infringed by the directors' 
decision. 176 However, because the directors' decision was made in the name of the 
company, which should take legal responsibility for the decision, and also 
because the directors do not owe direct duties to the shareholder, such an action 
must be brought against the company rather than against the directors who made 
the decision. 
Directors may owe duties directly to an individual shareholder according to 
contract law or law of torts. If directors breach such duties, they could be held 
liable for damages, and the individual shareholder can bring a direct action 
against them. For example, German case law has established that if directors sell 
shares to the purchaser in the knowledge that the shares price will subsequently 
fall, they will be held liable to the purchaser for the loss of the value of those 
shares. 177 In this case, the director's liability is based on contract law or tort law 
rather than the company law principle of duty of loyalty. Therefore no further 
attention will be paid to this type of liability. 
4.3.3 Claims arising from the shareholders misconduct (breach of the 
duty of loyalty) 
It is more problematic to identify the nature of the action to be taken where the 
claim arises from a shareholder's misconduct. Basically, the general principle still 
applies that, where the injury was done to the company, only the company can 
claim damages against the injury; an individual shareholder can only claim 
damages for his direct losses which are separate from the corporate losses. 178 
However, the problem is, by committing the misconduct which injured the 
company, the wrongdoing shareholder may also have breached his duty to other 
shareholders at the same time and therefore the misconduct may give rise to a 
shareholder's personal claim as well as a corporate claim, especially in a GmbH. 
The reason is that, as mentioned in Section 4.2.3, shareholders in both AGs and 
GmbHs owe a duty of loyalty to the company as well as to other shareholders, 
although the content and the scope of the duty may be different in various 
situations. 179 These two kinds of duties may overlap, especially in GmbHs. For 
176 Kleindiek (1993), at p. 144. 
177 Eckert (1960), p. 67; as cited in Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 554. 
178 Kleindiek (1993), at p. 144. 
179 See Section 4.2.3. For a more detailed discussion of the shareholders' fiduciary duty, see, for 
example, Brinkman (2002), pp. 70-77; Scogin (1993); Miller (1997). 
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example, in the GmbH, misconduct such as the appropriation of the corporate 
assets by the majority shareholder for his own benefit may breach both his duties 
to the company and his duties to the minority shareholders. In such cases the 
distinction between direct and derivative actions may be difficult. 
The German law takes a strict approach towards this distinction in cases where 
this very same overlap of claims exists. Under German law the identification of 
which action should be taken not only depends on whose right has been infringed, 
but also on the remedies sought. Where a shareholder has breached his duty to 
other shareholders by infringing the interests of the company, which is common 
in a GmbH, the aggrieved shareholders cannot bring a direct action against the 
company's losses. They can, however, seek the remedies of withdrawal or 
expulsion if they can establish a substantial basis for these respective remedies. 180 
We should note, however, that since it is difficult for minority shareholders to 
bring an actio pro socio on behalf of the GmbH against a wrongdoing share-
holder181, and since the aggrieved shareholders who withdraw from the company 
can only obtain a market value for their shares 182, they may not be fully com-
pensated in such cases. 
4.4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and 
protection for the corporation and the minority 
shareholders 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, German law concerning derivative actions in AGs 
has recently experienced significant changes due to the implementation of the 
UMAG. Therefore, in this section I will discuss the former rules as well as the 
current rules separately. Moreover, since minority shareholders in GmbHs cannot 
enforce corporate claims derivatively except against fellow shareholders by 
means of the right of actio pro socio, which is a membership right rather than a 
derivative right, this section will only discuss the law as it concerns AGs. 
4.4.1 The rules prior to the UMAG 
Before the UMAG, the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims 
was regulated by section 147 of the AktG (1998). This section actually laid down 
two different mechanisms covering the minority shareholders' right as found in 
two separate paragraphs, subsections 1 and 3. Section 147(1) granted the share-
holders' meeting, or those minority shareholders whose aggregate holding 
180 Please refer to Section 4.2.3.2.1. 
181 See Section 4.1.3.2. 
182 There is no explicit definition of 'market value' in German law; it may not compensate the 
withdrawing shareholders for those indirect losses, as reflected in the GmbH's losses, which 
were not claimed by the GmbH. 
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equaled or exceeded one-tenth of the share capital, the right to request the 
company or special representatives of the company to enforce corporate claims 
for compensation of damages. 183 If the corporate claim was not enforced 
according to section 147(1), the minority shareholders might then apply the 
second mechanism, which was stipulated in section 147(3). That is, those 
minority shareholders whose aggregate holdings exceeded one-twentieth of the 
share capital or the pro rata amount of EUR 500,000, were allowed to apply for 
the court to appoint special representatives in order to assert the corporate claim 
provided there were facts justifying the urgent suspicion that the company had 
sustained a loss through dishonesty or gross violation of the law or articles. These 
court-appointed representatives, however, were given the discretion to decide 
whether to assert the claim or not. Since the restrictions on the minority 
shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims could be different in the two 
mechanisms, I will discuss them separately where it proves necessary. 
4.4.1.1 
4.4.1.1.1 
Substantive limitations to the scope of misconduct which might be 
enforced by minority shareholders 
Whose misconduct might be the corporate cause of action 
enforceable by minority shareholders 
Section 147 of the AktG (1998) was mainly intended to enforce corporate claims 
regarding compensation for damages 'against persons liable pursuant to sections 
46 to 48 and 53 which have arisen in connection with the formation of the 
company or which have arisen in connection with the management of the 
company against members of the management board or the supervisory board or 
pursuant to s. 117' .184 According to section 117(1) of the AktG, any person who 
has exerted influence on the company and willfully induced the corporate 
management to act to the disadvantage of the company should be liable to the 
company. However, this section was not applicable if the act was engaged in 
through the exercise of 'voting rights at the shareholders' meeting'; 185 nor is it 
applicable if through the exercise of 'the right to direct under a control 
agreement' or 'the right to direct of an acquiring company into which the 
company has been integrated' .186 As a result, the liability under section 117 has 
not applied to the controlling shareholders. Consequently, section 147 did not 
apply to the controlling shareholders either. In fact, section 147 was mainly 
applied against members of the management board or the supervisory board. As 
183 For the appointment of the special representatives, see section 147(2) of the AktG (1998). 
184 Section 147(1) of the AktG (1998). 
185 Section 117(7)(1) of the AktG(1998). However, section 117(7)(1) has been abolished by the 
UMAG. See UMAG article I sub-article 3. 
186 Sections 117(7)(2) and 117(7)(3) of the AktG(l998), which are sections 117(7)(1) and 
117(7)(2) of the AktG (the UMAG). 
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a result, under the former German law, with the exception of groups of 
companies, only the management board, which is the body designated to decide 
upon and to initiate a corporate action, might pursue a corporate action against 
the controlling shareholders. 187 However, as will be seen in Section 4.4.2.2.1, this 
approach has since been changed by the UMAG. 
The German approach before the UMAG did in fact favor the directors' 
decision-making power: making a litigation decision is also a kind of business 
judgment. This approach could lead to a situation where the interests of the 
company and minority shareholders might be infringed without remedies. For 
example, if the controlling shareholder breached his duty of loyalty and 
misappropriated the company's assets through unfair dealing, the managing board 
should prevent such an unfair dealing or bring an action against it after the 
wrongdoing has taken place. However, the managing board might be controlled 
by this controlling shareholder and so the board would in such a case never bring 
the action. The complaining minority shareholders could only challenge the 
board's decision not to sue on the basis of breach of directors' duty of care. It 
would be far easier for minority shareholders if they could directly initiate a 
corporate action against the wrongdoing shareholder for his breach of duty of 
loyalty, since normally it is easier to sue against breach of duty of loyalty than 
against breach of duty of care. 
In conclusion, section 14 7 was mainly aimed at disciplining the conduct of 
directors. This approach, if taken alone, might lead to less protection for the 
interests of the company and minority shareholders in those cases where the 
majority shareholders are abusing their power. It should be borne in mind, how-
ever, that, as mentioned in Section 4.2.3 .1.2, German law still contains a variety 
of alternative mechanisms to solve the problem. 
4.4.1.1.2 Nature of the defendant's misconduct that might lead to a 
corporate action enforceable by minority shareholders 
Section 147(1) 
Section 147(1) did not place any restriction on the nature of the director's 
misbehavior which could give rise to corporate claims: it applied to all kinds of 
breaches of duty by directors, no matter whether they were negligence or a breach 
of the duty of loyalty. 
On the other hand, however, German case law has also acknowledged that 
directors should have discretion in making business judgments and should not be 
liable for normal business risks. A German version of the business judgment rule 
has been developed in German case law. In the ARAG/Garmenbeck case in 
187 For the law on groups of companies, see Section 4.1.3.3. 
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1997188, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) for the first 
time held that directors should be given discretion to exercise business judgment. 
It stated that: 
. . . directors possess a wide margin of appreciation for their activities as 
directors as any business activity is inconceivable without such discretion. It 
is within this margin of appreciation that they consciously take risks in the 
pursuit of business opportunities. Thus, even the most responsible director is 
faced with the risk of miscalculation and misjudgement. . . . In this regard, 
there can be no liability for damages. Such liability is conceivable only where 
the line of responsible directorship based on the careful analysis and 
evaluation of the underlying facts in the light of the welfare of the company 
has been clearly overstepped and where the willingness to accept entre-
preneurial risks has become irresponsible ... 189 
However, this German version of the business judgment rule may not provide 
directors with the same degree of protection as the American rule does. First, 
under German law, the accused director has to prove that he has employed the 
care of a diligent and conscientious manager190, while under American law, it is 
the plaintiff shareholder who bears the burden of proof that the business judgment 
rule is not applicable. Moreover, it is easier for German courts than it is for their 
American counterparts to second-guess the directors' decisions. 191 According to 
German law, in order to decide whether the directors should be liable, the courts 
need to judge the behavior of the directors according to the standard of care of a 
diligent and conscientious manager, while still recognizing that directors should 
enjoy discretion in making business judgments. 192 The directors' discretion in 
making business judgments is only one factor that the courts will take into 
consideration when deciding such cases. 193 Thus a hindsight evaluation of the 
directors' behavior by the courts is unavoidable. Even worse, this hindsight 
evaluation is often influenced by the judges' own subjective attitude toward risk. 
188 BGHZ 135,244. For a brief introduction to this case in English, see Hirt, (2004), p. 263. Hirt 
(2003c), pp. 533-535. 
189 BGHZ 135, 244; as cited in and translated by Briihmer (2000), p. 55. 
190 Section 93 of the AktG. German law differentiates between 'the breach of duty' (the objective 
aspect of the director's behavior) and 'negligence' (the subjective aspect of the director's 
behavior). The issue of breach of duty concerns what a director has to do or should have done; 
while the issue of negligence concerns how a director should act, that is, the level of care. As 
soon as the plaintiff can show that the defendant director has breached his duty (the objective 
aspect) and that the company has suffered damages as a result, then the burden of proof is 
reversed and the director must prove that he did comply with his duty (the subjective aspect). 
Nevertheless, as to the subjective aspect, German law takes an objective standard, the standard 
of a prudent businessman. See Stengel (1998), at p. 52. 
191 Briihmer (2000), p. 56; Butler (2000), pp. 591-592. 
192 Briihmer (2000), p. 56. 
193 Hopt(l997),p. 265. 
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In conh·ast, the American business judgment rule is a safe-harbor rule, by which 
the American courts try to avoid second-guessing the directors' behavior. Second, 
the German business judgment rule may have the disadvantage of uncertainty 
because there are few cases concerning directors' liabilities and there have been 
few opportunities for German courts to develop the rule. 194 Due to these dif-
ferences, especially the difference concerning the burden of proof, it has been 
argued that there actually is no business judgment rule under German law. 195 This 
opinion of course ignores the fact that German case law has adopted the sub-
stantive aspect of the American business judgment rule, that is, that the directors' 
discretion concerning his business judgment should be protected. 196 Therefore, 
we also would tend to agree that German case law has, for all intents and 
purposes, adopted a business judgment rule. 
As will be seen, the German legislature has also recognized the importance of 
the business judgment rule and has introduced it into the UMAG .197 
Section 147(3) 
Perhaps due to its lower capital threshold requirement for minority shareholders 
as compared to that found in section 147(1), section 147(3) took a different 
approach to that of section 147(1) with regard to the scope of liability and, in 
doing so, provided more protection for directors. Contrary to section 147(1), 
section 147(3) awarded minority shareholders the right to force a corporate action 
only in limited situations of directors' breach of duty, that is, in those situations 
where the corporate damage arose from directors' dishonesty or gross violation 
of the law or of the articles of association. 198 Therefore, certain kinds of directors' 
breach of duties, such as mere breach of duty of care, might not be enforced under 
section 147(3). Although it might be more lenient on directors, this restriction did 
actually, to a certain extent, play a similar role to that of the American business 
judgment rule in protecting directors, since the aggrieved minority shareholders 
were not able to apply section 147(3) against the directors for their mere breaches 
of duty of care and the plaintiff shareholders had to bear the burden of proof that 
the misconduct had amounted to dishonesty or gross violation of the law or of the 
articles of association. However, since this restriction only applied to section 
147(3), it did not affect the shareholders' right under section 147(1). 
194 Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 572. 
195 For this opinion, refer to, for example, Cunningham (1999), p. 1157. Although Jurgen Briihmer 
agrees that the German Federal Supreme Court, in the ARAG/Garmenbeck case (BGHZ 135, 
244), has adopted the principle that directors should have business discretion and should not 
be held liable for mere business risk, he does not say that the business judgment rule has been 
introduced into German law; see Briihmer (2000), pp. 55-56. 
196 See, for example, Hirt (2004b), p. 265, note 35; Oquendo (2001), p. 1011, Footnote 119; and 
Timmerman (2004), p. 50. 
197 See Section 4.4.2.2.1. 





Major requirements placed on plaintiffe in order to enforce 
corporate claims: the procedural aspect 
Section 147(1) 
Pursuant to section 147(1), the shareholders' meeting by a simple majority or 'a 
minority whose aggregate holdings equal or exceed one-tenth of the share capital' 
could request that the company bring an action. The minority shareholders who 
have made such a request must have held the shares for no less than three months 
prior to the date of the shareholders' meeting. According to this section, it does 
seem necessary to hold a shareholders' meeting in order for the minority group to 
request an enforcement of corporate claims. 199 Although minority shareholders 
have been awarded the right to call a shareholders' meeting200, this requirement 
might simply result in bringing more costs down on the dissatisfied minority 
shareholders. 
The minority shareholders' right under section 147(1) did not embody a 
derivative action in the common law sense. The minority shareholders were not 
able to file an action on behalf of the company in their own names. However, they 
were able to ask the court to appoint special representatives to assert their claim 
for the company, thus substituting for the normal corporate bodies, that is, the 
management board or the supervisory board, which the minority shareholders 
might not trust. 201 An advantage to this arrangement, whereby the action might be 
pursued in the name of the company, was that the complaining minority share-
holders were not able to control the action. Thus the issue that the complaining 
minorities might be able to abuse the litigation right, for example, by causing an 
unjust settlement between the complaining minority shareholders and the 
defendant, could not have arisen in Germany. 
4.4.1.2.2 Section 147(3) 
As seen above, the capital threshold under section 147(3) was significantly lower 
and more flexible than that under section 147(1). Shareholders whose aggregate 
holdings exceed one-twentieth of the share capital or the pro rata amount of EUR 
500,000 might cause corporate claims to be enforced. 
However, this section also laid down several significant requirements 
concerning the shareholders' right. First, in order for the minority shareholders to 
bring their motion before the court, they must show the existence of facts which 
justify the urgent suspicion that there has been dishonesty or gross violation of 
199 See Boyle (2002), p. 47. 
200 Section 122 of the AktG states that '[a] shareholders' meeting shall be called if shareholders 
whose holding in the aggregate equals or exceeds one-twentieth of the share capital demand 
such meeting in writing, stating the purpose and the reasons of such meeting ... '. 
201 Section 147(2) of the AktG (1998). 
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the law or the articles. This made a preliminary court procedure necessary for 
section 147(3).202 Second, the minority shareholders' motion only had the effect 
of causing the court to appoint a special representative, rather than of forcing a 
corporate action. Only the court-appointed special representative had the 
discretion to decide whether to initiate the action. Moreover, minority share-
holders had no influence on the court's appointment of special representatives. 
They might make some suggestions, but the court was not obliged to follow these 
suggestions.203 These requirements, then, along with the substantive restriction 
mentioned in Section 4.4.1.1, might well considerably increase the difficulty for 
minority shareholders in enforcing corporate claims and would, as a result, 
diminish the significance of a lowered capital threshold. 
4.4.1.3 The independent body s view 
The issue of the independent body's point of view may not arise under German 
law since the structural arrangement of corporate litigation under German law 
already considers the risk of conflict of interest. For example, the power to sue all 
wrongdoers except the management board or its members is in the hands of the 
management board, while the power to sue the members of the management 
board is awarded to the supervisory board. A shareholder cannot vote 'on his own 
behalf or on behalf of any other person in respect of a resolution concerning 
ratification of his acts, his discharge from a liability, or enforcement by the 
company of a claim against him'.204 Thus, no further discussion of the issue of the 
independent body's point of view is necessary. 
4.4.1.4 Incentives for plaintiffs to enforce corporate claims 
Compared to Anglo-American law, the previous German law did provide a 
negative rather than a positive incentive for minority shareholders to enforce a 
corporate claim. 
4.4.1.4.1 The negative incentive: allocation of litigation costs 
The general rules regulating litigation costs under German law are stipulated in 
the German Civil Procedure Code (Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO). Like many other 
civil law countries, section 91 of the ZPO establishes the general principle that 
'the costs follow the event,' that is, the losing party bears the litigation costs of 
both parties involved.205 
202 Hirt (2004b ), p. 296. 
203 Hirt (2004b), p. 294, Footnote 148. 
204 Section 136(1) of the AktG. 
205 Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 557; Hirt (2004b), p. 302, p. 315. 
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A prima facie conclusion drawn from the above principle might be that in a suit 
brought under section 147 of the AktG (1998), the company, if it lost the case, 
should pay the litigation costs because the suit was brought in the name of the 
company rather than in the name of the minority shareholders who initiated such 
a suit. However, section 147(4) of the AktG (1998) shifted the burden of costs 
from the company to the minority shareholders. It provided that: 
If a minority has requested that a claim for damages be asserted and the 
company shall be required to bear the costs of the litigation because it has 
been unsuccessful in the litigation in whole or in part, the minority shall be 
obligated to reimburse such costs to the company insofar as they exceed what 
was gained from the action. If the company has been completely unsuccessful, 
the minority shall also reimburse to the company the court costs incurred by 
the company in connection with the appointment of special representatives 
pursuant to subsection (2) sentence 3 or subsection (3) sentence 1 and the cash 
expenses and remuneration of such special representatives.206 
This provision was intended to prevent abuse of the minority shareholders' right 
under section 147.207 However, it had played a role of overdeterrence. It had 
generally been agreed that the fact that minority shareholders had to bear the 
litigation costs had significantly contributed to a lack of section 147 suits in 
practice. 208 On the one hand, if the company won, the minority shareholders could 
only indirectly benefit from the suit pro rata based on the shares they hold. On 
the other hand, they had to pay the litigation costs if the company lost the case on 
whatever basis. The minority shareholders might not be at fault at all in initiating 
such a suit: we should bear in mind that, under German law, the corporate body 
or the court-appointed special representatives, rather than the minority share-
olders, controlled the process of the action. This was even more unfair to minority 
shareholders in a section 147(3) case because in this case it was the court-
appointed special representative who finally decided to bring the action.209 
4.4.1.4.2 No positive incentive mechanisms: no contingency fee device 
A contingency fee arrangement, which is regarded as unethical and against public 
policy, is still not allowed in Germany.210 
206 Section 147(4) of the AktG (1998). 
207 The reason was stated in draftAktiengesetz (1962), see Hirt (2004b), p. 315. 
208 See, for example, Singhof & Seiler (1998), pp. 557-558; Hirt (2004b), p. 302. 
209 Hirt (2004b), p. 302, Footnote 175. 




Changes in the UMAG 
Reasons for the reform 
GERMANY 
Section 147 oftheAktG (1998) was introduced in 1998 by the KonTraG, the Law 
on the Control and Transparency in Business (Gesetz zur Kontrolle und 
Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich). However, this section has basically been 
regarded as a failure for several reasons. 211 First, it seems that the low threshold 
under section 147(3) of the AktG (1998) has made it easier for minority 
shareholders to force a corporate claim, especially due to the EUR 500,000 
requirement for minority shareholders in big companies. However, other re-
quirements set by section 147(3), as mentioned in Section 4.4.1, have in fact 
significantly limited this minority shareholders' right. Second, the former 
regulation concerning the shareholders' right to force corporate suits, which was 
found in section 147(1) of the AktG (1998), has still been maintained and the 
problems it has caused remain unresolved. The coexistence of section 147(1) and 
(3), which provides two different mechanisms for minority shareholders, might 
have also caused further complexity and inconsistency. 212 Third, the thresholds set 
by section 14 7, although lower than the former threshold, may still be too high for 
minority shareholders to enforce corporate claims. 
Since section 147 of the AktG (1998) did not prove to be satisfactory, suggestions 
for reform arose immediately upon its introduction.213 The most influential 
proposals for reform were prepared by both Ulmer and Baums, they were 
basically similar and suggested significant changes to section 14 7 of the AktG 
(1998).214 In September 2000, Baums made his recommendations for reform of 
the 63. DJT215, which were basically followed by the Regierungskommission 
Corporate Governance in its report of July 2001 216 and then implemented into law 
by the UMAG in 2005. This reform is indeed unusual because the Regierungs-
kommission Corporate Governance had as its principle that of not proposing any 
reform with regard to provisions that had already been amended by the KonTraG. 
The reason for this exception was that 'public' opinion concerning the minority 
211 See Hirt (2004b ), p. 296. The 63 Deutscher Juristentag (DJT) in September 2000 also took this 
view; see Hirt (2004b ), p. 306. 
212 Hirt (2004b), p. 306. 
213 Hirt (2004b), pp. 319-320. 
214 Hirt (2004b), pp. 319-321. 
215 T. Baums, 'Empfiehlt sich eine Neuregelung des aktienrechtlichen Anfechtungs-und Organ-
haftungsrechts, insbesondere der Klagem6glichkeiten von Aktioniiren?' (Gutachten F zum 63. 
Deutschen Juristentag Leipzig 2000 (Munchen: C. H. Beck, 2000), p. 242; as cited in Hirt 
(2004b ), pp. 319-321. The resolutions of the 63 DJT are published in (2000) 45 AG R439-
R442; as cited in Hirt (2004b), p. 319, Footnote 240. 
216 Report of the Regierungskommission, note 72; as cited in Hirt (2004b), p. 322. Also see Baums 
(2002), Part VII. 
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shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims had changed since the 
KonTraG.217 
4.4.2.2 Changes in the UMAG in regard to section 147 of 
the AktG (1998) 
The shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims has been amended several 
times since its first introduction in 1884. However, up until the introduction of the 
UMAG, there were only minor amendments. These mainly focused on lowering 
the capital threshold for minority shareholders to be able to enforce corporate 
claims, and continued to maintain the approach of favoring corporate efficiency 
over protecting minority shareholders. For example, according to article 223 of 
the Allgemeines Deutsch es Handelsgesetzbuch, the predecessor of section 14 7 of 
the AktG (1998), only shareholders who held at least twenty percent of the 
nominal share capital could initiate the assertion of corporate claims.218 The 
reform in 1965 reduced the threshold to ten percent. In 1998 the reform reduced 
the threshold to five percent or a pro rata amount of EUR 500,000, but put more 
restrictions on the minority shareholders' right; at the same time, the ten percent 
threshold mechanism was kept on. 
Unlike the earlier reforms, the UMAG has made significant changes, both 
substantively and procedurally, to the minority shareholders' right to enforce 
corporate claims. These changes are mainly embodied in the newly inserted 
section 148, which grants minority shareholders the right to bring a derivative 
action. In order to avoid unnecessary inconsistency, the UMAG has repealed 
those regulations of the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims 
found in the old section 147 of the AktG (1998) and has inserted a new section 
148 to exclusively regulate this right. As a result, the new section 147 of the AktG 
( the UMAG) now only regulates the right of the general meeting of shareholders 
to enforce corporate claims, while section 148 regulates the minority 
shareholders' right to bring a derivative action. We should note that, through these 
amendments, the UMAG not only purports to improve the minority shareholders' 
position in enforcing corporate claims, but also attempts to sh·ike a fair balance 
between the protection of minority shareholders and maintaining corporate 
efficiency.219 The latter purpose can be detected especially in the restrictions on 
the minority shareholders' right to derivative actions and the newly introduced 
business judgment rule in section 93 of the AktG (the UMAG). 
217 Report of the Regierungskommission, note 72; see Hirt (2004b), p. 322. 
218 See Hirt (2004b), p. 281. 




4.4.2.2.1 Substantive limitations to the scope of misconduct that may be 
enforced by minority shareholders 
Whose misconduct may be the causes of derivative action 
An important change in the UMAG is that shareholders, either via the share-
holders' meeting, or via a derivative action, may now enforce corporate claims 
against controlling shareholders. As mentioned in Section 4.4.1.1.1, since section 
117 of the AktG (1998) has not applied to the undue influence of the controlling 
shareholders, minority shareholders were not able to enforce corporate claims 
against the controlling shareholders based on section 147 of the AktG (1998). 
However, the situation has since been changed by the UMAG. The UMAG 
removes section 117(7)(1) of the AktG (1998)220; therefore, a shareholder can no 
longer be excused from liability under section 117 if he exerts his influence by 
exercising voting rights at the shareholders' meeting and so causes losses to the 
company. This corporate claim against the controlling shareholder can now be 
enforced by the shareholders' meeting or qualified minority shareholders through 
a derivative action.221 
The nature of misconduct which may give rise to c01porate claims 
The UMAG also lays substantive restrictions on the nature of the misconduct 
which may give rise to minority shareholders derivative actions. As will be seen 
in Section 4.4.2.2.2, the UMAG adopts a two-stage procedure regarding the 
derivative action: the minority shareholders must first pass through a preliminary 
trial in order for the court to allow a derivative action; only after that will a main 
trial be heard. The substantive restrictions on the nature of the misconduct are 
actually found in both stages. At stage one, in order for the court to grant a 
derivative action, the minority shareholders have to establish, among other things, 
that there is misconduct of fraud or other gross infringement of the law, or of the 
memorandum and articles222 ; any other misconduct may not give rise to a 
derivative action. This restriction actually is the same as that found in the previous 
section 147(3), which, as mentioned in Section 4.4.1.1.2, was similar to the 
American business judgment rule in the sense that it prevented minority 
shareholders from challenging a director's mere breach of duty of care and then 
went on to provide protection for directors. Of course, we can easily observe that, 
due to its limited scope of misconduct which may give rise to a derivative action, 
section 148 of the AktG (UMAG) is more favorable to directors than the 
American business judgment rule. 
220 Article 1 sub-article 3 of the UMAG. 
221 Sections 147 and 148 of the AktG (the UMAG). 
222 Section 148 (1)(3) of the AktG (the UMAG). 
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If a derivative action is granted in the preliminary trial, the defendant director 
may also be protected by a statutory business judgment rule which was in-
troduced by the UMAG. According to this amended section 93(1), there shall be 
no breach of the director's duties if the director's decision was based on 
appropriate information and if he could reasonably believe that he was acting in 
the best interests of the company.223 However, unlike the American business 
judgment rule, here the defendant director, rather than the plaintiff shareholder, 
must bear the burden of proof.224 Although this German approach of putting the 
burden of proof on the defendant director seems to provide less protection for 
directors than the American law does, this is in fact not the case in a derivative 
action, due to the two-stage procedure of the derivative action and the previously 
mentioned strict restrictions of the scope of actionable misconduct during the first 
stage. 
The changes in the UMAG as to those restrictions on the nature of the misconduct 
which can give rise to a derivative action seem to provide more protection for 
corporate directors. However, as will be seen in the following section, the UMAG 
also significantly improved the minority shareholders' right to derivative actions. 
Therefore, the UMAG in fact is trying to strike a fair balance between corporate 
efficiency and protection of the company and minority shareholders. 
4.4.2.2.2 Major requirements placed on plaintiffs to enforce corporate 
claims: the procedural aspect 
The UMAG makes fundamental changes to the procedural requirements concer-
ing the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims. These amend-
ments in fact change the nature of the minority shareholders' right, as well as the 
approach to the issue of who should make corporate litigation decisions under 
German law. 
First, section 148 of the AktG (the UMAG) reduces the capital threshold 
significantly. According to section 148(1 ), shareholders aggregately holding one 
percent of the capital stock or a pro rata amount of EUR 100,000 may bring an 
action to enforce corporate claims. Therefore, this right will now be accessible to 
more minority shareholders. 
Second, in order to avoid 'unnecessary, unfounded or harassment actions'225, 
the UMAG adopts a two-stage court procedure. According to the UMAG, a 
preliminary trial is necessary in order to decide whether the action on behalf of 
the company is allowed.226 The court will only allow the action if: 
223 Article I sub-article la of the UMAG. 
224 Explanatory memorandum of the UMAG, p. 24. 
225 Baums (2002), p. 18. 
226 Section 148(1) of the AktG (the UMAG). 
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1. The shareholders can produce evidence that they acquired their shares before 
such time as they, or, in the case of a universal successor, their legal 
predecessor, were forced to acknowledge the alleged violations of duty or the 
alleged damage on the grounds of them/it entering the public domain, 
2. The shareholders can produce evidence that the company has failed to resolve 
the claim itself within a reasonable period of time, despite having been 
notified of the claim by the shareholders, 
3. There is evidence to justify the suspicion that the company has sustained 
damage, whether by fraud or by other gross infringement of the law, or of the 
memorandum and articles, and 
4. There are no predominant (tiberwiegenden) grounds (i.e. the interests 
(Gesellschaftswohls) of the company) preventing the claim for damages.227 
Several issues should be noted regarding those factors considered by the court 
when making a decision. First of all, a demand on the company is necessmy in 
order to prevent multiplicity of actions. However, the company's decision not to 
sue will not bar a derivative action. Nevertheless, the court is granted discretion 
to decide whether to allow a derivative action, especially taking into account the 
last factor it will consider. 
Third, those minority shareholders who succeeded in the preliminaiy trial are 
allowed to enforce the corporate claims in their own names in the main trial; no 
special representatives are needed to represent the company in the trial.228 The 
UMAG also stipulates that the plaintiff shareholders should seek damages for the 
benefit of the company229 , and the judgment, whether successful or not, should be 
binding on the company and other shareholders. 230 Therefore, a cornrnon law 
sense derivative action has actually been adopted by the UMAG. 
4.4.2.2.3 The plaintiff's incentives 
The UMAG tries to encourage minority shareholders to enforce corporate claims 
by reducing the plaintiff's under-incentive problems. This can be seen from the 
following aspects. 
The allocation of litigation costs 
The rules concerning the allocation oflitigation costs in the AktG (1998) had the 
effect of deterring minority shareholders from enforcing corporate claims. This 
has been recognized and therefore the UMAG has also changed the law on the 
allocation of litigation costs. 
227 Section 148(1) of the AktG (the UMAG). 
228 Section 148(1) of the AktG (the UMAG). 
229 Section 148(4) of the AktG (the UMAG). 
230 Section 148(5) oftheAktG (the UMAG). 
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As mentioned in Section 4.4.1.4.1, the general rule regulating litigation costs 
under German law is that 'the costs follow the event' .231 This general rule also 
applies to the preliminary procedure according to the UAMG. If the preliminary 
procedure brought by the minority shareholders is dismissed, the minority 
shareholders must bear the litigation costs of the preliminary procedure, unless 
the dismissal is based on grounds adverse to the interests of the company, 
something which the company should have notified the court of in advance but 
failed to do; in this latter case, the company must pay the plaintiff's costs.232 
If the minority shareholders succeed in the preliminary procedure, costs will 
be apportioned in the main h'ial. 233 Actually, the allocation of litigation costs in 
the main trial favors the plaintiff minority shareholders. According to section 
148(6) of the AktG (the UMAG), if the minority shareholders have succeeded in 
the preliminary procedure, but fail or partly fail in the main trial and therefore 
have to bear the litigation costs, they have the right to be reimbursed by the 
company for those costs, unless the allowance of the claim was based on 
assertions that were willfully or grossly and negligently wrong. The new rule is 
reasonable since the company, which profits from the action, should also bear the 
risk of the litigation costs. 
The right to information 
At the same time the UMAG has also reduced the capital threshold for a special 
audit to the same level as that of the minority shareholders' derivative actions.234 
In other words, shareholders holding at least one percent of the share capital or a 
pro rata amount of EUR 100,000 can apply for a special audit. This provides an 
opportunity for the minority shareholders who want to bring a derivative action 
but who lack the evidence to do so. 
The shareholders 'forum (Aktionarsforum) 
The UMAG has also inserted a new section 127a, which requires that an AG 
provide a forum in the German electronic federal gazette ( elektronischen 
Bundesanzeigers). This forum is expected to enhance communication among 
shareholders and help to form a quorum necessary for the minority shareholders' 
actions.235 This will of course play a positive role in encouraging minority 
shareholders' derivative actions. 
231 Section 91 of German Civil Procedure Code (Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO ). 
232 Section 148(6) of the AktG (the UMAG). 
233 Section 148(6) oftheAktG (the UMAG). 
234 Section 142(2) of the AktG (the UMAG). 
235 Gunther & Roth (2006), p. 18. 
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4.4.2.3 Comments on the reform 
The reform in the UMAG as to the minority's right to enforce corporate claims 
has undoubtedly been affected by the Anglo-American approach and aims to 
strengthen this right. This reform, however, has generated debates in Germany 
especially as to its effect on improving corporate governance. 
One position on the reform finds it doubtful that the new rules will end up im-
proving German corporate governance as a whole.236 The main reason for this is 
that the new rules may not effectively deter strike suits: the threshold is regarded 
as too low and the preliminary trial may not effectively filter out strike suits.237 
Moreover, a preliminary trial itself may actually be a strike suit.238 The influence 
of strike suits on corporate management is multiple: they unjustly interfere with 
corporate management and prevent directors from taking business risks or even 
from doing their jobs. Although the court does have discretion in the preliminary 
tr·ial, this discretion is limited since it mainly exists where there are no pre-
dominant grounds (with regard to the company's interests) against the assertion 
of the claim for damages.239 Of course, what the 'predominant reasons' are still 
depends on the court's decision. Another reason is that this lenient approach 
towards derivative actions may deter day-to-day supervision of the board due to a 
'race to the courts'. 240 It has also been suggested that market disciplinary 
mechanisms would be more effective than derivative actions, more specifically, a 
liability mechanism, since directors are more vulnerable to losses in reputation 
than financial losses.241 
Interestingly, there is also a contrary approach regarding this reform. Although 
he agrees that the reform does move in the right direction, Hirt has criticized the 
reform from an aspect different from that of the first opinion discussed above. 
The criticisms behind his stance are, first, that although the UMAG has reduced 
the capital threshold and solved the plaintiff shareholders' under-incentive 
problem by a new rule of allocation oflitigation costs, minority shareholders may 
still have no adequate incentive for bringing a derivative action, especially as they 
still bear the risk of the costs of the preliminaty procedure.242 Second, the capital 
threshold may be unnecessary since it might not effectively filter out strike suits 
and might actually deter merit cases. Alternatively, the preliminary procedure and 
the allocation of litigation costs may well provide those mechanisms sufficient to 
deter strike suits. 243 Third, it is problematic that only fraud or gross violations are 
236 See, for example, Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. 1053; Hirt (2005c), at p. 222. 
237 Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. 1053; Hirt (2005c), at p. 222. 
238 Hirt (2005c), at p. 222. 
239 Section 148(1) of the AktG (the UMAG). See Section 4.4.2.2.2. 
240 Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. 1053. 
241 Noack & Zetzsche (2005), p. 1053, Footnote 101. 
242 Hirt (2005c), at pp. 223-224. 
243 Hirt (2005c), at p. 223. 
233 
CHAPTER4 
allowed to give rise to derivative actions because damage to the company through 
other violations, if not redressed, may also not be in the interests of the 
company.244 Fourth, the involvement and discretion of the courts in judging 
whether an action is in the interests of the company, which is itself a business 
judgment, is questionable.245 Fifth, the two-stage court procedure may not be the 
best way to decide whether to allow a derivative action. On the one hand, the 
preliminary stage, where a decision as to whether to admit a derivative action 
must be made, may turn into a mini trial, while, on the other hand, the very nature 
of the preliminary stage may force the court to make a decision based only on a 
superficial examination.246 In fact, Hirt concludes that whether the new derivative 
action will be significant in practice actually depends on the court's practice, and 
that it is unlikely that there will be a great number of derivative actions in the 
future.247 
4.4.3 Limiting directors 'financial exposure to the risks and costs of 
litigation 
Under German law, if they are held liable to the company, it is difficult for direc-
tors to escape financial risks. This may prove to be a negative factor in 
encouraging corporate management. 
This difficulty in escaping financial risks may be identified through the 
following aspects. First, directors' liability to the company arising from their 
breach of duty normally cannot be excluded or limited, except where they are 
obliged to follow the lawful instructions of the shareholders. 248 
Second, the waiver or settlement of corporate claims against directors is also 
difficult in AGs. In AGs, the company may waive or reach a settlement for the 
company's claims only on expiration of a three-year period after the claims have 
arisen and with the consent of the shareholders' meeting, and a minority of 
shareholders (ten percent of the share capital) can object to the waiver or 
settlement.249 In addition, the waiver or settlement does not prevent a creditor of 
the company from suing the management on behalf of the company.250 Never-
theless, in GmbHs the approach is more pro-directors. The waiver or settlement 
is only restricted to the consent of shareholders; there is no time limit or any 
minority shareholders' right of objection.251 
Third, a company will not indemnify directors if they breach their duties to the 
company and are held liable for this. Nevertheless, if directors are held liable by 
244 Hirt (2005c), at p. 224. 
245 Hirt (2005c), at p. 224. 
246 Hirt (2005c), at p. 224. 
247 Hirt (2005c), at p. 224. 
248 Section 93(4) oftheAktG.Also see Wegen et al. (2006), Question 16; Baums (1996), atp. 322. 
249 Section 93(4) oftheAktG. 
250 Section 93(5) of the AktG. 
251 Baums (1996), at p. 323. 
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third parties, the company may indemnify them if their conduct will not make 
them liable to the company. 252 
The good news for directors is that they may ask the company to buy D&O 
insurance to cover their liability, including the liability to the company, with the 
company paying the insurance premiums.253 However, this insurance would not 
cover liability arising from certain misconduct, such as willful breaches of duties, 
fraud, dishonesty or criminal behavior.254 In addition, the German Corporate 
Governance Code also recommends that if the company does take out a D&O 
liability insurance policy for the boards, a suitable deductible (that is, a fixed 
amount or percentage the board member has to pay despite the insurance255) 
should be agreed upon.256 This recommendation, although disputed, has been 
widely adopted.257 
4.5 Conclusion 
4. 5.1 The fimction of the minority shareholders' right to enforce 
co1porate claims in German c01porate governance 
Both theoretically and practically the minority shareholders' right to enforce 
corporate claims has played an unimportant role in Germany. German law on this 
issue actually reflects the German culture of favoring directors and of being afraid 
of shareholder's strike suits. 
Although under German law the minority shareholder's right to enforce cor-
porate claims is rather weak, we cannot take it for granted that minority protection 
is weak as well. In fact, it is difficult and inappropriate to compare the German 
law on shareholder rights and remedies with the English or the American law and 
then simply conclude that one of the countries provides better protection for the 
company and shareholders. The reason is that the major mechanisms applied in 
these countries to improve corporate governance are different. Unlike the English 
and the American law, German law traditionally has not focused on liability rules 
( or shareholder rights and remedies) to discipline directors and corporate 
management, but on a structural system of checks and balances. For more details 
on these mechanisms, please refer back to Section 4.2.3. 
Nevertheless, these traditional German mechanisms are facing challenges, 
and reforms of the whole of German law are now in progress. Current German 
reform shows that an approach closer to the Anglo-American one, which pays 
more attention to shareholder rights and remedies, has been adopted in Germany. 
252 Wegen et al. (2006), Question 16. 
253 Wegen et al. (2006), Question 17; Baums (1996), at pp. 323-324. 
254 Baums (1996), at p. 323. 
255 Wegen et al. (2006), Question 17. 
256 Section 3.8 of the German Corporate Governance Code (last amended on June 2, 2005). 
257 Wegen et al. (2006), Question 17. 
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This may partly be because of the problems in current German corporate 
governance, and partly because of the influence of globalization on the economy. 
The reform of the minority shareholders' right to derivative actions in the UMAG 
actually reflects this approach. Moreover, there is also a body of opinion that such 
a right should also be included when it comes to a GmbH.258 
However, as far as derivative actions are concerned the effect of the reform is 
still to be seen since the new law gives the court power and discretion to decide 
whether to allow a derivative action or not. Bearing in mind the German tradition, 
perhaps we have to admit that this minority shareholder right is unlikely to be at 
the forefront of German corporate governance. In fact, although there are 
criticisms of them, the traditional German mechanisms such as the supervisory 
board are still heavily relied upon and reforms to them have also been made.259 
4.5.2 
4.5.2.1 
The German model of strildng a balance between c01porate 
efficiency and protection of the interests of the company and the 
minority shareholders 
The appropriate body to make a litigation decision in the best 
interests of the company 
The German approach towards the issue actually shows that under German law 
the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims is considered 
distasteful. 
The supervis01y board and the shareholders' meeting 
The German approach towards the issue of what is the appropriate body to make 
a corporate litigation decision has its own features. While the management board 
generally has the power to make a corporate litigation decision, the supervisory 
board, which is granted the power of supervision and is regarded as being 
independent from the management board, also has the power and the obligation 
to do so where the management board has a conflict of interest in making the 
decision. The supervisory board is actually regarded as the major mechanism for 
disciplining the management board and protecting the interests of the company. 
In addition to the supervisory board, the shareholders' meeting also has the power 
to make such a litigation decision. In GmbHs where there is no supervisory board, 
this function is assumed by the shareholders' meeting. 
258 Baums (1996), at p. 322, Footnote 41. 
259 For example, the German Corporate Governance Code addresses many ways to improve the 
function of the supervisory board, such as encouraging 'cooperation between executive and 
supervisory boards' (Part 3) and imposing on the supervisory board the task of regular 
supervision and of ensuring the independence of the supervisory board (Part 5). 
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The minority shareholders 
Another feature of the German law concerns the minority shareholders' right to 
enforce corporate claims against directors. There are several characteristics to 
this. First, only the minority shareholders of AGs can enforce corporate claims 
against directors; such a right does not exist in GmbHs. 
Second, before the UMAG, the minority shareholders could not initiate the 
action in their own names. Instead, they had to ask the corporate body or the 
special representative to bring the action in the name of the company. The UMAG 
has now changed this approach. 
Third, the minority shareholders' right under German law is a group right as 
opposed to an individual right as is the case in Anglo-American law. Only share-
holders who pass the capital threshold can enforce corporate claims. This group 
approach has been taken for more than one hundred years in Germany. When the 
predecessor of the current section 148 was adopted in 1884, the legislators 
rejected the individual approach, fearing that to give an individual shareholder the 
right to enforce corporate claims would unjustly interfere with corporate 
management. 260 Although the law has been amended several times since then, the 
group approach has continued to be followed, despite the dispute over whether an 
individual approach should be adopted in Germany.261 
The group right approach, as a German feature, has attracted much debate. 
The argument for the group right approach is that the capital threshold, as a 
method of preventing strike suits, is objective and easy to enforce. Therefore, 
broad interference in the suit by the courts is not necessary. This may be more 
suitable for Germany, which is not a case-law country and traditionally does not 
grant very much discretion to the courts. Contrarily, there are also arguments 
against the capital threshold. The major reason is that 'bright-line rules always 
run the risk of being both under-and-over-inclusive' .262 On the one hand, no 
matter what the threshold is, there may always be 'small' shareholders who cannot 
meet the requirement but want to bring an action against misconduct. Injuries 
may not be compensated if such an action cannot be allowed. On the other hand, 
the capital threshold only, no matter how high it is, cannot guarantee that all 
actions initiated by the minority group of shareholders are in the best interests of 
the company. The minority group of shareholders may pursue the action for their 
own group interests, for example, using the action as a weapon against the 
majority shareholders. Moreover, any minimum capital holding requirement is 
arbitrary. 
The fourth feature of the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate 
claims under German law is that this right may not be blocked by the negative 
litigation decision of the shareholders' meeting or the supervisory board. 
260 See Hirt (2004b), pp. 280-281. 
261 Hirt (2004b), p. 281; also see Singhof & Seiler (1998), pp. 566-567. 
262 Singhof & Seiler (1998), p. 567; Hirt (2004b), pp. 308-309. 
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Although the UMAG requires that the qualified minority shareholders should 
first make a demand on the company before they initiate the preliminary 
procedure, the refusal of the company to sue will not be able to prevent them from 
initiating the preliminary procedure. 
Lastly, the minority shareholders alone, especially a small group of minority 
shareholders alone, may not be considered an appropriate body to make a 
corporate litigation decision. Therefore, an outside trustee such as the special 
representative or the court may be granted the power to make this litigation 
decision. I will discuss this in the following section. 
An outside trustee such as the special representative or the court 
Fearing that a small group of minority shareholders may abuse their right to 
enforce corporate claims, the former section 147(3) of the AktG (1998) and the 
current section 148 of the AktG (the UMAG) has taken the approach of adopting 
both the decision-right sh·ategy and the trusteeship strategy. In other words, 
qualified minority shareholders only have the right to trigger an action for the 
company, while an outside trustee, such as the special representative under the 
former section 147(3) of the AktG (1998) or the court under the current section 
148 oftheAktG (the UMAG), will be the one who makes the final decision as to 
whether to bring or allow such an action. 
4.5.2.2 The trend towards the Anglo-American model of strildng a 
balance between co,porate efficiency and protection of the 
interests of the company and the minority shareholders 
As mentioned, traditionally the minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate 
claims has been restricted under German law. Before the KonTraG in 1998, 
minority shareholders in German A Gs faced high capital thresholds for enforcing 
corporate claims against directors. As a result, there were few other restrictions 
placed on this minority's right and there were no mechanisms created for 
protecting directors since any opportunity for the minority to abuse this right was 
extremely rare. On the one hand, section 147(3) of the AktG (1998) which was 
inserted by the KonTraG has lowered the threshold, but, on the other hand, has 
placed more restrictions on the minority's right to initiate the assertion of 
corporate claims. The most important feature of these restrictions was that of 
granting the special representatives the power to decide whether to assert that 
claim. However, this section has not proved successful in practice. 
Partly due to the failure of the former section 14 7 and partly due to the influence 
of Anglo-American law, where more attention is paid to the liability rules, the 
UMAG, it seems, has turned to the Anglo-American approach in order to make 
the rules for the minority's right to enforce corporate claims. This can be il-
lustrated by the following changes. First, the minority's right to enforce corporate 
claims has been facilitated. Derivative actions in the common law sense are now 
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allowed. This at least procedurally facilitates the minority shareholders' right to 
enforce corporate claims. More significantly, the lower capital threshold makes 
the right available to more minority shareholders. Although the individual ap-
proach is still rejected, the new threshold represents considerable progress under 
German law. Second, the minority shareholders may also bring a derivative action 
against the controlling shareholders. Third, as a consequence of the strengthened 
right of the minority, the UMAG has also provided more protection for corporate 
management in order to strike a fair balance. There are more restrictions, both 
substantively and procedurally, on the minority's right to bring a derivative action. 
Moreover, a statutory business judgment rule has been introduced to provide 
more protection for directors. Fourth, the court has been awarded more power and 
discretion through the two-stage procedure. Of course, whether the Anglo-








Introduction to Chinese law on derivative actions 
Background 
The histmy of Chinese company law 
Historically the Chinese corporate system and company law are the result of 
transplantation. The business organization of the company did not develop 
naturally in China but was transplanted from Western countries. In the late 19th 
century (Qing Dynasty), China fell behind Western countries economically and 
suffered from invasions by Western countries. It was at that time that the concept 
of the company was introduced into China because the corporate system was 
regarded as one reason for the economic development found in Western countries. 
The earliest Chinese companies were established in order to achieve economic 
progress. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Qing Dynasty, under pressure 
from Western countries, began drafting commercial laws including company law 
in order to regulate companies and facilitate economic development. These laws 
were mainly inspired by the laws of Western countries, especially German and 
Japanese law. In 1904 (Qing Dynasty) the first Chinese Company Law (Gongsilu) 
was enacted and came into force. It was one of the earliest commercial acts in 
Chinese history. Companies and company law continued to be developed in 
China up until 1949. 
However, the development of the corporate system turned out not to be as 
successful as had been expected. Many reasons, such as social instability, foreign 
monopolies, bureau monopolies and corruption, might well account for this 
unsatisfactory development. But, in addition, it was undeniable that the gap 
between the Western corporate system and traditional Chinese culture also 
contributed to this lack of success. 1 For example, the Western corporate system 
requires the operation of the company to be subject to laws and rules, corporate 
law must balance the interests of the various participants, and democracy and 
publicity is needed so as to achieve this balance. However, at that time in China 
For a detailed discussion of this gap, please refer to Li X. (1997). 
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the ideas of one-man rule and the patriarchal clan system were deeply rooted, 
while both democracy and publicity were unfamiliar. As far as company law was 
concerned, this gap led to poor protection for minority shareholders. Actually, 
there were few regulations in company law which provided any protection for 
minority shareholders and even those regulations that did exist were hardly ever 
complied with. For example, the shareholders' meeting hardly played any role, 
since the company was generally regarded as belonging to the controlling 
shareholder and corporate management was generally controlled by this control-
ling shareholder. 
During the period between 1949 and 1978, all companies were gradually replaced 
by state-owned enterprises due to the adoption of a planned economic system by 
the Communist government. As a result, companies and company law in the sense 
of Western countries ceased to develop. It was not until the end of the 1970s that 
the situation began to change. Beginning in 1978 China commenced economic 
reforms, aimed at transforming the planned economy into one in which market 
forces played an increasingly important role. The reforms began with the opening 
of China to foreign trade and investment. Later they were further developed step 
by step to cover various other aspects. One important aspect of these economic 
reforms has been the reform of state-owned enterprises (referred to as 'SOE'), 
which were notorious both for inefficient management and for the de facto 
absence of any owner's control. Several reform strategies had been tried one after 
another, such as increasing the enterprise's autonomy, clarifying the enterprise's 
financial goals through contracts between the enterprise and the relative govern-
ment departments, leasing the enterprise, and increasing the responsibility of 
factory directors. Despite this, each of the strategies had their own deficiencies 
and none of them proved satisfactory. In the end reform focused on corpora-
tization of the SOEs, or in other words, reorganizing and reforming the SOEs 
according to the corporate system.2 At the same time, privately owned companies 
and foreign-investment enterprises and companies were also being developed. 
The Chinese legal system was being constructed at the same time as these 
economic reforms were taking place. Laws and regulations governing enterprises 
were being published and implemented. Since the economic reforms began by 
allowing foreign investment in China, the first enterprise law was 'the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Joint Equity Ventures' in 1979. This 
was followed by two other foreign investment enterprise laws: 'the Law of the 
People's Republic of China Concerning Enterprises With Sole Foreign Invest-
ment' in 1986 and 'the Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign 
Cooperative Joint Ventures' in 1988. Nevertheless, there was no statutory law 
concerning companies in general until 1994. Before the enforcement of Company 
2 A result of the reform was that the 1994 company law served the interests of reform. 
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Law 1994, domestic companies were regulated by scattered ordinances, local 
regulations, and governmental rules.3 
On December 29, 1993, the Company Law of the People's Republic of China 
was promulgated, which was effective as of July 1, 1994. Like the German 
company law, the Chinese Company Law also classified two types of companies: 
limited liability companies [You Xian Ze Ren Gong Si] (including the wholly 
state-owned companies), which are equivalent to Western private companies or 
close companies, and companies limited by shares (or stock companies) [Gu Fen 
You Xian Gong Si], which are equivalent to Western public companies. These two 
types of companies were regulated separately in certain aspects, such as fom1a-
tion of a company and the organizational structure, but uniformly in other aspects 
such as general principles, corporate bonds, financial affairs and accounting, 
merger and division, and dissolution and liquidation. Companies subjected to the 
regulation of the Company Law had to be constituted as 'limited liability com-
panies' or 'companies limited by shares.' Otherwise, other laws would be 
applicable, even if the name of the business organization included the term 'com-
pany.' This technique of legislation has been followed by Company Law 2006. 
One important feature of Company Law 1994 was that it was purported to 
serve in the reform of the SOEs. Therefore, many articles including the regula-
tions on corporate governance in the Company Law reflected this purpose.4 For 
example, according to the Company Law the shareholders' meeting was superior 
to other intra-corporate bodies and the board of directors and the supervisory 
board had to be responsible to the shareholders' meeting.5 However, although the 
intent of this law did play an important role in reforming the SOEs and did 
3 Such as the regulations on privately owned limited liability companies in 'Zhonghuaren-
mingongheguo Siying Qiye Zanxing Tiaoli [the PRC's Provisional Regulations on Privately 
Owned Enterprises],' which was promulgated on June 25, 1988; 'Shenzhen Shi Gufenyouxian-
gongsi Zanxing Guiding [the Provisional Regulations on Stock Companies of Shenzhen],' 
which was established on May 18, 1992. The most important governmental rules included 
'Gufenyouxiangongsi Guifan Yijian [Opinion on Standards for Companies Limited by Shares]' 
and 'Youxianzerengongsi Guifan Yijian [Opinion on Standards for Limited Liability 
Companies],' which were published by the State's Commission on the Restructuring of the 
Economic System ('CRES') on May 15, 1992. 
4 Other articles include, for example, article 4 of Company Law 1994, which stipulated that 
'Ownership of the State-owned assets in a company belongs to the state.' Article 5: 'Under the 
state's macro regulation and control adjustment, a company organizes its production and 
operations autonomously according to market demand with the objective of raising economic 
efficiency and labor productivity and preserving and increasing the value of assets.' Article 7: 
'A state owned enterprise which is being reorganized as a company shall replace its system of 
operation, gradually and systematically take inventory of its assets and verify its capital, 
determine property rights, clear creditors' rights and indebtedness, value assets and set up a 
standardized internal management structure in accordance with the law and conditions and 
requirements of administrative regulations.' Chapter 2, Subchapter 3 (articles 64 to 72) of 
Company Law 1994 regulated the wholly state-owned companies. 
5 See, for example, articles 37, 38, 46, 102, 103 and 112 of Company Law 1994. 
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accelerate economic development, it also led to a serious deficiency in Company 
Law 1994: Company Law 1994 barely restricted the power of the majority 
shareholders and provided little protection for minority shareholders. 
Due to the progress of Chinese economic reform and the development of the 
corporate system, the 1994 Company Law became outdated. It was criticized for 
many problems, such as the high thresholds for establishing new companies and 
unfavorable restrictions hindering investment, as well as a lack of mechanisms for 
preventing abuse of power by majority shareholders and directors and for 
providing protection for the company and minority shareholders. Therefore, a 
reform of Company Law 1994 was proposed shortly after its implementation. 
Although the Company Law was amended twice, in December 1999 and in 
August 2004 respectively, these amendments were very minor and had no 
significant influence on major corporate issues, including corporate governance.6 
On October 27, 2005, the broadly amended Company Law was publicized and 
then came into force as of January 1, 2006. The amendments in this new company 
law cover several aspects. For example, they reduce the thresholds for setting up 
a new company, allow for the one-person company, and give the company more 
autonomy. The law also improves the strncture of corporate governance and 
provides more protection for the company as well as for minority shareholders. 
5.1.1.2 Characteristics of the regulations on corporate governance in 
Chinese company law 
The regulations on corporate governance in Chinese company law have certain 
characteristics which reflect the civil law tradition of Chinese company law and 
its special purpose. 
Firstly, in both limited liability companies and stock companies the shareholders' 
general meeting is superior to other corporate bodies. At least three aspects in 
Company Law 1994 have reflected this shareholder supremacy: (1) the share-
holders' general meeting was regarded as the company's authoritative organi-
zation.7 (2) The shareholders' general meeting had wide power over corporate 
management.8 (3) The board of directors was responsible to the shareholders' 
6 Therefore, I will not discuss these two amendments here. 
7 Articles 37 and 102 of Company Law 1994. 
8 Article 38 of Company Law 1994 stipulated that the shareholders' meeting of limited liability 
companies had the power: '(l) to decide on the company's operational policies and investment 
plans; 
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(3) to elect and replace the supervisors who are representatives of the shareholders, and decide 
on matters relating to the remuneration of supervisors; 
( 4) to examine and approve reports of the board of directors; 
(5) to examine and approve reports of the board of supervisors or any supervisor(s); ➔ 
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meeting. 9 Therefore, the shareholder's position as a whole has been strengthened 
in the sense that the general meeting has more power to deal with corporate 
management. The reason behind shareholder supremacy in Company Law 1994 
was, at least partly, that Company Law 1994 was intended to serve as a reform 
tool for state-owned enterprises. In order to maintain the state's control of the 
enterprises, the shareholders had to be given adequate power to control corporate 
management. This, however, could have had the side effect that the controlling 
shareholder would have been able to abuse his power if there was no restriction 
on such power. As will be seen later, this abusive use of power by controlling 
shareholders actually has been a serious problem in Chinese corporate gover-
nance. 
The amended Company Law 2006 still adheres to the trend of shareholder 
supremacy. The above-mentioned articles in Company Law 1994 have been 
retained in Company Law 2006. 10 Nevertheless, a significant improvement in 
Company Law 2006 is that it contains several regulations which restrict the power 
of the controlling shareholders and protect the interests of the companies and 
minority shareholders. 11 
Secondly, as in Germany, Chinese company law has adopted a two-tier system. 
That is, a supervisory board, or one or two supervisors in small limited liability 
companies, is required in order to supervise the board of directors. It stipulates 
that the supervisory board shall be composed of representatives of the 
shareholders and members elected by the staff and workers of the company and 
that the supervisors elected by the staff and workers shall not be less than one-
third of the board. 12 However, in practice the function the supervisory board or 
the supervisors has played has not been satisfactory. 13 Therefore, in order to 
strengthen control over the board of directors in listed companies, the Chinese 
( 6) to examine and approve the company's proposed annual financial budget and final 
accounts; 
(7) to examine and approve the company's plans for profit distribution and recovery of losses; 
(8) to decide on increases in or reductions of the company's registered capital; 
(9) to decide on the issue of bonds by the company; 
(10) to decide on transfers of capital contribution by shareholders to a person other than a 
shareholder; 
( 11) to decide on issues such as merger, division, change in corporate form or dissolution and 
liquidation of the company; 
(12) to amend the company's articles of association.' 
The shareholders' general meeting of stock companies had similar power; see article 103 of 
Company Law 1994. 
9 Articles 46 and 112 of Company Law 1994. 
10 See articles 37, 38, 47, 99, 100, and 109 of Company Law 2006, contrasting articles 37, 38, 
46, 102, 103, and 112 of Company Law 1994, respectively. 
11 For a more detailed discussion, please refer to Section 5.1.1.4.3.1. 
12 Articles 52 and 118 of Company Law 2006. 
13 For the reasons, see Section 5.1.1.4.3.1. 
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Securities Regulation Commission (the CSRC) has introduced the mechanism of 
independent directors. The CSRC's 'Guidelines for Introducing Independent 
Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies 2001' requires that listed 
companies fill one third of their boards with independent directors. 14 As a result, 
currently in Chinese listed companies there exist both independent directors as 
well as a supervisory board. 
Thirdly, the 'legal representative' of a company plays an important role in 
corporate governance. 'The legal representative' is a special concept in Chinese 
law. According to article 38 of the 'General Principles of the Civil Law of the 
People's Republic of China,' the legal representative of a legal person is 'the 
responsible person who acts on behalf of the legal person in exercising its 
functions and powers' in accordance with the law or the articles of association of 
the legal person. Company Law 1994 stipulated that the legal representative of a 
company should be the chairperson of the board of directors or the executive 
director in small limited liability companies where there was no board of direc-
tors.15 
Although the legal representative is not a corporate body and the power to 
make a corporate decision still lies with the board of directors rather than with the 
legal representative, he does play an important role in corporate business since he 
represents the company vis-a-vis a third party by exercising the board's decision 
under both substantive and procedural law. For example, article 49 of Chinese 
Civil Procedure Law requires that 'a legal person shall be represented by its legal 
representative in the proceedings.' 
However, it may become problematic if only the legal representative is able to 
act on behalf of the company vis-a-vis third parties. Most importantly, when the 
legal representative is unable or unwilling to represent the company, or his 
representation would lead to a conflict of interest between himself and the 
company, who should replace him and represent the company? Under Company 
Law 1994, the only way to do this was to change the chairperson of the board, 
since he was the legal representative according to the law. Nevertheless, this 
change was time-consuming and costly. It was not suitable in an everyday 
business context. Recognizing the problem of the legal representative in 
Company Law 1994, Company Law 2006 broadens the scope of candidates for 
legal representative and gives the company more freedom to choose legal 
representatives. Article 13 of Company Law 2006 stipulates that according to the 
articles of association, the chairperson of the board of directors, executive 
directors or the manager can be the legal representative(s) of a company; it is 
uncertain whether there can be more than one legal representative in a company 
or not. However, the amendment to Company Law 2006 may not totally solve the 
problem of the legal representative. Since only one or a few directors or managers 
14 Article 1(3) of the Guidelines. 
15 Articles 45, 68 and 113 of Company Law 1994. 
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may be the legal representative(s), and since the articles of association must be 
amended in order to change the legal representative(s) and the change must be 
registered, the problem that the company might end up not being justly 
represented still exists under the new law. The solution may well be that the 
representative should not be settled on ex ante and that the company should have 
the freedom to choose its representative in any given case. 
The fourth characteristic of corporate governance in China is that minority 
shareholders are in a weak position. I will discuss this feature in detail in Section 
5.1.1.4.2. 
5.1.1.3 The major agency problems in Chinese companies 
As we know, the derivative action is a mechanism that provides protection for the 
company and minority shareholders against the misconduct of corporate con-
trollers, that is, the majority shareholders and/or the directors. We also note that 
due to its defects, the derivative action is here more effective against the directors 
than against the controlling shareholders. 16 Therefore, it is important to identify 
the major agency problems in Chinese companies in order to observe the position 
of minority shareholders and the function of derivative actions. 
The agency problems in limited liability companies 
As in Western countries, in Chinese limited liability companies there are only a 
few shareholders (no more than fifty shareholders17) and normally these share-
holders take part in corporate management. Therefore, the major agency problem 
in Chinese limited liability companies is also the conflict between the controlling 
shareholders and the non-conh·olling shareholders. We should note, however, that 
due to the system of the legal representative, the controlling shareholder is not 
necessarily the one who owns the majority of share capital; instead, the share-
holder, who controls the legal representative, may be the controlling shareholder. 
For example, in the cases of Zhongtian v. Bichun, etc. 18, Zhongtian Co., as a 
shareholder, held sixty percent of the capital of the joint venture named Yanzhong 
Co. Nevertheless, Yanzhong Co. was controlled by the second largest shareholder, 
Yanzhongshiye, which owned thirty per cent of the capital ofYanzhong since the 
legal representative ofYanzhong was on its side. 
Where the controlling shareholder is the state, there may also be conflict between 
the shareholders and the directors of the company. In China, local offices of the 
Bureau of State Property Management (the BSPM) exercise the shareholder's 
16 Section 1.3. 
17 Article 20 of Company Law 1994; article 24 of Company Law 2006. 
18 No. 2 Intermediate People's Courts of Shanghai, (1996) Hu Er Zhong Jing Chu (Zhi) No. 529, 
in Li C. (1999), pp. 321-330. 
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rights on behalf of the state. However, the BSPM may not perform its function 
well and the shareholder rights of the state may not be exercised. Therefore, the 
company may be in the control of the directors and/or officers of the company; in 
China this situation is called 'insider controls.' 
The agency problems in stock companies 
Both agency problems mentioned above also exist in stock companies, including 
listed companies. The major agency problem in Chinese stock companies is still 
the conflict between majority and minority shareholders. In fact, the most serious 
problem in Chinese stock companies is the misconduct of the controlling 
shareholders. It is common for the conh·olling shareholders to misappropriate the 
corporate assets by related-party transactions or in other ways. Several factors 
may account for the situation. The first is the highly concentrated shareholding 
shucture in stock companies. In China, even in listed companies, the share-
holding shucture is normally highly concentrated. Jin Xin conducted a statistical 
research project. He studied 425 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges from April 1999 to April 2003. 19 The statistics show that there were 
228 companies (fifty-four percent of the sample companies) in which the largest 
shareholder owned more than fifty percent of the shares. The following table is 
based on his study20 : 
The degree of concentration of shares in the 425 sample companies 
The percentage of shares 


















Percentage of the total 









Another characteristic of the shareholding structure in listed companies is that in 
most of the listed companies the largest shareholder is the state or state-
owned/controlled entities. This is also shown in Jin Xin's study. In 338 of the 425 
sample companies (79.5%) the largest shareholder was the state or state-
owned/controlled entities.21 This high concentration of shareholding structure, as 
19 Jin (2005), pp. 76-77. 
20 Jin (2005), Figure 6-4, pp. 76-77. 
21 Jin (2005), p. 76. 
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well as the special position of the state or state-owned/controlled entities, together 
easily leads to a situation in which the listed companies are controlled by the 
controlling shareholder(s). 
Second, even in the listed companies where the shareholding strncture is not 
highly concentrated, the largest shareholder, who normally holds less than twenty 
percent of the shares, still controls the management of the company.22 The largest 
shareholder is normally an industrial enterprise rather than an investment 
institution; its major purpose is to control the management of the company rather 
than to maximize profits through dividends or by an increase in share price. 
Third, as mentioned, from the beginning the corporate system was regarded as 
taking on the role of reform in state-owned enterprises. In China, many stock 
companies, especially listed companies, were originally traditional stated-owned 
enterprises and the state or state-owned/controlled entities normally owned the 
majority of the corporate shares. Preserving and increasing the value of state 
properties is at least one of the main purpose( s) of such companies. However, this 
purpose may be in conflict with the interests of the company and of minority 
shareholders. 
Fourth, as mentioned, the patriarchal system has long been deeply rooted in 
Chinese culture and there has been a lack of democracy throughout this long 
history; it is common for the controlling shareholder to consider the company to 
be his own property. 
Fifth, due to the special situation in Chinese stock markets, where in most 
listed companies only a small portion of shares are freely tradable on the stock 
exchanges, there is no market mechanism for disciplining the conduct of the 
controlling shareholders, who normally own non-tradable shares.23 
Last but not least, before Company Law 2006 there were few regulations for 
disciplining the conduct of the controlling shareholders and for providing 
protection for the company and minority shareholders. Therefore, the controlling 
shareholder could abuse his rights almost without restriction or penalty. 
The conflict between shareholders and directors/officers also exists in stock 
companies, especially in the companies where the controlling shareholder is the 
state. The reason is the same as that for limited liability companies. 
22 An exception is China Minsheng Banking Corp., Ltd; see Jin (2005), p. 116. 
23 In China the shares of listed companies are divided into tradable shares which can be freely 
transferred on the stock exchanges and non-tradable shares which cannot. Most state-owned 
shares and legal-person-owned shares are non-tradable, while shares owned by individuals are 
tradable. However, recognizing the defects in this distinction, China has been engaged in a 
reform, known as the 'Equity Division Reform (Gu Quan Fen Zhi Gai Ge),' to make the non-




To summarize, in both limited liability companies and stock companies the 
agency problems are almost the same, although the reasons for the problems and 
the kinds of misconduct may be different. 
5.1.1.4 
5.1.1.4.1 
A general review of the protection for minority shareholders 
provided by Chinese company law 
Sources of Chinese law providing protection for companies and 
minority shareholders 
The major source of Chinese law, which provides protection for companies and 
minority shareholders, is statutory legislation including the Company Law and 
the Securities Law. The Company Law regulates issues with regard to corporate 
governance and provides protection for companies and minority shareholders in 
general. The Securities Law, through regulations on information, disclosure, and 
market transparency, etc., also has the effect of protecting stock companies and 
the minority shareholders therein. 
In addition to the statutes, judicial interpretations of the Supreme People's Court 
(SPC) also play an important role in regulating corporate issues. Judicial 
interpretations of the Supreme People's Court range from its reply on a specific 
issue raised by lower courts when hearing a case, to its general guidelines on how 
to apply a law.24 Although China is traditionally regarded as a civil-law country 
and there is no principle of stare decisis, the SPC's judicial interpretations are 
considered as an authoritative source of law in China. There are four regulations 
which grant the SPC the power to interpret law: 'Decisions on Issues Regarding 
Interpretation of Law' issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress, the highest legislative body in China, in May 1955; article 33 of 'The 
Law on the Organization of People's Courts' passed on July 1, 1979; 'The 
Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 
Strengthening the Work of the Interpretation of Law' passed on June 10, 1981; 
and 'The Rules of the Supreme People's Court on the Work of Judicial Inter-
pretation' issued by the SPC on June 23, 1997. The SPC's Rules of 1997 regulate 
in detail the judicial interpretations' legal effect, drafting procedures, enforce-
ment, tidying up, codification and so on. For example, article 14 of the SPC's 
Rules holds that when judicial interpretations, together with laws and regulations, 
24 Judicial interpretations can be found in the Gazette of the Supreme People's Court which is the 
only official publication of the Court and is published several times every year. An English 
version of the Gazette, as well as the Chinese version, can be found on http://www.isinolaw. 
com. For a more detailed introduction to judicial interpretations in China, please see Zhai 




are the basis of a court's judgments (pan jue) or decrees ( cai ding), they should be 
adduced therein.25 As a result, the judicial interpretations of the Supreme People's 
Court are legally binding on all lower courts in adjudicating cases unless 
otherwise specified and are regarded as just as important as the law made by 
legislative bodies. 
Regulations of the China Securities Regulation Committee (the CSRC) also play 
an important role in protecting the listed companies and minority shareholders 
therein against the misconduct of controlling shareholders and directors/of-
ficers.26 Since Company Law 1994 and Securities Law 1999 were inefficient in 
governing the acts of controlling shareholders, as well as directors, and barely 
provided any protection for minority shareholders, the CSRC has enacted several 
new regulations in order to supplement these statutes. The nature of the CSRC's 
regulations may be different. The regulations enacted and issued under the 
authorization of the State Council are hard law27, while others are soft law.28 
Nevertheless, the CSRC's soft law is also in practice enforceable since the CSRC 
may take measures against the companies, such as preventing the companies from 
listing29, if they do not follow the soft law. The main regulations of the CSRC 
have included, for example, 'Provisional Regulations for the Administration of 
25 See SPC's Gazette, Vol. 3 of 1997 (Vol. 51 in general), p. 96. Under Chinese law, a judgment 
means a court's decision concerning substantive issues of the case and is made when the court 
closes the case. A decree is a court's decision, which mostly concerns procedural issues of the 
case, but sometime also concerns substantive issues; a decree can be made at any stage of the 
case. 
26 The CSRC was established in October 1992, as the executive branch of the State Council 
Securities Committee (SCSC), which was established at the same time. In April 1998, the 
SCSC and the CSRC were merged to form one unit directly under the State Council, which is 
the current CSRC. After the reform both the power and the functions of the CSRC were 
strengthened. Now it is the department authorized to govern the securities and futures markets 
in China. For a more detailed introduction to the CSRC, please refer to the website of the 
CSRC: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/homepage/about_en.jsp (last visited: May 2006). The 
regulations of the CSRC I have mentioned here include those issued by the former SCSC; 
nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, I will not make a distinction. 
27 Such as 'Provisional Regulations for the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Shares' 
(1993), and 'Provisional Measures on the Prohibition of Securities Fraud' (1993). 
28 Such as 'Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies' (1997) (amended in 
2006), 'General Requirements of the Shareholders Meeting of Listed Companies' (2000) 
(amended in 2006), 'Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of 
Directors of Listed Companies' (2001), and 'Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies' (2002). 
29 Before 2000 all companies which were planning on being listed on the stock exchanges had to 
get the approval of the CSRC. Since March 2001, this approval system has been transformed 
into a verification system. Under the verification system, the approval of the CSRC is no 
longer necessary for the company to be listed; nevertheless, the CSRC will still examine and 
verify the documents for listing which are submitted by the company and, ifnecessary, disallow 
the company's being listed. Therefore, practically speaking, the CSRC still has the power to 
decide whether a company can be listed or not. 
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the Issuing and Trading of Shares' (1993), 'Implementation Rules for the 
Disclosure of Information by Companies Issuing Shares to the Public' (1993), 
'Provisional Measures on the Prohibition of Securities Fraud' (1993), 'Guidelines 
for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies' (1997) (amended in 2006), 
'General Requirements of the Shareholders' Meeting for Listed Companies' 
(2000) (amended in 2006), 'Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to 
the Board of Directors of Listed Companies' (2001), 'Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies' (2002), and 'Regulations for the Protection of 
Individual Shareholders' Rights' (2004). 
5 .1.1.4 .2 Legal protection for minority shareholders prior to Company 
Law 2006 
5.1.1.4.2.1 General characteristics 
Generally, compared with that of majority shareholders and managers, the 
minority shareholders' position is rather weak in China. On the one hand, there is 
no mechanism of market controls to protect minority shareholders, even those in 
listed companies, against the misconduct of majority shareholders and corporate 
managers. Chinese stock markets are notorious for speculation, disorder, and lack 
of protection for investors. On the other hand, legal protection for minority 
shareholders prior to Company Law 2006 was also insufficient. Company Law 
1994 barely played any role in preventing misconduct by the controlling share-
holders and directors and in protecting minority shareholders. Although there are 
rules promulgated by the CSRC, which are intended to protect investors in listed 
companies, these rules are scattered and unsystematic; in addition, they only 
provide limited and low-level protection. To make matters worse, Chinese courts 
have been reluctant to hear civil cases arising from misconduct in securities 
markets.30 
5.1.1.4.2.2 Company Law 1994 
We should take a look at Western law on the issue of providing legal protection 
for minority shareholders before we examine Company Law 1994, in order to 
judge the latter better. The Western experience shows that in addition to the basic 
rights provided to shareholders in general, company law also provides special 
protection for minority shareholders due to their naturally weak position (mainly 
caused by the majority rule principle). The shareholders' basic rights are those 
enjoyed by them in respect to their status as members of the company, the 
property rights attached to the shares, such as the right of participation in 
management, the right to profits, and the right to assets upon winding-up, as well 
as the procedural rights to enforce these rights.31 Specifically, these include the 
30 See Section 5.2.2.3.2. 
31 Swart (1996), at p. xii. 
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right to call and attend the general meeting of shareholders, the right to vote, the 
right to information, the right to inspect corporate books and records, the right to 
have the constitution followed, the right to dividends (the right to participation in 
the profits), the right to remedies when the rights have been infringed upon, and 
so on. Some of these rights can be enjoyed individually, while others have to be 
exercised collectively. 
However, these basic rights are not sufficient to protect minority shareholders. 
Company law in Western countries also provides special protection for minority 
shareholders, which is mainly aimed at preventing the abuse of power by the 
majority shareholders and/or the management. Generally a plurality of mecha-
nisms has been developed in order to protect the interests of the company and the 
minority shareholders. Hansmann and Kraakman classify the legal strategies to 
protect minority shareholders as the appointment-rights sh·ategy, the decision-
rights strategy, the husteeship strategy, the reward strategy, the constraints 
strategy, and the affiliation-rights strategy.32 Specifically, the mechanisms include 
(1) the appointment rights33; (2) the decision rights granted to minority 
shareholders individually or as a group to positively participate in management or 
negatively block a majority shareholders' decision; (3) rules restricting the power 
of controlling shareholders, which include ex ante prevention of conflict of 
interest, duties owed by the controlling shareholders to the company and/or the 
minority shareholders; ( 4) rules restricting the power of management; (5) ex post 
remedies where the misconduct has already occurred; ( 6) protection under special 
circumstances such as change of control (merger), dilution of capital; (7) right to 
information (including mandatory disclosure).34 
Company Law 1994 also provided basic rights to shareholders in general. For 
example, article 4 of the law in principle provided that '[t]he shareholders of a 
company, as capital contributors, have the right to enjoy the benefits of the assets 
of the company, make major decisions, choose managers, etc., in accordance with 
the amount of capital they have invested in the company.' Specifically, the law 
provided the right to attend the general meeting of shareholders and the right to 
vote,35 the right to inspect corporate books and records36, the right to dividends 
(the right to participation in profits)37, the preemption right38, and the right to 
remedy when the shareholder's right was infringed upon.39 
32 Kraakman et al. (2004), at pp. 54-60. 
33 Even for minority shareholders it is important to have a board seat, see Kraakman et al. (2004), 
p. 54. 
34 Regulations on information, disclosure, and market transparency, etc., have the side-effect of 
protecting minority shareholders; see Timmerman & A. Doorman (2004), I.4, 12, pp. 498-499. 
35 Articles 37, 41, 102, 106 of Company Law 1994. 
36 Articles 32, 110 of Company Law 1994. 
37 Article 33 of Company Law 1994. 
38 Article 33 of Company Law 1994. 
3 9 Article 111 of Company Law 1994. 
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However, compared with Western law, the special protection for minority 
shareholders, especially against the controlling shareholders, was rather weak 
under Company Law 1994. This was at least partly due to the fact that the law was 
intended to serve in the reformation of state-owned enterprises. There may also 
be another reason: Chinese law traditionally has focused more on criminal and 
administrative fines and penalties than on civil remedies and therefore has 
neglected to provide protection for minority shareholders. 
Several features may be identified as far as special protection for minority 
shareholders under Company Law 1994 is concerned. First, there were only a few 
scattered provisions which provided protection for minority shareholders. For 
example, shareholders representing more than one-fourth of the voting rights in 
limited liability companies40 or holding more than ten percent of the shares of 
stock companies41 were awarded the right to request that an interim shareholders' 
meeting be convened. Shareholders representing one-third of voting rights in 
limited liability companies and shareholders representing one-third of the voting 
rights of the shareholders, who were present at the general meeting of stock 
companies, were awarded the right to block important decisions such as alteration 
of the articles of association, the increase or reduction of registered capital, and 
the division, merger, dissolution, or transformation of the company.42 In addition, 
article 111 granted an individual shareholder the right to action with respect to 
defective resolutions of the shareholders and/or the boards. However, other 
mechanisms protecting minority shareholders, such as the right to propose share-
older resolutions, the right for a class of shareholders to be entitled to vote sepa-
rately on issues affecting their own rights, or various remedies such as derivative 
actions and exit rights for shareholders in limited liability companies, were not 
provided for. 
Second, these few provisions were generally ambiguous and difficult to apply 
in practice. For example, as mentioned, articles 43 and 104(3) granted a small 
group of minority shareholders the right to request that an interim shareholders' 
meeting be convened. However, whether such a group of minority shareholders 
had the right to convene an interim shareholders' meeting, where the board had 
refused to do so upon their request, is unclear. Another example is article 111, 
which I will discuss in detail in Section 5.1.2.1.1. 
Third, provisions regarding the director's agency problem did exist, but were 
not effective in practice. Company Law 1994 recognized the possibility for 
directors and officers to abuse their power and therefore adopted several 
mechanisms to discipline the directors and officers. These mechanisms included, 
for example, the requirement of a supervisory board or supervisors in the 
company to supervise the board of directors43; eligibility requirements for 
40 Article 43 of Company Law 1994. 
41 Article 104(3) of Company Law 1994. 
42 Articles 39, 40, 106 and 107 of Company Law 1994. 
43 Articles 52-54, 124-128 of Company Law 1994. 
254 
CHINA 
directors (restrictions on who can be a director)44; fiduciary duties imposed on 
directors and managers and liabilities to the company if they have breached their 
duties and injured the company45; and administrative and criminal liabilities in 
certain situations.46 However, these mechanisms were not effective in practice. 
For example, the supervisory board or supervisors did not perform the anticipated 
task of supervision47; directors were rarely held liable for a breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
Fourth, in Company Law 1994 there were almost no restrictions on the 
controlling shareholders. For example, there were no fiduciary duties, no 
cumulative voting48, and no restriction on voting in the case of a related-party 
transaction. 
5.1.1.4.2.3 Other legislation 
Theoretically, investors may also rely on other legislation to protect themselves. 
For example, the PRC 's General Principles of Civil Law provides that tort victims 
are entitled to civil compensation if they have suffered losses.49 Securities Law 
also provides that issuers, underwriters and the responsible directors and officers 
therein should be liable for the investors' losses if there have been false or 
misleading statements or material omissions in disclosure documents.50 However, 
as will be seen in the following section, it may be difficult for the injured 
investors to seek legal remedies in practice. 
5.1.1.4.2.4 The SPC's judicial interpretations 
The SPC has played an important role in the legal system by issuing judicial 
interpretations, which as mentioned are also regarded as an authoritative source 
oflaw in China. This role, as far as providing protection for minority shareholders 
is concerned, may be twofold. On the one hand, the SPC may promote protection 
for minority shareholders. For example, the SPC acknowledged derivative actions 
by judicial interpretation even before company legislation had provided for it.51 
44 Articles 57-58, 123, and 128 of Company Law 1994. 
45 Articles 59-63, 123, and 128 of Company Law 1994. We should note that this law did not 
stipulate that the director owed in general a fiduciary duty to the company. 
46 Chapter 10 of Company Law 1994. 
47 For a detailed discussion of the function of the supervisory board, please refer to Section 
5.1.1.4.3.1. 
48 Cumulative voting is a voting system which gives minority shareholders more power by 
allowing them to obtain representation on the board of directors. Under the regular voting 
system, a shareholder must vote for a different candidate for each available seat. However, 
when voting cumulatively, a shareholder can multiply the number of his shares by the number 
of seats of directors and cast this multiplied number of votes for a single candidate. 
49 Such as articles 106 and 117 of the General Principles of Civil Law. 
50 Article 63 of Securities Law 1999; article 69 of Securities Law 2006. 
51 For a detailed discussion, please refer to Section 5.1.2.1.2. 
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On the other hand, however, it may reduce protection for shareholders by 
limiting the injured shareholder's right to suits. Unlike Western courts, which 
must take all cases that come before them, Chinese courts can first decide 
whether to accept a case. There is a procedure of docketing (li'an) before the 
court hears the case.52 In all levels of Chinese courts there is a li'an division as 
well as criminal divisions, civil divisions and so on. The plaintiff must bring the 
case to the li'an division and the li'an division will decide whether to accept the 
case. All civil cases must meet four requirements in order to be accepted: (1) the 
plaintiff must be a citizen, legal person or any other organization that has a direct 
interest in the case; (2) there must be a definite defendant; (3) there must be 
specific claim(s), fact(s), and cause(s) for the suit; and (4) the suit must be within 
the scope of acceptance for civil actions by the people's court and lie within the 
jurisdiction of the people's court where the suit is being filed. 53 If the 
requirements are met, the li' an division shall li' an ( docket the case) within seven 
days and notify the parties concerned; if the requirements are not met, the li' an 
division shall reject the case within seven days and the plaintiff, if not satisfied, 
can file an appeal. 54 
Most disputes as to whether a case should be accepted or not arise from the 
third requirement, that is, whether there are specific claim(s), fact(s) and cause(s) 
for the suit. In fact, in order to be accepted the cause of action must be one of 
those acknowledged by the SPC55, otherwise, the case will be rejected. Therefore, 
not all disputes can be heard by the courts. The SPC's judicial interpretations as 
to misconduct in the securities markets are a good example illustrating this. 
Although as mentioned investors may initiate civil actions and claim for damages 
against misconduct in the securities markets according to the PRC's General 
Principles of Civil Law and/or the Securities Law 1999, the SPC's judicial 
interpretations have made it practically impossible to do so. In September 2001, 
the Supreme People's Court issued the 'SPC's Circular on Non-Acceptance of 
Private Securities Litigation Cases Temporarily.' This judicial interpretation was 
seriously criticized. As a result, the SPC changed its attitude several months later. 
On January 15, 2002, the SPC issued 'the Circular on Questions Relating to the 
Acceptance of Cases Involving Civil Disputes Arising from Infringement of 
Rights Due to Fraudulent Statements on the Securities Markets' (Circular 2002). 
This judicial interpretation allowed lower courts to hear civil damages cases 
where a securities-market investor filed proceedings with a people's court on the 
grounds that a party with a disclosure obligation violated provisions of the law by 
52 It is difficult to find an appropriate translation for the Chinese term 'li'an.' Here I use the 
English word 'docketing,' which is applied by Clarke D. C. (2002b), p. 13. 
53 Article 108 of the PRC's Civil Procedure Law. 
54 Articles 111 and 112 of the PRC's Civil Procedure Law. 
55 The SPC lists the civil causes of action which will be accepted by courts. See the SPC's 
Regulations on Civil Causes of Action (Trial Implementation) effective as of January l, 200 I. 
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making misrepresentations and thereby caused losses to the investor56, but only in 
those cases where the CSRC or its agencies had investigated the case and handed 
down an effective administrative penalty.57 This Circular has also been criticized 
for its limited application. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that this Circular has 
led to progress in protecting investors. Prior to it, the main sanctions for securities 
violators were criminal and/or administrative ones; there were hardly any civil 
remedies for the injured company and minority shareholders. Just after the 
Circular came into effect, many cases were filed against misrepresentation in the 
securities markets. 58 
Since Circular 2002 was too general to be applied in practice, the SPC issued 
the revised interpretation with the same title on January 9, 2003, which is 
effective as of February 1, 2003 (Circular 2003). Circular 2003 is more detailed 
and easier to apply in practice. At the end of 2003, more than 1600 cases had been 
accepted by the courts.59 However, Circular 2003 still limits its application to the 
securities-markets misrepresentation cases in which there were already a relevant 
authority's administrative penalty decisions60 or criminal judgments by a people's 
court. 61 
5 .1.1.4.2.5 The CSRC's regulations 
Unlike the SPC's conservative approach to the protection of minority share-
holders in securities markets, the CSRC has taken a more aggressive one. It has 
tried to improve corporate governance in listed companies by issuing regulations 
which provide more protection for minority shareholders and discipline the 
conduct of controlling shareholders as well as that of directors and officers. These 
regulations have played an important role in governing the management of listed 
companies. They have improved corporate governance in several aspects. First, 
the CSRC reinforces the minority shareholders' right to participate in corporate 
management. For example, it specifies that shareholders holding at least ten 
percent of the company stock have the right to request an interim shareholders' 
56 Article 1 of 'The Circular on Questions Relating to the Acceptance of Cases Involving Civil 
Disputes Arising from Infringement of Rights Due to Fraudulent Statements on the Securities 
Market,' 2002. 
57 Article 2 of 'The Circular on Questions Relating to the Acceptance of Cases Involving Civil 
Disputes Arising from Infringement of Rights Due to Fraudulent Statements on the Securities 
Market,' 2002. 
58 Since the publishing of Circular 2002 and up until February 2003, at least eleven companies 
were sued by investors. See Xuan (2003), pp. 114-117. We should note that until this period, 
the CSRC had made penalty decisions against eighteen listed companies (including 
intermediate institutions); see Xuan (2003), Appendix 8, pp. 414-416. 
59 Hou (2005), 252. 
60 Such as the CSRC or the Ministry of Finance. 
61 Article 6 of 'The Circular on Questions Relating to the Acceptance of Cases Involving Civil 




meeting and the right to convene such a meeting if the board of directors does not 
convene the meeting upon their request.62 In addition, shareholders holding five 
percent or more of the voting rights have the right to submit proposals.63 The 
CSRC also requires a cumulative-voting system in shareholders' meetings for the 
election of directors.64 The individual shareholders' right to participate in the 
corporate management of listed companies has also been improved. As 
mentioned, in Chinese listed companies shares are divided into non-tradable 
shares which are generally owed by the state and legal persons and tradable shares 
which are generally owned by individual shareholders. Normally the individual 
shareholders are minorities. Although the rights attached to the two kinds of 
shares are in practice different, Company Law 1994 did not classify these shares 
and all shareholders exercised their voting rights without difference. Therefore, 
the minority individual shareholders may not have the power to decide on issues 
related to their own rights. In order to protect the minority individual 
shareholders' rights, the CSRC promulgated the 'Regulations for the Protection 
oflndividual Shareholders' Rights' in 2004, which provides that in the case of the 
division of shares, according to laws, administrative regulations, and the articles 
of association, the approval of more than fifty percent of the tradable shareholders 
who cast their votes must be obtained, in addition to the approval of the general 
meeting of shareholders, in order to execute or propose certain transactions.65 
Second, the CSRC had promulgated several regulations to improve share-
holder access to information before the enactment of the Securities Law in 1999. 
These included 'Provisional Regulations for the Administration of the Issuing and 
Trading of Shares' (1993), 'Implementation Rules for the Disclosure of 
Information by Companies Issuing Shares to the Public' (1993), and 'Provisional 
Measures on the Prohibition of Securities Fraud' (1993). 
Third, the CSRC has also improved the supervision of the board of directors 
and officers. On the one hand, it has strengthened the power of the supervisory 
board, for example, by granting the supervis01y board the power to request an 
interim shareholders' meeting and the power to convene the meeting if the board 
of directors does not do so upon its request. 66 On the other hand, it has introduced 
the mechanism of independent directors to ensure that the board will not operate 
solely in the interests of the directors and/ or the controlling shareholders. 67 
62 Articles 44 and 54 of the CSRC's 'Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies 
(1997).' Company Law 1994 only provided such shareholders the right to request an interim 
shareholders' meeting. 
63 Article57 of the CSRC's 'Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies (1997)'. 
64 Article 31 of the CSRC'S 'The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (2002)'. 
65 Article 1(1) of the CSRC's 'Regulations for the Protection oflndividual Shareholders' Rights 
(2004)'. 
66 Articles 44 and 54 of the CSRC's 'Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies 
(1997)'. 
67 The 'Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed 
Companies 2001 '. 
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Fourth, the CSRC has also adopted several mechanisms to prevent the 
controlling shareholder's abuse of power and to protect the interests of the listed 
company and minority shareholders. These mechanisms include the requirement 
that the shareholder, who has a personal interest in the transaction, cannot vote 
for it68, and that the controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the company 
and other shareholders. 69 In order to ensure that the management of the listed 
companies be independent and separate from the influence of the controlling 
shareholder, the CSRC also requires that personnel, assets and financial affairs of 
the listed companies should be independent from the controlling shareholders70, 
that the controlling shareholder should not give insh1.1ctions to the listed 
company71 , and that the controlling shareholder should avoid competing with the 
listed company.72 
Although there is no empirical study on it, it is generally agreed that the CSRC's 
regulations have effectively improved corporate governance in listed companies. 
In fact, many aspects of the regulations have been incorporated into Company 
Law 2006.73 
5.1.1.4.3 The new regulations of Company Law 2006: a better position for 
the company and minority shareholders 
Recognizing the insufficient protection for the company and minority share-
holders in Company Law 1994, the Chinese legislature added new regulations to 
provide better protection in the latest amended Company Law 2006. Many of the 
protective methods in the CSRC's regulations have also been adopted in the new 
Company Law and have been extended to protect companies and minority share-
holders in general. In addition, Company Law 2006 also contains other protection 
methods. 
5.1.1.4.3.1 Methods of protection in Company Law 2006 
Protection methods in Company Law 2006 can be observed from several angles. 
68 Article 72 of the CSRC's 'Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies (1997); 
article 34 of the CSRC's 'General Requirements of Shareholders' Meeting of Listed 
Companies (2000)'. 
69 Article 19 of the CSRC'S 'The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (2002)'. 
70 Articles 20-26 of the CSRC'S 'The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
(2002). 
71 Articles 22, 26 of the CSRC'S 'The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
(2002). 
72 Articles 22, 27 of the CSRC'S 'The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
(2002). 
73 See Section 5.1.1.4.3.1. 
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More rights granted to minority shareholders 
Company Law 2006 grants more rights to minority shareholders. First of all, it 
provides more rights for minority shareholders to participate in corporate 
management. These rights include, for example, that shareholders representing 
more than one-tenth of voting rights (for a continuous ninety days in stock 
companies) may convene and preside over the shareholders' meeting at their own 
discretion if the supervisory board or the supervisors fail to do so,74 that in stock 
companies shareholders who aggregately own more than three percent of shares 
have the right to submit proposals to the shareholders' meeting75, and that in stock 
companies shareholders representing more than one-tenth of the voting rights 
have the right to propose a convening of an interim meeting of the board of 
directors.76 In addition, minority shareholders may have more of a voice in 
corporate management. In limited liability companies, shareholders may not 
exercise their voting rights in the shareholders' meeting in proportion to their 
capital contributions if the articles of association of the company so provide 77; in 
stock companies, when electing directors or supervisors, the cumulative voting 
system may be applied in accordance with the provisions of the articles of 
association or the resolution of the shareholders' general meeting.78 
Second, shareholders are granted more rights to information. These rights are 
especially important for minority shareholders who normally are unable to take 
part in corporate management. The rights include ( 1) the shareholders' right to 
check and review corporate documents such as the articles of association of the 
company, the register of the shareholders, the corporate bond counterfoils, the 
meeting minutes of the shareholders' general meeting, the resolutions of the 
board of directors, the resolutions of the board of supervisors, and the financial 
and accounting reports79; and (2) the directors and senior officers' duty to answer 
any inquiry by shareholders in the shareholders' general meeting. 80 
Third, minority shareholders are granted more ex post remedies. (1) The 
individual shareholder's right to initiate actions against defective resolutions of 
the corporate bodies has been improved in several respects: the right has been 
extended to shareholders in limited liability companies; the defective resolutions 
have been divided into void and voidable ones; violation of the articles of 
association in addition to the violation of law and regulations now also makes the 
74 Articles 41 and 102 of Company Law 2006. 
75 Article 103 of Company Law 2006. 
76 Article 111 of Company Law 2006. 
77 Article 43 of Company Law 2006. 
78 Article 106 of Company Law 2006. 
79 As to this shareholders' right in limited liability companies, please compare article 34 of 
Company Law 2006 with article 32 of Company Law 1994; as to the right in stock companies, 
please see article 98 of Company Law 2006. 
80 Article 151 of Company Law 2006. 
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resolution voidable; and restrictions have been placed on the shareholder's right 
to challenge defective resolutions in order to prevent abusive use of such a right, 
for example, the shareholder must now bring the action within sixty days of the 
date of making the resolution and the court may, upon the request of the company, 
require the shareholder to provide security. 81 (2) Minority shareholders have also 
been granted the right to initiate direct or derivative actions for compensation. 82 
(3) An exit right has been provided for shareholders in limited liability companies 
under certain circumstances. However, minority shareholders in limited liability 
companies are not granted the exit right where they are oppressed by majority 
shareholders, a situation where the minority shareholders may really need an exit 
right. 83 (4) Minority shareholders are also awarded the right to require the court 
to dissolve the company. Article 183 stipulates that: 
If serious difficulties arise in the operation and management of a company and 
its continued existence would cause a material loss to the interests of the 
shareholders and the difficulties cannot be resolved through other means, 
shareholders holding at least 10% of all shareholder voting rights may petition 
a people's court to dissolve the company.84 
The ex ante prevention of conflicts of interest 
Company Law 2006 also notes the importance of ex ante prevention of conflicts 
of interest between the company and its shareholders, directors or officers. First, 
it keeps and further develops the requirement that certain conduct of the directors 
and officers, such as entering into contracts or conducting transactions with the 
company or providing security for a third party using corporate assets, should be 
allowed by the articles of association or permitted by the shareholders' meeting. 85 
Second, it stipulates in several articles that the related party, including share-
holders and directors, is forbidden to vote under certain circumstances. For 
example, as far as the shareholders are concerned, article 16 requires that where 
the shareholders' meeting makes a decision to provide security for its share-
holders or de facto controllers, such shareholders or the shareholders under the 
control of the de facto controllers shall not be allowed to vote for the decision. 86 
Directors may not vote either in certain situations. Article 125 provides that a 
81 Article 22 of Company Law 2006. 
82 Articles 152 and 153 of Company Law 2006. For a detailed discussion of the direct and 
derivative actions, please refer to Sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
83 Article 75 of Company Law 2006. For the content of the article, please refer to Section 5.2.2.2. 
84 The English version of Chinese Company Law 2006 in this book is cited from China Law & 
Practice, December 2005/January 2006, Vol. 19, No. 10, published by Asia Law & Practice, 
Hong Kong, pp. 21-71. 




director in a listed company cannot vote ifhe has an affiliate relationship with the 
enterprise related to the matter to be decided, nor can he vote on behalf of other 
directors. As will be seen later, article 152, which governs the shareholders' 
derivative actions, also embodies the rationale of ex ante prevention of conflict of 
interest. 
Improving the functioning of the supervis01y board or the supervisors 
The ineffective functioning of the supervisory board or the supervisors had been 
seriously criticized before enactment of Company Law 2006. The criticism was 
mainly focused on two aspects. First, the supervisory board was criticized for 
being too dependent to exercise its function freely. As mentioned in Section 
5 .1.1.2, the supervisors are elected either by shareholders or employees. However, 
the supervisors elected by shareholders, just like the directors, are normally 
controlled by the majority shareholders; while the employee supervisors gene-
rally will not challenge the controlling shareholders and/or the directors either 
since they are afraid of losing their jobs. In addition, in working together with 
directors, Chinese supervisors generally will not sue their colleagues due to 
Chinese cultural tradition. 
The second aspect of the criticism was that the supervisory board or the super-
visors were not granted sufficient power to enforce their supervisory function. 
Although Company Law 1994 granted the supervisory board or the supervisors 
the power to examine the financial affairs of the company, the power to supervise 
the acts of the directors and senior executives performing their functions, the 
power to demand directors and senior executives make corrections if any of their 
acts is found to have damaged the interests of the company, and the power to 
propose the convening of interim shareholders' meetings87, these powers were far 
from enough for the supervisory board or the supervisors to perform their 
function. 
Company Law 2006 tries to improve the functioning of the supervisory board or 
the supervisors. Nevertheless, the effort at improvement mainly focuses on the 
second aspect rather than the first. The new amended law grants more power to 
the supervisory board or the supervisors, but unfortunately leaves the problem of 
dependence almost untouched. While keeping the powers granted in Company 
Law 199488, Company Law 2006 adds more powers to the ones the supervisory 
board may exercise. These include the power 'to bring the proposal to dismiss 
those directors and senior executives violating the laws, administrative regula-
tions, the articles of association of the company or the resolutions of the 
86 Nevertheless, a general requirement that a shareholder may not vote in the shareholder's 
meeting in cases of a related-party transaction is not stipulated in Company Law 2006. 
87 Articles 54, 126 of Company Law 1994. 
88 Articles 54, 119 of Company Law 2006. 
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shareholders' meetings' 89; the power 'to convene and preside over the share-
holders' meetings in case the board of directors fails in its function of convening 
and presiding over the shareholders' meetings as provided by this Law'90; the 
power 'to bring a proposal to the shareholders' meetings'91 ; the power 'to bring a 
lawsuit against the directors or senior executives in accordance with the 
provisions of article 152 of this Law' .92 The supervisory board may also 'bring 
enquiry and suggestion on the matters decided by the board of directors,' or may, 
'in case of finding the business situation of the company abnormal, conduct an 
investigation, and, if necessary, may engage any accountant's firm to assist its 
work at the expenses of the company' .93 However, these powers will only be paper 
tigers if the supervisors remain dependent. 
Reinforcing the duty of directors (including supen1isors) and senior officers 
An important improvement of Company Law 2006 is that it reinforces the duty of 
directors (including supervisors) and senior officers. In addition to the specific 
duties imposed on directors (including supervisors) and senior officers94, 
Company Law 2006 asserts that they generally owe a duty of loyalty and duty of 
care towards the company.95 If they breach their duty and injure the company or 
the shareholders, they will be held liable to the company or the shareholders, and 
minority shareholders can bring direct or derivative actions for compensation.96 
Imposing duties on the shareholder in regard to the company and other share-
holders 
Recognizing that the conflict between majority and minority shareholders is one 
of the major agency problems in Chinese companies, the legislature tried to 
regulate the issue under Company Law 2006. Company Law 2006 imposes duties 
on any shareholder in regard to the company and other shareholders, and makes 
the shareholder liable to pay compensation ifhe breaches these duties. The duties 
are mainly regulated by two articles. Article 20 states that: 
A company shareholder shall comply with laws, administrative regulations 
and the company's articles of association, exercise his or her shareholder 
rights in accordance with the law, and shall not abuse his or her shareholder 
89 Articles 54(2), 119 of Company Law 2006. 
90 Articles 54( 4), 119 of Company Law 2006. 
91 Articles 54(5), 119 of Company Law 2006. 
92 Articles 54(6), 119 of Company Law 2006. 
93 Articles 55, 119 of Company Law 2006. 
94 Articles 21, 148 and 149 of Company Law 2006. 
95 Article 148 of Company Law 2006. 
96 Articles 21, 150, 152 and 153 of Company Law 2006. For details on the shareholder's direct 
and derivative actions, please refer to Sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
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rights to harm the interests of the company or those of other shareholders ... 
If a company shareholder abuses his or her shareholder rights, thereby causing 
the company or other shareholders to incur a loss, he or she shall bear liability 
for damages in accordance with the law. 
Article 21 states that: 
A company's controlling shareholder, de facto controller, director, supervisor, 
or senior officer shall not use his or her affiliated relationship to harm the 
interests of the company. 
If such a person violates the preceding paragraph, thereby causing the 
company to incur a loss, he or she shall be liable for damages.' 
However, the articles may be paper tigers. First, they are too general to apply in 
practice. Company Law 2006 is silent as to the contents or the standards of these 
duties; besides, there has been no case brought regarding these duties. Second, 
enforcement of the duties may also be difficult. On the one hand, where a 
shareholder breached his duty owed to the company and caused damage to the 
company, the company certainly can sue for damages; however, whether minority 
shareholders can bring a derivative action against the wrongdoing shareholder in 
such cases is still uncertain.97 Nevertheless, the minority shareholders' right to 
derivative actions against the wrongdoing shareholder is important since in most 
cases the wrongdoing shareholder controls the company and it is hardly possible 
for the company to bring an action against him otherwise. On the other hand, 
where a shareholder has breached his duty owed to other shareholders, there is no 
regulation in Company Law 2006 which explicitly grants the injured shareholder 
the right to sue for breach. This is different from the breach of duty by directors. 
Where a director or senior officer breaches his duty owed to individual 
shareholders, article 153 of Company Law 2006 explicitly grants that injured 
shareholder the right to sue.98 This lack of any explicit litigation right may prove 
a disadvantage for the injured shareholder, considering the docketing (li'an) 
system under Chinese law. 
These articles have another defect of not providing sufficient remedies for 
breach of shareholder's duties. If the articles are understood literally, 
compensation may be the only remedy. However, for the injured shareholders, 
especially those in limited liability companies, compensation may not be 
sufficient; other remedies such as an exit right may be important as well. 
97 Article 152 of Company Law 2006. For a detailed discussion on this uncertainty, please refer 
to Section 5.4.1.1. 
98 See Section 5.3.2. 
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Imposing a duty on the de facto controller of the company 
A characteristic of Company Law 2006 is that it imposes duties on the de facto 
controller of the company in certain situations. Article 16 requires that where the 
company provides security to the de facto controller of the company, such 
security should be decided by the shareholders' general meeting; the shareholders 
controlled by the de facto controller should not vote on the decision. Article 21 
states that the de facto controller, as well as the controlling shareholders, 
directors, supervisors and senior officers, shall not infringe on the interests of the 
company by taking advantage of his affiliate relationship; otherwise, he should be 
held liable for compensation. 
According to Company Law 2006, the de facto controller is the person 'who 
is not a shareholder of a company but can control the company's acts through 
investment relationships, agreements or other arrangements'. 99 Taking into ac-
count that the problem of the de facto controller is a serious one in Chinese 
companies, the regulations in the new amended company law are necessa1y and 
will provide better protection for companies and minority shareholders if they are 
well enforced. 
5.1.1.4.3.2 Defects of Company Law 2006 
Undoubtedly Company Law 2006 improves many aspects of corporate gover-
nance and provides more protection for the company and minority shareholders. 
However, it still has its defects. To name just a few, the first is the technical 
problem that the regulations in the law are scattered and unsystematic. For 
example, Chapter 6 regulates eligibility requirements and duties of directors, 
supervisors and senior officers while at the same time the articles regulating 
shareholders' duties are found in Chapter 1 of 'the general provisions.' More 
ironically, article 21 repeatedly stipulates that the company's controlling share-
holders, de facto controllers, directors, supervisors and senior officers cannot 
infringe on corporate interests through affiliated h·ansactions. Another example is 
that the shareholders' right to set aside the defective resolutions of corporate 
bodies is regulated in Chapter 1 of 'the general provisions' while at the same time 
Chapter 6 also regulates shareholders' rights to direct and derivative actions. 
Second, the duties owed by shareholders, directors (including supervisors) and 
officers to the company and/or other shareholders, especially the shareholder's 
duties, are still not clear and enforcement of the duties is doubtful. 100 Of course, 
we also acknowledge that it is not wise for the corporate statute to clearly define 
the duties ex ante and that this task should be left to the courts. Therefore, the 
effect of the rules is still to be seen, and this to a great extent depends on the 
99 Article 217(3) of Company Law 2006. 
100 See, for example, Section 5.2.2.3.1 as to the court's ability to hear derivative actions. 
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operation of the Chinese judicial branch. Third, the role of the supervisory board 
or the supervisors is still a doubtful one. Although more power is granted to the 
supervisory board or the supervisors by the new law, the problem of lack of 
independence of the supervisory board is still not solved. Without independence, 
the superviso1y board cannot perform its role well no matter how many powers it 
has. 
5.1.2 The development of derivative action in China 
After a discussion of the Chinese background behind the derivative action, we can 
now take a look at the development of the derivative action itself in China. This 
development can also be divided into two phases: development prior to Company 
Law 2006 and development after that. 
5.1.2.1 
5.1.2.1.1 
The development prior to Company Law 2006 
Article 111 of Company Law 1994 
Article 111 was the only article in Company Law 1994 which granted share-
holders the right to initiate actions against corporate misconduct. It was of 
significance in the sense that it granted individual shareholders the right to seek 
for judicial remedies. The article provided that: 
If any resolution adopted by a shareholders' general meeting or the board of 
directors violates any statute or administrative regulation, infringes legal 
rights and interests of shareholders, the shareholders are entitled to initiate a 
proceeding to the people's court to require that such acts of violation or 
infringement be stopped. 
However, this article only provided limited protection for the company and 
minority shareholders. It only applied to stock companies since the article was in 
the chapter on 'Establishment and Organizational Structure of Stock Companies.' 
In addition, literally, the remedy that the plaintiff shareholder could acquire under 
the article was only an injunction: compensation might well not be granted. 
Furthermore, the article was too general and obscure to be applied in practice. For 
example, it was not clear what the 'legal rights and interests of shareholders' 
were; besides, there were no regulations regarding the procedure for applying the 
article. 
Another dispute regarding the article was whether the article granted minority 
shareholders the right to initiate derivative actions. The dispute arose from the 
ambiguous wording of the article. In its original Chinese version, there was only 
a comma between the condition of violating any statute or administrative 
regulation (the condition of 'violation') and the condition of infringing legal 
rights and interests of shareholders (the condition of 'infringement'). Therefore, 
whether both of the conditions had to be met in order for the shareholder to 
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pursue an action or whether either one or the other of the conditions was 
sufficient was questionable. The majority view in practice was that both of the 
conditions had to be met; therefore, the article did not grant the shareholder the 
right to initiate derivative actions. However, there was also a minority view, which 
held that the article included a right to derivative actions101 or should be broadly 
interpreted to include such a right. 102 
5 .1.2 .1.2 The application of derivative action by the courts 
5.1.2.1.2.1 Practical problems faced by Chinese courts: the necessity for 
introducing the mechanism of derivative action 
Although Company Law 1994 did not explicitly grant a shareholder the right to 
initiate a derivative action, such a right may be a practical necessity. As men-
tioned, where there is the general principle that an action against a corporate 
wrong should be brought by the injured company, derivative actions are necessary 
in order to protect the company and the shareholders' interests in exceptional 
cases. This general principle has also been established in Chinese law. Article 
108(1) of Chinese Civil Procedure Law stipulates that 'the plaintiffs must be 
citizens, legal persons and/or other organizations which have a direct interest in 
the case,' and article 3 of Chinese Company Law 1994 recognized companies as 
legal persons. As a result, according to Chinese law, when misconduct has been 
done to a company, only the company can be the proper plaintiff because only the 
company has a direct interest in the case. Since there was no specific regulation 
in Company Law 1994 with regard to which corporate body was granted the 
power to make a corporate litigation decision, either the board of directors or the 
general meeting of shareholders might make such a decision. However, article 49 
of Chinese Civil Procedure Law requires that 'a legal person shall be represented 
by its legal representative in the proceedings.' According to articles 45, 68 and 
113 of Company Law 1994, the chairperson of the board of directors was the 
legal representative of the company. Thus, in the case of a wrong done to the 
company, if the board of directors or the general meeting of shareholders has 
decided not to bring an action against the misconduct, or the chairperson of the 
board of directors has refused to represent the company in the action, the wrong 
done to the company might not be redressed and therefore the derivative action 
might prove necessary. 
This legislative situation had caused problems in practice. In China, both in 
limited liability companies and stock companies, it was a serious problem that 
majority shareholders and/or directors, sometimes colluding with third parties, 
infringed on the interests of the company and minority shareholders. Without the 
derivative action, the interests of the company and minority shareholders could 
101 Kong (1996), pp. 248-250. 
102 Zhao (1998), p. 258. 
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not be redressed. For example, in the cases of Zhongtian v. Bichun, etc., the 
controlling shareholder ofYanzhong Company established two subsidiaries which 
unfairly competed with Yanzhong Company. Because Yanzhong Company was 
controlled by the controlling shareholder, it did not bring an action against the 
controlling shareholder's two subsidiaries, although another shareholder of 
Yanzhong, Zhongtian, required it to do so. As a result, Zhongtian filed two 
separate claims in its own name with the No. 1 and No. 2 Intermediate People's 
Courts of Shanghai against the controlling shareholder and its subsidiaries. 
Nevertheless, both cases were dismissed due to lack of legal provisions on 
derivative action and other defects within the Company Law. 
In order to protect the interests of the company and minority shareholders, 
Chinese courts began applying the mechanism of derivative action when ad-
judicating cases. In fact, although Company Law 1994 was silent on the issue, 
Chinese courts have played an important role in developing the mechanism of 
derivative action. 
5 .1.2.1.2.2 The judicial application of derivative action 
The SPC's judicial interpretation in 1994 (a partial recognition of derivative 
action) 
On November 4, 1994, in its judicial interpretation of 'Reply of the Supreme 
People's Court concerning in whose name the Chinese party of a Sino-Foreign 
equity joint-venture company should file a suit with the People's court where the 
joint-venture company has external economic contract disputes, and the 
controlling foreign party of the joint-venture company has interests with the 
seller' 103, the Supreme People's Court of the PRC partially recognized that where 
a company was not able to bring an action to redress its damages, its shareholders 
should be awarded the right to sue. This judicial interpretation was based on a 
case heard by the High People's Court of Jiangsu Province. In this case (here-
inafter referred to as the Zhang Jia Gang case), a Chinese factory (named as 
Zhang Jia Gang Terylene Long Silk Factory, hereinafter referred to as 'the 
Chinese party') and a Hong Kong private company (named as Hong Kong 
Jixiong, a limited liability company, hereinafter referred to as 'the Hong Kong 
party') entered into a Sino-Foreign equity joint-venture contract and established 
a Sino-Foreign equity joint-venture limited liability company (named as Zhang 
Jia Gang Jixiong Chemical Fiber Limited Liability Company, hereinafter referred 
to as 'the Joint-Venture Company')104, of which the Hong Kong party was the 
controlling shareholder. The Joint-Venture Company, as the purchaser, entered 
into a sales contract with a third party who was the seller. Both in the joint-
103 Fa Jing [1994] No. 269; see SPC (2004), p. 430. 




venture contract and in the sales contract there were arbitration clauses. Later, 
disputes arose about the sales contract, and the purchaser's interests were injured 
by the seller. Since the Hong Kong party, which controlled the Joint-Venture 
Company, had direct interests with the seller, it refused to convene a meeting of 
the board of directors of the Joint-Venture Company in order to decide to sue the 
seller. As a result, the interests of the Joint-Venture Company could not be 
redressed, and as a result the Chinese party's interests were infringed upon as 
well. The Chinese party filed the case with the High People's Court of Jiangsu 
Province. However, since there was no mechanism of derivative action in Chinese 
law then, the High People's Court of Jiangsu Province was not sure in whose 
name the Chinese party should file the case. Hence, it raised the question before 
the Supreme People's Court. 
In its Reply, the Supreme People's Court acknowledged that in this case, if 
there had been no arbitration clauses in the joint-venture contract and the sales 
contract, the Chinese party would have been entitled to file a suit when the board 
of the Joint-Venture Company did not do so and the court should have accepted 
such a case. Nevertheless, due to the existence of arbitration clauses, the dispute 
then had to be submitted to arbitrators and so the court was not the one to hear 
the case. From the Reply, we can see that the Supreme People's Court accepted 
the idea of derivative actions, although the terminology of'derivative actions' was 
not used, nor were any further details illustrated. However, the effect of this Reply 
on future judicial decisions was limited because it was about a specific case of a 
Sino-foreign equity joint-venture enterprise: in China, special laws and principles 
may apply to foreign investment companies but not to other companies. The 
Reply was regarded as only applying to the same situation as the Zhang Jia Gang 
case, that is, those situations where the interests of a Sino-foreign joint-venture 
enterprise and the Chinese party of the enterprise had been infringed. This might 
explain why the above-mentioned case of Zhongtian v. Bichun, which happened 
after the Zhang Jia Gang case in 1996, was dismissed: in the case of Zhongtian 
v. Bichun, it was the interests of the joint-venture company and the foreign party 
rather than the Chinese party that had been infringed. 
Cases decided by local courts 
Although the two cases filed by Zhongtian were dismissed by the No. 1 and No. 
2 Intermediate People's Courts of Shanghai, some local courts did begin applying 
the mechanism of derivative action to adjudicate cases, even if the situations of 
the cases were different from that of Zhang Jia Gang. At the outset, the derivative 
suits accepted by the courts concerned limited liability companies such as the Xin 
Jiangnan case, decided by the Intermediate People's Court of Wuxi City of 
Jiangsu Province in 1998 105 ; the Huafeng case, decided by Xiangzhou District 
105 SPC's Gazette, Vol. 6 of 2001 (in general Vol 74), pp. 213-214. 
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People's Court of Zhuhai City of Guangdong Province in 2000 106; the Wu Fang 
Zhai case, decided by the Intermediate People's Court of Jiaxing City of Zhejiang 
Province in 2001 107; and the Zhong Qi Qi Hua case, decided by the High People's 
Court of Beijing in December 2005 .108 The disputed amount in some of the cases 
was very large. For example, in Zhong Qi Qi Hua case, the disputed amount was 
about 164 million Chinese RMB (about EUR 16.4 million). 109 
The courts were more conservative as to derivative actions regarding listed 
companies. On April 8, 2003, an individual shareholder of Saajiu Medical and 
Pharmaceutical (referred to as Sanjiu hereafter), a company listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, filed a derivative action against the chairman of 
Sanjiu with Shenzhen Futian District People's Court, claiming that the chairman 
should compensate Saajiu for losses suffered due to the chairman's miscon-
duct.110 The case was not accepted and the plaintiff filed with the Intermediate 
People's Court of Shenzhen a few days later. Nevertheless, the Intermediate 
People's Court of Shenzhen again dismissed the case, stating that the plaintiff 
should acquire the authority of all the shareholders before initiating the case since 
the derivative action represented the interests of all the shareholders. 111 Although 
the plaintiff shareholder tried to justify his action by citing the speech of Li 
Guoguang, the then associate chief justice of the SPC, given on December 11, 
2002, which stated that the people's court should accept the suit filed by the 
shareholder against the controlling shareholder or against senior management's 
infringement on the company, the Intermediate People's Court of Shenzhen 
disagreed with this plaintiff's argument and held that the speech was only a 
reference point and could not be used as a legal basis for accepting the case. 112 
Therefore, although many derivative actions regarding limited liability companies 
had long been accepted by various local courts, this first derivative action 
regarding listed companies was still refused. 
However, about one year later, another derivative claim filed by an individual 
shareholder regarding a listed company named Lianhua Weijing, jointly with the 
plaintiff's direct claims, was accepted by Daqing Ranghulu District People's 
Court. 113 This case was regarded as a significant step towards derivative actions. 
However, the result of the case is unknown. 
To summarize, neither corporate statute nor the SPC introduced the mechanism of 
derivative action in general before the implementation of Company Law 2006. 
106 Wang T. (2001 ). 
107 Lu (2001), p.14; Yang (2001), p. 5. 
108 Wang N. (2006). 
109 Wang N. (2006). 
110 Xu (2003). 
111 Wang L. (2003). 
112 Wang L. (2003). 
113 Wang L. (2004). 
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However, Chinese courts, including the SPC, had to a certain extent tried to apply 
the principle to protect the interests of the injured company and minority 
shareholders. This effort occurred step by step. Nevertheless, since there was no 
legislation or general guidelines from the SPC on them, the application of 
derivative actions was in a state of chaos. Some courts accepted the cases, while 
others refused the cases. The courts, which did accept the cases, also took different 
approaches to important issues such as the prerequisites of bringing the cases. 
Nevertheless, there are several common issues which might be revealed by 
these cases. First, most of the cases brought to court concerned limited liability 
companies rather than listed companies. Second, in most of the cases, the conflict 
was between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. 114 Third, in most 
of the cases, the defendants were the majority shareholders and/or those who 
directly committed and benefited from the misconduct, be it unfair competition 
or conflict dealing. Directors who had not benefited from the misconduct 
normally would not be sued for their breach of duty in assisting the misconduct 
or in failing to initiate corporate litigation against the misconduct. 
Judicial opinions on the application of derivative action 
With more and more derivative action cases in practice, the courts felt the 
necessity to explicitly acknowledge the mechanism of derivative action and to 
have guiding rules on how to apply this mechanism. High people's courts in 
several provinces and municipalities, such as Zhejiang Province in 2002 115, 
Shanghai in 2003 116, Jiangsu Province in 2003 117, and Beijing in 2004118, res-
pectively, promulgated judicial opinions which had a guiding effect on lower 
comis under their jurisdictions. Some opinions simply acknowledged that 
114 In fact, even in listed companies, it is very common for the majority shareholders to infringe 
on the company's interests. 
115 No. 2 Civil Division of the High People's Court of Zhejiang Province, Zhejiangsheng 
Gaojirenminfayuan Minshi Shenpan Di' erting Guanyu Gongsifa Shiyong Ruogan Yinan Wenti 
de Lijie [No. 2 Civil Division of the High People's Court of Zhejiang Province Understandings 
on Several Difficult Issues Regarding the Application of the Company Law], December, 2002, 
article 15. 
116 No. 2 Civil division of Shanghai High People's Court, Guanyu Shenli Sheji Gongsi Susong 
Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Chuli Yijian (yi) [The Opinions on Adjudicating Cases Regarding 
Corporate Litigations (No. 1 )], issued in June, 2003, article 5. 
117 The High People's Court of Jiangsu Province, Jiangsusheng Gaojirenminfayuan Guanyu Shenli 
Shiyong Gongsifa Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (Shixing) [The Opinions of the High 
People's Court of Jiangsu Province on Several Issues on Adjudicating Cases Applying the 
Company Law (Trial Implementation), issued in June, 2003, articles 17, pp. 73-78. 
118 Beijing High People's Court, Beijingshi Gaojirenminfayuan Guanyu Shenli Gongsi Jiufen 
Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) [The Guiding Opinions of Beijing High 
People's Court on Several Issues on Adjudicating Corporate Disputes Cases (Trial Implemen-
tation), issued in February, 2004, article 1 (8). 
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derivative action cases should be accepted119, while others specified several rules 
for applying the mechanism of derivative action. 120 
In November 2003, the Supreme People's Court also published 'Regulations on 
Several Issues of Adjudicating Corporate Disputes Cases (I), (the Draft for 
Soliciting Opinions)' 121 , which included five articles concerning derivative 
action. Article 43 concerned the nature of a liability which could be challenged 
through a derivative action. Article 44 stated the standing criteria for bringing a 
derivative action. Article 45 provided that in order to file a derivative action, the 
plaintiff must first prove certain facts. Article 46 was concerned with the status 
of other parties in the suit, such as other shareholders who also filed an action, 
colluders, and the injured company itself. And article 47 was about ordering the 
plaintiff to post security for costs in certain situations. Nevertheless, no further 
steps were taken since it was expected that Company Law 1994 would soon be 
amended. Although the SPC's Regulations were only a draft and had no effect in 
judicial practice, they did demonstrate the effort on the part of the SPC to unify 
the rules on derivative suits. 
5.1.2.2 The stipulation in Company Law 2006 
Judicial development in China has shown that it was an inevitable trend for 
Company Law 2006 to adopt the mechanism of derivative action. As expected, 
article 152 of Company Law 2006 grants minority shareholders the right to 
initiate derivative actions. 122 The article has been widely welcomed and regarded 
as making significant progress towards protecting the interests of the company 
and minority shareholders. However, there are also defects in the article, which I 
will discuss later. Due to these defects, the effect the article will have in practice 
is still difficult to predict. 
5.2 The role of derivative action in China 
5.2.1 Prior to Company Law 2006 
As mentioned above, although there was no legislation on derivative actions prior 
to Company Law 2006, Chinese courts had already applied the mechanism of 
derivative action to adjudicate cases. In fact, since there were hardly any market 
controls on corporate management and Company Law 1994 provided few 
mechanisms to discipline corporate management and to protect the interests of 
119 Such as Beijing and Jiangsu. 
120 Such as Shanghai and Zhejiang. 
121 http://www.civillaw.eom.cn/weizhang/default.asp?id=l3334 (last visited: November 6, 2003). 
122 For the details of the article, please refer to Section 5.4. 
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the company and minority shareholders, the derivative action, as an ex post legal 
remedy, should have been an important solution for aggrieved minority share-
holders. 
Nevertheless, the role of the derivative action was limited. The judicial 
application of derivative action was in a state of disorder, in bits and pieces, 
unsystematic, in disunity, and not anticipatable. Minority shareholders could not 
actually rely on the principle to protect themselves and the company; instead, they 
felt more as if they were simply lucky if the derivative suit was accepted and the 
misconduct rooted out. 
Another aspect of the limited role of derivative action was its restricted 
application. The cases already decided showed that derivative actions were mainly 
applied to resolve the conflicts between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders in limited liability companies. On the one hand, directors were 
barely held liable even if they colluded with the wrongdoing majority share-
holder. On the other hand, Chinese legislators and courts took a very conservative 
attitude towards actions regarding listed companies, including derivative actions. 
This approach was at least partly due to the complexity of such actions and the 
public influence they had. The only generally accepted corporate actions in-
volving listed companies were, as mentioned in Section 5 .1.1.4.2.4, actions 
against listed companies on grounds of false statements, which are shareholders' 
direct actions. Nevertheless, we should notice that to a certain extent the CSRC's 
regulations played the role of disciplining corporate management and protecting 
listed companies and minority shareholders therein. 
5.2.2 After Company Law 2006 
As mentioned, Company Law 2006 is intended to improve corporate governance 
across the board. It provides both ex ante and ex post mechanisms for disciplining 
corporate management and protecting the interests of the company and minority 
shareholders. Derivative action is just one of these. In fact, Chinese legislators, 
judges, scholars and legal practitioners agree unanimously that the derivative 
action is an important mechanism and should play an important role in corporate 
management. However, will derivative action play that anticipated role in China? 
Will Chinese special circumstances affect the application of the derivative action 
in China? These are very difficult questions and currently there may be no 
satisfactory answers to them. Nevertheless, it is also not appropriate for us to 
simply ignore the questions since we might then misunderstand the role of 
derivative actions in China. Therefore, in this section I will briefly discuss these 
issues. 
5.2.2.1 Lack of market controls on corporate management 
It is widely agreed that there are no market controls on corporate management in 
China due to factors such as a lack of negotiability of a certain percentage of 
shares, a lack of a managers' market and the serious problem of speculation in the 
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securities markets (the prices of shares do not reflect the performance of the 
company and the markets are considered worse than gambling casinos). Although 
the Chinese government is trying to solve some of these problems, such as by 
promoting the negotiability of shares, this situation of a lack of market controls 
will take more than just a short period of time to change. As a result, this lack of 
market controls makes derivative actions important even for listed companies. 
5.2.2.2 The influence of legal rules and norms 
Comparative study leads us to acknowledge the fact that legal rules and norms 
will affect the application of derivative actions. Firstly, specific legal rules on 
derivative actions such as the standing criteria and the prerequisite procedure will 
directly affect the application of derivative actions. How to construct specific 
rules depends on the legislature's attitude towards the function of derivative 
actions. Many factors such as the economic and legal environment will influence 
the legislature's attitude. Secondly, some legal rules which do not specifically 
regulate derivative actions do at the same time have a direct influence on 
derivative actions, such as litigation fees, the shareholder's access to information, 
the security required for the litigation, and alternative remedies, which include 
removal of directors, injunctions, settlement, and the right of exit. West calls them 
'extrasystemic legal rules' .123 Thirdly, a broader group of legal rules, including 
rules on corporate governance, will also affect derivative actions; for example, a 
better ex ante prevention of mismanagement will reduce the necessity for ex post 
remedies. 
Will the first and second groups of rules in Company Law 2006 and other laws 
support an active role for derivative actions in China? The answer may be 
negative, especially for derivative actions initiated by minority shareholders in 
listed companies. I will discuss these rules in detail in Section 5.4. Here I will 
consider the third group of legal rules, especially the influence of alternative 
mechanisms on derivative actions. As we know, if there are sufficient effective 
alternative mechanisms, there may be less need for derivative actions. When this 
is not the case, aggrieved shareholders have to turn to derivative actions in order 
to protect themselves. 
As mentioned, Company Law 2006 tries to improve corporate governance as 
a whole by providing and improving several mechanisms in addition to derivative 
actions. Nevertheless, the effect of these mechanisms is still unknown. The effect 
will most certainly depend on the enforcement of the statute, which may not be 
satisfactory. For example, although Company Law 2006 provides more power to 
the supervisory board, with the aim of improving its supervisory function, it is 
still doubtful whether that aim will be achieved due to problems such as super-
visors' dependence. Another example is that Company Law 2006 acknowledges 
123 West (1994), p. 1443. 
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the importance of ex ante prevention of conflict of interest and then goes on to 
forbid the related party voting in certain situations. However, it may be 
problematic to define this related party: too broad a definition may negatively 
affect ordinary business; while too narrow a definition may not have the 
anticipated effect, especially considering the fact that cross holding is very 
common and that China is a 'relationship' (Guan Xi) society. 
Ex post remedies for aggrieved shareholders afforded by Company Law 2006 
are also limited. For example, the duty owed by a shareholder to the company and 
other shareholders is not clear and is difficult to enforce. 124 It is also difficult for 
minority shareholders in limited liability companies to have the harm done to 
them redressed by exercising an exit right. In limited liability companies, 'a 
shareholder who votes against a relevant resolution at a meeting of the share-
holders may request that the company purchase his or her equity at a reasonable 
price' only if 
(1) the company has not distributed profits to the shareholder for five 
consecutive years where the company has been profitable during those five 
years and the shareholder satisfies the conditions for the distribution of profits 
specified in this Law; 
(2) the company merges, is divided, or transfers its main property; or 
(3) the term of operation specified in the company's articles of association 
expires or other grounds for dissolution as specified in the articles of 
association arise and the shareholders' meeting resolves to amend the articles 
of association to extend the life of the company. 125 
Thus, most situations where majority shareholders abuse their rights and then 
infringe on the interests of the company and/or minority shareholders are ex-
cluded. In addition, there is no clue at all as to how 'a reasonable price' will be 
calculated. 
As a result, derivative actions may still be important since other mechanisms 
provided in Company Law 2006 may not work well, at least for a period of time. 
5.2.2.3 The influence of Chinese special situations 
Chinese special situations may also affect the application of derivative actions. 
Here I will discuss the most obvious of these situations. 
5.2.2.3.1 The court's ability to hear derivative cases 
As the comparative study shows, courts have been playing an important role in 
derivative actions. Derivative actions involve balancing the interests of the 
124 Articles 20 and 21 of Company Law 2006. 
125 Article 75 of Company Law 2006. 
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different parties, and it is difficult to have fixed rnles that can anticipate all 
situations and strike a fair balance beforehand. Therefore, the court's discretion is 
necessary. For example, the standard of fiduciary duty and the decision as to 
whether to allow a derivative action both involve the court's discretion to a large 
extent. In fact, there is a convergence in the countries we have studied showing 
that the court has come to play a more important role in derivative actions. 
However, Chinese courts may not be competent to fulfill such an important task. 
Chinese courts are notorious for many problems such as the dependence and the 
poor quality of judges. For example, it is well known that Chinese courts are 
dependent on local governments and tend to protect the interests of local 
governments. According to Chinese Civil Procedure Law126, the derivative action 
may be under the jurisdiction of the court where the defendant has his domicile. 
Therefore, wrongdoing directors or controlling shareholders, especially where 
they are appointed by state-owned enterprises or are state-owned enterprises, may 
be under the protection of the local courts. 
Chinese judges are also infamous for their lack of skill and experience, their 
unwillingness to exert discretion when adjudicating cases (partly due to the civil 
law tradition), and the problem of corrnption. As we know, however, judges 
dealing with derivative suits may need more technical skills and experience, along 
with being fair, because of the difficulty of balancing the interests of the different 
parties in derivative suits, a situation which results in judges being granted more 
discretion. Due to this need for discretion, Chinese judges may simply not be 
competent to hear derivative actions or not be trusted by the parties. 
5.2.2.3.2 Attitudes towards derivative actions 
An interesting issue is whether Chinese tradition with its cultural distaste for 
litigation will have an effect on the application of derivative actions. This may be 
viewed from different aspects. 
Legislature and court attitudes towards derivative actions 
Chinese courts traditionally take a cautious attitude towards suits. Two examples 
may illustrate this approach. First, as mentioned, there is a procedure of docketing 
for deciding whether a case should be heard by the courts. Therefore, courts often 
will end up not solving all civil disputes. Second, the courts always keep 
encouraging settlement or mediation throughout the course of the hearing. A case 
in point: many actions with regard to false statements are settled or mediated 
rather than decided by the courts.127 
126 Article 22 et seq of the Chinese Civil Procedural Law. 
127 See Pistor & Xu (2004), p33; Xuan (2003), pp. 114-117. 
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Chinese legislators and courts have also been afraid of the threat of a flood of 
corporate litigation. The restrictions on hearing securities suits are an obvious 
example. Whether this attitude will affect the application of derivative actions in 
listed companies is still unknown. 
Judicial practice and the acknowledgment of derivative actions by Company Law 
2006 show that Chinese legislators and courts already recognize the impmtance 
of derivative actions. However, the legislators' approach is not as clear as it seems 
due to the vagueness of article 152. 128 This vagueness also grants the courts great 
leeway in interpreting the rules according to their own approach. Neve1theless, 
the history of the courts' judicial practice shows that it might be too optimistic to 
draw the conclusion that in practice courts will encourage derivative actions, 
especially derivative actions involving listed companies. 
The plaintiff shareholders' attitude towards derivative actions 
The plaintiff shareholders' attitude towards derivative actions will also affect the 
function of derivative actions. If shareholders are not willing to file derivative 
actions, derivative actions will then be paper tigers and cannot play their proper 
role. 
Are minority shareholders also affected by the Chinese tradition of cultural 
distaste for litigation? A study of Japan, a neighbor of China, which shares with 
China the same cultural distaste for litigation, may illustrate the issue to a certain 
extent. After comparing American law and Japanese law on derivative actions and 
studying the development of Japanese law, Mark D. West comes to the conclusion 
that 'although culture may play some role in explaining actor behavior, decisions 
on whether to bring derivative actions are primarily determined not by culture, but 
by economics' .129 West's conclusion is more than reasonable if we consider that 
unlike an action brought in a divorce, a personal injury case or other issues 
concerning social relationships, a derivative action, especially with regard to 
listed companies, is filed by investors whose purpose is solely to gain access to 
profits. Economics should be their first, if not their only, concern. In addition, our 
comparative study shows that factors such as the cost of litigation and the free-
ride problem have an affect on the shareholders' incentive to file derivative 
actions as well. So these factors, in turn, will affect shareholders of Chinese 
companies just as much. 
However, we should not ignore the influence of the Chinese legal environment 
on shareholder incentive to file derivative actions. The relatively poor legal 
environment in China, such as the dependence and poor quality of judges, the 
unpredictability of the law, along with the difficulty of enforcing judgments, may 
128 For a detailed discussion of article 152 of Company Law 2006, please refer to Section 5.4. 




discourage shareholders, including foreign shareholders, from filing derivative 
actions. In fact, the current Chinese distaste for litigation may not be based on the 
traditional psychological position that litigation is shameful, but rather might well 
be based on the practical consideration of whether litigation will obtain justice for 
them or not. 
5.2.2.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, whether derivative actions will play a more important role after the 
advent of Company Law 2006 is still difficult to predict. Currently, while there 
are factors which may still impede the application of derivative actions, derivative 
actions may still be seen as an important remedy that minority shareholders can 
use to seek relief. 
However, there is no doubt that derivative action will play a more important role 
in limited liability companies than they will in stock companies in China. At least 
four factors can account for this. First, Chinese courts may take a more cautious 
attitude towards derivative actions with regard to listed companies due to the 
complexity and public effect of such cases. Second, as will be seen in Section 5.4, 
shareholders in limited liability companies face a lower threshold for filing 
derivative actions than do those in stock companies. Third, minority shareholders 
in Chinese limited liability companies have no other legal remedies against 
majority shareholder oppression, such as the unfair prejudice remedy under 
English law or the fiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders to them under 
American law and German law. The exit right for minority shareholders in limited 
liability companies awarded by article 75 does not cover most situations of 
oppression by majority shareholders. Therefore, they can only seek remedies 
based on derivative actions. Fourth, as is well known, there may be fewer under-
incentive problems for minority shareholders in limited liability companies than 
there are for those in listed companies. 
It is difficult to anticipate, at least currently, whether derivative actions will 
mainly be applied to the conflict between majority and minority shareholders, or 
the conflict between shareholders and directors, or both. This difficulty mainly 
arises from the vagueness of article 152, as well as the vagueness of the 
substantive law on the duties of shareholders and directors. I will come back to 
the issue in Section 5 .4.1.1 when we discuss article 152 in detail. 
5.3 The proper plaintiff principle: the distinction between 
derivative action and direct action 
As mentioned, the only civil remedy provided in Company Law 1994 was article 
111, which was generally regarded as providing a shareholder with the right to 
claim for injunctions only where his legal rights and/or interests were infringed 
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upon. This situation of lack of civil remedies has been changed in Company Law 
2006. The new company law, in several articles, stipulates that shareholders can 
directly or derivatively file actions against the misconduct of controlling 
shareholders, directors (including supervisors) or senior officers. Therefore, the 
distinction between direct and derivative actions will also be an important issue 
under the new company law. 
5. 3.1 Claims to set aside defective resolutions of a shareholders' 
meeting or of the board of directors 
Article 111 of Company Law 1994 was superseded by article 22 of Company Law 
2006, which reads as follows: 
A resolution of the shareholders' meeting, shareholders' general meeting or 
board of directors of a company that violates laws or administrative regu-
lations shall be invalid. 
If the procedure for convening or the method of voting at a shareholders' 
meeting, shareholders' general meeting or meeting of the board of directors 
violates laws, administrative regulations or the company's articles of 
association, or if the substance of a resolution breaches the company's articles 
of association, a shareholder may file a petition with a people's court to revoke 
the same within 60 days of the date the resolution was adopted. 
If a shareholder institutes a lawsuit in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph, the people's court may, at the request of the company, require that 
the shareholder provide commensurate security. 
Therefore, according to article 22, an individual shareholder can bring an action 
to nullify and withdraw a void or voidable resolution of the shareholders' meeting 
or of the board of directors, no matter whether the shareholder's rights and/or 
interests were injured or not. In such cases, the distinction between direct or 
derivative action is no longer necessary. The shareholder can be regarded as 
having a statutory right to challenge defective resolutions of corporate bodies. In 
addition, in order to avoid unnecessary interference with corporate management 
by providing a shareholder with such a right, Company Law 2006 also sets several 
limitations on this right, such as the deadline for exercising this right and the 
requirement that the plaintiff shareholder post security at the company's request. 
However, article 22 only grants an individual shareholder the right to bring suits 
in order to nullify defective resolutions. If the defective resolution has caused 
damage to the company or the individual shareholder, the shareholder may not 
claim for damages under article 22. Instead, he must rely on other articles in the 
law. In addition, before he claims for damages, he must first decide whether he 




5.3.2 Claims for damages arising from director (including any 
supervisors) and senior officer misconduct 
An important advance made in Company Law 2006 is that it explicitly states that 
directors, supervisors or senior officers may be held liable to the company or its 
shareholders if they have breached their duty. For example, articles 21 and 150 
stipulate that directors, supervisors and senior officers may be held liable for 
compensation to the company if they breach their duty and cause losses to the 
company. According to article 152, minority shareholders may bring a derivative 
action against such infringement with certain restrictions. 130 
On the other hand, article 153 grants an individual shareholder the right to bring 
direct actions. It reads as follows: 
If a director, supervisor or senior officer violates laws, administrative 
regulations or the company's articles of association, thereby harming the 
interests of a shareholder, this shareholder may institute legal proceedings in 
a people's court in respect thereof. 
Nevertheless, article 153 is not clear enough to apply in practice. Several 
questions may arise with regard to the individual shareholder's right to bring 
direct actions. First of all, it is not clear what the shareholder's interests are. 
Where the company was injured and shareholders suffered indirect (reflective) 
losses due to the reduced value of the company, can we say the shareholders' 
interests were also infringed upon and therefore can apply article 153? The 
comparative study and the intention of Company Law 2006 to make a distinction 
between direct and derivative action may show that the shareholders' reflective 
losses should not be included in a definition of 'the interests of shareholders.' 
Therefore, an individual shareholder should not be allowed to apply article 153 in 
order to bring a direct action for his reflective losses. 
The second question is who should be the defendant where an individual 
shareholder brings a direct action according to article 153, is it the company or 
the wrongdoing director or senior officer? The wording of article 153 may well 
imply that the defendant should be the wrongdoing director or senior officer. 
However, sometimes when the director or senior officer is guilty of misconduct, 
he was acting on behalf of the company; it is the company then which would owe 
the duty to the individual shareholder. Therefore, the company rather than the 
wrongdoing director or senior officer should be the defendant. Of course, the 
company may, in turn, seek remedies against the wrongdoing director or senior 
officer for the losses. As a result, when deciding who should be the defendant, we 
should identify who owes the duty to the individual shareholders. There may be 
several possibilities: (1) The company may be the defendant. For example, where 
130 For the scope of the shareholders' right to derivative actions, please see Section 5.4.1. 
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a decision made by the board of directors has infringed upon the shareholder's 
right to participate in the shareholders' meeting or the right to a dividend decided 
on, the shareholder may bring a direct action for damages against the company, 
since the decision was made in the name of the company and the duty not to 
infringe on such rights is owed by the company. 131 (2) The wrongdoing director 
or senior officer may be the defendant. Although Company Law 2006 does not 
mention the duty of directors and senior officers towards individual shareholders, 
such a duty may be laid down in other laws, such as securities law, contract law 
or law of torts. A common example, which we have already seen in the com-
parative study, is that a director may breach his duty to an individual shareholder 
where he sold shares to the shareholder with the knowledge that the share price 
would fall afterwards. (3) Both the company and the wrongdoing director or 
senior officer may be the defendants. For example, according to article 69 of 
Securities Law 2006, where there was misrepresentation and the shareholders 
suffered losses, the company will be held liable to the shareholders and the 
wrongdoing directors, senior officers and so on will be held liable jointly. 
The third issue is that article 153 stipulates that a shareholder can only bring 
a direct action where a director or senior officer infringed his interests; therefore 
literally it does not include a supervisor's infringement. However, theoretically a 
shareholder should also have the right to bring an action where a supervisor has 
violated the law and the articles of associations, and has infringed upon his 
interests. 
Since Company Law 2006 acknowledges both the shareholders' direct actions 
and derivative actions against directors, supervisors and senior officers' 
misconduct, the problem then lies in how to distinguish the actions. As we saw 
from the comparative study, two standards may be applied to make the dis-
tinction: the 'rights' standard and the 'injury' standard. Company Law 2006 is 
vague as to the standard it sets since it adopts both the words 'injury' and 
'interest.' Nevertheless, where the Chinese situation is concerned, the 'injury' 
standard may be more suitable since it may be difficult to identify the 'interest' 
of the plaintiff or the 'duty' of the defendant under Chinese law. Although as in 
Western countries, Company Law 2006 also recognizes that directors, supervisors 
and senior officers generally have a duty to the company rather than to 
shareholders individually132, it is unclear what that duty is and what remedies the 
victim will qualify for if the duty has been breached. It is also unclear under what 
circumstances the company, directors, supervisors or senior officers will owe this 
duty directly to the shareholders individually. In addition, Chinese courts may not 
be competent to distinguish between the duty owed to the company and the duty 
to the shareholders individually. 
131 But as mentioned, if he only claims to nullify the resolution, the shareholder can bring an 
action according to article 22. 
132 See articles 21, 148-149 of the Company Law 2006. 
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5.3.3 Claims for damages arisingfivm shareholder misconduct 
It may be more difficult under Company Law 2006 to make a distinction between 
shareholders' direct action and derivative action against the misconduct of other 
shareholders. Before we discuss this issue, we should first have a look at whether 
there is a possibility for minority shareholders to bring derivative actions against 
other shareholders. The answer is affirmative according to article 152 of 
Company Law 2006. 133 
A shareholder's duty and liability to the company and to other shareholders is 
briefly stated in article 20 of Company Law 2006. 134 This article is the basic one 
that governs the shareholder's duty and liability to the company, to other 
shareholders as well as to creditors. In addition, article 21 also stipulates that the 
controlling shareholder of the company shall not, by taking advantage of their 
affiliate relationship, damage the interests of the company; otherwise, he will be 
held liable for compensation to the company should the company suffer any loss. 
There is no further regulation in Company Law 2006 with regard to the duty owed 
by a shareholder to the company, nor as to the duty to other shareholders. 
Articles 20 and 21 impose duties owed by a shareholder both to the company 
and to other shareholders. However, it is not clear what the content of the duties 
is or which conduct, in other words, amounts to 'abuse' of shareholder rights. It 
is not clear either whether the duty is owed to the company or the individual 
shareholders in specific cases. Therefore, it is not appropriate to classify the 
nature of the action by identifying whose rights have been infringed, the 
company's or the individual shareholder's. On the contrary, we have to classify the 
action by examining who has suffered the losses. This, however, may put the 
minority shareholders in a poor position if the majority shareholders oppress 
them by infringing on the company's interests, such as by appropriating the 
corporate assets. In such cases, since the minority shareholders suffered no direct 
losses and since Company Law 2006 does not grant them the exit remedy, they 
can only file a derivative action, and therefore the duty owed to them by the 
majority shareholders is only a paper tiger. 
5 .4 Striking a balance between corporate efficiency and 
protection for the company and the minority shareholders 
Chinese legislators and courts also face the problem of how to strike a fair ba-
lance between corporate efficiency and protection for the company and minority 
shareholders. Company Law 2006, as well as the courts that heard the derivative 
suits before Company Law 2006, has paid attention to this issue. However, 
133 As to the scope of and prerequisites for such actions, please refer to Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. 
134 For the regulation of article 20, please refer to Section 5.1.1.4.3.1. 
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Chinese legislators and courts have mainly focused on procedural limitations 
rather than the substantive limitations on derivative actions. 
Our discussion on how Chinese law strikes a balance mainly focuses on Company 
Law 2006. Article 152 of Company Law 2006 grants minority shareholders the 
right to initiate derivative actions by providing that: 
If a director or senior officer has committed a violation as specified in article 
150 hereof, the shareholders of a limited liability company or (a) share-
holder(s) of a company limited by shares who alone or jointly has/have held 
at least 1 % of the company's shares for at least 180 days in succession may 
make a request in writing to the supervisory board, or in the case of a limited 
liability company that has not established a supervisory board, the super-
visor( s) that it/he/she/they institute legal proceedings in a people's court in 
respect thereof. If a supervisor has committed a violation as specified in 
article 150 hereof, the aforementioned shareholders may make a request in 
writing to the board of directors, or in the case of a limited liability company 
that has not established a board of directors, the executive director that 
it/he/she institute legal proceedings in a people's court in respect thereof. 
If the supervisory board, supervisor( s) of a limited liability company that has 
not established a supervisory board, board of directors or executive director 
refuses to institute legal proceedings after receipt of the written request from 
the shareholders mentioned in the preceding paragraph, fail(s) to institute 
legal proceedings within 30 days of the date ofreceipt of the request or, under 
urgent circumstances where failure to promptly institute legal proceedings 
could cause possibly irreparable harm to the company's interests, the share-
holders mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall have the right, in the 
interests of the company, to directly institute proceedings in a people's court 
in their own name. 
If another person 135 infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of a com-
pany, causing the company to incur a loss, the shareholders mentioned in the 
first paragraph hereof may institute legal proceedings in a people's court in 
accordance with the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs. 
Nevertheless, since the statute itself is vague in many respects, the judicial 
attitude also plays an important role. In fact, Xi Xiaoming, the associate chief 
justice of the SPC, said that the SPC would in the future publish judicial 
interpretations on the application of derivative actions and other regulations in 
Company Law 2006. 136 
135 The English version translated by China Law & Practice uses the term 'a third party' instead 
of 'another person.' However, when compared to the original Chinese version, I think the 
translation 'another person' is more accurate since 'a third party' may be thought to exclude 
the controlling shareholder. 





Substantive limitations on the scope of derivative actions 
Whose misconduct may be lead to a derivative action 
According to article 152, derivative action is mainly intended to seek remedies 
against the misconduct of directors, supervisors and/or senior officers. However, 
what other infringement might be a cause of derivative action is rather vague 
under article 152. 
The vagueness is caused by the last paragraph of article 152, which states that: 
If another person infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of a company, 
causing the company to incur a loss, the shareholders mentioned in the first 
paragraph hereof may institute legal proceedings in a people's court in 
accordance with the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs. 
The ambiguity of the paragraph is mainly due to the wording 'in accordance with 
the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs.' In fact, there may be two ways 
to explain the wording and the paragraph. The first one is that 'in accordance with 
the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs' means that the conditions in the 
two preceding paragraphs must also be met. Therefore, in order to sue against 
infringement by another person, misconduct on the part of directors, supervisors 
and/or senior officers must also exist. Or in other words, the cause of the action 
should be the misconduct of the directors, supervisors and/or senior officers. 
Another explanation is that 'in accordance with the provisions of the two pre-
ceding paragraphs' only means following the procedures stipulated in the two 
preceding paragraphs. Therefore, the shareholders who meet the requirements 
stipulated in the two preceding paragraphs can bring a derivative action against 
infringement by another person, no matter whether the directors, supervisors 
and/or senior officers have committed any misconduct or not. 
However, because the term 'another person' in the paragraph may be broadly 
interpreted to include the controlling shareholder of the company, as well as a 
third party such as a business person who simply signed a contract with the 
company, and because the regulation regarding the effect of the demand 
requirement is also problematic, which I will come back to later, neither 
explanation may be appropriate. The first explanation may be too narrow since it 
excludes the controlling shareholders' misconduct from being the cause of 
derivative action. As we know, however, because the abuse of power by the 
controlling shareholders is a major agency problem in both limited liability 
companies and stock companies in China, and because the duty of directors, 
supervisors and senior officers is not clear and is difficult to enforce, such an 
explanation may make it difficult to discipline the controlling shareholders and so 
protect the company and minority shareholders against any misconduct by the 
controlling shareholders. In fact, the judicial opinions of some local high courts 
on derivative actions have already included the controlling shareholders' 
misconduct, as well as that of the directors, supervisors and senior officers, as 
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being possible causes of derivative action. 137 On the other hand, however, the 
second explanation may be too broad. If any person's infringement on the 
company can be the cause of derivative action, it would be very easy for the 
minority shareholders to unjustly interfere with corporate management. As a 
result, the last paragraph of article 152 should be explained to include the 
controlling shareholders' misconduct, rather than a third party's misconduct, as 
being the causes of derivative action. 
5.4.1.2 Nature of the defendant's misconduct that may lead to a 
derivative action 
Restriction of article 150 
The comparative study shows that an important mechanism which prevents the 
unjust interference with corporate management by derivative actions and provides 
necessary protection for directors, supervisors and senior officers is to restrict the 
nature of the defendant's misconduct which may lead to derivative actions; or in 
other words, derivative actions may not be applied against certain misconduct. 
Does Company Law 2006 also restrict the misconduct of directors, supervisors 
and senior officers which may lead to derivative actions? The answer may be yes. 
However, the restriction may not be reasonable and might not serve the purpose · 
of protecting corporate management. In addition, the restriction may also have the 
effect that the company and minority shareholders cannot be protected in certain 
situations. 
The restriction is mainly embodied in articles 150 and 152. As we have already 
seen, article 152 grants minority shareholders the right to bring derivative actions 
against directors, supervisors and/or senior officers where the latter fall under the 
conditions of article 150. 138 Article 150, which stipulates the liability of 
137 See, for example, Beijing High People's Court, Beijingshi Gaojirenminfayuan Guanyu Shenli 
Gongsi Jiufen Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) [The Guiding Opinions of 
Beijing High People's Court on Several Issues on Adjudicating Corporate Dispute Cases (Trial 
Implementation), issued in February, 2004, article 1(8); No. 2 Civil Division of Shanghai High 
People's Court, Guanyu Shenli Sheji Gongsi Susong Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Chuli Yijian (yi) 
[The Opinions onAdjudicating Cases Regarding Corporate Litigations (No. 1)], issued in June, 
2003, article 5(2); The High People's Court of Jiangsu Province, Jiangsusheng Gaojirenmin-
fayuan Guanyu Shenli Shiyong Gongsifa Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (Shixing) [The 
Opinions of the High People's Court of Jiangsu Province on Several Issues on Adjudicating 
Cases Applying Company Law (Trial Implementation), issued in June, 2003, article 17. 
138 Article 21 also stipulates that directors, supervisors and senior officers may be held liable for 
compensation to the company if they caused losses to the company by taking advantage of their 
affiliate relationship. Although article 152 literally only grants shareholders the right to 
derivative actions where there are circumstances as stipulated in article 150, the shareholders' 
right to derivative actions should also include the circumstances of article 21. 
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compensation to the company by directors, supervisors and/or senior officers, 
states that: 
If a director, supervisor or senior officer violates laws, administrative regula-
tions or the company's articles of association in the course of pe1forming his 
or her company duties, thereby causing the company to incur a loss, he or she 
shall be liable for damages. (Emphasis added.) 
The wording of the two articles naturally brings up the question of whether the 
director, supervisor or senior officer should be held liable if he violated the law 
or the articles of association and caused losses to the company while acting under 
other circumstances rather than in the course of performing his company duties. 
If the answer is positive, then can minority shareholders bring a derivative action 
against him? 
Ifwe interpret articles 150 and 152 literally, we can draw the conclusion that 
a derivative action should not be allowed against directors, supervisors and/or 
senior officers if they caused losses to the company while not in the course of 
performing company duties. However, this restriction on the shareholders' right 
to derivative actions may not be reasonable. Since directors, supervisors and/or 
senior officers may commit misconduct in other circumstances, and the company 
is prevented from suing them in such cases as well, then derivative actions are still 
necessary in order to make them liable and to protect the interests of the company 
as well as those of minority shareholders. Derivative actions are needed because 
of wrongdoers' conflict of interest in litigation; under what circumstances they 
committed the wrong is not relevant. 
Lack of the principle of non-judicial interference in corporate management 
Our comparative study shows that Western countries widely acknowledge the 
principle of non-judicial interference in corporate management. The justifications 
for the principle have been listed in Section 1.6.2, so I will not repeat them again. 
Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that this principle is very important for 
keeping a fair balance between corporate efficiency and protection for companies 
and minority shareholders; therefore it must be taken into account when applying 
the mechanism of derivative action. 
Unfortunately we cannot find such a principle in Chinese Company Law 2006, 
and therefore the law may well not provide effective protection for the efficiency 
of corporate management as well as for directors, supervisors and senior officers. 
As we know, Company Law 2006 does explicitly state that directors, supervisors 
and senior officers owe a duty of loyalty and a duty of diligence ( the duty of care) 
to the company. 139 However, it does not restrict director misconduct that may lead 
139 Article 148 of Company Law 2006. 
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to derivative actions to certain misconduct such as fraud, dishonesty or gross 
violations of the law or the articles, nor does it include the business judgment 
rule. As a result, minority shareholders may bring derivative actions against 
directors for mere breach of duty of care under Company Law 2006. This 
certainly would prove fatal to directors as well as corporate business. 
Chinese courts also hardly have any experience in dealing with a director's 
breach of duties, especially breaches of the duty of care. Company Law 1994 did 
not explicitly impose the duty of care on directors; therefore, as far as we know, 
there has been no action against the director's breach of duty of care except under 
article 118 of Company Law 1994, which actually imposed a strict liability on 
directors (that is, no proof of the breach of duties is needed). 140 Therefore, 
Chinese courts have had no opportunity to show their attitude toward issues such 
as what the duty of care is, under what circumstances a director might breach his 
duty of care, and whether the court should judge the director's business decisions. 
The danger under current Chinese company law is that a director or senior officer 
may be held liable for simply making careless or 'bad' business decisions, which 
can only be judged in hindsight. This shows that it is necessary to introduce the 
principle of non-judicial interference in corporate management into Chinese 
company law. However, as we now know, there are at least two mechanisms for 
implementing this principle. One is to provide ex ante restrictions by law that only 
certain kinds of misconduct, excluding the mere breach of duty of care, may give 
rise to derivative actions. The traditional English common law derivative action 
and the current German law (section 148 of the AktG (UMAG)) take this 
approach. The American business judgment rule, which provides a safe harbor for 
directors, plays a similar role in practice: although the American law on derivative 
actions does not explicitly restrict the application of derivative actions to certain 
misconduct ex ante, the prevailing approach of the business judgment rule 
requires that the plaintiff bear the burden to prove certain misconduct of directors 
in order to rebut the presumption that the defendant director is deemed to have 
fulfilled his duty; therefore, the plaintiff needs to prove something more than the 
director's mere breach of duty in order to hold the director liable. The other 
mechanism is that although there is no ex ante restriction, the court will exercise 
its discretion not to interfere with business judgment when hearing cases. This 
approach is taken by, for example, the British Companies Bill. We also know that 
each mechanism has its own advantages and disadvantages. For example, the first 
mechanism has the advantage that the law is more stable and anticipatable; 
however, it also has the disadvantage that the plaintiff has to bear the burden of 
proof; that is not easy, especially considering his poor position concerning 
acquiring information; besides, how to make the ex ante restrictions is also 
problematic: a too narrow restriction will not provide sufficient protection for the 
140 I will discuss article 118 of Company Law 1994, and its successor in Company Law 2006, in 
the next section. 
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company and minority shareholders, while too wide a restriction will unjustly 
interfere with corporate management. On the other hand, the second mechanism 
may not have the same problems as the first mechanism; nevertheless, it needs the 
court's wide discretion to strike a fair balance, which the courts in civil law 
counh·ies may not be used to. 
As a result, China may face the difficult issue of which mechanism should be 
introduced in order to protect the efficiency of corporate management. Due to the 
current situation of Chinese courts, the second mechanism, which totally depends 
on the court's discretion to protect corporate efficiency, may not be appropriate 
for China. An ex ante resh-iction in the Company Law may not be appropriate 
either since it would need an amendment to the current company law, which 
would involve the legislature. Therefore, the American style of business judgment 
rule may be more suitable for China. In addition, the introduction of the business 
judgment rule would also have the advantage that it would not only provide 
protection for directors and senior officers in derivative actions, but also in 
actions brought against them by the company as well. Of course, in order to avoid 
disorder in judicial practice, the Supreme People's Court should publish judicial 
interpretations of the application of this rule. Actually, the necessity of 
introducing the business judgment rule has also been recognized by some 
scholars and practitioners. For example, Li Guoguang, a former associate chief 
justice of the Supreme People's Court and currently a commissioner on the Law 
Committee of the People's Congress, and Wang Chuang, a judge of the No. 2 
Civil Division of the Supreme People's Court, have both suggested that the court 
should introduce the business judgment rule when deciding a directors' liabil-
ity.141 
A strict liability for directors in stock companies 
To make matters worse, Chinese company law may actually provide less pro-
tection for directors in stock companies. The directors may be held liable even if 
they did not breach their duty. The third paragraph of article 113 of Company Law 
2006, which applies to stock companies only142, states that: 
Directors shall bear liability for the resolutions of the board of directors. If a 
resolution of the board of directors violates laws, administrative regulations, 
the company's articles of association or the resolutions of the shareholders' 
general meeting, causing the company to incur serious losses, the directors 
who took part in such a resolution shall be liable to the company for damages. 
However, if a director is proved to have expressed his or her opposition to such 
a resolution when it was put to the vote, and such opposition has been 
recorded in the minutes of the meeting, such a director may be released from 
such liability. 
141 See, for example, Li G. & Wang (2006). 
142 There is no relevant article with regard to directors in limited liability companies. 
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Article 113 imposes director liabilities for defective resolutions of the board of 
directors. However, according to the article, director liabilities do not depend on 
whether they have fulfilled their duties, but upon the legality of the board's 
resolution. A director can only be relieved of the liability if he did not participate 
in the wrongful resolution or expressly objected to that resolution and had the 
objection recorded. Since a director's performance of company duties obviously 
includes involvement in resolutions of the board of directors, the director 
liabilities under article 113 should be covered by article 150. Therefore, share-
holders may be able to bring derivative actions against these directors according 
to article 113 as well. 
This regulation in article 113, which follows the approach of article 118 of 
Company law 1994, is too rigid and puts too much of a burden on directors. 
According to this article, directors may be held liable even if they did not breach 
their fiduciary duty. It requires that a director discover the illegality of the board's 
decision ex ante, no matter whether it is possible for him to discover it or not. This 
requirement is especially unkind to independent directors who are not supposed 
to be participating in the company's daily operations. Although it may deter 
director misconduct, this strict liability, in the long run, will discourage ap-
propriate people from becoming directors and thus will negatively affect 
corporate management as well as investors' interests. In fact, the approach taken 
by article 113 also runs contrary to international trends. In Western countries, it 
is generally agreed that a director can be free of liability if he has performed his 
duty. 
Article 113 may have another defect if literally interpreted. If a director 
breached his duty of diligence and did not attend the meeting, he may not be held 
liable for the defective resolution of the board under this article since he did not 
participate in making the resolution. However, this freedom from liability should 
not be justifiable because the director may well have breached his duty by not 




The procedure of docketing (li 'an) 
As mentioned in Section 5.1.1.4.2.4, a potential plaintiff must first file the case 
with the li'an division of a people's court. The li'an division has the power to 
examine whether the case has satisfied the four conditions required by article 108 
of the Civil Procedure Law and then to decide whether to accept the case or not. 
This procedure applies to all civil cases, including derivative actions. 
Several issues around the application of this docketing (li'an) procedure to 
derivative actions may require special attention. To begin with, as mentioned, the 
first requirement that a potential plaintiff must satisfy is that 'the plaintiff must 
be a citizen, legal person or any other organization that has a direct interest in the 
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case'. 143 Where the company has suffered losses, the traditional view is that it is 
the company, rather than shareholders individually, which has the direct interest 
in the case. Since the Chinese Civil Procedure Law has not been amended as yet, 
the li'an division should not be applying this requirement to derivative actions. 
Second, the li'an division may exercise more discretion when examining 
derivative actions. Generally the li'an division will only examine the case 
procedurally rather than substantively: as long as the four requirements have been 
satisfied, the case must be accepted. 144 Nevertheless, the requirements that 'there 
must be specific claim(s), fact(s), and cause(s) for the suit' and that 'the suit must 
be within the scope of acceptance for civil actions by the people's court' 145 may 
leave room for the court's discretion. Since the derivative action is a new type of 
action and runs the risk of being abused, it is possible that Chinese courts might, 
in turn, apply more discretion when examining it. Of course, this is only our 
expectation and it is still to be seen whether Chinese courts will actually apply 
more discretion and, if they do, on what basis. 
Third, it is uncertain whether 'the Circular on Questions Relating to the 
Acceptance of Cases Involving Civil Disputes Arising from Infringement of 
Rights Due to Fraudulent Statements on the Securities Markets' (Circular 2003) 
of the Supreme People's Court146, which limits the scope of actions in the 
securities markets, will also apply to derivative actions. If it does, minority 
shareholders may only bring derivative actions against those cases in which there 
have already been a relevant authority's administrative penalty decisions or the 
court's criminal judgments. 
In fact, the procedure of docketing (li'an) may serve as a judicial screen and 
therefore prevent abusive derivative actions, especially those which cannot satisfy 
the requirements of the Civil Procedure Law. However, to what extent the 
docketing procedure will prevent abusive (or sometimes perhaps meritous) deri-
ative actions is still unknown. This may depend on the standards the li' an division 
might apply when examining the derivative actions before it. For example, will 
the division consider whether article 152 has been satisfied? Or will the division 
consider the best interests of the company? Further judicial interpretations on the 
issues are actually expected. 
5.4.2.2 The standing requirements 
Company Law 2006 treats shareholders in limited liability companies and those 
in stock companies differently as far as their standing to initiate derivative actions 
is concerned. According to article 152 (1), any individual shareholder in limited 
143 Article 108 (1) of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law. 
144 Articles 111 and 112 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law. 
145 Article 108 (3) and (4) of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law. 
146 See Section 5.1.1.4.2.4. 
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liability companies can initiate a derivative action; however, shareholders in stock 
companies must hold more than one percent of corporate shares individually or 
aggregately for 180 consecutive days in order to initiate a derivative action. 
It is rational that there should be no minimum capital threshold for share-
holders in limited liability companies when they come to file derivative actions 
because the abusive use of derivative actions in limited liability companies is 
rather uncommon. 147 This easy access to derivative actions for shareholders in 
limited liability companies is also important for them because they still have 
difficulty seeking other relief. 
However, the threshold with regard to stock companies may be too strict, 
especially considering Chinese special situations. First, the requirement to hold 
more than one percent of shares does not take into account the situation of large 
companies. In large companies, even one percent of shares involves a huge 
amount of capital. Therefore, the German approach to the threshold, which 
requires that shareholders hold one percent of the share capital or the pro rata 
amount of EUR 100,000, is more reasonable. Second, the one-percent threshold 
may still be impractical considering the nature of the shareholding sh·ucture in 
Chinese listed companies. As mentioned, shares in listed companies are divided 
into non-tradable and h·adable shares. The 11011-tradable shares are generally 
owned by a very few shareholders, normally the state or legal persons, while the 
shareholding of tradable shares is widely scattered. In addition, the percentage of 
tradable shares in the whole market is relatively low, even now, despite the fact 
that the Equity Division Reform has been in effect for some time. 148 As a result, 
for tradable shareholders the one percent threshold is too high. Although 
theoretically minority shareholders can consolidate to meet the one percent 
requirement, this will entail much time and expense. Third, the requirement of 
holding shares for 180 consecutive days may also be a real obstacle to share-
holders in listed companies. Chinese securities markets are notorious for 
speculation and investors normally buy shares for short-term profit rather than 
long-term profit. Therefore, the average holding period for shares is very short. 
The study by Jin Xin showed that the average holding period was less than four 
147 This opinion is confirmed by Chinese judges the author has interviewed. Also see Thompson 
& Thomas (2004), pp. 1784-1785. 
148 For example, in the Shanghai Stock Exchange there were about 470 billion shares altogether 
in 2004, while of those about 137 billion were tractable shares, which is only about 29 percent 
of the total; see SSE (2004). In March 2006, almost six months after the start of the Equity 
Division Reform, the percentage of tradable shares is a little bit higher, but not significantly. 
In March 2006, there were about 504 billion shares and about 163 billion were tradable; thus 
tradable shares are about 32 percent of the total; see the website of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange: http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/ps/zhs/home.shtrnl, March 21, 2006. 
The percentage oftradable shares is a little bit higher on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, but it 
is still only about 46 percent as of March 2006. In March 2006, on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, there were altogether about 213 billion shares; about 97 .5 billion were tradable 
shares; the data is available at the website of Shenzhen Stock Exchange: 
http://www.szse.cn/main/marketdata/ Catalog_1803.aspx, March 21, 2006. 
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months. 149 In such a situation, the 180 consecutive-day requirement is significant. 
As a result, although the policy consideration under the standing requirements 
with regard to stock companies is to prevent the minority shareholders' abusive 
use of derivative actions, these requirements may significantly deter minority 
shareholders (as opposed to the state and legal-person shareholders) in listed 
companies from bringing derivative actions. 
5.4.2.3 The demand requirement 
On whom the demand will be made 
According to article 152(2), qualified minority shareholders may bring derivative 
actions in three alternative situations. The first situation is where the relevant 
body of the company refuses to bring an action after the minority shareholders 
have submitted a written demand to it. The second one is where the body has 
failed to bring an action within thirty days of receipt of the written demand. And 
the third one arises under urgent circumstances where the company's interests will 
suffer irreparable damage if no lawsuit is brought immediately. Except in the last 
situation, the minority shareholders need to make a written demand before they 
can file a derivative action. In order to avoid conflicts of interest when the 
corporate bodies make a litigation decision, article 152 requires that the demand 
should be made upon the supervisory board, or the supervisors of a limited 
liability company without a supervisory board, in those cases where an action is 
taken against the managing directors or senior officers. Where the action is 
against the supervisors, however, the demand should be made on the board of 
directors or upon the executive director of a limited liability company without a 
board of directors. Still, it is unknown on whom the demand should be made 
when it is the directors, senior officers and supervisors who are being sued. In 
addition, there may also be another problem: if article 152(3) is interpreted as 
granting qualified minority shareholders the right to bring a derivative action 
against the wrongdoing controlling shareholder, in cases where at the same time 
no director, senior officer or supervisor has committed a wrong, on whom then 
should the minority shareholder make the demand? The difficulty lies in the fact 
that normally both the board of directors and the supervisory board are under the 
control of the controlling shareholders and therefore are unlikely to make a fair 
litigation decision. 
The effect of the demand 
Article 152 may be problematic as to the effect of the demand if literally inter-
preted. The first problem is whether a just and reasonable refusal of the demand 
should have a binding effect. As we know, minority shareholders may bring a 
149 Jin (2005), pp. 143-144. 
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derivative action as long as they have made a written demand on the relevant body 
and the demand has been refused. However, the relevant body's decision not to 
sue may be just and reasonable since the body which made the decision has, at 
least theoretically, no conflict of interest as to the decision. Although it is a 
notorious fact in China that supervisors are almost never truly independent from 
directors, this is still an issue which should end up being decided on a case-by-
case basis. If the relevant body's negative litigation decision (refusal of the 
demand) is just and reasonable, it would be unreasonable if such a decision could 
not prevent minority shareholders from filing derivative actions. After all, one 
rationale for the demand requirement is that the intra-corporate bodies on which 
the demand has been made are prima facie regarded as being more appropriate 
for making litigation decisions than minority shareholders are. 
Nevertheless, if the relevant body's litigation decision is to be deferred to, 
several issues will then arise: (1) who should have the power to decide whether 
the corporate body's litigation decision should be binding or whether the 
derivative action should be allowed? In fact, it is generally agreed that whether 
the corporate body's litigation decision is just and reasonable should be decided 
case by case, and therefore it is the court which should be the appropriate body 
for deciding the effect of the corporate body's litigation decision. In fact, it is 
difficult and inappropriate to create an ex ante standard in the statute. This is also 
the approach taken by the countries we chose to study in this book. (2) Which 
standards should be applied when deciding the effect of the body's litigation 
decision? As we know, the countries we studied have also taken different 
approaches to this issue. Considering the situation of Chinese courts, the 
Supreme People's Court of China should issue guidelines that list the several 
factors the court should consider when deciding such cases. 
The second issue as to the effect of the demand is as follows: if the relevant body 
agrees to bring a corporate action in order to block the minority's derivative action 
but fails to pursue the corporate action diligently and therefore deliberately loses 
the case, the interests of the company and minority shareholders still may end up 
not being protected. In such cases, it is better to allow the minority's derivative 
actions. As a result, even if the relevant body decides to bring a corporate action 
upon the demand of the minority shareholders, it is not necessary that this body 
be the most appropriate one to represent the company. 
Thirdly, the regulation that qualified minority shareholders can bring a derivative 
action if the body fails to bring an action within thirty days of receipt of the 
written demand is also a problematic one. As we know, some cases may be 
complicated and it will take more time for the body to investigate and decide 
whether it is in the best interests of the company to bring an action. A cursory 
decision may not be good for the company. Of course, since the minority 
shareholders can bring a derivative action as long as the body refuses to sue, this 
thirty-day requirement is actually intended to prevent the body from suspending 
the minority's right to derivative actions by doing nothing. Nevertheless, a 
293 
CHAPTERS 
negative result of the thirty-day requirement is that the body may make a cursory 
decision to sue. 
In conclusion, the regulation on the demand requirement in article 152 is positive 
in the sense that it avoids multiplicity of suits, especially when the corporate body 
also decides to sue. However, if it is interpreted literally, article 152 may not 
provide enough protection for the company and minority shareholders. It also has 
the fatal defect that it may not protect corporate efficiency since it may have no 
effect on deterring qualified shareholders from bringing derivative actions if they 
fulfill the procedural requirement to make a written demand, no matter whether 
the derivative action is necessary or not. The only burden on the shareholders is 
that they have to make a written demand and then wait for thirty days. Therefore, 
the demand requirement in article 152 cannot effectively prevent shareholders' 
abusive use of derivative actions and their unjust interference in corporate 
management. Interference in corporate management would be more possible if 
article 152 was broadly interpreted to include the misconduct of 'other persons' 
as a possible cause of derivative action. 
5.4.3 The independent body's view 
Chinese legislators have already considered the issue of conflict of interest when 
deciding who should make the corporate litigation decision. Since Chinese com-
pany law also adopts the two-tier system, it takes the same approach as German 
law does. Where the claim is against directors and/senior officers, the demand 
should be made to the supervisory board, or to the supervisors where there is no 
supervisory board. On the other hand, where the claim is against the supervisors, 
the demand should be made to the board of directors, or to the managing director 
where there is no board of directors. Under company law, the two boards are 
supposed to be independent of each other. 
However, as mentioned in Section 5.1.1.4.3.1, the problem in China is that the 
supervisory board or the supervisors may not be sufficiently independent in 
practice. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the supervisory board or the super-
visors are the appropriate ones to be making any corporate litigation decision 
against the directors and/or senior officers. 
5.4.4 
5.4.4.1 
Incentives for the plaintiff to pursue derivative actions 
Litigation costs 
As mentioned in Section 5.2, shareholders of Chinese companies may be more 
unwilling to initiate derivative actions than those of Western companies for 
several reasons. One of the most important of these reasons is the financial 
burden laid on the plaintiff shareholders. 
Shareholders in China who plan to file a derivative action may, as a result, find 
themselves burdened with huge financial costs. The costs are composed of at 
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least two parts: the court's fees and the attorneys' fees. In addition, certain under-
the-table fees may also have to be paid. 
The court fees 150 
The court fees include the filing fees [anjian shouli fei] paid to the court before 
the suit can proceed and other expenses incurred during the hearing of the case, 
such as fees for investigation and for preservation of assets. 
According to article 107 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law and article 13 of the 
SPC's Measures on the People's Courts' Acceptance of Litigation Fees issued in 
1989, any plaintiff who files a suit with the court must submit a certain amount 
of money to the court within seven days after he has received the court's notice to 
pay. If he does not pay, the case will be treated as withdrawn by the plaintiff and 
will not be continued. If the disputes are with regard to property, the filing fees 
are proportionate to the disputed amount (that is, a sliding system). For example, 
according to the SPC's Measures on the People's Courts' Acceptance of Litigation 
Fees (1989), the standards of the amount of filing fees with regard to proprietary 
suits are as follows: if the disputed amount is less than 1,000 RMB yuan, the 
filing fee is 50 yuan; if between 1,001 yuan and 50,000 yuan, the fee is 4 percent 
of the disputed amount plus 10 yuan; if between 50,001 yuan and 100,000 yuan, 
the fee is 3 percent of the disputed amount plus 510 yuan; if between 100,001 
yuan and 100,000 yuan, the fee is 2 percent of the disputed amount plus 1510 
yuan; if between 200,001 yuan and 500,000 yuan, the fee is 1.5 percent of the 
disputed amount plus 2510 yuan; if between 500,001 yuan and 1,000,000 yuan, 
the fee is 1 percent of the disputed amount plus 5010 yuan; if more than 
1,000,000 yuan, the fee is 0.5 percent of the disputed amount plus 10,010 yuan. 151 
If the plaintiff decides to withdraw the case, he still has to pay half of the filing 
fees as well as the other litigation costs already incurred. 152 
Since derivative actions belong to the category of proprietary cases, the filing fee 
can be very high. For example, in the Xin Jiangnan case ( decided in Jiangsu 
province), the filing fee was 152,573 RMB yuan (about EUR 15,200)153; in the 
Huafeng case (decided in Guangdong province)154, the filing fee was 20,743 
RMB yuan (about EUR 2,000); in the Zhongqi Qihuo case (decided in Beijing), 
the filing fee was about 830,000 RMB yuan (about EUR 83,000). 155 Therefore, it 
150 Many Chinese scholars have criticized the system of court fees. See, for example, Fang (2000). 
151 See article 5( 4) and the attachment of 'The Schedule of Simplified Calculation on the Filing 
Fees Regarding Proprietary Disputes' of the SPC's Measures on the People's Courts' 
Acceptance of Litigation Fees (1989). 
152 Article 23 of the SPC's Measures on the People's Courts' Acceptance of Litigation Fees (1989). 
153 SPC's Gazette, Vol. 6 of2001 (in general Vol. 74), pp. 213-214. 
154 Wang T. (2001). 
155 Wang N. (2006). 
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is understandable that in China many plaintiffs are purported to have reduced the 
disputed amount in order to pay lower filing fees. For example, in the above-
mentioned Sanjiu case, the individual shareholder of a listed company only 
claimed 20,000 RMB yuan (about EUR 2,000), which was much less than the real 
disputed amount, on behalf of the company against the defendant directors in the 
derivative claim. 156 
However, problems may arise if the practice of the Sanjiu case is widely 
applied. First, if the plaintiff shareholder reduces the disputed amount in order to 
pay lower litigation fees, the company he represents may not be adequately 
compensated if the judgment only refers to the claimed amount. This also gives 
rise to a relevant issue of whether other shareholders can bring another action 
based on the same cause of action but with a different disputed amount. Second, 
a serious deterrence to derivative suits may be circumvented if the plaintiff 
shareholder can claim for a smaller disputed amount. Nevertheless, article 7 of 
the SPC's Measures on the People's Courts' Acceptance of Litigation Fees (1989) 
may lead to a different conclusion. The article states that 'in proprietary cases if 
the claimed disputed amount is different from the real disputed amount, the filing 
fees should be levied according to the real disputed amount as calculated by the 
people's court.' In practice, courts have great discretion in deciding the disputed 
amount. 
Attorneys 'fees 
Although they will vary greatly in different cases, attorneys' fees are also a 
serious financial burden on the plaintiff shareholders. Nevertheless, a special 
agreement between the plaintiff and the attorney, which is similar to the American 
contingency fee arrangement, may help to reduce the plaintiff's burden to a 
certain degree. 157 
The principle of allocation of costs 
According to article 19 of the SPC's Measures on the People's Courts' Acceptance 
of Litigation Fees (1989), the losing party should bear the filing fees and other 
litigation fees allocated by the court, which normally includes the fees paid to the 
court but excludes the attorney's fees. Therefore, if the plaintiff shareholder loses 
the case, he has to pay a serious amount in litigation costs. However, even if the 
plaintiff shareholder wins, he still has to pay the attorney's fees and may suffer 
financial loss if the defendant is bankrupt or refuses to pay him back for the 
litigation fees. In the latter case, he has to apply to the court for the enforcement 
of the judgment; the filing fees for enforcement cases are also proportionate to 
the amount to be enforced. 
156 Xu (2003). 
157 Such a special agreement exists in Chinese legal practice. 
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No regulations on indemnity to the plaintiff by the company 
Although plaintiff shareholders in derivative actions bear the risk of a heavy 
financial burden for the benefit of the company, with the damages going to the 
company if they win the cases, there is no regulation on indemnity for the plaintiff 
shareholders by the company in Company Law 2006. 
Nevertheless, some local courts have recognized the necessity of such in-
demnity and have allowed it in their judicial opinions. According to article 5 of 
The Opinions of Shanghai High People's Court on Adjudicating Cases Regarding 
Corporate Litigations (No. 1) [Shanghai High People's Court Guanyu Shenli 
Sheji Gongsi Susong Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Chuli Yijian (yi)] (June 2003), 
courts can decide that the benefiting company should pay a reasonable indemnity 
to the plaintiff shareholder. Article 78 of The Opinions of the High People's Court 
of Jiangsu Province on Several Issues on Adjudicating Cases Applying the 
Company Law (Trial Implementation) [Jiangsusheng Gaojirenminfayuan Guanyu 
Shenli Shiyong Gongsifa Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (Shixing)] (June 3, 
2003) also states that in derivative actions if the court supports the plaintiff's 
derivative claims, reasonable litigation fees such as the attorney's fees and travel 
costs should be borne by the company; if the court does not support the derivative 
claims, the litigation costs should be paid by the plaintiff shareholder; if the court 
partly supports the claims, the plaintiff shareholder and the company should bear 
the costs pro rata. 
Conclusion 
High litigation costs and lack of indemnity rules actually work as a serious 
deterrence to shareholders' derivative actions. Compared to the large amount of 
filing fees the plaintiff shareholders have to pay in advance and the high risk of 
financial burden they bear, the indirect benefit they will acquire if they win the 
case is not attractive at all. Indeed they hardly have any incentive to file derivative 
actions. This is especially the case for minority shareholders in listed companies. 
On the one hand, minority shareholders normally own a very small percentage of 
shares each; the accumulation of one percent of share capital is not easy. On the 
other hand, the share price of Chinese listed companies is generally regarded as 
irrational, in that it does not reflect the true value of the company; therefore, the 
shareholders may not be compensated by an increase in share price resulting from 
the success of the suit. 
Nevertheless, we should also note that some minority shareholders are willing to 
initiate derivative actions for the public interest in spite of these negative factors. 
The plaintiff shareholder in the Sanjiu case is such an example. 
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5.4.4.2 The attorneys role 
Attorneys may play an important role in encouraging derivative actions, 
especially derivative actions with regard to listed companies. On the one hand, the 
special fee agreement between the plaintiff and the attorney, which is similar to 
the American contingency fee arrangement, may reduce the financial burden on 
the plaintiff to a certain degree. On the other hand, attorneys may play an 
important role in gathering minority shareholders together, especially those of 
listed companies, in order to satisfy the standing requirements under article 152. 
This can be seen from the development of private securities litigation. Several 
lawyers have actively encouraged such cases through various means such as 
running advertisements to gather potential plaintiff shareholders, or by taining a 
website with extensive information regarding securities litigation. 158 
5.4. 5 Limiting directors 'financial exposure to the risks and costs of 
litigation 
In current Chinese company law there are neither regulations on capping 
directors' compensation to the company, nor regulations on whether it is possible 
for the company to reimburse the directors or officers for litigation costs that are 
related to the performance of their duties. Therefore, directors may face huge 
financial liabilities if they lose a case. Worse, they might also end up bearing the 
litigation costs of both parties. 159 
Directors and officers in China may be financially protected if the company buys 
D&O insurance for them. In article 39 of the CSRC's 'Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies' which is effective as of January 7, 2002, the 
listed company can buy liability insurance for its directors upon the approval of 
the shareholders' general meeting, except for directors' liability which arises from 
a directors' violation of statutes, legal regulations and the articles of association. 
The first D&O insurance policy in China was signed on January 24, 2002, just 
after the Supreme People's Court published 'Several rnles on adjudicating civil 
lawsuits against listed companies on grounds of false statements' on January 15, 
2002. 160 
158 Song Yixin, a lawyer famous for protecting minority shareholders' interests, established the 
first website serving securities litigation in May 16, 2002 http://www.syxlawyer.com.cn; see 
http://www.imm.cn/pendingDelete/2005-5-16.htm, (last visited March 23, 2006). However, the 
website was closed down on May 31, 2005; see http://www.imm.cn/Delete/2005/20050531. 
htm (last visited March 23, 2006). 
159 For details oflitigation costs, see Section 5.4.4.1. 
160 http://www.cctv.com/news/financial/20020124/201.html (last visited: October 2006). 
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5.4. 6 The 'abuse of rights' doctrine as a method of preventing the 
abusive use of derivative actions 
CHINA 
Article 20 of Company Law 2006 stipulates that no shareholder of a company 
shall abuse his rights in order to damage the interests of the company or of other 
shareholders, otherwise he will be held liable for compensation if the company or 
other shareholders suffer losses due to his abuse of rights. Theoretically, this 
provision may be used in derivative actions to prevent strike suits. However, 
whether Chinese courts will apply this article to deter derivative actions is still 
unknown. 
5.5 Conclusion 
5. 5.1 The function of derivative action in Chinese corporate 
governance 
That Company Law 2006 regulates derivative action has been widely welcomed. 
Since it is common for the interests of the company and minority shareholders to 
be infringed upon, and since there are hardly any effective alternative remedies, 
the derivative action is intended to play an important role in protecting the 
company and minority shareholders. However, due to vagueness in article 152 
and other factors such as the competence of courts to hear such cases, it is 
doubtful whether derivative actions will be playing the role expected. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 5.2.2.4, we may expect that derivative 
actions will play a more important role in limited liability companies than they 
will in listed companies. 
Another issue that Chinese lawyers should consider, as far as the function of 
derivative actions is concerned, is whether derivative actions should play an 
important role in solving conflicts between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders. Although article 152 is vague as to whether the misconduct of 
controlling shareholders should be a cause of derivative action, judicial practice 
concerning derivative actions and the serious problem of the controlling 
shareholders' abuse of power may yet show that article 152 should permit 
derivative actions against the misconduct of controlling shareholders. In fact, we 
may even further anticipate that derivative actions are going to be playing an 
important role in solving these conflicts. However, as we know, derivative actions 
may have built-in defects in solving such conflicts. Comparative study also shows 
that derivative actions are not the major mechanism for solving such conflicts. On 
the contrary, there are better alternative mechanisms, such as ex ante prevention 
of abuse of power and an individual shareholder's direct action against the 
wrongdoing shareholder in limited liability companies, even in cases where the 
company is the party which has suffered the losses. Therefore, alternative 
mechanisms should also be developed in China in order better to reduce conflicts. 
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Although Company Law 2006 already reinforces some of these mechanisms, 
there are still insufficient numbers of them. 
5.5.2 
5.5.2.1 
The Chinese model for strildng a balance between corporate 
efficiency and the protection of the interests of the cmporation 
and its minority shareholders 
The appropriate body for making cmporate litigation decisions 
As in the Western countries we studied, in China the board of directors is also the 
body that makes corporate litigation decisions under normal situations. However, 
due to the principle of the legal representative, it is possible that the board's 
decision to sue may not be enforced by the legal representative and therefore the 
company may not recover its losses. 
In Chinese company law, there is no regulation of the right of the share-
holders' meeting to file an action in the name of the company. Theoretically, they 
should have that right. Even if they do not, they can remove the directors and 
appoint new ones, and thus the new directors can file the corporate actions. In 
practice, however, since the controlling shareholders normally control both the 
shareholders' meeting and the board of directors, it hardly ever happens that a 
shareholders' meeting and a board of directors have different opinions. 
Although minority shareholders (an individual shareholder in limited liability 
companies and a group of shareholders in stock companies) are granted the power 
to bring derivative actions, the role of minority shareholders in making a 
corporate litigation decision is not clear due to the vagueness of article 152 
regarding the effect of the demand requirement. For the same reason, the court's 
role in the corporate litigation decision is unclear as well. 
We should also note that, unlike the situation in Germany, the supervisory 
board, or the supervisors where no supervisory board exists, has no power to 
make corporate litigation decisions by itself, even though it has assumed the 
function of supervision. According to articles 54( 6) and 119, it can only 'bring a 
lawsuit against the directors or senior executives in accordance with the 
provisions of article 152 of this Law'; that is, it can only bring a lawsuit based on 
the minority shareholders' request. This lack of power to make corporate 
litigation decisions independently undoubtedly reduces its supervisory function. 
5.5.2.2 A fair balance between cmporate efficiency and protection for the 
company and minority shareholders 
Undoubtedly, Chinese legislators have made an effort to strike a fair balance 
between corporate efficiency and protection for the company and minority 
shareholders. This can be seen from article 152 of Company Law 2006. While 
article 152 provides the mechanism of derivative actions to protect the company 
and minority shareholders, at the same time it has also been carefully designed so 
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as to prevent the abuse of derivative actions and prevent any unjust interference 
with corporate management. 
However, does Chinese company law strike a fair balance between corporate 
efficiency and protection for the company and minority shareholders? The answer 
may be grounds for pessimism. It appears that in order to strike a fair balance, 
article 152 has tried to learn from Western countries. For example, it has adopted 
experiences found both in German law (the capital threshold in stock companies 
and the role of the supervisory board in making corporate litigation decision) and 
in American law (the period of shareholding and the demand requirement). 
Nevertheless, Chinese company law may have defects both in facilitating 
derivative actions and in protecting corporate management. On the one hand, 
minority shareholders in stock companies may face high thresholds and so have 
difficulties in initiating derivative actions; in addition, high litigation costs may 
also deter derivative actions. On the other hand, corporate management may not 
be sufficiently protected. This can be viewed from two angles. First, directors, 
supervisors and senior officers may be exposed to the risk of huge financial 
liability since there is a lack of protection, such as the business judgment rule, as 
well as a lack oflimitation of their financial liability. Second, the only obstacle to 
shareholders who do satisfy the standing requirements in article 152 and want to 
bring derivative actions is the demand requirement; however, article 152 is 
unclear as to the effect of the demand requirement. As a result, due to these 
defects in the Company Law, it is possible for derivative actions to be abused by 
qualified shareholders in order to interfere with corporate management, with the 
result that the interests of the company and minority shareholders are not 
protected. 
In order to strike a fair balance between corporate efficiency and protection 
for the company and minority shareholders, the rules on relevant issues, such as 
the right of minority shareholders to information, should also be improved. After 
all, it is generally acknowledged that for enforcement of a derivative action, a 
comprehensive system needs to be constructed. 
5.5.2.3 The courts role in derivative actions 
It is still unclear what degree of discretion the Chinese court will have in hearing 
derivative actions. Although the international trend shows that courts are awarded 
a great deal of discretion in derivative actions, the problems of Chinese courts 





6.1 The function of derivative action 
6.1.1 Conclusionsf,-om the comparative study of England, the United 
States and Germany 
Several conclusions may be drawn as far as the role of derivative actions in 
England, the United States and Germany is concerned. 
Different roles for derivative actions in these countries 
It is obvious from comparative study that derivative actions play different roles in 
these countries. Derivative actions play a major role in the United States, while in 
England and Germany they are rarely applied. The function of derivative actions 
in each country depends on many factors, such as legal traditions, policy 
considerations and the availability of alternative mechanisms capable of provi-
ding protection for minority shareholders. 1 For example, traditionally both Eng-
land and Germany are more concerned about the disadvantages of derivate 
actions than with their advantages and so focus on corporate efficiency rather 
than on protection of the company and minority shareholders. As a result, 
stringent requirements for initiating derivative actions have been established 
making it quite difficult for derivative actions to play any important role.2 In the 
United States, on the other hand, the attitude towards private litigation is more 
positive than it is in England and Germany, and as a result, derivative actions are 
quite important in corporate governance.3 
Although it is still an open question as to what function derivative actions should 
have, there does seem to be a trend towards convergence regarding this issue. 
Both England and Germany have reformed the law in order to facilitate derivative 
actions4, while in America rules to restrict derivative actions have been 
For factors affecting the function of derivative action, see Section 1.4.3. 
2 For the English attitude towards the derivative action, see Section 2.2.1; for the German 
attitude, see Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
3 For the American attitude towards the derivative action, see Section 3.2. 




developed. 5 Although derivative actions are unlikely to play similar roles in 
practice in any of these countries even after the reforms, this trend at least shows 
that it is commonly recognized that derivative actions should play an important, 
albeit limited role. 
The influence of the agency problems to be resolved and the type and size of the 
companies involved 
The function of derivative actions may vary according to the agency problems 
needing to be resolved as well as the type and size of the companies. To begin 
with, derivative actions may be less effective in resolving the majority/minority 
shareholder conflict than they are in resolving the shareholder/director conflict. 
As we have mentioned, the nature of derivative actions requires that the recovery 
be awarded to the injured company. 6 This corporate recovery, however, may be 
problematic where the wrongdoer is a majority shareholder. Since it is difficult to 
expel the wrongdoing majority shareholder from the company or to loosen his 
grip on power, the recovery awarded to the injured company ends up still being 
under his control. In addition, he will indirectly benefit from any corporate 
recovery simply through the shares he owns. Thus, the dual function of com-
pensation and deterrence may not be achieved. 
However, the above-mentioned ineffectiveness does not mean that a derivative 
action is no longer viable against the controlling shareholder's misconduct 
towards the company. On the contrary, in principle the justifications for a deri-
vative action still exist, especially against one-shot misconduct. Nevertheless, 
there may be exceptions. For example, in owner-managed companies, where the 
real conflict is between the majority and the minority shareholders, the 
justifications for a derivative action may not exist at all. 7 Generally such a com-
pany is characterized by rather distinctive features. For example, there might only 
be a few shareholders who could be divided into the two necessary groups of 
plaintiffs and defendants, the shares might not be publicly transferable, or the 
company might be managed by the shareholders. Indeed, as DeMott points out, in 
such a company 'the distinction between the interests of the corporation as an 
entity and interests of its shareholders may seem more formal than real'. 8 Where 
such a company is injured by the majority shareholder, it is the minority share-
5 For the development of the American law on derivative action, see Section 3.1.1. 
6 See Section I. I. 
7 Since the legal standards for the classification of companies are different in every country, I 
will use the classification devised by Davies in order to avoid misunderstanding. Davies 
divides companies into four types: the owner-managed company; the large private company; 
the public company whose shares are not publicly traded; and the public company whose shares 
are traded on a public market and whose activities are thus additionally regulated by the rules 
of that market, see Davies (2002), p. 27. As far as a derivative action is concerned, 
identification of the first type of company, the owner-managed company, is important. 
8 DeMott (2003), Section 2, pp. 2-34 ( 2-35. 
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holders who are actually injured and therefore the real dispute is among 
shareholders rather than between the wrongdoing shareholder and the injured 
company. In addition, due to the special features of owner-managed companies, 
justifications for a derivative action may simply not exist. For example, since 
generally there are no non-party shareholders, problems of multiplicity of suits 
and of prejudice to other non-party shareholders, in cases where individual 
remedies are given, will not exist. As long as the company is not bankrupt, the 
interests of creditors and other stakeholders will not be injured, even if the 
damages do not go to the company. 
The ineffectiveness of derivative actions in solving the conflict between 
majority and minority shareholders, along with the special features of owner-
managed companies, make derivative actions less important in such companies, 
if not absolutely unnecessary. Practice in Western countries also shows that 
derivative action is not the major remedy for the aggrieved minority shareholders 
in owner-managed companies when the company has been injured, even if there 
are non-party shareholders. Instead, direct remedies play a more important role. 
For example, in England a minority shareholder can directly apply the unfair 
prejudice procedure in order to challenge the majority shareholder's misconduct 
towards the company.9 In the United States, where a close corporation has been 
injured by the majority shareholder, the court may identify causes of direct action 
by relying on 'the broadened involuntary dissolution remedy' or 'the enhanced 
fiduciary duties owed by the controlling shareholder to other shareholders'. 10 The 
court may also allow a direct action where, in a public corporation, a derivative 
action would have to be brought. 11 As a result, the plaintiff minority shareholder 
of a close corporation may be awarded direct remedies where the corporation has 
been injured. In Germany, there is no statutory derivative action in the GmbHG 
and the case law mechanism of actio pro socio only plays a limited role. 12 In order 
to provide protection for minority shareholders against majority shareholders, 
German case law imposes fiduciary duties with regard to the company and other 
shareholders upon the majority shareholders, and grants remedies of dissolution, 
withdrawal and expulsion to the aggrieved shareholders. 13 
Nevertheless, we should also note that by adopting different mechanisms to 
redress the majority shareholder's misconduct towards the company, each country 
provides a different degree of protection for the aggrieved minority shareholders 
in owner-managed companies. For example, in the United States, a minority 
shareholder is able to bring a derivative action against the majority shareholder's 
misconduct towards the company14, and it is relatively easier to satisfy the 
9 See Section 2.2.2. 
10 See Section 3.2.3.4. 
11 See Section 3.3.3.2. 
12 See Section 4.1.3.2. 
13 See Section 4.2.3.2. 
14 See Section 3.4.1.1. 
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requirements for bringing a derivative action in such situations. 15 He may also 
seek remedies based on the mechanisms of 'oppression' or the majority 
shareholder's 'breach of fiduciary duty' .16 In addition, some courts may treat the 
derivative action case flexibly and allow a direct action in such situations and thus 
the aggrieved minority shareholder will obtain an individual recovery. 17 In short, 
the minority shareholder is well protected: he can be compensated for the injury 
directly via the individual recovery or indirectly via the corporate recovery, or he 
may choose to exit the company. 
English law also provides good protection for minority shareholders in such 
circumstances, due to the recent development of the unfair prejudice remedy. The 
recent development of the unfair prejudice procedure shows that English courts 
are willing to apply this procedure where the company suffers the injury and may 
compensate the aggrieved minority shareholder for his reflective losses, in 
addition to granting him the right to exit the company. 18 In fact, English courts 
are granted wide discretion to award relief as they think fit. 19 This wide discretion 
in general ensures protection for aggrieved minority shareholders, provided the 
court is competent and impartial. This is generally the case in England. In 
addition to the unfair prejudice remedy, an aggrieved minority shareholder may 
also bring a derivative action against the majority shareholder's misconduct 
towards the company if he satisfies the requirements for bringing such an 
action.20 Although the derivative action is in general not attractive for minority 
shareholders, it at least provides a solution. 
The aggrieved minority shareholders of a German GmbH also have an exit 
remedy where the majority shareholder injures the company, just as do their 
counterparts in the United States and England.21 However, they may not be fully 
compensated in such circumstances since the cause of action for the 
compensation belongs to the company and it is difficult for the minority 
shareholder to bring an actio pro socio on behalf of the GmbH against the 
wrongdoing majority shareholder.22 In addition, since the aggrieved shareholders 
who withdraw from the company can only acquire market value for their shares23 , 
they may not be fully compensated if they choose to exit the company. In this 
sense, minority shareholders of German GmbHs are not in as good a position as 
their counterparts in England or the United States are. 
15 It is easier to plead demand futility for close corporations. See Thompson & Thomas (2004), 
p. 1784. 
16 See Section 3.2.3.4. 
17 See Section 3 .3 .3. 
18 See Section 2.2.2. 
19 See Section 2.2.2.1.3. 
20 See Section 2.4.1. 
21 See Section 4.2.3.2. 
22 See Section 4.1.3.2. 
23 There is no explicit definition of 'market value' in German law; nevertheless, it may not 
compensate the withdrawing shareholders for the indirect losses reflected in the GmbH's 
losses, which have not been claimed by the GmbH. 
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Derivative action as part of a comprehensive system of c01porate governance 
As I already indicated, the derivative action is only one of the many mechanisms 
for disciplining corporate management and protecting minority shareholders. 
Due to factors such as legal traditions and corporate structures, the major 
mechanisms for improving corporate governance are different in the various 
countries and derivative action does not necessarily play a similar role. For 
example, both in England and Germany, where derivative action hardly has any 
function in corporate governance, there are other mechanisms that provide 
protection for the company and minority shareholders.24 In fact, the role of 
derivative action is inversely proportional to the availability and effectiveness of 
other mechanisms: the more effective other mechanisms are, the less important 
the function of the derivative action is. Of course, the experiences of all three 
countries also show that no mechanism can completely substitute for another one, 
including the derivative action. Due to this comprehensive system of corporate 
governance, it simply cannot be asserted that any one of the countries provides a 
better solution than any of the others, as far as the function of the derivative action 
is concerned. 25 
6.1.2 The pwpose of derivative actions in China (suggestions for 
China) 
As we know, before Chinese Company Law 2006 there were no statutory rules for 
derivative action and derivative action did not play an important role in protecting 
injured companies and minority shareholders. 26 However, this has changed. Now 
that the derivative action has been adopted in Chinese Company Law 2006, the 
Chinese legislature, in addition to scholars and practitioners, anticipates that the 
derivative action will play an important role in corporate governance. It should be 
noted, though, that this expectation is based on the poor position of minority 
shareholders, as well as on the shortage and ineffectiveness of other corporate 
governance mechanisms, rather than on a comprehensive understanding of the 
advantages and disadvantages of derivative actions. 
A comparative study of Western countries generates two questions with regard to 
the function of derivative actions in China. The first issue is whether the deri-
vative action will be able to play this anticipated role in China. As we have already 
observed in the comparative study, many factors can affect the application of the 
derivative action, such as legal rules and norms, legal tradition, policy 
considerations and the availability of other mechanisms.27 These factors surely 
24 For English law see Section 2.2.1; for German law see Section 4.2.3. 
25 For a good comparison of the strategies applied in these countries as well as in some other 
countries, see Kraakman et al. (2004). 
26 See Sections 5.1.2.1 and 5.2.1. 
27 See Sections 2.2, 3.2 and 4.2. 
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will also affect the application of the derivative action in China. In fact, there are 
several factors that may promote the use of the derivative action, such as the poor 
position of minority shareholders and poor corporate governance, while there are 
also several factors that may impede the function of derivative action, such as the 
relatively poor quality of the courts and the plaintiff shareholder's under-incentive 
problem.28 Nevertheless, we can still expect that derivative action will eventually 
play an important role, since there are few alternative remedies available for the 
injured company and minority shareholders. 
We should also note that derivative action may be expected to play a more 
important role for Chinese limited liability companies, which to a certain extent 
are equivalent to close corporations or private companies, than it will for Chinese 
stock companies, especially those listed companies.29 Several factors may 
account for this. For example, the Chinese legislature and courts are taking a 
more cautious approach towards the derivative action for stock companies; the 
threshold for minority shareholders of stock companies wishing to bring a 
derivative action is higher than that that for minority shareholders of a Chinese 
limited liability company; there are no alternative remedies such as an exit right 
for the minority shareholders in a limited liability company; and a minority 
shareholder in a limited liability company may have more interest in a derivative 
action than does a shareholder in a listed company, since the latter may only have 
a small stake in the company.30 The expectation that derivative action will play a 
more important role in limited liability companies is reflected in current judicial 
practice, since most of the derivative action cases heard by the courts so far 
concern limited liability companies.31 However, the more important role that 
derivative action might come to play in Chinese limited liability companies may 
be inconsistent with present-day international trends and result in insufficient 
protection for minority shareholders. This actually is the second issue as far as the 
function of derivative action in China is concerned. Based on the experience of 
Western countries, we may draw the conclusion that although at present the 
derivative action will and should play an important role in Chinese limited 
liability companies due to the lack of other remedies, this should not be the 
direction of future development. Instead, in the future China should also develop 
mechanisms that provide direct remedies for aggrieved minority shareholders in 
limited liability companies, in order to provide better protection for them at the 
outset. 
We should also consider what function the derivative action should play in 
Chinese stock companies. Although Western countries do not provide a uniform 
answer, practice does show that whether the derivative action should be important 
or not depends on the special situation of each country. Based on the Chinese 
28 See Section 5.2.2. 
29 See Section 5.2.2.4. 
30 See Section 5.2.2.4. 
31 See Section 5.1.2.1.2. 
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situation, we suggest that derivative actions should play an important role for 
stock companies because of serious problems with Chinese corporate governance 
and the poor protection given minority shareholders and also because of the lack 
of other effective mechanisms. For example, due to the traditional Chinese 
Guanxi (relationship) culture, supervision of corporate management by an 
independent body is unlikely to be successful. Of course, for derivative actions to 
develop such an important role, China would have to improve its judicial branch, 
as the success of derivative actions to a great extent depends on the comts. 
Moreover, we should also note that the role of the derivative action should not be 
exaggerated, especially since in China controlling shareholder and majority/ 
minority shareholder conflict is common even in the largest listed companies. 
Due to the defects inherent in derivative actions when solving such conflicts, 
other methods should also be developed in order to improve corporate governance 
as a whole. 
6.2 The distinction between derivative actions and direct 
actions 
6.2.1 Conclusions ft-om the comparative study of England, the United 
States and Germany 
Due to restrictions on his right to initiate a derivative action and due to the 
corporate recovery should the derivative action succeed, the minority shareholder 
would normally prefer to bring a direct action rather than a derivative action, 
despite the advantages he may well have in a derivative action.32 In other words, 
a minority shareholder is generally in a better position if he is allowed to bring a 
direct action against the misconduct. 
Comparative study of Western countries shows that normally the injmy standard 
and/or the right standard are applied in order to distinguish a shareholder's direct 
action from a derivative action.33 In most cases the employment of the injury and 
the right standards do not lead to different results based on this distinction, since 
legal rights and injuries normally relate to one another.34 Therefore, in order to 
make the distinction, the identification of the shareholder's personal rights35 or 
personal losses as something separate from the corporate rights or losses, is very 
important. How such identification is made is regulated by the substantive law of 
32 For example, he may be reimbursed for his litigation costs by the company in a derivative 
action. 
33 See Sections 2.3.1, 3.3.1 and 4.3. However, American law may sometimes consider other 
factors, such as policy considerations when making the distinction, see Section 3.3.1.2. 
34 See Section 3.3.1.1.1. 
35 Sometimes it is the defendant's duty that needs to be determined since 'rights correspond with 
duties', see Welch (1994), p. 163. 
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each country. In many cases the line between the shareholder's personal rights and 
corporate rights is clear, while in many other cases it is not. The difficulty in 
making this clear identification stems mainly from three legal rights: the right of 
claims against defective resolutions of the company ( or breach of the 
constitution), the right of claims against the director's breach of duty, and the right 
of claims against the shareholder's breach of duty. 
However, there are also circumstances where the infringement of rights may not 
be identical to the injuries suffered. Therefore, the application of the injury 
standard and the right standard may lead to different results as far as the 
classification of the nature of the litigation is concerned. For example, sometimes 
the infringement (or a prospective infringement) ofrights may lead to no injury 
to the company, while sometimes an injury to the company may infringe both the 
rights of the company and of shareholders individually. The latter is frequently the 
case in owner-managed companies. Where the misconduct against the company 
causes no injury to the company or where corporate injury does occur but where 
the litigation claims for non-pecuniary remedies such as an injunction or a setting 
aside of defective resolutions rather than for damages, Western countries may 
allow a shareholder to bring a direct action, subject to the principle of non-
interference with corporate management.36 In fact, the very scope of the in-
dividual shareholder's right to bring such a direct action is different in these 
countries precisely due to the different applications of the principle.37 
Where an injury to the company infringes the individual shareholder's 
personal rights as well as the corporate rights, Western countries take differing 
approaches towards the classification of these actions. Although all the countries 
accept the general principle that an individual shareholder cannot bring a direct 
claim for his reflective losses, some countries may apply this principle flexibly, 
especially in the case of owner-managed companies, while others may not. For 
example, in the United States, some courts require an individual shareholder to 
bring a derivative action in order to claim for damages against the corporate 
injury. However, other courts take a more flexible approach and allow for a 
shareholder's direct action to claim for personal damages in close corporations, 
where, in public corporations, the claimant might well have brought a derivative 
action. 38 In England, this distinction is actually moot due to the popularity of the 
unfair prejudice procedure.39 Since German law basically adheres to the general 
principle of no reflective loss, the nature of the action depends on the remedies 
sought. An individual shareholder can bring a direct action against the injury to 
the company if his claim is based on a personal remedy such as withdrawal. 
However, ifhe wants to claim compensation, he has to bring a derivative action.40 
36 See Sections 2.3, 3.3 and 4.3. 
37 For the scope of this individual shareholder's right in each country, see Sections 2.3.2, 3.3.2.1 
and 4.3.1. 
3 8 See Section 3 .3 .3. 
39 See Section 2.2.2.1.2. 
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These varying approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages. For 
instance, the flexible approach taken by the English courts and some American 
courts may provide better protection for minority shareholders. However, this 
approach at the same time requires competent and fair judges to hear these cases 
since identification of the nature of the litigation under the flexible approach has 
to be done on a case-by-case basis. Although the German approach may require 
less court discretion, it may not redress the wrong due to the difficulty in bringing 
a derivative action. 
6.2.2 Suggestions for China 
Several defects in current Chinese company law may be identified as far as the 
distinction between shareholders' direct and derivative actions is concerned. First, 
the substantive law concerning the shareholder's personal rights or in regard to the 
duties owed to individual shareholders is not clear.41 This can make it difficult to 
draw distinctions. Therefore, future reform should clarify the substantive law. 
Second, under Chinese Company Law 2006 an individual shareholder has a wide-
ranging right to initiate a direct action in order to set aside defective resolutions 
of corporate bodies, no matter whether his personal rights have been infringed or 
not.42 Although there are restrictions on it, this right may unjustly interfere with 
corporate management. Therefore, Chinese company law should also introduce 
the principle of non-interference with corporate management and restrict this 
right of individual shareholders, for example, by requiring that an individual 
shareholder only bring such an action where his personal interests have been 
infringed or where the misconduct challenged involves serious mismanagement. 
Third, some rights ( or duties) under current Chinese company law are not coupled 
with remedies and so, as a result, no action may arise from the breach of duties. 
For example, although a shareholder owes fiduciary duties to other shareholders, 
a breach of duties does not necessarily give rise to a direct action by the aggrieved 
shareholders as there is no remedy for the aggrieved shareholders except where 
they have suffered direct losses.43 Therefore, in order to prevent these rights from 
becoming only paper tigers, future Chinese company law should provide minority 
shareholders with direct remedies against infringement of rights. Due to these 
defects, it is currently more appropriate in China to apply the injury standard 
when identifying the nature of the shareholder's action. However, when the above 
defects have been remedied, the right standard should prevail in those cases where 
it is inconsistent with the injury standard. 
Chinese law is also faced with the issue of whether or not it should take a 
flexible approach towards the distinction between direct and derivative action in 
40 See Section 4.3.3. 
41 See Sections 5.1.1.4.3.2, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. 
42 See Section 5.3.1. 
43 See Section 5.3.3. 
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owner-managed companies. This is actually an open-ended question because 
comparative study does not provide any conclusive answer and because the very 
development of the Chinese judicial system still remains to be seen. 
6.3 Maintaining a fair balance between corporate efficiency 
and protection for the company and minority 
shareholders 
6.3.1 General comments 
The Western countries we have studied have taken differing approaches towards 
striking a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the company 
and minority shareholders. Generally, both in England and Germany, this balance 
favors corporate management, while in the United States it is easier to bring a 
derivative action.44 However, in spite of these different approaches, the basic 
strategies for striking a balance which have been adopted by these countries are 
similar, as they are all faced with the same problems derivative action causes. This 
has provided the foundation for our comparative study. Traditionally these 
countries have adopted different solutions to these problems; however, more 
recent reforms in these countries now show a trend towards convergence in many 
respects. 
This comparative study illustrates the fact that the application of derivative 
actions is affected by a wide range oflegal rules, including the specific legal rules 
for derivative actions, the legal rules which, while not specific to derivative 
actions, do have a direct influence on derivative actions, and a broader group of 
legal rules including rules on corporate governance.45 It is important for China to 
recognize this influence stemming from a wide range of legal rules since China 
has been focusing on specific legal rules for derivative actions while neglecting 
the influence of other rules. 
Due to its limited scope, this book could not discuss all of these legal rules but 
has focused mainly on the first group of rules and some rules from the second 
group. Among these are some issues which are especially important for 
improving Chinese law on derivative actions, so I will be discussing these in the 
following sections. 
44 See Sections 2.2, 3.2 and 4.2. 





The appropriate body to make a litigation decision in the best 
interests of the company 
Conclusions fi·om the comparative study of England, the United 
States and Germany 
As this comparative study has shown, all countries are faced with the issue of the 
appropriate body to make a litigation decision in the best interests of the 
company, especially where public companies are concerned. While in owner-
managed companies the difficulty lies in determining whether the controlling 
shareholder's misconduct against the company should give rise to a direct or a 
derivative action, in other companies, especially in public companies, the real 
difficulty lies in identifying the appropriate decision-making body, where the 
board of directors has a conflict of interest when making a corporate litigation 
decision. 
Comparative study has demonstrated that several strategies to handle this have 
been developed in the three countries discussed and that these have resulted in 
different bodies, such as the shareholders' general meeting, an independent 
corporate body, minority shareholders, or the court, making such a decision. Each 
of these bodies has its own advantages and disadvantages when making the 
decision. For example, under the decision-making strategy, the general meeting 
of shareholders generally has the right to make a litigation decision in the name 
of the company, but this strategy has the defect of collective action, which, 
especially in publicly held companies, makes the decision-making process slow 
and costly. Moreover, where the majority of shareholders are also the wrongdoers 
or where they control the wrongdoers, the problem of conflict of interest may well 
arise. Disinterested shareholders, when substituting for the general meeting, have 
the advantage of avoiding the problem of conflict of interest, but the problem of 
collective action is not resolved; in small companies there may not even be any 
disinterested shareholders. The minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate 
claims (the derivative action) may solve the above-mentioned problems, but may 
generate the new problem of interfering with corporate management and create 
the problem of shareholder incentive.46 Trusteeship strategies are not perfect 
either. Internal trustees, such as the independent directors, may have the advan-
tage of expertise and knowledge of the company's affairs, but they may not be 
sufficiently independent or may actually be structurally biased. Outsider trustees 
have problems as well. For example, the courts, although independent, are not 
business experts and, as outsiders, may not be the appropriate body to make a 
decision for the company; besides, a judicial process normally costs a great deal 
of time and money. 
Since no strategy is perfect, it is difficult to choose the appropriate body to 
make a litigation decision in the best interests of the company where the board 
46 See Section 1.3. 
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has a conflict of interest. In fact, several factors may affect the choice, such as the 
type and size of the company47, the shareholding of the company48, effects arising 
from the application of the strategies49, or even policy attitudes towards the issue, 
for example, the policy of favoring the collective nature of corporate litigation 
decisions. 50 It is also common for more than one strategy to be adopted in order 
to achieve a better effect. For example, the minority shareholder's right to bring a 
derivative action is normally combined with judicial discretion in order to permit 
the continuance of the action. 51 
Western countries have traditionally taken different approaches towards the issue 
of the appropriate body. Nevertheless, recent reforms in these countries also show 
a trend of convergence. For example, England traditionally has always recognized 
that the general meeting of shareholders has the right to make a corporate 
litigation decision and that an individual shareholder can bring a derivative action 
only in exceptional cases. Recently, however, English law has identified two other 
bodies which may make this decision: an independent body of the company and 
the court. Based on the policy of favoring the collective nature of corporate 
decisions, an independent body of the company is regarded as being more 
appropriate than an individual shareholder when making such a decision. 52 More-
over, the court's permission is required in order for the individual shareholder to 
continue the derivative action. 53 It has even been recently suggested that the 
court's role should be improved. The Companies Bill suggests that the court be 
given greater discretion in deciding whether to permit a derivative action. 54 
However, this reform will not change the tradition of regarding an individual 
shareholder's right to bring a derivative action as a last resort. 55 
Unlike in England, an individual shareholder's derivative action has 
traditionally played an important role in the United States.56 Nevertheless, the 
development of the special litigation committee has to a large extent transferred 
the power from the individual shareholder to the independent directors.57 This 
development has also had the effect of giving the court more discretion to decide 
whether to allow a derivative action, since the courts in some states, such as 
Delaware, review the decision of the special litigation committee with a standard 
47 Hirt (2005a), p. 200. 
48 Hirt (2005a), pp. 201-202. 
49 Hirt (2005a), pp. 200-201. 
50 Hirt (2005a), pl 73. English law is an example of this, see Section 2.6.2.1. 
51 Hirt (2005a), pp. 180-181. As noted below, this approach has been taken in England, in the US, 
as well as in Germany. 
52 See Sections 2.1.3.3 and 2.4.1.3. 
53 See Sections 2.1.4 and 2.4.1.2.3. 
54 See Section 2.4.2.3. 
55 See Section 2.4.2. 
56 See Section 3.2. 
57 See Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.3.1. 
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that is different from the standard applied when reviewing the board's decision. 
The court will usually apply the business judgment rule to review the board's 
litigation decision, while, when reviewing the decision of the special litigation 
decision, it will exercise more discretion, such as applying its own business 
decision. 58 
German law has its own features regarding this issue. 59 First of all, German 
law provides different solutions to the issue depending on whether AGs or 
GmbHs are involved. Second, the supervisory board, which is regarded as being 
independent from the managing board, has taken on the task of making a 
litigation decision against members of the managing board, and this has been 
recognized for quite a while now. In GmbHs, where no supervisory board exists, 
the shareholders' general meeting can make such a decision. Third, in AGs the 
general meeting of shareholders as well as a group of minority shareholders also 
have the right to make litigation decisions. Fourth, there is no priority as far as 
these bodies' power to make a litigation decision is concerned. In other words, 
one body's negative litigation decision will not bar another body's right to make 
a decision. Fifth, accepting the experience derived from the common law 
countries, the UMAG has also granted the court greater discretion in deciding 
whether to allow a shareholder's derivative action. 
The development of the above-mentioned laws obviously shows a trend to-
wards convergence in spite of their different approaches: the countries all 
recognize that more than one body should be given the power to make such a 
decision and, of these bodies, it is the court that should be awarded wide 
discretion to decide whether it is in the best interests of the company to sue. 
6.3.2.2 Suggestions for China 
One defect of the Chinese law on derivative actions is that it fails to consider 
several fundamental issues or principles regarding derivative actions. Identifying 
the appropriate body is one of those issues that have been ignored. 
The issue of choosing an appropriate body is pivotal to the application of 
derivative actions since the negative litigation decision of a body, if this body is 
regarded as being more appropriate than the minority shareholders for making a 
litigation decision, may bar a derivative action. In fact, as we have observed, many 
of the rules regulating the issue of the appropriate body are embodied in the 
requirements for bringing a derivative action. Unfortunately, Chinese law is rather 
vague as far as this issue is concerned. This vagueness, for example, can be 
observed when examining the following aspects. First, article 152 of Company 
Law 2006 requires that, before they initiate a derivative action, the minority 
shareholder(s) make a demand on the supervisory board or the board of directors, 
58 See Section 3.4.2.2.2.3.3.2. 
59 For a detailed discussion of the German law, see Section 4.1.3. 
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which is supposed to have no conflict of interest regarding the litigation decision. 
However, if article 152 is interpreted literally, a negative litigation decision by 
either of the boards will not bar the derivative action. 60 Therefore, the minority 
shareholder(s) are not regarded as being less appropriate to make such a decision 
than the board, which is regarded as independent. The purpose of this demand 
requirement seems to revolve around preventing multiplicity of litigation rather 
than subjecting the minority shareholders' will to the board's business decision.61 
This approach may result in the minority shareholders interfering with corporate 
management by bringing a derivative action.62 Second, although article 152 
requires that the minority shareholder(s) make a demand on the supervisory 
board or on the supervisors (in those limited liability companies where no 
supervisory board exists), the supervisory board or the supervisors can only bring 
a corporate action against the directors or senior executives on the basis of the 
minority shareholders' request.63 In other words, the supervisory board or the 
supervisors cannot make an independent litigation decision. This approach, 
together with the effect of the demand requirement, could lead one to conclude 
that the supervisory board or the supervisors are not regarded as an appropriate 
body to make a corporate litigation decision under Chinese law. Third, the court's 
role in making a corporate litigation decision is not clear either. On the one hand, 
Company Law 2006 does not grant the court any discretion as to permitting a 
derivative action or reviewing the boards' decision. 64 On the other hand, however, 
judicial practice shows that the court may actually have this discretion in 
practice. 65 
This vagueness will obviously cause problems such as uncertainty and 
inconsistency in the implementation of the law. Therefore, China should find a 
solution to this issue on the basis of the particular situations found there. 
6.3.3 The principle of non-judicial inte1ference with corporate 
management 
6.3.3.1 Conclusions fi-om the comparative study of England, the United 
States and Germany 
The comparative study shows that it is a generally recognized principle that 
corporate management should not be unjustly interfered with, either by a share-
holder's direct action or by his derivative action. Following this principle, all 
Western countries acknowledge that a shareholder can only bring litigation 
against certain kinds of corporate mismanagement. 
60 See Section 5.4.2.3. 
61 See Section 5.4.2.3. 
62 See Section 5.4.2.3. 
63 See articles 54(6) and 119 of Chinese Company Law 2006. 
64 See Section 5.4.2.3. 
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As far as the derivative action is concerned, this principle is mainly embodied in 
the substantive restrictions placed on the shareholder's right to initiate a derivative 
action. These are the resh-ictions placed on the possible defendants in a derivative 
action ( or, in other words, those whose misconduct may be the cause of derivative 
action) and the restriction placed on the nature of the misconduct which may give 
rise to a derivative action. The approaches towards these restrictions may differ in 
Western countries. For example, with regard to the restriction on the possible 
defendants, the difference mainly lies in whether the controlling shareholder's 
misconduct may be a cause of derivative action. Under American law and English 
common law, a derivative action may be initiated against the conh·olling 
shareholder's misconduct.66 Nevertheless, the British Companies Bill suggests 
that the cause of derivative action should only arise from the director's mis-
conduct.67 The German law has also changed its approach, but in another 
direction. Before the UMAG, basically only the director's misconduct could be a 
cause of derivative action68, however, the UMAG has extended the causes to 
include the shareholder's misconduct as well.69 These different approaches may 
provide different degrees of protection for the injured company and minority 
shareholders. If a derivative action is not permitted against the controlling 
shareholder's misconduct, the injured company and the aggrieved minority 
shareholders may not be well protected, since the board, which is normally under 
the control of the wrongdoing controlling shareholder, is unlikely to bring a 
corporate action against the misconduct. However, we should note that currently 
only the British Companies Bill suggests that a derivative action should be 
initiated only against the director's misconduct. That said, the disadvantage of the 
approach taken by the British Companies Bill may not be significant in England 
because the controlling shareholder may qualify as a shadow director and 
because, more especially, the minority shareholders can be protected against the 
wrongdoing shareholder via the unfair prejudice petition.70 
Different approaches have also been taken towards the nature of misconduct 
that may give rise to derivative actions. One approach is that the law lays down 
restrictions ex ante that only certain kinds of misconduct can give rise to 
derivative actions. This approach has been adopted, for example, by English 
common law and the German UMAG.71 The American business judgment rule 
plays a similar role by shifting the burden of proving certain misconduct onto the 
plaintiff.72 Nevertheless, we should note that the scope of actionable misconduct 
varies in these countries. The other approach revolves around no ex ante 
65 See Sections 5.1.1.4.2.4 and 5.4.2.1. 
66 See Sections 3.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.1.1 respectively. 
67 See Section 2.4.2.2.1. 
68 See Section 4.4.1.1.1. 
69 See Section 4.4.2.2.1. 
70 See Section 2.2.2. 
71 See Sections 2.4.1.1.2 and 4.4.2.2.1 respectively. 
72 See Section 3.4.1.2. 
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restriction being established, but expects that the court will exercise its discretion 
when deciding whether a derivative action should be permitted. The British 
Companies Bill takes this approach. 73 As mentioned, each of these approaches 
has its own advantages and disadvantages. 74 
6.3.3.2 Suggestions for China 
The principle of non-judicial interference with corporate management is 
important for striking a balance between corporate efficiency and protection for 
the company and minority shareholders. However, it would appear that Chinese 
law has not recognized this principle very well. The restrictions on minority 
shareholders' litigation mainly focus on prevention of abuse of litigation rather 
than on this principle. For example, an individual shareholder can bring a direct 
action to set aside defective resolutions of the board or of the shareholders' 
general meeting, even if there are only minor procedural defects75; the 
requirement that the plaintiff shareholder provide security is, to a great extent, 
intended to prevent the abuse of this right. 
The Chinese law on derivative actions does not reflect this principle either. The 
restrictions placed on the minority shareholder's right to derivative actions are 
mainly procedural, such as the threshold requirement and the demand require-
ment. However, the substantive restrictions remain rather vague. For example, 
article 152 of Company Law 2006 allows a derivative action to be pursued against 
persons other than directors, supervisors and senior officers, but it does not 
clarify under what circumstances the derivative action is allowed against these 
persons. In other words, it is not clear whether the misconduct of these persons 
can be the cause of derivative action or not. 76 As far as the nature of the mis-
conduct that may give rise to a derivative action is concerned, Company Law 
2006 has no restriction except for the requirement that the misconduct of 
directors, supervisors and senior officers must arise during the course of 
performing their company duties. 77 That is, a director may be held liable for his 
mere breach of the duty of care when performing his company duties. 
It is obvious that these vague substantive restrictions under Chinese law will 
make corporate management an easy target for minority shareholders, this will, 
in turn, negatively affect economic development and investors' interests. 
Therefore, China should introduce the principle of non-judicial interference in 
corporate management and improve the rules of substantive restrictions on 
derivative action. 
73 See Section 2.4.2.2.2. 
74 See Section 5.4.1.2. 
7 5 See Section 5 .3 .1. 
76 See Section 5.4.1.1. 
77 See Section 5.4.1.2. 
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6.3.4 The procedural requirements for minority shareholders to bring a 
derivative action 
This comparative study shows that Western countries lay down different 
procedural requirements for minority shareholders to bring a derivative action. 
For example, English law requires that the minority shareholder prove prim a facie 
the Foss rule requirements and obtain the court's permission in order to continue 
the derivative action.78 American law requires the plaintiff shareholder to own the 
shares at the time the wrong was committed and to make a demand on the board 
before he initiates the derivative action. 79 German law has traditionally relied on 
the capital threshold requirement80, but the latest UMAG inserts a new require-
ment of a two-stage court procedure. Therefore, the court's permission is needed 
in order for the minority shareholder(s) to continue the derivative action.81 These 
requirements are all intended to prevent the abusive use of derivative actions and 
to maintain a balance between corporate efficiency and minority shareholder 
protection. Due to the different backgrounds of each country, it is actually 
difficult to conclude which approach is the best. In the end, the effect of the 
various procedural requirements should be evaluated against the whole system. 
Chinese law also lays down procedural requirements for bringing a derivative 
action. 82 However, the effect of these requirements remains to be seen. 
6.3.5 The plaintiff's incentives to initiate a derivative action 
In Western countries there is still no satisfactory solution to the plaintiff's under-
incentive and/or over-incentive problems. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the 
allocation of litigation costs will to a great extent affect the plaintiff's incentives. 
In appropriate situations shifting the plaintiff's burden of litigation costs to the 
company, which is the real beneficiary of the suit, is a common way to reduce the 
under-incentive problem.83 This should also be learned by China. 
6.3.6 The court's role in derivative actions 
Our study illustrates that the court has played a more and more important role in 
derivative actions in Western countries, including Germany where the court has 
traditionally played a less important role. The court has wide discretion not only 
in deciding the fiduciary duties of directors and controlling shareholders, but also 
in identifying the nature of the action and in deciding whether to allow a 
derivative action. This trend reflects one feature of company law. Due to the 
78 See Section 2.4.1.2. 
79 See Section 3.4.2. 
80 See Section 4.4.1.2. 
81 See Section 4.4.2.2.2. 
82 See Section 5.4.2. 
83 See Sections 2.4.1.4, 3.4.4.1 and 4.4.2.2.3. 
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different situations in every company and the difficulty in balancing the interests 
of the different parties, not to mention the overriding context of the rapid 
development of business society, company law should be sufficiently flexible. 
The best way to achieve this flexibility is to establish basic principles and grant 
the court wide discretion in implementing these principles on a case-by-case 
basis. 
However, granting the court wide discretion is based on the premise that the court 
will be fair and competent to hear these cases. It is generally agreed that currently 
Chinese courts are not able to satisfy these requirements. 84 Therefore, improving 
the quality of the Chinese judicial branch will be important for the application of 
derivative actions and their future development. 
84 See Section 5.2.2.3.1. 
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Where injuries have been done to a company, the general principle is that a suit 
against this misconduct should be pursued by that company and that damages 
should be awarded to that company. However, in certain circumstances (such as 
when the company is controlled by the wrongdoer and therefore cannot bring an 
action by itself), an individual shareholder or a group of minority shareholders of 
the injured company can bring a derivative action against this misconduct in their 
own name in order to protect the interests of that company and the shareholders 
thereof. This fact notwithstanding, this exception to the general principle may 
also have its disadvantages, for example, corporate management may be unjustly 
interfered with or the shareholders may not have sufficient incentive to bring the 
action. Because of both its justifications and disadvantages, there have always 
been different attitudes towards the derivative action. 
Western countries among themselves also take differing approaches towards 
derivative action in practice, including its very role and the mechanisms for 
regulating it. These different approaches and the reasons for them may provide 
valuable experience and lessons for China on how to improve its own law on 
derivative action. This is also the aim of our comparative study. 
This book is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter 1 provides a general introduction to derivative action (such as its nature, 
justifications for and disadvantages of it, as well as its role) and briefly illustrates 
the countries chosen for the comparative study, as well as noting the structure of 
the study. This book has chosen England, the United States and Germany, as well 
as China, for the actual study. These three Western countries have their own 
characteristic features as far as derivative action is concerned and China is where 
the author is from. Although the countries we will study take different approaches 
towards derivative action, the major issues concerned are similar. This book has 
identified several key issues (that is, the function of derivative action, how to 
distinguish between shareholders' derivative action and direct action, how to 
strike a fair balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the company 
and its minority shareholders) and has studied the issues on a country-by-country 
basis. Moreover, since each country has its own traditions and background, which 
may affect its resolution of these issues, this book also discusses these varying 
backgrounds when necessary. 
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Chapter 2 studies English law. It starts with an introduction to the current English 
law on derivative actions, specifically, the Foss v. Harbottle rule and its 
exceptions as well as the development of this rule. The Foss v. Harbottle rule and 
its exceptions are important in modern company law to the extent that they have 
established several basic principles for company law, such as the proper plaintiff 
principle, the majority rule principle (which reflects the principle of non-
interference in corporate business) and the minority shareholder's right to bring a 
derivative action against corporate misconduct in certain circumstances. In fact 
the law of derivative action is generally regarded as originating in English law. 
However, due to the strict requirements for initiating a derivative action under 
English law and the traditionally unfavorable attitude toward the derivative action, 
current common law derivative action is regarded as obscure, complex and 
obsolete. It has not played an important role in England in the protection of the 
company and minority shareholders or in disciplining corporate management. 
Instead, the most popular remedy that is applied by minority shareholders, 
especially those in close companies, is the unfair prejudice remedy. The second 
section of this chapter discusses the unimportant role the derivative action plays 
in England and the relationship between the unfair prejudice remedy and the 
derivative action. 
The third section of this chapter studies how English law distinguishes 
between shareholders' derivative actions and direct actions. This distinction is 
important since the plaintiff shareholder has to meet strict requirements if he 
wishes to bring a derivative action against the misconduct. Basically English law 
adopts the 'right' and/or 'injury' criteria in making such a distinction. 
Nevertheless, the substantive law on the rights of the company and on that of 
individual shareholders is not very clear in England. The discussion of the 
distinction mainly focuses on the three areas where the distinction is vague: where 
there is a breach of a company's constitution, where a director breaches his duties, 
and where a majority shareholder breaches his duties. 
The fourth section of this chapter studies how English law tries to strike a 
balance between corporate efficiency and protection for the company and its 
minority shareholders. As already observed in the previous sections, under 
English law the balance favors corporate efficiency over minority protection. The 
main method in the common law derivative action for striking this balance is the 
strict restrictions (both substantive and procedural) established by the Foss rule. 
In addition, the court also plays an important role since the court's permission is 
needed in order to continue a derivative action. 
The whole of the British Companies Act is currently in the process of reform. 
The proposed Companies Bill puts forth suggestions for a new statutory 
derivative action in order to facilitate derivative action. The most obvious change 
in the new statutory derivative action is that it will grant the court great discretion 
in controlling derivative actions. Nevertheless, this Bill is not intended to affect 
the current balance between corporate efficiency and minority protection. 
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Chapter 3 of this book studies American law. It is generally recognized that 
derivative action plays a more important role in the United States than in other 
countries and that the American rules governing derivative action are 
sophisticated and well developed in both facilitating and controlling derivative 
actions. This chapter starts with an introduction to the development of derivative 
actions in the United States, which can be divided into four stages. The devel-
opment shows how the American law has adjusted to the tension between cor-
porate efficiency and shareholder protection. The latest trend is that the balance 
is tilting more towards corporate efficiency. 
The second section of this chapter studies the role of derivative action in the 
United States. Several features of the role are identified. First, it is a fact that the 
derivative action does play an important role in the United States. Second, it plays 
a less important role nowadays than it has in the past. Third, it plays a more 
important role in public corporations than in close corporations. We also point out 
that there is still an ongoing debate as to what role the derivative action should 
play. 
The third section of this chapter discusses how American law identifies the 
nature of actions. The major criteria are the right/injury criteria. But American 
law also considers other factors, such as policies and repercussions of the action 
when identifying the nature of actions. Another feature of American law is that 
some American courts may take a more flexible approach towards the distinction 
between derivative action and direct action in close corporations due to the 
special nature of close corporations. Where the majority shareholder infringes on 
the interests of a close corporation, the real dispute lies among the shareholders 
and the real victims are the minority shareholders. As a result, some courts tend 
to identify a direct action rather than a derivative one where the close corporation 
is infringed by the majority shareholder. Of course, the basis for the special 
treatment may be different: the courts may apply a varied injury criterion, or take 
into account factors such as lack of justification for derivative action in close 
corporations, prevention of unjust emichment, and so on. 
The fourth section illustrates how American law strikes a balance between 
corporate efficiency and protection for the corporation and its minority 
shareholders. As mentioned, the American law is sophisticated in both controlling 
and facilitating derivative actions. The major limitations on the shareholder's right 
to bring a derivative action are found in the business judgment rule (which 
substantively restricts the scope of misconduct, which may give rise to a 
derivative action) and the demand requirement (which is a procedural require-
ment, but subjects the individual shareholder's right to bring a derivative action to 
the decision of the board or to the special litigation committee, as well as to the 
discretion of the court, which has the power to review this decision). In addition, 
there are other requirements such as the contemporaneous ownership requirement 
and security-for-expenses. In this section, we also take note of two other features 
of the American law. One is that it limits directors' financial exposure to the risk 
of the costs of litigation in order to protect corporate directors. The other feature 
is that due to the contingency fee agreement, attorneys to a great extent contribute 
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to the popularity of derivative action in the United States; this, however, has the 
side effect of precipitating the problem of abuse of derivative actions. 
A discussion of German law is found in Chapter 4. German law has a background 
different from that of Anglo-American law. Therefore, in the first section of this 
chapter, we offer a brief summary of the German background, such as the 
existence of two types of companies (the AG that is equivalent to public 
companies, and the GmbH that is equivalent to private companies), the two-tier 
system of their corporate structures, as well as recent reforms in Germany 
concerning corporate governance. This section also serves as an introduction to 
how corporate claims are enforced under German law. Since the AG and the 
GmbH are regulated by different acts, the rules on how to enforce corporate 
claims are also different in each case. In short, minority shareholders of an AG 
have the statutmy right to enforce corporate claims, while those of a GmbH do 
not have such a right. Minority shareholders of a GmbH only have a right of actio 
pro socio, which has been developed through case law and is not regarded as 
being equivalent to derivative action. 
The minority shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims, which is now 
translated as a right to bring a derivative action according to the UMAG, has not 
played an important role in German corporate governance. Traditionally, German 
law has focused on a structural system of checks and balances rather than on 
liability rules for the disciplining of corporate management. The second section 
of this chapter also seeks to illustrate how the German rules have been working. 
The third section studies how German law distinguishes the shareholders' 
derivative action (a corporate action before the UMAG) from a direct action. In 
this regard, German law strictly applies the right/injury criteria. For example, only 
a corporate action or a derivative action is allowed to seek a claim for damages 
where the company has suffered losses. This, however, may not provide sufficient 
protection for minority shareholders, especially in a GmbH where no derivative 
action is allowed, in cases where the wrongdoer is a majority shareholder of the 
company. The discussion of this distinction mainly focuses on those three areas: 
where a defective resolution of a corporate body needs to be set aside, where a 
director breaches his duties, and where a majority shareholder breaches his 
duties. 
The German rules concerning how a balance is struck between corporate 
efficiency and protection for the company and its minority shareholders have 
been changed since the UMAG. The fourth section of the chapter therefore 
discusses both the old and the new rules in order to trace the development of 
German law. Under the old law, the major restriction on the minority 
shareholders' right to enforce corporate claims was the high capital threshold. 
Actually, though, there were two different capital thresholds. If the minority 
shareholders chose the lower one, they still found themselves subject to other 
restrictions. For example, they were required to show the existence of facts which 
justified the urgent suspicion that there was dishonesty or gross violation of law 
or the articles. But then they only were granted the right to cause the court to 
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appoint a special representative who would, in turn, have the discretion to decide 
whether to initiate a corporate action. The UMAG makes some fundamental 
changes to this situation. First, the UMAG significantly reduces the capital 
threshold for bringing a derivative action to that of aggregately holding one 
percent of the capital stock or stock with an exchange or market value of EUR 
100,000. Second, the UMAG introduced the business judgment rule while 
restricting the scope of misconduct that might give rise to a derivative action to 
cases of fraud or other gross infringement of the law or of the memorandum and 
articles, and this in order to protect corporate management. Third, the UMAG has 
adopted a two-stage court procedure in order to prevent the abuse of derivative 
action. The procedure grants the court the discretion to decide whether to allow a 
derivative action. Fourth, the minority shareholders can enforce corporate claims 
in their own names, which means that a derivative action in a real sense is now 
allowed. Fifth, the UMAG has also changed the rule concerning allocation of 
litigation costs so that the minority shareholders may now have more incentive to 
bring a derivative action. In sum, these changes point to a trend where German 
law is becoming more lenient towards the minority shareholders' derivative action 
and is moving towards the Anglo-American approach. 
Chapter 5 studies Chinese law. The first section discusses the background to 
Chinese law and the development of derivative action in China. A discussion of 
the background, such as the history of Chinese company law, the characteristics 
of regulations on corporate governance, the major agency problems found in 
Chinese companies and the situation for minority shareholders, can help us to 
form a better understanding of the Chinese law in this regard. The development 
of derivative actions in China is also worth noting. Chinese courts had already 
heard derivative actions before there was any statutory rule regarding them in the 
Company Act, this in spite of the fact that China has a civil law tradition. In fact, 
Chinese courts, especially the Supreme People's Court, have played an important 
role in the development of derivative actions. 
The second section of this chapter discusses the function derivative action has 
in China. Derivative action only played a limited role before its specific 
introduction in Company Law 2006 because of its 'unofficial' status. However, 
whether it will play an important role after this introduction still remains to be 
seen. On the one hand, derivative action is needed in order to protect the company 
and minority shareholders and to discipline corporate management. On the other 
hand, Chinese special circumstances, such as the poor quality of its courts, the 
unfavorable attitude towards derivative actions in stock companies, as well as 
high litigation costs, may impede the application of derivative actions, especially 
in stock companies. Furthermore, the defects in the Chinese Company Law, such 
as a lack of the principle of non-interference in corporate management, may also 
cause problems if the derivative action is widely applied. Nevertheless, we also 
note that derivative action may play a more important role in Chinese limited 
liability companies than in stock companies. 
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The third section discusses how derivative action is distinguished from direct 
action under Chinese law. Under Chinese law, an individual shareholder can bring 
a direct action to nullify and withdraw a void or voidable resolution of the 
shareholders' meeting or of the board of directors, no matter whether the 
individual shareholder's rights and/or interests have been injured or not. 
Therefore, in such cases, a distinction is not necessary. This, however, may result 
in the problem of unjust interference in corporate management. On the other 
hand, an individual shareholder can bring a direct action to claim for damages 
only when his personal interests have been infringed. As a result, as far as the 
claim for damages is concerned, Chinese law also applies the right/injury criteria. 
However, Chinese law has additional problems, such as the lack of clarity in the 
substantive law of shareholder's rights and the fact that some rights are not 
coupled with remedies. 
The Chinese methods for striking a balance between corporate efficiency and 
protection for the company and its minority shareholders are then discussed in the 
fourth section. The importance of striking a balance has also been recognized in 
China and Chinese law has already taken some measures for achieving this. 
However, these major methods entail procedural restrictions on the minority 
shareholders' right to bring a derivative action, such as the standing requirement 
for shareholders in stock companies and the demand requirement. The principle 
of non-judicial interference in corporate management has not been well 
acknowledged and there have been no restrictions such as the American business 
judgment rule to protect directors from liability for their mere negligence. Under 
what circumstances a controlling shareholder will be held liable is also unclear. 
Furthermore, the high litigation costs, which are born by the plaintiff 
shareholders, will negatively affect their incentive to pursue a derivative action. 
All these problems show that Chinese law still needs to be improved in order to 
strike a balance. 
The last chapter of this book offers our conclusions. On each issue we first draw 
conclusions from the comparative study and then make suggestions for China. As 
far as the function of derivative action is concerned, we conclude that (1) 
derivative actions play different roles in all these countries; (2) their function may 
vary according to the agency problems to be solved and the type and size of the 
companies involved; and (3) derivative action is only one method in a 
comprehensive system of corporate governance. Recognizing that derivative 
action does and will continue to play a more important role in Chinese limited 
liability companies than in stock companies, we suggest that China improve the 
function of derivative action in stock companies and at the same time develop 
other mechanisms to provide better protection for minority shareholders. 
As far as this distinction is concerned, we conclude that the injury and/or right 
criteria are widely applied. However, the distinction is not always clear, especially 
in the case of owner-managed companies. Chinese law also adopts the injury 
and/or right criteria but has defects such as the fact that the substantive law on the 
rights of the minority shareholders and of the company is vague, while some 
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rights of minority shareholders are not coupled with remedies, and corporate 
management may be unjustly interfered with. Reform of these defects should be 
undertaken. 
Comparative study shows that the issue of how to strike a balance between 
corporate efficiency and protection for the company and its minority shareholders 
is key in derivative actions. It is also a comprehensive task. After studying the 
rules in Western countries, we have suggested that China should improve its law 
overall instead of in one single aspect. Such improvements would entail 
identifying the appropriate body for making a corporate litigation decision, 
introducing the business judgment rule, solving the plaintiff's incentive problem, 




Wanneer schade is toegebracht aan een vennootschap heeft als uitgangspunt te 
gelden dat de procedure tegen de veroorzaker van de schade door de vennoot-
schap moet worden gevoerd en dat eventuele schadevergoeding aan de vennoot-
schap moet worden betaald. Onder bepaalde omstandigheden (zoals bijvoorbeeld 
in het geval dat de vennootschap wordt beheerst door de veroorzaker van de scha-
de en daardoor zelf geen procedure kan beginnen) echter kan een aandeelhouder 
of een groep van minderheidsaandeelhouders van de desbetreffende vennoot-
schap op eigen naam een derivative action1 beginnen om de belangen van de ven-
nootschap en haar aandeelhouders te beschermen. Deze uitzondering op het 
beginsel <lat de vennootschap zelf schadevergoeding eist brengt nadelen met zich 
mee. Er bestaat risico op onterechte inmenging in het management van de ven-
nootschap en de aandeelhouders zijn niet altijd voldoende gemotiveerd om een 
procedure te beginnen. Gezien de voors en tegens van derivative action bestaan 
hierover uiteenlopende meningen. 
Westerse landen hanteren bovendien in de praktijk een verschillende benade-
ring van derivative action, zowel ten aanzien van de functie als de wettelijke rege-
ling ervan. Deze verschillen in benadering en de redenen voor die verschillen 
kunnen waardevolle inzichten opleveren, die kunnen bijdragen tot verbetering 
van de Chinese derivative action-wetgeving. Het rechtsvergelijkende onderzoek 
in dit boek richt zich daarom op deze inzichten. 
Het boek bestaat uit zes hoofdstukken. 
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een algemene introductie van het begrip derivative action. Het 
benoemt de kenmerken van derivative action, de voors en de tegens en geeft een 
korte beschrijving van de landen die zijn gekozen als object van het rechtsverge-
lijkende onderzoek. Tevens wordt de opzet van het onderzoek uiteengezet. In dit 
onderzoek is ervoor gekozen om Engeland, de Verenigde Staten, Duitsland en 
China te bestuderen. De drie westerse landen hebben hun eigen specifieke ken-
merken met betrekking tot derivative action, en China is het geboorteland van de 
auteur. De benadering van derivative action door deze landen is verschillend, 
maar de belangrijkste aspecten zijn hetzelfde. Het boek identificeert een aantal 
essentiele kernthema's: de functie van derivative action, hoe een derivative action 
In Nederland bestaat de 'afgeleide actie' zoals hier besproken wordt als zodanig niet, derhalve 
is er voor gekozen de term derivative action te blijven gebruiken. 
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ingesteld door aandeelhouders kan warden onderscheiden van een rechtstreekse 
vordering, hoe het evenwicht kan warden gevonden tussen cmporate efficiency 
en de bescherming van het bedrijf en zijn minderheidsaandeelhouders. Deze the-
ma's warden per land besproken. Als bepaalde tradities en de specifieke achter-
grond van landen de benadering van deze kwesties kunnen bei:nvloeden, besteedt 
het boek daar ook aandacht aan. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het Engelse recht nader bekeken. Het hoofdstuk begint met 
een introductie van het geldende Engelse recht op het gebied van derivative 
action, en bespreekt in het bijzonder de Foss v. Harbottle rule, de uitzonderingen 
daarop en de ontwikkeling ervan. Deze rule en de uitzonderingen erop zijn 
belangrijk voor het huidige vennootschapsrecht. In deze beslissing werd een aan-
tal basisprincipes van het vennootschapsrecht vastgesteld, zoals het proper plain-
tiff principle, het principe van de majority rule - <lit drukt het uitgangspunt van 
geen inmenging in cmporate management uit - en het recht van minderheids-
aandeelhouders om, onder bepaalde omstandigheden, een derivative action in te 
stellen indien er sprake is van wanbeleid. Overigens wordt over het algemeen van 
de derivative action aangenomen <lat zij is ontstaan in het Engelse recht. 
Het geldende recht met betrekking tot derivative action wordt beschouwd als 
een obscuur, ingewikkeld en achterhaald rechtsgebied vanwege de strenge voor-
waarden die worden gesteld aan de eisende partij en de van oudsher negatieve 
houding ten aanzien van derivative action. Derivative action heeft dan ook geen 
belangrijke rol gespeeld in Engeland bij het beschermen van vennootschappen en 
hun minderheidsaandeelhouders noch bij het toezicht houden op het manage-
ment. In plaats daarvan is de meest populaire oplossing voor minderheidsaan-
deelhouders, met name die in close companies, de vordering op grand van unfair 
prejudice. In het tweede gedeelte van <lit hoofdstuk wordt deze ondergeschikte rol 
van derivative action en het verband tussen derivative action en de gangbare 
oplossing van unfair prejudice nader bezien. 
In het derde gedeelte van <lit hoofdstuk wordt onderzocht op welke wijze het 
Engelse recht een derivative action van minderheidsaandeelhouders onderscheidt 
van een rechtstreekse vordering. Het verschil is belangrijk omdat de eisende aan-
deelhouder( s) die een derivative action wil instellen tegen wangedrag aan stren-
ge voorwaarden moet( en) vol do en. Het Engelse recht maakt hier gebruik van 
twee criteria om het onderscheid te duiden: het criterium van right (recht) en/of 
injury (schade/nadeel). Desondanks is het materiele recht in Engeland met 
betrekking tot de rechten van de vennootschap en de rechten van haar individuele 
aandeelhouders onduidelijk. De discussie richt zich voornamelijk op de drie 
gebieden waar het onderscheid niet helder is, namelijk schending van bepalingen 
in de statuten, breach of duty door een bestuurder en breach of duty door een 
meerderheidsaandeelhouder. 
In het vierde gedeelte van hoofdstuk 2 wordt bekeken hoe het Engelse recht 
het evenwicht probeert te vinden tussen cmporate efficiency en bescherming voor 
het bedrijf en minderheidsaandeelhouders. Zoals al eerder opgemerkt in voor-
gaande alinea's slaat in het Engelse recht de balans door naar cmporate efficien-
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cy ten koste van de bescherming van minderheidsbelangen. De belangrijkste 
wijze waarop in de op common law gebaseerde derivative action het evenwicht 
wordt gevonden bestaat uit de sh·enge (materiele en procedurele) eisen die met de 
Foss rule zijn vastgesteld. Daarbij komt <lat de rechter een belangrijke rol heeft, 
aangezien deze toestemming moet geven voordat een derivative action kan wor-
den voortgezet. 
De Eng else Companies Act wordt momenteel in zijn geheel herzien. Het wets-
voorstel, de Companies Bill, komt met een nieuwe regeling om derivative action 
te vergemakkelijken. De meest in het oog springende verandering in <lit nieuwe 
voorstel is de ruime discretionaire bevoegdheid die aan de rechter wordt toege-
kend als het gaat om het al dan niet toelaten van een derivative action. Het wets-
voorstel is echter niet bedoeld om de huidige balans tussen c01porate efficiency 
en minderheidsbelangen te veranderen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 betreft het Amerikaanse recht. Over het algemeen wordt erkend <lat 
derivative action een belangrijkere rol speelt in de Verenigde Staten dan in ande-
re landen en <lat de Amerikaanse derivative action-wetgeving verfijnde en goed 
ontwikkelde regels bevat, die enerzijds de derivative action faciliteren en ander-
zijds uitwassen beogen te voorkomen. Het hoofdstuk begint met een introductie 
van de ontwikkeling van derivative action in de Verenigde Staten. Deze ontwik-
keling kan worden ingedeeld in vier fasen en laat zien hoe het Amerikaanse recht 
het evenwicht heeft gevonden tussen c01porate efficiency en de bescherming van 
de aandeelhouders. Recentelijk begint de balans door te slaan naar efficiency. 
In het tweede gedeelte van <lit hoofdstuk wordt de rol van derivative action in de 
VS onderzocht en wordt een aantal kenmerken van deze rol vastgesteld. Ten eer-
ste is het duidelijk <lat de derivative action in de VS een belangrijke rol vervult. 
Ten tweede is die rol tegenwoordig minder groot dan in het verleden. Ten derde 
is derivative action belangrijker voor public co,porations dan voor close co,po-
rations. Overigens woeden er in de VS nog steeds discussies over wat de functie 
van derivative action zou moeten zijn. 
In het derde gedeelte van hoofdstuk 3 bekijken we hoe Amerikaans recht on-
derscheid maakt tussen verschillende vorderingen. De belangrijkste criteria zijn 
die van right/injury, maar er wordt ook gelet op andere factoren, zoals beleids-
overwegingen en repercussies van een actie, om het onderscheid vast te stellen. 
Een ander kenmerk van Amerikaans recht is de flexibele benadering die Ameri-
kaanse rechters soms hanteren als het gaat om het verschil tussen een derivative 
action en een rechtstreekse vordering in geval van close companies. Deze bena-
dering komt voort uit het bijzondere karakter van close companies. Bij schending 
van de belangen van een close c01poration door een meerderheidsaandeelhouder 
speelt het conflict zich in feite af tussen de aandeelhouders. Het werkelijke slacht-
offer is niet de vennootschap, maar de minderheidsaandeelhouders. Het resultaat 
is <lat in dergelijke gevallen no gal eens wordt uitgegaan van een rechtstreekse vor-
dering in plaats van een derivative action. De grondslag voor deze speciale bena-
dering kan van geval tot geval verschillen. Soms past de rechter een ruim injwJ1-
criterium toe, ofworden factoren als de onmogelijkheid van een derivative action 
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in geval van een close corporation of het voorkomen van ongerechtvaardigde ver-
rijking in aanmerking genomen. 
Het vierde gedeelte schetst het evenwicht <lat het Amerikaanse recht heeft 
gevonden tussen co,porate efficiency en de bescherming van de vennootschap en 
haar minderheidsaandeelhouders. Zoals eerder aangestipt bevat de Amerikaanse 
derivative action wetgeving verfijnde regels zowel ter facilitering als ter voorko-
ming van misbruik van derivative actions. De voornaamste beperkingen van het 
recht om een derivative action in te stellen zijn de business judgment rule ( deze 
begrenst het begrip 'slecht management' dat de grondslag vormt voor een derge-
lijke vordering) en de demand requirement ( dit is een procedurele vo01waarde die 
het recht van een aandeelhouder om een derivative action te beginnen onderwerpt 
aan het besluit van het management of de beslissing van de speciale procescom-
missie ). Bovendien heeft de rechter vervolgens de bevoegdheid deze beslissing te 
herzien. Overige voorwaarden zijn contemporaneous ownership en security-for-
expenses. In dit vierde deel worden nog twee andere kenmerken van het 
Amerikaanse recht gesignaleerd. Ten eerste beschermt het Amerikaanse recht 
bestuurders door het risico <lat de bestuurder wordt veroordeeld in de proceskos-
ten te beperken. Ten tweede is de populariteit van de derivative action voor een 
belangrijk deel toe te schrijven aan de advocatuur, die in de VS op no cure, no 
pay-basis mag werken. De consequentie van deze populariteit is echter dat er nog 
wel eens misbruik wordt gemaakt van de mogelijkheid om een derivative action 
in te stellen. 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt aandacht besteed aan het Duitse recht, dat een andere ach-
tergrond heeft dan het Anglo-Amerikaanse recht. Daarom wordt in het eerste 
gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk eerst deze achtergrond belicht. Achtereenvolgens 
wordt stilgestaan bij: het onderscheid tussen de twee Duitse kapitaalvennoot-
schappen (De AG, die overeenkomt met de NV, en de GmbH die correspondeert 
met de BV), de two-tier bestuursstructuur in deze vennootschappen en recente 
Duitse wetswijzigingen op het terrein van c01porate governance. Dit deel bevat 
tevens inleidende opmerkingen over de wijze waarop rechtsvorderingen van de 
vennootschap naar Duits recht geldend gemaakt kunnen worden. De regeling van 
de AG en de GmbH wordt in twee afzonderlijke wetten uitgewerkt en er zijn dan 
ook verschillende regels met betrekking tot het instellen van vorderingen ten 
behoeve van de vennootschap. Het komt erop neer dat de minderheidsaandeel-
houders van een AG een wettelijk erkend recht hebben een vordering namens de 
vennootschap in te dienen; de minderheidsaandeelhouders van een GmbH hebben 
dat recht niet. De laatsten kunnen enkel een actio pro socio beginnen. Deze actio 
is het product van jurisprudentie en wordt niet beschouwd als gelijkwaardig aan 
een derivative action. 
Het recht van minderheidsaandeelhouders om een vordering van de vennoot-
schap geldend te maken, een recht <lat inmiddels volgens het UMAG (Gesetz zur 
Unternehmensintegritat und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts) inhoudt dat 
aandeelhouders een derivative action kunnen instellen, heeft binnen het Duitse 
systeem van Duitse c01porate governance geen belangrijke rol gespeeld . Het 
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Duitse recht legt van oudsher de nadruk op een geshuctureerd systeem van checks 
and balances, in plaats van op aansprakelijkheidsregels als middel om het bestuur 
van de vennootschap ter verantwoording te roepen. In het tweede deel van het 
hoofdstuk wordt gei:llustreerd hoe de Duitse corporate governance-regels tot dus-
verre hebben gefunctioneerd. 
In het derde deel zien we hoe het Duitse recht onderscheid maakt tussen een 
derivative action van aandeelhouders (v66r invoering van het UMAG: een vor-
dering van de vennootschap) en een rechtstreekse vordering. In Duitsland wordt 
streng de hand gehouden aan de right/inju,)1 criteria. Indien de vennootschap 
schade heeft geleden is slechts een vordering ingesteld door de vennootschap of 
een derivative action mogelijk. Dit uitgangspunt betekent dat de minderheids-
aandeelhouders soms onvoldoende worden beschermd als de boosdoener een 
meerderheidsaandeelhouder is. Dit zal zich met name kunnen voordoen bij een 
GmbH, aangezien haar aandeelhouders niet beschikken over een derivative 
action. De behandeling van het verschil richt zich met name op de volgende drie 
situaties: ten eerste de situatie waarin een vernietigbaar besluit van een vennoot-
schappelijk orgaan moet worden vernietigd, ten tweede de situatie van breach of 
duty door een bestuurder, en ten derde breach of duty door een meerderheidsaan-
deelhouder. 
Ten gevolge van de invoering van het UMAG zijn de Duitse regels met betrek-
king tot het evenwicht tussen corporate efficiency en de bescherming van de ven-
nootschap en de minderheidsaandeelhouders gewijzigd. In het vierde gedeelte 
van hoofdstuk 4 worden de oude en de recente wetgeving in Duitsland nader 
onderzocht om zo de ontwikkeling van het Duitse recht te kunnen weergeven. De 
belangrijkste beperking van het vorderingsrecht van minderheidsaandeelhouders 
onder de oude wetgeving betrof het kapitaalvereiste. Om precies te zijn beston-
den er zelfs twee verschillende kapitaaldrempels. Als de aandeelhouders kozen 
voor de lage kapitaaldrempel kregen ze te maken met andere beperkingen. Zo 
moest men dan feiten aandragen ter rechtvaardiging van een ernstig vermoeden 
<lat er sprake was van oneerlijkheid of grove overtreding van wetgeving of de sta-
tuten. Daarbij kwam dat de minderheidsaandeelhouders in zo'n geval enkel de 
rechtbank konden vragen een speciale vertegenwoordiger aan te stellen die de 
bevoegdheid had om te besluiten tot het instellen van een vordering namens de 
vennootschap. Het UMAG heeft hierin grote veranderingen gebracht. Ten eerste 
is de kapitaaldrempel voor een derivative action significant verlaagd tot aandeel-
houders die gezamenlijk 1 % van het maatschappelijk kapitaal bezitten, of aande-
len met een beurs- dan wel marktwaarde van 100.000 euro. Ten tweede introdu-
ceert het UMAG de business judgment rule, waarbij - om de bestuurders van ven-
nootschappen te beschermen - de mogelijkheid van een derivative action tegen 
onbehoorlijk bestuur wordt beperkt tot gevallen van fraude en/of grove schending 
van de wet of de statuten. Ten derde voert het UMAG een procedure in twee fasen 
in om te voorkomen dat er misbruik wordt gemaakt van derivative action. In de 
eerste fase van deze procedure hebben rechters de bevoegdheid te beslissen over 
de voortzetting van een derivative action. Ten vierde kunnen de minderheidsaan-
deelhouders een vordering van de vennootschap op eigen naam geldend maken, 
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wat betekent dat nu een echte derivative action mogelijk is. Punt vijf is <lat wet-
geving met betrekking tot de veroordeling in proceskosten is veranderd waardoor 
minderheidsaandeelhouders eerder geneigd zullen zijn tot het instellen van een 
derivative action. Kort gezegd wijzen deze veranderingen op een meer welwil-
lende houding van de Duitse wetgever ten opzichte van de derivative action door 
minderheidsaandeelhouders, waardoor het Duitse recht opschuift in de richting 
van deAnglo-Amerikaanse benadering. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt het Chinese recht onder de loep genomen. In het eerste ge-
eelte van het hoofdstuk wordt gekeken naar de achtergronden van het Chinese 
recht en de geschiedenis van derivative action in China. Een bespreking van deze 
achtergronden, zoals de geschiedenis van het Chinese vennootschapsrecht, de 
kenmerken van c01porate governance-wetgeving, de grote principaal-agent-pro-
blemen in Chinese bedrijven en de situatie van minderheidsaandeelhouders, kan 
bijdragen aan een beter begrip van het Chinese recht. Het is ook van belang om 
de ontwikkeling van derivative action in China nader te bekijken. Chinese recht-
banken hadden derivative action al toegestaan, ook zonder dat hieraan enige wet-
telijke regeling ten grondslag lag, en ondanks het feit <lat het Chinese recht geba-
seerd is op de civil law traditie van gecodificeerd recht. Chinese rechters, en met 
name de rechters van de Supreme People's Court, hebben zelfs een belangrijke rol 
gespeeld bij de ontwikkeling van derivative action. 
In het tweede gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk wordt gekeken naar de rol van deri-
vative action in China. Derivative action werd officieel gei'ntroduceerd in de 
Company Law 2006; voorheen was het van weinig betekenis. Het valt nog te 
bezien of met deze invoering een verandering is ingezet. Enerzijds is derivative 
action is aan de ene kant noodzakelijk om vennootschappen en hun minderheids-
aandeelhouders te beschermen en als middel om het management van de ven-
nootschap ter verantwoording te roepen. Anderzijds kunnen specifieke Chinese 
omstandigheden, zoals het gebrek aan inhoudelijke kwaliteit bij de rechtbanken, 
de afwijzende houding ten aanzien van derivative action met betrekking tot stock 
companies (het Chinese equivalent van naamloze vennootschappen) en de hoge 
proceskosten het gebruik van derivative action belemmeren, met name als het 
gaat om stock companies vennootschappen. Ook kent de Chinese Company Law 
tekortkomingen (bijvoorbeeld het ontbreken van het beginsel van geen inmenging 
in c01porate management) die tot problemen kunnen leiden als derivative action 
op grote schaal zou worden toegepast. Desondanks plaatsen hier we de opmer-
king dat derivative action wellicht een grotere rol zou kunnen spelen voor limi-
ted liability companies (Chinese BV's) dan voor stock companies. 
Deel drie behandelt het onderscheid dat het Chinese recht maakt tussen deri-
vative action en een rechtstreekse vordering. Het is toegestaan dat een aandeel-
houder een nietigverklaring vordert van een nietig ( of vernietiging vordert van 
een vernietigbaar) besluit van de aandeelhoudersvergadering of de Raad van 
Bestuur, ongeacht of de rechten of belangen van deze aandeelhouder zijn ge-
schonden. In dergelijke gevallen is het onderscheid derhalve niet relevant, maar 
het brengt wel het probleem van onterechte inmenging in corporate management 
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met zich mee. Een aandeelhouder kan echter enkel een rechtstreekse vorde1ing tot 
schadevergoeding instellen als zijn persoonlijke belangen zijn geschonden. Dit 
betekent, <lat ook het Chinese recht, althans voor zover het vorderingen tot scha-
devergoeding betreft, gebruik maakt van het right/injwJ1-criterium. Bijkomende 
problemen in het Chinese recht zijn echter het gebrek aan duidelijkheid van het 
materiele recht ten aanzien van aandeelhoudersrechten en het feit dat bepaalde 
rechten niet geldend kunnen worden gemaakt omdat een rechtsgang ontbreekt. 
De wijze waarop in China het evenwicht wordt gezocht tussen cmporate effi-
ciency en bescherming van de vennootschap en de minderheidsaandeelhouders 
komt aan de orde in deel vier. Het belang van evenwicht tussen deze twee wordt 
erkend en de Chinese wetgever heeft een aantal stappen ondernomen om een 
evenwicht te creeren. De belangrijkste daarvan zijn procedurele beperkingen van 
het recht van minderheidsaandeelhouders om een derivative action in te stellen. 
Zo is er een standing requirement ingevoerd voor aandeelhouders in vennoot-
schappen en de demand requirement is tevens ingevoerd. Het beginsel van geen 
imnenging in c01porate management is echter niet algemeen geaccepteerd en er 
bestaan geen beperkingen zoals de Amerikaanse business judgment rule die 
bestuurders beschermt tegen vorderingen tot schadevergoeding op grond van 
enkel nalatigheid. Ook zijn de omstandigheden waaronder een aandeelhouder met 
beslissende invloed aansprakelijk kan worden gesteld niet helder. Daarbij komt 
<lat de hoge proceskosten die moeten warden voldaan door de eisende aandeel-
houders hen niet zal stimuleren tot het instellen van een derivative action. Deze 
problemen tonen aan <lat de Chinese wetgeving verdere verbetering behoeft ten-
einde een goed evenwicht te vinden. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk van het boek bevat de conclusies van het onderzoek. Per 
onderwerp komen eerst de conclusies van het vergelijkende onderzoek aan bod, 
waarna voorstellen volgen tot verbetering van het Chinese recht. Wat de rol van 
derivative action betreft, zijn onze bevindingen <lat (1) derivative action ver-
schillende functies heeft in de besproken landen; (2) deze functie afhankelijk is 
van de principaal-agent-problemen die opgelost moeten warden en tevens van de 
ondernemingsvorm en haar omvang; (3) derivative action vormt enkel een onder-
deel van het geheel van regels met betrekking tot co1porate governance. Hoewel 
derivative action een belangrijkere rol zal blijven spelen voor aandeelhouders van 
limited liability companies dan voor aandeelhouders van stock companies, zou 
China er toch goed aan doen de rol van derivative action te verbeteren ten aan-
zien van stock companies en tevens andere instrumenten in te voeren met het oog 
op een betere bescherming van minderheidsaandeelhouders. 
Wat betreft het onderscheid tussen derivative action en een rechtstreekse vor-
dering is onze conclusie dat het injwylright-criterium breed wordt toegepast. 
Desondanks is het onderscheid niet altijd duidelijk, met name niet in geval van 
vennootschappen die worden bestuurd door de aandeelhouder. Het injwylright-
criterium is overgenomen in het Chinese recht, maar brengt problemen met zich 
mee. In China ontbreekt het aan materieel recht <lat de rechten van minderheids-
aandeelhouders en de vennootschap regelt, en soms bestaat er geen rechtsgang, al 
335 
SAMENVATTING 
zijn er wel rechten toegekend aan minderheidsaandeelhouders. Bovendien bestaat 
er een risico op onterechte inmenging in c01porate management. Aan deze tekort-
komingen zal moeten warden gewerkt. 
Ons vergelijkend onderzoek toont aan dat de sleutel van een goede regeling 
van derivative action Iigt in het vinden van evenwicht tussen c01porate efficien-
cy en de bescherming van de vennootschap en haar minderheidsaandeelhouders. 
Dit is een complexe taak. Gezien onze bevindingen met betrekking tot de regel-
geving in Westerse landen stellen wij voor <lat China de regels met betrekking tot 
derivative action niet op een specifiek punt verbetert, maar deze in hun geheel 
hervormt. Verbeteringen die in <lit onderzoek warden voorgesteld zijn: de aan-
wijzing van het orgaan <lat bevoegd is om te beslissen tot het instellen van een 
corporate claim, de invoering van de business judgment rule, het oplossen van het 
probleem <lat een stimulans voor aandeelhouders om tot derivative action over te 
gaan ontbreekt en het verbeteren van de demand requirement. 
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